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To: GST who wrote (154164)3/13/2003 3:18:59 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 164684
 
How could oil not lie behind Bush’s push for the conquest of Iraq?

globalpublicmedia.com
globalpublicmedia.com
globalpublicmedia.com SIMMONS&origin=/INTERVIEWS/MATT.SIMMONS/index.php&transcript=2003/02/MattSimmons.02-3.2003-02-10

Could oil really lie behind Bush’s push to unseat Saddam Hussein? Perhaps we should rephrase this question: How could oil not lie behind Bush’s push for the conquest of Iraq?

Iraq

Even unnamed senior US defense officials are stating that the plan is to take the oil fields as quickly as possible, supposedly to protect them from Saddam.5 British troops will be used to seize the oil fields so as to thwart the appearance of a US oil grab. However, ExxonMobil is in the lead position for rehabilitating the Iraqi oil fields. Oil executives are quoted as saying there is a desperate need to find another 80 million barrels per day to meet growing oil demand.6 Might we add that this growing demand cannot be met elsewhere because of the abovementioned lack of spare capacity.
Even after seizing Iraq’s oil fields and quelling unrest throughout the country, the oil majors will find it very difficult to increase Iraqi oil production in the short term. They may even have to cut production from its current level, as Iraq has been using unsound methods to pump the amount of oil which they are currently generating. Before the 1991 Gulf War and the decade long Iraq-Iran War, Iraq was pumping an average of 3.5 million barrels per day (b/d). 7 In 2001, Iraq averaged 2.45 million b/d, and experts say their current sustainable production capacity could go no higher than 2.8-3.0 million b/d.8
Most of Iraq’s current oil production is centered around three large fields, the Kirkuk field in the north of Iraq (10+ billion barrels), the East Baghdad field in the central part of the country (11+ billion barrels), and the Rumailah fields in the south of Iraq (10+ billion barrels).9 There are two other very large fields in southern Iraq which are basically untapped to date: the Majnoon field near the Iranian border (20+ billion barrels, possible as much as 30 billion barrels), and the West Kuma field closely associated with the Rumailah field (15+ billion barrels).10 Other notable fields are Nahr bin Umar (6+ billion barrels), Rattawi (3.1 billion barrels), Halfaya (2.5-4.6 billion barrels), Zubair (4 billion barrels), Nassiriya (2-2.6 billion barrels), Suba-Luhais (2.2 billion barrels), Bai Hassan (2 billion barrels), Buzurgan (2 billion barrels), Khabboz (2 billion barrels), Abu Ghirab (1.5 billion barrels), Khormala (1.5 billion barrels), Tuba (1.5 billion barrels), Gharraf (1.0-1.1 billion barrels). All told, including a number of smaller fields not mentioned here, Iraq holds proven assets of 112 billion barrels of oil. The unexplored regions of the Western Desert could add as much as another 100 billion barrels to this total. The area is known to contain oil-bearing Jurassic, Triassic and Paleozoic formations, though they are buried much deeper than the eastern formations and so might provide more natural gas than oil.11
Much of Iraq’s oil industry was damaged during the 1991 Gulf War. Completely destroyed were the gathering centers and compression/degassing stations at Rumailah, storage facilities, and pumping stations along the Iraqi Strategic (North-South) Pipeline.12 Many sizable fields were damaged and have remained unrepaired. Sixty percent of Northern Oil Company's facilities in northern and central Iraq were damaged during the Gulf War.13 Iraq’s oil export infrastructure was also severely damaged during both the Iraq-Iran War and the 1991 Gulf War. Pipelines, ports and pumping stations have all been affected. And Iraq’s two main Persian Gulf tanker terminals, Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya, were heavily damaged during the Gulf War. Damage to Mina al-Bakr appears to have been largely repaired over the past decade. Khor al-Amaya, on the other hand, was severely damaged during the Iraq-Iran War and then completely destroyed during Operation Desert Storm.14

