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Politics : DON'T START THE WAR -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 6:39:03 PM
From: one_less	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 25898

"Jewell--Are you aware that it was the French, who the very next day after 9/11, introduced into the United Nation the resolution that crteated the worldwide coalition against terrorism?" No. Thanks for the info. "Are you aware that all the French want is: * permanent weapons insepctors * permanent UN peacekeepers * permanent no-fly zone over all of Iraq * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Yes. It is well recognized that Saddam has shown cooperation once the threat of force became real. In order to keep the threat real and make what France wants work the threat needs to remain real. So we have two choices: 1) follow through so that neither Saddam nor his cheerleaders ever have a doubt about our integrity now or in the future; or 2)as France seems to "want" we camp the US military where it currently is in full ready status. We are ready, willing, and able for success at option 1. For option 2 to work we need for France to fund the US military to stay in full ready position. Did you leave out the 30 billion dollar per year offer from France? I missed that part. "The French alternative is far better than engaging in a war that will rival the number of deaths that Saddam himself has committed, and making America an agressive nation much like Iraq was when it invaded Kuwait." Hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis have died over the past few years of starvation and treatable disease. There were resources available to treat them and to feed them. These were Saddam's citizen enemies: Shi'i villagers, children under the age of 5, Kurds. I protested the US policy of containment because innocent people were the target. Our government believed that when the Iraqi people saw that Saddam was willing to sacrifice the children in this way, they would rise up and throw him out. A couple of attempts were made to do just this. Unfortunately the weakened populace couldn't pull it off. Now most of those who could have, his citizen/enemies, are dead. Now we have correctly targeted the despotic regime that is our enemy. He has ordered 15,000 uniforms that are identical to US and British military uniforms, for his elite soldiers. These soldiers will attack his citizen enemies and murder them when we engage his army. Once again the US will carry the responsibility for him sacrificing innocent lives. The people of Bagdad could stand clear and let us take him out but they probably wont. He recieved 100% approval from them. hmmmm who else have you ever heard of getting 100% approval from the citizenry, Jesus, Moses, Mohammad, Ghandi, any president ...none. Was it because he is so nice and benevelent? I doubt it, since he lines women up in the public market for beheadings...no trial or even charges filed. He invites his relatives to the Castle for reconciliation and executes them infront of all concerned. He gasses villages and test chemical and biological weapons on political prisoners. He disembowels children in front of their parents. Given his goals of uniting the Arab nations under him toward global domination, we might want to take a reality pill here: "...an agressive nation much like Iraq was when it invaded Kuwait." What indication do you have that he has become any less of an aggressor except that we have been sitting on him? Why live at all if we are unwilling to stand for the things that are worth living for and against the things that are intolerable and heinously despotic? I know lives will be lost. Many, many lives have already been lost. Innocent lives that are sacrificed for the priviledge of this despotic heinous torturing murderer to stay in power. We are all going to die. Living isn't just a numbers game or an arena sport for points. There are things that make living and dying worthwhile. Death is as much of a miracle as birth is. How many live or die is a pointless arguement since we all live and die. A life worth living is one where you have placed your life in the path of worth while causes and stood for them even knowing that it may bring the miracle of your death. Removing this man from power is an honorable goal. You may argue, rightfully, that some people or organizations are in it for dishonorable reasons, oil, trade, political influence, etc. Personally, I can't imagine the dishonor of bringing our troups home and leaving him in power. If you agree that the threat of force is what gave the inspectors some credibility, what do you think the future threat of force will accomplish if our bluff is called and we abandon the mission? Nothing, The tyrannical despots of the world will see no threat to their bullying. They will have free reign.

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 6:46:31 PM
From: one_less	Respond to of 25898

Oh, yeah and Happy Saint Patrick's day.

