And let's go back to the analysis near the time UN 1441 was crafted:
PART ONE
An Analysis of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
as Adopted on November 8, 2002
The Security Council, Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,
Phyllis Bennis, fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and author of the new book Before and After: U.S. Foreign Policy and the September 11th Crisis: "According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'if Iraq violates this resolution and fails to comply, then the Council has to take into immediate consideration what should be done about that, while the United States and other like-minded nations might take a judgment about what we might do about it if the Council chooses not to act.' In other words, if the Council decision does not match what the Bush administration has unilaterally decided, Washington will implement its own decision regardless. This represents a thoroughly instrumentalized view of the United Nations that its relevance and authority are defined by and limited to its proximity to Washington's positions."
Denis Halliday, a former UN Assistant Secretary General who headed of the UN's food-for-oil program in Iraq: "Have we really bought the fiction, the Washington propaganda, that Iraq is a threat? We all know -- the issue is oil, oil and more oil. And U.S. control thereof. The new resolution of the UN Security Council is a charade, a device to obscure. Nevertheless it is transparent enough that one can point out the trip wires, hoops and hurdles (combined with dangerous ambiguity) placed so that Iraq must inevitably fail to avoid material breach. Then the Bush war can begin nicely covered in UN respectability -- although of course it has already begun, what with the 12 years of deadly embargo, the no-fly zone bombings and now placement of army, navy and air force resources on the ground in the Gulf, Kuwait, etc. Just as in the U.S. military preparations in advance of the 1990 Kuwait invasion, the U.S. is again in training and ready to go -- having set up Baghdad yet again. The resolution is little more than a sop to other member states and a response to the domestic pressures that took Bush to the General Assembly in September when he outrageously threatened the entire membership. Pressure on Baghdad to comply will not prevent war -- only intense pressure on the Bush regime might. To pretend this resolution represents progress, or is hopeful, or a move in the right direction strikes me as naive and dangerous."
James Paul, executive director of the Global Policy Forum which monitors global policy-making at the United Nations, is the author of a series of papers including "Iraq: the Struggle for Oil": "This resolution takes a hard-line approach that will almost certainly lead to war. Thirteen members of the Security Council were opposed to this resolution or deeply skeptical, but Washington used intense pressure and eventually bent them to its will. The U.S. used hardball diplomacy of the type deployed to gain the first Gulf War resolution in 1990. The Secretary of State at that time, James Baker, later described in his autobiography how he lined up votes for resolution 678: 'I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy.'" [For other recent quotes from Paul, see: www.accuracy.org/press_releases/PR092402.htm, www.accuracy.org/press_releases/PR100202.htm]
Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law: "In 1990, France, the Soviet Union and China all sold Iraq out at the Security Council?. Russia can be bought by getting admitted to the WTO and being given a free hand on Georgia and Chechnya, as well as having its oil interests guaranteed in Iraq. China wants an end to proposed high-tech U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan. France wants its oil interests in Iraq protected, as well as its sphere of influence in Francophone Africa respected. The serious bargaining has yet to begin. Meanwhile, Kofi Annan plays the role of Pontius Pilate. Remember that under the UN Charter, the UN Secretary General is not supposed to be an errand boy for the Permanent 5. And yet he is. The bottom line here is that the Bush Jr. administration originally sought and has now failed to obtain the same language from the UN Security Council that the Bush Sr. administration obtained in resolution 679 (1990), authorizing UN Member States 'to use all necessary means' to expel Iraq from Kuwait. So a unilateral attack by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq without further authorization from the Security Council would still remain illegal and therefore constitute aggression. In recognition of this fact, British government officials are already reportedly fearful of prosecution by the International Criminal Court. And the Bush Jr. administration is doing everything humanly possible to sabotage the ICC in order to avoid any prospect of ICC prosecution of high-level U.S. government officials over a war against Iraq. Lawyers call this 'consciousness of guilt.'"
Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,
Glen Rangwala, lecturer in politics at Cambridge University, UK: "The new reference to 1382, the only resolution mentioned in this paragraph and unmentioned in the previous drafts, is puzzling. Its renewal of the oil-for-food program expired in May 2002 and has been supplanted by 1409 (2002), so the implementation clause is not a commitment to continue the oil-for-food program. Resolution 1382 does not commit the Council to lift economic sanctions -- either the import or the export prohibition -- upon Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations: preambular paragraph 2 of 1382 only lists compliance in disarmament as a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the lifting of sanctions. It is possible that Council members have been mis-sold this part of the resolution. According to reports, certain Council members wanted to relink Iraq's effective and verifiable disarmament to the lifting of sanctions. The U.S. and U.K. may present this preambular paragraph as a concession to this argument, but in reality it is no concession at all." [Resolution 687 called for economic sanctions to be lifted when Iraq complied with weapons inspector, but the U.S. government has repeatedly stated it would not abide by this, see: www.accuracy.org/iraq]
Recognizing the threat Iraq's noncompliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,
Jim Jennings, president of Conscience International, a humanitarian aid organization that has worked in Iraq since 1991: "The preamble alone provides several possible reasons to attack Iraq irrespective of the operative articles in the body of the resolution. It refers to previous war powers resolutions and reiterates the use of 'all necessary means' to achieve Security Council objectives. It assumes that Iraq is already guilty of proliferation of WMD and has developed prohibited classes of long-range missiles, without reference to UNSCOM's having dealt effectively with these issues in the past. It is illogical to assume the truth of allegations UNMOVIC was designed to investigate, when the new inspection regime has not yet taken the field."