During the decade of sanctions following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq tried to maintain production at existing fields despite an embargo on spare parts and oilfield equipment. Many of the reservoirs in production have been damaged through mismanagement and the use of questionable techniques in an effort to increase current production at the price of future production. In addition to the naturally occurring problem of water cut in Iraq’s southern wells (the damaging intrusion of water into oil reservoirs), many fields have been damaged by the practice known as water flooding in order to boost current production. Iraq’s oil minister stated that in 2002 only 24 of 73 Iraqi oil fields were producing. Oil consulting firm Saybolt International has pointed out the risk of a 5% to 15% annual production decline at damaged Iraqi oil fields. A U.N. report in June 2001 said that Iraqi oil production capacity would fall sharply unless technical and infrastructure problems were addressed. And U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned of a possible "major breakdown" in Iraq's oil industry if spare parts and equipment are not forthcoming. The United States has resisted any efforts for a long term solution to the problems, insisting on only short-term improvements to the oil industry. According to the head of the UN Iraq program, Benon Sevan, the number of holds placed on contracts for oil field equipment threatens the entire program with paralysis. Sevan stated in January 2002 that the United States placed over 80% of the holds, which affect nearly 2,000 contracts worth approximately $5 billion.15

Solving these problems will require major investment from a consortium of international oil companies. It will take at least a decade to double output, providing there is no further damage done. It will take at least $7 billion worth of investment to bring Iraq back to its 3.5 million b/d production level. Pushing past that level to 5.5 million b/d will require at least $20 billion of investment. Analysts say Iraq has the capacity to produce double that amount, albeit at an extraordinary cost over an extended period of time.16 Many international companies have stepped up to offer the needed investment. Iraq has signed multi-billion dollar deals with companies from China, France and Russia. And in recent months Iraq has signed a number of deals with companies from Italy (Eni), Spain (Repsol YPF), Russia (Tatneft), France (TotalFinaElf), China, India, Turkey, and others.17 However, none of these deals can move forward until they are okayed by the U.N. Security Council.

Could all of this go toward explaining why it has become so urgent for the United States to make war on Iraq and take over control of Iraqi oil fields? For over a decade, the U.S. has blocked any reparations or new development of Iraqi oil resources. In 2001, reports finally came out announcing that without increased access to spare parts, repairs and new technology, Iraqi oil fields could be damaged permanently. Pressure is building in the U.N. to allow this remediation and modernization of Iraqi oil infrastructure. Iraq is awarding contracts to major oil companies from various countries, excluding U.S. and British companies. And all of this is being blocked largely by the U.S., while U.S. and British oil companies line up for a piece of the action in the aftermath of an Iraqi conquest.

Let’s see, are there any pieces of the picture which we are missing? Oh yes, the U.S. is studying international law to determine oil field rights in the event of a U.S. & British conquest of Iraq. And they believe that international law would give them considerable leeway in managing Iraq’s oil fields (for the benefit of the Iraqi people, of course).18

And now, to round out this picture, let’s look at Iraqi oil exports as compared to US imports. As of July 2002, Iraq was producing 1.99 million b/d (oil production was 2.45 million b/d in 2001). Of this, they export 1.5 million b/d, over one-third of that, 566,000 b/d to the U.S. This is down from 795,000 b/d (or 53%) in 2001. The route to the U.S. is very circuitous, as the oil is first purchased by companies from many countries, including Cyprus, Sudan, Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Egypt, Italy, Ukraine, and others and then is resold to U.S. importers, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, Citgo, BP, Marathon, Coastal, Valero, Koch, and Premcor.19 There is also an unknown amount of oil being smuggled out through Syria and other countries. It is difficult to say how much of this, if any, is making its way to the U.S.

Now let’s look at the U.S. side of this equation. The U.S. imported an average of 10.3 million b/d as of September 2002. Of this, Iraqi oil would only amount to 6% of U.S. imports (8% in 2001). However, the U.S. derives around 26% of its daily oil imports from the Middle East—that is 2.3 million b/d as of August 2002. So Iraqi oil accounts for about one-quarter of our Middle East imports. Comparing Iraqi imports to our top sources of imports, Saudi Arabia exports 1.49 million b/d to the U.S. (14% of total imports), Mexico exports 1.46 million b/d (also 14% of total U.S. imports), Canada exports 1.37 million b/d to the U.S. (13% of the total), and Venezuela—prior to the oil strike—exported 1.14 million b/d (11% of the total).20 If this ranking of major oil imports was continued, Iraq would probably rank in the top ten. However, were the sanctions removed and the oil infrastructure repaired, Iraq would undoubtedly rival Saudi Arabia for the number one position; especially under a US military protectorate with US and British companies running the oil business. Beyond this, the conquest of Iraq—if successful—would allow us to add badly needed spare capacity to world oil production and it might stop the flight of oil countries from the petrodollar to the euro.