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:24:29 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1991 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org How can you say Saddam didn't produce anything while previous inspectors were there, when just a quick read shows the deceptions and previous WMD. 1991 3 Apr 1991 Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Section C, decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept, under international supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometres, and related production facilities and equipment. It also provides for establishment of a system of ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these weapons and missiles. Requires Iraq to make a declaration, within 15 days, of the location, amounts and types of all such items. 6 Apr 1991 Iraq accepts resolution 687 (1991) (S/22456). 18 Apr 1991 Iraq provides initial declaration required under resolution 687 (1991), declares some chemical weapons and materials and 53 Al-Hussein and Scud type long-range ballistic missiles. Iraq declares it has no biological weapons programme. 14 May 1991 Entry into force of the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of Iraq setting out the rights, privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and its personnel in Iraq. 16 May 1991 Iraq submits revised declarations covering additional chemical weapons and a refinement of the missile declaration. 9 Jun 1991 UNSCOM commences its first chemical weapons inspection. 23-28 Jun 1991 UNSCOM/IAEA inspectors try to intercept Iraqi vehicles carrying nuclear related equipment (Calutrons). Iraqi personnel fire warning shots in the air to prevent the inspectors from approaching the vehicles. The equipment is later seized and destroyed under international supervision. 17 Jun 1991 Security Council resolution 699 (1991), confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have a continuing authority to conduct activities under section C of resolution 687 (1991). 28 Jun 1991 Statement by the President of the Security Council deploring Iraq’s denial of access to an inspection site and asking the Secretary-General to send a high-level mission to Baghdad immediately (S/22746). 30 Jun 1991 UNSCOM commences its first missile inspection. 5 Jul 1991 Report of the high-level mission sent to Iraq containing undertakings by Iraq of full cooperation, including immediate and unimpeded access to sites and the right to stop and inspection vehicles in movement (S/22761). 2 Aug 1991 Iraq declares to the first biological inspection team that it had conducted "biological research activities for defensive military purposes". 15 Aug 1991 Security Council resolution 707 (1991), demands that Iraq provide without further delay full, final and complete disclosures of its proscribed weapons and programmes, as required by resolution 687 (1991). 6 Sep 1991 The first UNSCOM inspection team which intended to use helicopters is blocked by Iraq. 23 Sep 1991 Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s failure to provide unconditional acceptance of resolution 707 (1991) (SC/5306 - IK54). 21-30 Sep 1991 IAEA inspectors find large amounts of documentation relating to Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The Iraqi officials confiscate some documents from the inspectors. The inspectors refuse to yield a second set of documents. In response, Iraq refuses to allow the team to leave the site with these documents. A four-day stand-off during which the team remained in the parking lot of the site ensues. Iraq permits the team to leave with the documents following a statement by the President of the Security Council, threatening enforcement action by members of the Council. 24 Sep 1991 Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s detention of an inspection team and reiterated that the Commission is the sole judge of the definition of documents, sites or materials subject to inspection (SC/5307 - IK61). 24 Sep 1991 Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning the use of its own helicopters by the Special Commission and noting a letter from Iraq which the Council considered to be an unconditional acceptance of resolution 707 (1991) (SC/5370-IK/61). 11 Oct 1991 Security Council resolution 715 (1991), approves the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev. l) and the Director General of the IAEA (S/22872/Rev.1). The Commission's plan also establishes that Iraq shall "accept unconditionally the inspectors and all other personnel designated by the Special Commission". Oct 1991 Iraq states that it considers the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Plans, adopted by resolution 715 (1991), to be unlawful and states that it is not ready to comply with resolution 715.

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:27:49 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1992 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1992 18 Feb 1992 Special report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM regarding the visit of a special mission to Baghdad on 27 January 1991, recording that Iraq was rejecting any obligations imposed on it by Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) (S/23606). 19 Feb 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council approving the report of the special mission and expressing grave concern over Iraq’s failure to acknowledge its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification, and supporting a decision to despatch a further special mission to Baghdad (S/23609). 28 Feb 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council, upon receipt of the special Commission’s report, reaffirming that it is for UNSCOM alone to determine which items are to be destroyed under resolution 687, and condemning Iraq’s failure to provide full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions (S/23663). 11 Mar 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning general and specific obligations of Iraq including those in the weapons areas, under the various Security Council resolutions (S/23699). 12 Mar 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council noting a statement made in the Council by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and expressing the view that Iraq had not yet complied fully and unconditionally with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions (S/23709). 19 Mar 1992 Iraq declares the existence of previously undeclared ballistic missiles (89), chemical weapons and associated material. Iraq reveals that most of these undeclared items were unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991, in violation of resolution 687 (1991). 9 Apr 1992 Iraq calls for a halt of UNSCOM's aerial surveillance flights, making reference to the possibility that the aircraft and its pilot would be endangered. 10 Apr 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning Iraq’s threats to the safety and security of UNSCOM’s aerial surveillance flights over Iraq and reaffirming UNSCOM's right to conduct such flights (S/23803). Subsequently, Iraq affirms that it does not intend to carry out any military action aimed at UNSCOM's aerial flights. May 1992 Iraq provides its first Full, Final and Complete Disclosures for its prohibited biological and missile programmes. Iraq admits to having had only a "defensive" biological weapons programme. Jun 1992 Iraq provides its first Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited chemical weapons programme. Jul 1992 UNSCOM begins the destruction of large quantities of Iraq's chemical weapons and production facilities. 6-29 Jul 1992 Iraq refuses an inspection team access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. UNSCOM had reliable information that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities. 6 Jul 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning refusal by Iraq to permit the UNSCOM inspection team entry into the Ministry of Agriculture and stating that Iraq’s denial constituted a material and unacceptable breach of resolution 687 (1991) (S/24240). Access was thereafter obtained. Evidence gathered from the Ministry is consistent with the removal of items during the period the team was denied entry. 15 Oct 1992 Statement to the press by the President of the Security Council concerning a high-level statement made in Iraq which appeared to constitute a threat to the security of United Nations inspectors, expressing the Council’s concern for the safety of the inspectors and expressing the wish that Iraq cooperate fully with them (S/5484 - IK125). 23 Nov 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning general and specific obligations of Iraq, including those in the weapons areas, under the various Security Council resolutions (S/24836). 24 Nov 1992 Statement by the President of the Security Council concerning statements by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and regretting threats, allegations and attacks made by him regarding the various United Nations operations in Iraq (S/24839).

