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To: The Duke of URL© who wrote (173439)3/11/2003 1:17:04 PM
From: hueyone  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 186894
 
More good stuff from this year's BRK Annual Report, including a little background on the history of accounting for stock options:

The Chicago Tribune ran a four-part series on Arthur Andersen last September that did a great job of illuminating how accounting standards and audit quality have eroded in recent years. A few decades ago, an Arthur Andersen audit opinion was the gold standard of the profession. Within the firm, an elite Professional Standards Group (PSG) insisted on honest reporting, no matter what pressures were applied by the client. Sticking to these principles, the PSG took a stand in 1992 that the cost of stock options should be recorded as the expense it clearly was. The PSG’s position was reversed, however, by the “rainmaking” partners of Andersen who knew what their clients wanted – higher reported earnings no matter what the reality. Many CEOs also fought expensing because they knew that the obscene megagrants of options they craved would be slashed if the true costs of these had to be recorded.

Soon after the Andersen reversal, the independent accounting standards board (FASB) voted 7-0 for expensing options. Predictably, the major auditing firms and an army of CEOs stormed Washington to pressure the Senate – what better institution to decide accounting questions? – into castrating the FASB. The voices of the protesters were amplified by their large political contributions, usually made with corporate money belonging to the very owners about to be bamboozled. It was not a sight for a civics class.

To its shame, the Senate voted 88-9 against expensing. Several prominent Senators even called for the demise of the FASB if it didn’t abandon its position. (So much for independence.) Arthur Levitt, Jr., then Chairman of the SEC – and generally a vigilant champion of shareholders – has since described his reluctan bowing to Congressional and corporate pressures as the act of his chairmanship that he most regrets. (The details of this sordid affair are related in Levitt’s excellent book, Take on the Street.)

With the Senate in its pocket and the SEC outgunned, corporate America knew that it was now boss when it came to accounting. With that, a new era of anything-goes earnings reports – blessed and, in some cases, encouraged by big-name auditors – was launched. The licentious behavior that followed quickly became an air pump for The Great Bubble.
After being threatened by the Senate, FASB backed off its original position and adopted an “honor system” approach, declaring expensing to be preferable but also allowing companies to ignore the cost if they wished. The disheartening result: Of the 500 companies in the S&P, 498 adopted the method deemed less desirable, which of course let them report higher “earnings.” Compensation-hungry CEOs loved this outcome: Let FASB have the honor; they had the system.

In our 1992 annual report, discussing the unseemly and self-serving behavior of so many CEOs, I said “the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society – about which it may have much of value to say – when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.” That loss of credibility has occurred. The job of CEOs is now to regain America’s trust – and for the country’s sake it’s important that they do so. They will not succeed in this endeavor, however, by way of
fatuous ads, meaningless policy statements, or structural changes of boards and committees. Instead, CEOs must embrace stewardship as a way of life and treat their owners as partners, not patsies. It’s time for CEOs to walk the walk.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Three suggestions for investors: First, beware of companies displaying weak accounting. If a company still does not expense options, or if its pension assumptions are fanciful, watch out. When managements take the low road in aspects that are visible, it is likely they are following a similar path behind the scenes. There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen.

Trumpeting EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is a particularly pernicious practice. Doing so implies that depreciation is not truly an expense, given that it is a “non-cash” charge. That’s nonsense. In truth, depreciation is a particularly unattractive expense because the cash outlay it represents is paid up front, before the asset acquired has delivered any benefits to the business. Imagine, if
you will, that at the beginning of this year a company paid all of its employees for the next ten years of their service (in the way they would lay out cash for a fixed asset to be useful for ten years). In the following nine years, compensation would be a “non-cash” expense – a reduction of a prepaid compensation asset established this year. Would anyone care to argue that the recording of the expense in years two through ten
would be simply a bookkeeping formality?

Second, unintelligible footnotes usually indicate untrustworthy management. If you can’t understand a footnote or other managerial explanation, it’s usually because the CEO doesn’t want you to. Enron’s descriptions of certain transactions still baffle me.

Finally, be suspicious of companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a tranquil, no-surprise environment, and earnings simply don’t advance smoothly (except, of course, in the offering books of investment bankers). Charlie and I not only don’t know today what our businesses will earn next year – we don’t even know what they will earn next quarter. We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know the future – and we become downright incredulous if they consistently reach their declared targets. Managers that always promise to “make the numbers” will at some point be tempted to make up the numbers.



