PART THREE:
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998);
Rangwala: "This provision does away with resolution 1154, which endorsed the memorandum of understanding that created special procedures for the inspection of eight defined and delineated Presidential sites. It firstly causes a new and unnecessary arena for conflict between the UN and the government of Iraq. Secondly it demonstrates that agreements with the UN are without legitimacy, in that one party to the agreement has acquired a habit of nullifying them when it no longer suits its interests. For the UN to abandon the standards of legality in its own resolutions would be to cast a grave aspersion on the United Nations and the fabric of international law."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;
-- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient UN security guards;
Rangwala: "There is no description of the number or composition of these 'guards.' Iraq is being asked to accept a resolution that permits a foreign military presence on its soil, without knowing the nature of that military presence."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;
Mahajan: "Because the U.S. has gotten so much Security Council opposition, an initial draft that was tailored to be a Rambouillet-style demand for effectively unlimited military occupation, which neither Iraq nor any other sovereign nation could accept, has been dramatically watered down. The provision for ground and air 'exclusion zones' was one of the key elements of that approach, and it has been retained. If UNMOVIC construes this power broadly enough, it will be an intolerable imposition of the kind that Iraq could not accept. Since Hans Blix has been cooperating closely with the United States, even allowing the U.S. to keep him from sending inspectors back to Iraq, it's not clear the UNMOVIC will be any more independent of U.S. policy considerations than UNSCOM was."
Rangwala: "With this provision UNMOVIC could declare large areas of Iraq to be 'exclusion zones' for an indefinite period of time. Limitations on the authority of inspectors need to be worked into the resolution to preserve a sense of the inspectors' legitimate role, with an obligation imposed on the inspectorate to limit the use of this measure to the environs of specific buildings and only for the duration of a specific inspection. Without such a provision, long-term cooperation between the parties is likely to be subject to periodic crises that would threaten to derail the on-going work of the inspectorate."
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and
-- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;
Bennis: "The clear language, as written, would allow inspectors to seize and 'export' anything they come across in the course of doing inspections -- trucks, computers, carpets -- whether or not it has anything to do with prohibited materials or prohibited WMD or missile programs."
Mahajan: "One of the problems with UNSCOM is that it committed espionage, often involving leaving monitoring equipment behind in places that had been inspected. This provision seems like a way to make sure that UNMOVIC inspectors could also smuggle such equipment into inspected sites."
8. Decides further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;
Jennings: "Article 8 in effect demands unconditional surrender of Iraq, a demand not pressed on Iraq during the 1991 post-war cease fire negotiations conducted at Safwan by Gen. Schwarzkopf. Iraq must 'not threaten hostile acts.' The presence of armed guards at any site, or merely slowing or stopping vehicles for normal checks, might be taken as such a threat. This language places the entire UNMOVIC process in Iraq on a hair trigger war alert. It is difficult to see how conflicts can be avoided under these circumstances."
Bennis: "This language is aimed at demanding Iraqi compliance with the U.S.-British air patrols and bombings going on in the so-called 'no-fly' zones. Neither creation or military enforcement of those zones was ever authorized by the United Nations; no UN resolution before this one ever even mentioned 'no-fly' zones. This section would serve to legitimize the 11-year-long illegal U.S.-British imposition of 'no-fly' zones, and the four-year-long illegal bombing raids carried out there. The U.S. claims that those bombing raids, and the imposition of the zones themselves, are to 'enforce' UN resolutions -- specifically 688, which calls on Iraq to protect the human rights of various communities. But in fact the bombing is without any actual UN authorization. So far the Security Council has never called the U.S. and Britain to account for their illegal actions; this language serves to legalize those actions instead. While not specifying what would constitute 'any member state taking action to uphold any Security Council resolution,' it clearly demands that Iraq allow any action -- including illegal military actions -- that the U.S. or another country claim is designed to enforce a resolution. It also denies the reality that not all Council resolutions may be enforced with military force at all, even if the Council itself makes the decision. Only resolutions specifically passed under the terms of Chapter VII can lead to the use of force. Resolution 688 was not passed under Chapter VII; quite the contrary, it reaffirms 'the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq.'"
9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
Bennis: "Because there is no specified consequence here for a potential Iraqi delay, it is likely the U.S. will interpret this section as authorizing immediate and unilateral military force. No such force would be appropriate, but there is a history of usurpation of such language."
10. Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;
Jennings: "Article 10 blandly invites member states to contribute intelligence and suggest locations for inspections. In addition to potentially causing the process to continue endlessly, the provision can be construed as formalizing another open season for spying on Iraq by its enemies, which is exactly how UNSCOM got in trouble earlier."
Bennis: "This implies that UNMOVIC must share its actual findings and raw data with 'the Council,' meaning intelligence operatives from Council member states, including those pledged to overthrow the Iraqi regime (such as the U.S.). When UNMOVIC was created, its director made clear that his view of intelligence sharing was that it could only be 'one way' -- meaning member states could provide UNMOVIC with information to assist their inspection work, but UNMOVIC would not provide reciprocity to national intelligence agencies. That would, he rightly recognized, repeat the disaster of UNSCOM's unauthorized sharing of intelligence material with U.S. intelligence agencies. Calling here for UNMOVIC to report 'the results' of its interviews and data to the Council indicates a clear U.S. intention to gain access to UNMOVIC and IAEA data."