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:30:01 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1993 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1993 Jan 1993 Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq starts incursions into the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait and increases its military activity in the no-fly zones. 8 Jan 1993 Statement by the President of the Security Council, noting that Iraq's action in prohibiting the use of UNSCOM aircraft is an "unacceptable and material breach" of resolution 687 (1991) and warns Iraq of "serious consequences", were it to continue (S/25081). 11 Jan 1993 Statement by the President of the Security Council reiterating the Statement of 8 January 1993 regarding Iraq’s prohibition on the use of UNSCOM aircraft, and again warning of serious consequences that would flow from continuing defiance (S/25091). 19 Jan 1993 Air raids are conducted on sites in southern Iraq by France, the UK and the US. Iraq informs UNSCOM that it will be able to resume its flights (S/225172). Jun-Jul 1993 Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine test stands. 18 Jun 1993 Statement by the President of the Council, expressing deep concern over Iraq’s de facto refusal to accept UNSCOM installation of monitoring devices and warning Iraq of the serious consequences of material breaches of resolution 687 (1991) (S/25970). Subsequently, Iraq agrees to the installation of the monitoring cameras. 16 Sep 1993 Tripartite report by the Executive Chairman, the leader of the IAEA Action Team and the Director of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Corporation on measures to implement the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (S/26451).

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:33:13 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1994 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1994 10 Feb 1994 Joint statement dated 5 February 1994, by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission regarding significant progress made since July 1993 in both the political and technical areas, and expressing readiness to expedite the process establishing ongoing monitoring and verification (S/1994/151). 29 Apr 1994 Joint Statement issued by the Chairman of the Special Commission, the Head of the IAEA Action Team and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq regarding progress made, in particular in regard to the establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification, and recording Iraq’s assurances that it would respect the rights and privileges of the Commission and the IAEA and the Commission’s and the IAEA’s commitment to exercise their rights and privileges in a manner respecting Iraq’s legitimate concerns regarding sovereignty, independence, security and dignity (S/1994/520) Jun 1994 UNSCOM completes the destruction of large quantities of chemical warfare agents and precursors and their production equipment. 20 Jul 1994 Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, transmitting a further joint statement regarding progress made in the implementation of paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991) (S/1994/860). Sep/Oct 1994 Iraq sets a deadline of 10 October 1994 for the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), rejects all appeals to withdraw its threat to stop cooperation with UNSCOM, and starts deploying troops in the direction of Kuwait. It leads the US to begin deploying troops to Kuwait. 8 Oct 1994 Statement by the President of the Security Council, underlining the complete unacceptability of Iraqi statements threatening to withdraw cooperation with UNSCOM and grave concern over reports regarding the deployment of troops in Iraq in the direction of Kuwait (S/PRST/1994/58). 15 Oct 1994 Security Council resolution 949 (1994), demands that Iraq "cooperate fully" with UNSCOM and that it withdraw all military units deployed to southern Iraq to their original positions. Iraq thereafter withdraws its forces and resumes its work with the Commission. 15 Oct 1994 Letter from the Representatives of Iraq and of the Russian Federation, transmitting a Joint Communique containing Iraq’s announcement that it had withdrawn its troops to rearguard positions (S/1994/1173).