To: The Duke of URL© who wrote (173439)3/11/2003 7:54:22 PM
From: hueyone  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 186894
 
Here is an excellent Op-Ed from the Wall Street Journal written by some prominent finance guys: Mr. Bodie is a professor of finance at the Boston University School of Management. Messrs. Kaplan and Merton are professors of accounting and finance, respectively, at Harvard Business School. Mr. Merton won the Nobel Prize in 1997 for his work on option pricing.

online.wsj.com

Options Should Be Reflected
In the Bottom Line

By ZVI BODIE, ROBERT S. KAPLAN and ROBERT C. MERTON

There are some issues on which accounting and finance professors disagree, but the expensing of employee stock options is not one of them. Despite the pronouncements of a few renegades in our disciplines, we believe there is near unanimity of opinion among scholars in the fields of accounting and finance that the value of employee stock options should be expensed on a firm's income statement at the time they are granted.

The reasons are clear.

Stock options have a market price, so when a company grants options to employees, the company has given up something that has considerable value. This value is the amount the company would have received had these same options been underwritten and sold for cash in a competitive options market. Indeed, Coca-Cola recently led the way when it announced plans to expense employee stock options using competitive bids from investment banks to compute the cost of its options.

Even when a company's options are not traded directly in a market, their approximate price can be inferred from the prices of other securities that are traded in markets. Analysts use mathematical models and formulas to estimate the prices of all types of options. In this respect, options are no different from any other class of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, mortgages, and widely-traded derivative securities.

Sometimes analysts' models provide only a rough estimate of the "true" market value of a nontraded asset. Nevertheless these estimates are used every day to settle transactions involving the payment of billions of dollars, such as in a merger or acquisition.

When a company issues securities whose value can be reasonably determined, accounting principles require that this value be recorded in the company's financial statements. Yet many executives, venture capitalists, politicians, journalists, and even some professional economists have voiced their opposition to proposals that companies reflect the cost of employee stock options on their income statements. We think their arguments make one or more errors in reasoning.

First, some argue that grants of stock options do not involve cash outlays, and therefore no expense should be recorded. This reasoning violates the basic accrual principle of accounting. Not every cash outflow is recorded as an expense in the period in which it occurs, nor does every expense recognized in a period involve a cash outflow. For example, when a company compensates employees by making outright grants of stock or promising future pension benefits, no cash outflows occur. Yet the company would record, as compensation expense, the value of the stock granted or the present value of the pension benefit promised. Stock-option grants should receive comparable treatment.

A second error is to argue that the expensing of stock options would be double counting because the diluting effect of granting the options is recognized by an increase in the number of shares in the denominator of a fully-diluted earnings per share calculation. But by extension this argument would apply to shares of stock granted to employees as well as to stock options. If accepted, companies could issue stock in lieu of salary to employees, ignore the value of the stock issued, and just record the increase in the number of shares outstanding. This erroneous argument would also enable a company to issue stock options to, say, a supplier of materials or energy, and not record the materials or energy consumed as an expense because the effect would show up in the higher number of shares in an earnings-per-share calculation. Curious reasoning.

Third, some argue that employee stock options are worth less than publicly traded options because employees do not gain full ownership of the shares for several years (called the vesting period) and the company may place restrictions on employees' selling their options. But a firm's financial report reflects the perspective of the firm and its shareholders, not the entities with which it contracts. This principle is so fundamental that it is usually taught on the first day of an introductory accounting course. Therefore, the value of the stock option to the company is its cost -- the cash forgone by granting the options to an employee rather than selling them to external investors -- not its value to the person who receives it.

Finally, some opponents of expensing employee stock options make two arguments that actually conflict with each other. First, they claim that it is enough to disclose the information in the footnotes to corporate financial statements as is done now. And second, they claim that to require that options be expensed would hurt companies, particularly high-tech firms that rely heavily on options as a form of compensation. But if deducting the expenses of options that are already disclosed in footnotes would drive a company's stock price down, then we have proof that the disclosure alone was inadequate to capture the underlying economic reality.

The accounting for employee stock options on a firm's income statement should be decided according to economic and accounting principles, not by dubious rationalizations. If the following true-or-false question appeared on an accounting exam, the answer is quite clear: Employee stock options should be expensed on a firm's income statement. True.

Mr. Bodie is a professor of finance at the Boston University School of Management. Messrs. Kaplan and Merton are professors of accounting and finance, respectively, at Harvard Business School. Mr. Merton won the Nobel Prize in 1997 for his work on option pricing.

Updated August 1, 2002 1:05 p.m. EDT