I thought this was rather good. It gores most of the oxen in the ring, and in doing so, makes a pretty fair assessment of the situation (I'm working on the theory here that when only your ox is gored in an op-ed piece, you obviously feel the piece is wrong, and when it is the other guy's ox being gored the piece is right- but in this case, dealing relatively evenly with all oxen...):
When three blind mice don't see eye to eye
By Janadas Devan
THE unprecedented crisis of legitimacy in the United Nations Security Council today is due to three men - French President Jacques Chirac, UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix and United States President George W. Bush.
'Three blind mice, three blind mice; see how they run, see how they run.'
The only person who benefits from the Security Council's paralysis is Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Whether or not the US succeeds in deposing him, he has successfully managed to deny Washington the mantle of legitimacy that only the UN can provide.
'They all ran after the farmer's wife; she cut off their tails with a carving knife.'
All three men are compounding the crisis by taking intransigent positions: Mr Bush by refusing to consider the possibility of inspections working; Mr Chirac by refusing to consider a reasonable timetable for Mr Saddam to disarm; and Mr Blix, by speaking with such supple confusion that all sides to the dispute, including Mr Saddam, find comfort in his statements.
'Did you ever see such a sight in your life, as three blind mice?'
France is milking the moment for all its worth, playing hero to the anti-war crowd in Europe and elsewhere, but it bears a great deal of responsibility for the present impasse.
To begin with, it never seriously contemplated the use of force to ensure Iraqi disarmament. It withdrew from patrolling the no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq in the early 1990s, leaving the task to Britain and the US; and in the late 1990s, it advocated the lifting of UN sanctions on Iraq.
It argues now that inspections should be given a chance, suggesting that the containment policy that it had opposed in the 1990s might work after all. But it has consistently blocked the only thing that might have ensured a successful inspection regime, which is a credible threat of force.
Mr Chirac conceded recently that inspectors are in Iraq only because of the presence of 250,000 US and British troops in the area. His declaration, though, that France will say 'no', 'whatever the circumstances', to any resolution authorising force, suggests that he would be quite happy if the troops left, or remained passive forever, twiddling their thumbs.
Mr Chirac was Prime Minister when France sold Iraq a nuclear reactor in 1976 - ostensibly for energy production, but which it knew well was intended to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. (Incidentally, goody-two-shoes Germany in the 1970s and 1980s was Baghdad's chief contractor for its chemical and biological warfare complexes, as well as for its ballistic missile programme. If truth be told, Berlin, Paris, Moscow, Beijing and Washington probably know better than the UN inspectors what precisely Mr Saddam possesses, for they have in their files the receipts for all that they had sold to him over the years.)
But if Mr Chirac bears part of the responsibility for the Security Council's paralysis, so does Mr Bush, perhaps doubly so.
To begin with, it is clear he never seriously contemplated the possibility of disarming Iraq peacefully. From the beginning, he was intent not just on disarmament, but also on regime change as a prelude to a region-wide civilisational change. He was going to fight a war, come what may, and nothing short of Mr Saddam hanging himself from a tree in the centre of Baghdad, or exiling himself to deepest Siberia, was going to divert him from his purpose.
Sometimes, he seemed more anxious that Baghdad might actually disarm, thus negating the necessity of an invasion, than he was about fighting a war.
As for the UN, he advanced the novel theory that its approval of Washington's position would be a test of its legitimacy, not Washin- gton's. The Security Council could be right only if it agreed with Washington, and an abject failure if it didn't.
Mr Bush sought the UN's approval, but declared he didn't really need it. He had Secretary of State Colin Powell say repeatedly that Baghdad might avoid a war if it disarmed, only to have his spokesman Ari Fleischer declare that disarmament was not enough, only regime change would do. And he kept saying time was running out for Mr Saddam to comply, when it was quite obvious to everyone that the only thing driving the timetable was the weather.
Why can't the inspectors be given more time? Because April would be too hot for a war. Imagine that. Mr Bush has risked the credibility of the Security Council, the unity of the Western alliance, Nato, the European Union, all because it would be too hot in April for US soldiers to don their chemical warfare suits.
Disarming Mr Saddam is the correct thing to do - but it needs to be done correctly, with America's reputation enhanced in the process.
Transforming the Middle East politically and culturally is a noble aim - but it can be accomplished only with the support of the world, especially Europe. The war on terrorism will continue long after a US proconsul is installed in Baghdad - but it can be waged effectively only if American leadership is accepted willingly by the world.
Mr Bush - with a little help from Mr Chirac and Mr Blix, the Mr Magoo of international diplomacy - sank all three possibilities this week.
'Three blind mice. See how they run. They all ran after the farmer's wife. She cut off their tails with a carving knife. Have you ever seen such a sight in your life, as three blind mice?'
straitstimes.asia1.com.sg |