Rahul Mahajan, author of The New Crusade: America's War on Terrorism: "Claims of a threat posed by Iraq to international peace and security are entirely untenable. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet refuted Bush's claims in a letter to the Senate, where he said clearly the threat of an Iraqi WMD attack was virtually nonexistent, except possibly in the eventuality of a U.S. war for 'regime change.' Nobody claims Iraq has nuclear weapons, nobody has produced any evidence that Iraq is capable of weaponizing biological agents, and it's quite clear that Iraq can have no more than a nominal chemical weapons capability. When Tony Blair produced a dossier purporting to establish the Iraqi threat, the Labor Party produced a counter-dossier and Glen Rangwala produced notes further to the counter-dossier. Blair is nominally of the Labor Party, and the CIA is part of the Executive Branch, so Bush and Blair can't even get their own people to back up this absurd claim. Even if Iraq had any WMD capacity, nobody has explained why it would risk certain, massive retribution if it either attacked directly or gave weapons to any terrorist organization." [More about this is available at: www.accuracy.org/bush]
Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,
Rangwala: "This paragraph is a clear attempt to provide post hoc legal justification for the bombing of Iraq since 1991. It suggests that resolution 678 authorized the use of force to implement all resolutions on Iraq from 1990 to the present day. This is clearly untrue: 678 only justifies the use of force to implement resolutions on Iraq passed between 2 August and 29 November 1990. This is a position that has been repeated by Council members ad nauseum since 1991, with no state but the U.K. and U.S. holding anything other than a literal and meaningful construction of 678."
Mahajan: "The invocation of resolution 678 here is another step in the absurd attempt to claim that 678 somehow justified all use of force against Iraq for all time, if it's in aid of enforcing Security Council resolutions. This would include a claim that 678 justified the imposition of the 'no-fly zones,' a novel claim that no previous administration managed to come up with. Although 678 authorized 'all necessary means' to uphold 660 and 'all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660,' the only reasonable interpretation of the language is to mean all subsequent resolutions up to the time that 678 was passed, not all resolutions for all time to come."
Ratner: "It makes no sense, legal or otherwise, to claim that an earlier resolution can authorize the use of force to enforce subsequent resolutions"
Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,
Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,
Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,
Jennings: "The preamble deplores the fact that Iraq ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM, but does not indicate why this happened, i.e. confirmed cases of intrusive espionage, which surely would be of concern if the Security Council were genuinely interested in establishing a level playing field for UNMOVIC's operations."
Sam Husseini, communications director of the Institute for Public Accuracy: "UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq by issuing a trumped-up report which provided a pretext for the U.S. bombing campaign Desert Fox in December 1998. Some may recall this occurred on the eve of President Clinton's scheduled impeachment vote. UNSCOM was not only used for espionage, but also as an excuse for bombing. It delegitimized itself as an instrument of weapons inspections. For the Security Council to now one-sidedly blame Iraq for not cooperating with UNSCOM is absurd." [See: www.accuracy.org/articles/twisted-policy.html]
Mahajan: "Although it's true that Iraq has repeatedly restricted access, its degree of compliance is very high -- far higher than the compliance of most nations with regard to binding decisions like Security Council resolutions or judgments of the International Court of Justice. Israel, for example, is in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions with no attempt at progress toward compliance [www.fpif.org/commentary/2002/0210unres.html]. The United States vetoes Security Council resolutions directed against it, as it did with a resolution against its invasion of Panama, and it completely ignored a ruling by the International Court of Justice to cease its terrorist operations against Nicaragua and to pay $17 billion in restitution."
Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,
Husseini: "This is fundamentally false. It implies that the suffering of the Iraqi people is because of Iraq's non-compliance with the weapons inspectors. That is not true. Contrary to what is stipulated in 687, the U.S. government has repeatedly stated that it would continue the economic sanctions even if Iraq were to fully comply with the weapons inspectors. This means the U.S. policy over the last decade gave a disincentive for Iraqi compliance with the weapons inspectors and ensured an indefinite continuation of the devastating economic sanctions with no legitimate cause." [See: "Autopsy of a Disaster: The U.S. Sanctions Policy on Iraq"]
Rangwala: "This is a pure fabrication: the Council has not made 'repeated demands' that Iraq comply with UNMOVIC, it has only made one such demand, in resolution 1284 (1999). No resolution subsequent to its creation even mentions UNMOVIC."
Jennings: "The document goes on record as 'regretting the suffering of the Iraqi people.' One would think that the authors of the resolution were declining attendance at an afternoon tea party rather than admitting complicity in draconian sanctions which have caused the unnecessary death of hundreds of thousands of human beings."
Ratner: "To blame the suffering of the Iraqi people on Iraq is to rewrite history and let the U.S. off the hook. The United States has repeatedly refused to modify the embargo despite efforts by Russia and France to step down the embargo as a result of Iraqi compliance with the inspections of its alleged nuclear weapons research."
Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,
Rangwala: "By incorporating mention of 688 and regarding Iraq 'ending repression of its civilian population' into a resolution setting out the new standard for Iraqi compliance, the U.S. and U.K. may be leaving the way open to claim that Iraq is not in compliance with the new resolution, even if there is full progress on the disarmament agenda. It is worth noting that the Council has not made reference to 688 in its previous resolutions on Iraq's disarmament -- for example, 1284, establishing UNMOVIC, does not mention 688. That there has now been a change of U.S.-UK policy in this regard is an immediate cause for concern."
Jennings: "The allegation of involvement in unspecified 'terrorism' is in itself a possible pretext for war in the current tense political and military climate. If the claim has any substance, it should be detailed in full. If not, it should be abandoned. Perhaps the U.S. Department of State should read the CIA's report, which downplayed this charge against Iraq. The claim that Iraq has 'failed to comply ... in providing access by international humanitarian organizations to all of those in need of assistance in Iraq' is not strictly true. International assistance agencies have had remarkable access to the entire country for years and a high degree of cooperation from Iraqi officialdom. The word 'all' apparently refers to internally displaced persons, and to prisoners. It would be more accurate to say that certain international organizations, such as the Red Cross, have not been granted access to certain groups of persons, such as prisoners, who may need humanitarian assistance. However, it is not clear that this right is granted to international organizations under the UN Charter or existing resolutions, or that any entity other than the government of Iraq has the mandate or responsibility to help 'all' those in need of assistance within the country. In fact, the UN and other agencies have expressly not been able to help everybody who needs help, even if they wanted to, because of budget restraints and the vast amount of need. Iraq's recent wholesale release of prisoners may have been an attempt to address this issue and remove it as a pretext for war."
Mahajan: "Iraq has made numerous significant moves to return Kuwaiti property, recently concluding an agreement to return part of the Kuwaiti National Archives. There is no evidence that Iraq has not fully complied with obligations to account for Kuwaiti and third country nationals. It's quite likely that at least some of them were charred beyond recognition by U.S. forces in the so-called 'Highway of Death' massacre, and that Iraq would have no way of accounting for them?. Most serious is the insertion of a claim that Iraq has not complied with its 687 commitments to end support for international terrorism. Without more specifics, this is just more innuendo of the kind the Bush administration has repeatedly used to try to connect Iraq with the 9/11 attacks even in the absence of any evidence. One of the few concrete claims made is that Iraq was involved in a supposed plot to assassinate ex-President Bush when he visited Kuwait in 1993. This claim has been thoroughly debunked, by Seymour Hersh among others. The evidence for it was so poor that U.S. officials were reduced to claiming that certain electronic components found in a bomb had a unique signature showing they were Iraqi in origin, while experts said the same construction was widely available in mass-produced transistor radios and similar products."
Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,
Rangwala: "This is an even more egregious re-writing of history than those cited above: the draft resolution simply misquotes the Security Council's earlier resolution. The ceasefire was not based on Iraq's acceptance of the provisions of resolution 687: it was based on 'official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance' of that resolution (resolution 687, para. 33). The difference is highly significant: the U.S.-U.K. draft text implies that the ceasefire would no longer be operative if Iraq is taken by them as no longer accepting its full disarmament obligations, thus leaving open the justification to use force against Iraq without further Council authorization. The ceasefire is thus portrayed as continually conditional upon Iraqi compliance. This is contrary to the position of every other Council member since 1991: this consistent position has been that the ceasefire can only be terminated if there is new Council authorization to use force. Through this paragraph, the U.S.-U.K. are attempting to award themselves the legal right to use force if they alone perceive Iraq as non-compliant; the abandonment of the specific authorization to use force that was in earlier drafts is thus resuscitated in an oblique but legally equivalent form here." |