11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
Jennings: "Article 11 fails to explain what constitutes 'any interference,' leading to the possibility that a misunderstanding could become a reason for going to war.
12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;
Ratner: "It could be argued that this is the second-stage meeting France and Russia desired and that the consequences of a breach are to be decided by the Security Council. But, by this time, such a meeting may not have any efficacy in stopping the U.S. from making unilateral war. Suppose the Council decides it does not think force is appropriate or reaches no decision -- deciding, for example, that Iraq has sufficiently complied. The U.S. might still go to war. It will argue that the Council has already decided that Iraq was in material breach of past resolutions and that any infraction of the current resolution was a 'material breach.' This gives the U.S. all the ammunition it claims it needs for the authority to go to war against Iraq under its theory that the ceasefire is no longer in effect and that the 1990 use of force resolution governs."
Jennings: "Article 12 is actually the war empowerment part of the resolution. It does say that the Council will convene. In the absence of 'full compliance,' the wording directly [in the next paragraph] mentions 'serious consequences.' If such a meeting is held, the Security Council will in effect have a gun to its head, since the U.S. administration has already stated that if the UN fails to act, the U.S. will act unilaterally."
Bennis: "This clear language should prohibit any country -- including the United States -- from acting unilaterally in response to any perceived Iraqi obstruction. However, given Bush administration officials' consistent claim that they need 'no further' UN resolutions to authorize the use of force 'to enforce' UN resolutions, it is highly doubtful that Washington intends to adhere to this language. The inclusion of the reference 'in order to restore international peace and security' is a code for proceeding immediately to using force, whether or not authorized by a new 'consideration of the situation.' It is certain the Bush administration will point to this reference if they choose to go to war without actual Council consent. The fact that they specifically do not call for an actual formal meeting of the Council, and do not call for a new resolution or new decision, but only the informal call 'to convene' implies a lack of seriousness about the right of the Council alone to determine sufficiency of compliance and possible consequences."
13. Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;
Bennis: "The problem is how to define the consequences. Washington uses the term to refer explicitly to military force; for this reason, France and Russia have objected to the use of the term in the new Council resolution. In 1998, when the UN Security Council passed a resolution endorsing Kofi Annan's negotiated stand-down with Iraq, the resolution called for 'severest consequences.' At that time, every Council ambassador except that of the U.S. said explicitly that use of the term did not constitute an automatic authorization of the use of force for any country or group of countries. It did not, they said, include what the Russian ambassador called 'automaticity.' The U.S. ambassador, Bill Richardson, alone of all the Council, said, 'we think it does' authorize immediate unilateral use of force."
Jennings: "The word 'consequences' used in this paragraph is a code word for war. It is not at all clear that war is warranted over major or minor disputes that may arise over interpretations of Security Council resolutions. This paragraph prejudges the outcome. It would be better for the international community to wait and see if any degree of non-cooperation by Iraq warrants even thinking of going to war. It is eminently possible that such a drastic step, which the U.S. President claims is the last thing he wants to do, would not be desirable or necessary in any case."
Paul: "The multi-speak coming from Washington allows the allied leaders, and especially the P-5 [Permanent 5] governments, to put a good face on the deal they are striking with Washington. They don't want it to appear that war is 'automatic.' But everyone understands that war is very probable if not inevitable and that the new resolution paves the way for Washington. If it is not so, why are there emergency plans already in full gear to evacuate non-Iraqis from Iraq, to set up refugee camps for those displaced by the fighting, to rush in food to the starving Iraqi population and (most importantly) to seize and administer the Iraqi oil fields under a U.S. military government. Studies about the legal implications of this latter have been made and it appears that the U.S. will be able to pay for its war and occupation out of the seized oil production, according to sympathetic interpretations of relevant international law. Washington ran a 'profit' on the 1991 war, as they extracted more in 'contributions' from Kuwait, Saudi, Japan, Germany and others than they actually spent (the term 'profit' was used humorously in Washington at the time). Now perhaps they are going to run a 'profit' again! But, obviously, George is not talking about that aspect of things!"
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Bennis: "This is a fundamental point of principle -- it means that the issue of Iraqi requirements and Iraqi compliance remains on the Security Council's agenda, and only the Council itself can make decisions as to future interpretation or enforcement."
Ratner: "We must not forget what this resolution does not do. It does not authorize the United States to go to war against Iraq. Despite claims to the contrary by the United States, that can only happen by means of a second resolution. The U.N. Charter requires specific and unambiguous authorization for the use of force; it is for the Security Council and not the United States to decide the consequences of any failure to implement resolutions."
Majahan: "This makes it unequivocally clear that this resolution would not give the United States the right of unilateral military action. In the past, the U.S. has claimed that 688, which calls on states to help in humanitarian efforts to aid 'minority' groups in Iraq (the Shia are actually a majority) and is not a Chapter VII resolution (i.e. cannot authorize use of force), authorized it to create the 'no-fly zones' and carry out its regular bombing attacks in the course of enforcing those zones. Once again, it's likely that the U.S. will claim this resolution does provide authorization for war, and it will be important to point out that it does not."
[This analysis was compiled by the Institute for Public Accuracy on November 13, 2002.]
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