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:36:44 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1995 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1995 Mar 1995 Iraq provides the second Full, Final and Complete Disclosures of its prohibited biological and chemical weapons programmes. 1 Jul 1995 As a result of UNSCOM's investigations and in the light of irrefutable evidence, Iraq admits for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons programme but denies weaponization. Jul 1995 Iraq threatens to end all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA if there is no progress towards the lifting of sanctions and the oil embargo by 31 August 1995. Aug 1995 Iraq provides the third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited biological weapons programme. 8 Aug 1995 General Hussein Kamel, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programmes, leaves Iraq for Jordan. Iraq claims that Hussein Kamel had hidden from UNSCOM and the IAEA important information on the prohibited weapons programmes. Iraq withdraws its third biological Full, Final and Complete Disclosure and admits a far more extensive biological warfare programme than previously admitted, including weaponization. Iraq also admits having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range missiles than had previously been declared. Iraq provides UNSCOM and the IAEA with large amounts of documentation, hidden on a chicken farm ostensibly by Hussein Kamel, related to its prohibited weapons programmes which subsequently leads to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon. Iraq also informs UNSCOM that the deadline to halt its cooperation is withdrawn. Nov 1995 Iraq provides second Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited missile programme. Nov 1995 The Government of Jordan intercepts a large shipment of high-grade missile components destined for Iraq. Iraq denies that it had sought to purchase these components, although it acknowledged that some of them were in Iraq. UNSCOM conducts an investigation, which confirms that Iraqi authorities and missile facilities have been involved in the acquisition of sophisticated guidance and control components for proscribed missiles. UNSCOM retrieves additional similar missile components from the Tigris river, which had been allegedly disposed of there by Iraqis involved in the covert acquisition.

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:39:11 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1996 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1996 Mar 1996 UNSCOM teams are denied immediate access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams enter the sites after delays of up to 17 hours. 19 Mar 1996 Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing the Council’s concern at Iraq's denial of access, which it terms a clear violation of Iraq's obligations under relevant resolutions. The Council also demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection (S/PRST/1996/11). 27 Mar 1996 Security Council resolution 1051(1996), approves the export/import monitoring mechanism for Iraq and demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the mechanism and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director-General of the IAEA. May-Jun 1996 UNSCOM supervises the destruction of Al-Hakam, Iraq's main facility for the production of biological warfare agents. Jun 1996 Iraq denies UNSCOM teams access to sites under investigation for their involvement in the "concealment mechanism" for proscribed items. 12 Jun 1996 Security Council resolution 1060 (1996), terms Iraq's actions a clear violation of the provisions of the Council's resolutions. It also demands that Iraq grant immediate and unrestricted access to all sites designated for inspection by UNSCOM. 13 Jun 1996 Despite the adoption of resolution 1060 (1996), Iraq again denies access to another inspection team. 14 Jun 1996 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council condemns the failure of Iraq to comply with resolution 1060 (1996). The Council also asks that the Executive Chairman visit Baghdad with a view to securing access to all sites which the Commission designates for inspection (S/PRST/1996/28). 19-22 Jun 1996 The Executive Chairman visits Baghdad. UNSCOM and Iraq agree on a Joint 1996 Statement and a Joint Programme of Action (S/1996/463). The Chairman establishes modalities for inspection of so-called "sensitive sites", in order to take into account Iraq's legitimate security concerns. 22 Jun 1996 Iraq provides the fourth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited biological weapons programme. Jun 1996 Iraq provides third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited chemical weapons programme. The progress achieved in verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the Security Council (S/1997/774). Jul 1996 Iraq provides the third Full, Final and Complete Disclosure of its prohibited missile programme. The results achieved by the Commission verifying this disclosure, and subsequent attachments presented by Iraq, is described in the Commission's October 1997 report to the Security Council (S/1997/774). 23 Aug 1996 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council strongly reaffirms its full support of the Commission in the conduct of its inspections and other tasks and expresses its grave concern at Iraq’s failure to comply fully with resolution 1060 (1996). The Council also states that Iraq’s failure to grant immediate unconditional and unrestricted access to sites and its attempts to impose conditions on the conduct of interviews with Iraqi officials constitute a gross violation of its obligations. The Council also reminds Iraq that only full compliance with its obligations would enable the Executive Chairman to present a report in accordance with section C of resolution 687 (1991) (S/PRST/1996/36). Nov 1996 Iraq blocks UNSCOM from removing remnants of missile engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq. 30 Dec 1996 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council deplores the refusal of Iraq to allow the Special Commission to remove certain missile engines from Iraq for analysis, and demands that Iraq allow such removal. (S/PRST/1996/49).