Other Oil News

Venezuela is still recovering from the oil strike. The EIA now states that Venezuelan oil production gradually rose to 1.2 million b/d in February.21 The EIA’s current short-term energy outlook assumes that the Venezuelan oil crisis will be over by March.22 However, they warn that Venezuelan supplies will not approach pre-crisis levels for another several months. Furthermore, it is possible that around 700,000 b/d of production may be permanently lost due to the strike.23 The EIA warns that OPEC efforts to increase output to make up for lower Venezuelan exports has reduced global spare capacity to only 2 million b/d—this spare capacity coming almost entirely from Saudi Arabia. There is very little room remaining to make up for unexpected supply drops or demand increases.24

On top of this, Nigeria’s white collar union began an oil export strike on Saturday, February 15th. Nigeria is the seventh largest oil exporter in the world. Royal Dutch/Shell, the country’s biggest producer, pumps an average 900,000 b/d. The oil companies expect to replace strikers with senior staff, and point out that previous strikes had little impact on exports. However, fear of the strike caused oil prices to temporarily jump by 16 cents per barrel.25 It is evident that the market is now so tight and the world economy so gun-shy that it is to be wondered how the world will survive an invasion of Iraq.

On top of all this, there was a small item in the Australian newspaper The Courier Mail stating that leftist rebels in Colombia have blown up a large section of that country’s most important pipeline. Operated by Occidental Petroleum, the pipeline carried 105,000 b/d.26 Little more is to be found about this story on the various news wires. The Bush administration has been bolstering military aid to Colombia, including increasing numbers of advisors. They have impressed upon the Colombian military that it is of primary importance to protect the oil pipelines, and they have labeled the rebels as international terrorists. What response there will be on the part of the U.S. to this latest strike at U.S. oil interests is hard to say.

Finally, in the EIA weekly petroleum updates, we find that for the week ending February 7th, crude oil imports declined by another 1.2 million barrels from the previous week. U.S. commercial crude inventories for that week sank to 269.8 million barrels, just crossing the Lower Operational Inventory Level (LOIL). This is the lowest inventory level since October 1975. However, in the week ending February 14th, crude oil imports rose to nearly 8.8 million b/d, the largest weekly average since December 20th. U.S. commercial crude inventories increased by 3.1 million barrels to 272.9 million barrels. This was back above the LOIL, but still 50.4 million barrels below the level of a year ago.27

Natural Gas

The picture for natural gas (NG) is even worse. As of February 14th, NG storage stood at 1,168 billion cubic feet (Bcf), down by 203 Bcf from the week previous. This was 868 Bcf less that a year ago and 436 Bcf below the 5-year average of 1,604 Bcf.28 In an article in The Oklahoman, Tony Say, president of gas marketing company Clearwater Enterprises said he expects NG reserves to reach an all-time low of 600 Bcf by the end of the season. Bruce Bell, Chairman of the Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association’s Oklahoma Division, warned that once you get down to 700 Bcf there are serious doubts as to how much gas can be withdrawn. The nation's gas reserves are stored in underground caverns, where there must be a certain amount of gas to create enough pressure to force the reserves out.29

Raymond James & Associates, in a recent report on natural gas, points out that NG production will continue to fall by 1.0 -1.5% per quarter for the foreseeable future. They warn that even if production returned to the feverish pitch of 2001, it would take three to six months before the new production would begin to slow down the natural declines in existing wells.30 Yet the NG rig total has hovered between 800 and 900 for the past year; at least 100 less than the number needed to meet national demand, according to Bruce Bell. Despite rising NG prices for the last couple months, work has begun on only 15 new wells.31

And according the Lehman Brothers, Canadian gas production is continuing to fall by as much as 4%. And this drop will coincide with a 500 million cubic feet per day decrease in NG exports to the U.S. Canadian NG demand rose in 2002 by 2 to 3% from the previous year. Net exports to the U.S. are expected to fall by 5% in 2003.32

Based on all of this data, the NG crunch of this year could lead to an NG crisis a year from now.