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:40:47 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1997 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1997 Feb 1997 Iraq allows UNSCOM to remove the missile engines. Jun 1997 Iraq interferes with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews. 18 Jun 1997 Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing serious concern at Iraq’s actions endangering the Commission’s helicopters, deploring such incidents and demanding that Iraq permit UNSCOM to carry out its air operations anywhere in Iraq without interference of any kind (S/PRST/1997/33). 21 Jun 1997 Iraq again blocks UNSCOM's teams from entering certain sites, which have been designated by UNSCOM for inspection. 21 Jun 1997 Security Council resolution 1115 (1997), condemns Iraq's actions and demands that Iraq allow UNSCOM's team immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any sites for inspection and officials for interviews by UNSCOM. The Council also calls for an additional report on Iraq's cooperation with the Commission and suspends the periodic sanctions reviews. Sep 1997 Iraq provides fifth Full, Final and Complete Disclosure for its prohibited biological weapons programme. An international panel of experts is convened in New York to discuss Iraq’s declaration. The panel unanimously finds Iraq’s declaration to be incomplete, inadequate and technically flawed. 13 Sep 1997 One of UNSCOM's personnel is manhandled by an Iraqi officer on board one of the Commission's helicopters while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of the unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive", that was designated for inspection. Two days later, Iraq again failed to freeze movement inside another "sensitive site" designated for inspection. 17 Sep 1997 The President of the Security Council makes a statement to the media, which, inter alia, deplores the incidents and urges Iraq to cooperate fully with UNSCOM. 17 Sep 1997 While seeking access to a site for inspection declared by Iraq to be "sensitive", UNSCOM inspectors witness and videotape the movement of files, the burning of documents and dumping of ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river. Sep/Oct 1997 UNSCOM inspection teams are prevented from inspecting three sites designated for inspection, on the basis that the sites are "presidential sites", which Iraq claims are out of bounds to UNSCOM's inspectors. 23 Oct 1997 Security Council resolution 1134 (1997), demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission, continues the suspension of the periodic sanctions reviews and foreshadows additional sanctions pending a further report on Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM. Oct 1997 UNSCOM completes the destruction of additional, large quantities of chemical weapons related equipment and precursors chemicals. Iraq had previously denied that part of the equipment had been used for CW production. Only in May 1997, on the basis of UNSCOM's investigations, did Iraq admit that some of the equipment had indeed been used in the production of VX. 27 Oct 1997 The Executive Chairman sends a letter to Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, suggesting the agenda for forthcoming meetings in Baghdad. The letter proposes that Iraq address important outstanding issues, including warheads, VX and the biological weapons area. It also mentions the need to review the "modalities for inspection of sensitive sites" to ensure that inspections are conducted in a credible manner. 29 Oct 1997 The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, sends a letter to the President of the Security Council, informing the Council of policy decisions taken by the Government of Iraq. The letter includes a decision not to deal with personnel of United States nationality working for UNSCOM, a demand that all personnel of United States nationality working with UNSCOM leave Iraq by a given deadline, and a request that UNSCOM withdraw its "cover" for the "spy plane" U-2, provided by the United States. 29 Oct 1997 Statement by the President of the Security Council condemning Iraq's decision and terming it "unacceptable". The statement also demands that Iraq cooperate fully, without restrictions or conditions with UNSCOM, and warns of the serious consequences of Iraq's failure to comply immediately and fully with its obligations under relevant resolutions (S/PRST/1997/49). 12 Nov 1997 Security Council resolution 1137 (1997), condemns the continued violation by Iraq of its obligations, including its unacceptable decision to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with UNSCOM. It also imposes a travel restriction on Iraqi officials who are responsible for or participated in the instances of non-compliance. 13 Nov 1997 Iraq requires the personnel of United States nationality working for UNSCOM to leave Iraq immediately. The Executive Chairman decides the majority of the UNSCOM personnel should withdraw temporarily from Iraq. A skeleton staff remains in Baghdad to maintain UNSCOM's premises and equipment. 13 Nov 1997 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council condemns the unacceptable decision of Iraq in expelling personnel of UNSCOM of a specified nationality, demands Iraq to rescind its decisions of 29 October 1997 and demands that Iraq cooperate fully with UNSCOM (S/PRST/1997/51). 20 Nov 1997 Following intensive diplomatic activity an agreement is reached between Iraq and the Russian Federation whereby Iraq accepts the return of the Commission with its full complement of staff to resume its work in Iraq. The Commission’s personnel, who had been temporarily withdrawn to Bahrain, return to Iraq on 21 November and resume their inspection activities the following day. 21 Nov 1997 An Emergency Session of the Special Commission is held in New York in order to discuss and advise on ways to make the work more effective. The report of the Emergency Session is submitted to the Security Council (S/1997/922). 3 Dec 1997 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Emergency Session of the Commission. The Council also stresses that the effectiveness and speed with which UNSCOM might accomplish its responsibilities was determined by the degree to which Iraq cooperated in disclosing the full extent and disposition of its proscribed programmes, and in granting UNSCOM unimpeded to all sites, records and individuals. The Council further welcomes the progress achieved by UNSCOM and the IAEA in the various disarmament areas (S/PRST/1997/54). 17 Dec 1997 The Executive Chairman returns to New York from Iraq and reports, inter alia, to the Council that Iraq would not permit the Commission’s inspectors into a category of sites (Presidential and Sovereign) hitherto not identified to the Council or the Commission as being off-limits to inspection (S/1997/987). 22 Dec 1997 The President of the Security Council issues a statement in which members of the Council call upon the Government of Iraq to cooperate fully with the Commission and stress that failure by Iraq to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any site is unacceptable (S/PRST/1997/56).