ENDNOTES

1 Colin Campbell Discussing Oil Depletion, Julian Darley. Global Public Media, 12/18/2002. globalpublicmedia.com

2Matt Simmons discussing oil peak; natural gas; what the President knows; hydrogen; and Iraq, Julian Darley. Global Public Media, 2/10/2003. globalpublicmedia.com

3 The Party’s Over: Oil, War, and the Fate of Industrial Societies, Richard Heinberg. New Society Publishers, April 2003. amazon.com.
002-4461621-4414410?v=glance&s=books

4 Ibid. Page 86.

5 US Admits Plan to Snatch Iraqi Oil Fields, Mark Ellis & Gary Jones. The Daily Mirror, 1/25/2003. mirror.co.uk
objectid=12568779&method=full&siteid=50143

6 Ibid.

7 Iraqi Oilfields, Dev George. Oil & Gas International, 1/22/03. oilandgasinternational.com
regional_spotlight/jan03_iraq.html

8 Iraq Country Analysis Brief. EIA, October 2002. eia.doe.gov

9 Ibid.

10 Op.Cit. See note 7.

11 Op. Cit. See notes 7 & 8. Oil & Gas International, and EIA.

12 Op. Cit. See note 8.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Op. Cit. See note 7.

17 Op. Cit. See note 8.

18 US Studying International Law to Determine Oil Field Rights in Event of War with Iraq. Drudge Reports, 1/29/2003. Citing the Wall Street Journal. drudgereportarchives.com
2003/01/30/20030130_061815_flash.htm

19 Op. Cit. See note 8.

20 United States Country Analysis Brief. EIA, November 2002. eia.doe.gov

21 OPEC Brief. EIA, 2/7/2003. eia.doe.gov

22 Short-Term Energy Outlook—February 2003. EIA, 2/7/2003. eia.doe.gov

23 Op. Cit. See note 21.

24 Op. Cit. See note 22.

25 Nigerian Oil Export Strike Starts Saturday –Union, Dino Mahtani. Reuters, 2/14/2003. story.news.yahoo.com
nm/20030214/wl_nm/energy_nigeria_strike_dc_2

26 Rebels Blow up Key Oil Pipeline. The Courier Mail, 2/6/2003. thecouriermail.news.com.au
0,5936,5944948%255E401,00.html

27 Summary of Weekly Petroleum Data. EIA, 2/14/2003. eia.doe.gov
weekly_petroleum_status_report/current/txt/wpsr.txt

28 Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report. EIA, 2/20/2003. tonto.eia.doe.gov

29 Cold snap gives boost to gas prices, Adam Wilmoth. The Oklahoman, 2/8/2003. newsok.com.

30 Energy "Stat of the Week" January 21, 2003. Raymond James & Associates. 170.12.99.3

31 Op. Cit. See note 29.

32 Canada Gas Production Seen Falling 2%-4% - Lehman Bros. The Morning Star, sourcing Dow Jones, 2/12/2003. news.morningstar.com



To: GST who wrote (154164)3/13/2003 3:35:30 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 164684
 
COULD AN INVASION OF IRAQ VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW?

nytimes.com

Q&A: Is the U.S. at Risk of Violating International Law?

From the Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2003

Anne-Marie Slaughter, the dean of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, says that eight of 10 international law experts would say that a U.S. invasion of Iraq would violate international law if it took place without solid Security Council authorization. And even if the United States can make a valid claim for legal authorization without a new resolution, it would be preferable to wait a month or so and "hang in [at] the Security Council until we got approval."

Slaughter, the current president of the American Society of International Law, says that a great deal of the worldwide opposition to the United States "could be reversed if we showed ourselves willing and able to stay with the multilateral process and to use it not only to go to war, but in the aftermath."

Slaughter was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on March 3, 2003.

In a January interview, Richard Butler, the United Nations' former chief weapons inspector, said that a U.S. invasion of Iraq without a specific Security Council resolution would violate international law. What is your view on this?

I think it is certainly true that eight out of 10 international lawyers would say that would be a violation of international law. That view would also be supported by the legal advisers of most other countries in the United Nations. On the other hand, the United States has said from the beginning that it did in fact have authorization for the use of force, based on a string of resolutions going back to the original [Gulf War] ceasefire resolution in 1991.

And certainly it was clear in November under Resolution 1441 that we were reserving the right to act without a second Security Council resolution. The other members of the council were insisting that we should come back for a second vote. So this is an area in which the law is sufficiently undeveloped that I think you can reasonably agree to disagree. There's no question, however, that many, many, many other countries-the majority of other countries and certainly many of our European allies-will not see a unilateral American-led attack as explicitly authorized by the Security Council.

So, technically, a U.S. attack would fall within the rules of international law, but in practice it would be better to get Security Council authorization? And that's why the administration is seeking one?

Exactly. The best evidence that we think that, although we have a case it is not a very strong one, is that we are indeed going back and seeking additional authorization. If we were so sure of our case, we wouldn't even have needed Resolution 1441, much less an additional resolution.

In Resolution 1441, the administration settled for an ambiguous resolution that left open the question of force?

Yes, that's right. And the law here is a fluid thing. We are operating within the framework of the United Nations charter, which is in itself an extraordinary phenomenon [and] which not enough people have noticed. We are facing an enormous threat to global peace and security and we are operating through the United Nations. The United Nations mandates a political process operating within general rules and according to resolutions, but obviously there is going to be a lot of ambiguity there, and there is going to be a number of cases in which there are valid but disputed, competing interpretations.

Let's say the administration withdraws the second resolution because it doesn't have the nine votes needed for approval, or the resolution passes but the French veto it. What will be the effect on the Security Council if the United States invades anyway?

It depends enormously on what the vote looks like. If the United States has a majority and the French vetoes, then the United States will go ahead and will have the better of the legal argument, assuming the war is as the United States predicts-both short and successful. At that point, it will look as if the French thwarted a majority of the Security Council. If that is the scenario, I predict we will go ahead and the Security Council will then endorse what happened in the same way that it did after Kosovo in 1999, and the French will find a face-saving way to join that post-war consensus on the grounds that things were uncovered that they did not realize existed. That assumes we have a majority. If there is no majority, I predict that we will not actually let this resolution come to a vote.

What if you had the French and the Russians casting vetoes?

We are not likely to bring it to a vote on those terms either. I think we are quite confident with enough time we can both get a majority and have the Russians vote with us.

If we don't have a majority and we go ahead into Iraq, the president will probably claim that the Security Council didn't live up to its mandate. Do you agree with that?

(Page 2 of 2)

No, and I am not sure I agree the president will actually say that. I think the administration will say the Security Council in the end could not agree but the Security Council will remain a player for us. But even if the president says it, I disagree. The Security Council and the United Nations, in general, are enormously important. We've been claiming their relevance is at stake. I think in September, Bush had a valid claim to make. The challenge to the Security Council then was: "If you're going to keep passing those resolutions, you have to mean what you say." And I think the Security Council did step up to the plate and pass a unanimous resolution with real teeth, insisting on inspections and insisting they make a difference. At this point, that kind of rhetoric by the president doesn't ring nearly so true. What's much more evident and important is that the United Nations will be a major player in the aftermath of any use of force.

We will go back to it and ask for some kind of United Nations force in the same way as we did after Kosovo in 1999, as we did after Afghanistan in 2001-2. All the United Nations agencies will be involved. It is unimaginable to think of doing this without the high commissioner for refugees, the high commissioner for human rights, all the expertise in peacekeeping and nation-building. We do not have that expertise-the United Nations and the European Union do-and we will need them both.

It seems a while since the United States had so few friends around the world. Do you agree?

We have been here before. Anyone who remembers being in Europe in 1982 with the massive, enormous demonstrations against the deployment of Pershing [tactical nuclear] missiles knows we have been through very bumpy times before. I think the stakes are higher now, precisely because this is unipolar rather than a bipolar system with the disappearance of the Soviet Union. There's a greater danger of other nations genuinely coalescing against us, so that although that I don't think it is unique-having many nations very opposed to us-I think the stakes are higher and we would do well to be more careful because a lot of the enmity and the political maneuvering could be reversed if we showed ourselves willing and able to stay with the multilateral process and to use it not only to go to war, but in the aftermath. So if we were to hang in [at] the Security Council until we got approval, which I think in another month we will get, we could do extraordinary things.

You never would have predicted in September that it would have taken until November to get Resolution 1441. If you remember that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in August and Vice President Dick Cheney right before the president's September 12 speech [to the United Nations] were saying "we're going to go" after Saddam now, it was remarkable the president would go to the United Nations. But no one expected we would seriously negotiate for two months. If this takes another month, it is well worth it if we get a resolution.

The president has spoken recently as if we were definitely going to war. But how much of the president's rhetoric is to scare the Iraqis into cooperating and how much is it because he actually means to go to war?

Everything he says sounds one way if you think his audience is the United States public and the Europeans and the rest of the United Nations community. It sounds a completely different way if you think his audience is Saddam Hussein and the Republican Guard. So when he says regime change is the objective, what he is saying is, if we go to war, you will not still be in office at the end of it. That is a very clear statement to both Saddam Hussein and his supporters. It sounds very different if the president is trying to put pressure on the Iraqis or to dictate to our European allies.