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:45:02 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1998 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1998 13 Jan 1998 The Executive Chairman reports to the Council that during the first day of an inspection, Iraq announced that it was withdrawing its cooperation with the inspection team on the pretext that the team had too many individuals of US or UK nationality (S/1998/27 of 13 January 1998). 14 Jan 1998 Iraq continues to block the work of the inspection team. 14 Jan 1998 The President of the Security Council issues a statement terming Iraq’s actions unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions and reiterates its demand that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately without conditions (S/PRST/1998/1). 22 Jan 1998 Following a visit to Iraq, the Executive Chairman reports to the Council that, despite the Council’s Statement on the need for unrestricted access to all sites, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq continues to assert that Iraq would not permit access to eight so-called Presidential sites (S/1998/58). Early Feb Two technical evaluation meetings (TEMS) take place in Baghdad, reviewing 1998 the position with respect to the chemical weapons agent VX. and missile warheads. The report of the outcome of the meetings is submitted to the Council (document S/1998/176). Despite Iraq’s assertions and it having had a full opportunity to present its views on all matters pertaining to the two issues, the team of UNSCOM international experts conclude unanimously that Iraq has still not provided sufficient information for the Commission to conclude that Iraq had undertaken all the disarmament steps required of it in these areas. The Commission’s experts provide the Council with an oral briefing of the outcome on these two TEMS in March 1998. 15-18 Feb 1998 In order to understand the scope (size and perimeters) of the eight Presidential sites which Iraq had decided to declare off-limits to the Commission’s inspectors, the Secretary-General decides to despatch a technical survey team to Iraq. The report of this mission is forwarded to the Council under cover of a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council (S/1998/166 Add.1). 20-23 Feb 1998 The Secretary-General visits Iraq. As a result of his meetings, the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq agree on the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding (MO.) (S/1998/166) which was signed on 23 February. The Secretary-General secures Iraq’s reconfirmation of its acceptance of all relevant resolutions of the Council and the reiteration of its undertaking to cooperate fully with the Commission and the IAEA. In the Memorandum, Iraq also undertakes to accord to UNSCOM and the IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access in conformity with the resolutions of the Council. For its part, the United Nations reiterates the commitment of all member States to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. The Memorandum also includes an undertaking by the Commission to respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity. The Memorandum also provides for the establishment of special procedures which would apply to initial and subsequent entries for the performance of the tasks mandated at the eight Presidential sites. The Memorandum. also makes provisions for the appointment of a Commissioner to head the Special Group established for the mandated tasks at Presidential sites. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala is appointed to this position by the Secretary-General. 2 Mar 1998 Security Council resolution 1154 (1998) endorses the provisions of the MOU. 9 Mar 1998 In pursuance of the MOU, procedures for initial and subsequent entry to the sites are drawn up and presented to the Council (document S/1998/208). 20-27 Mar 1998 The Commission and Iraq conduct a further technical evaluation meeting (TEM) in Vienna dealing with all aspects of Iraq’s biological weapons programme. 4 Apr 1998 The initial entry to the eight Presidential sites is completed by mission UNSCOM 243 (S/1998/326, Appendix III). 8 Apr 1998 The report of the biological weapons TEM is transmitted to the Council (S/1998/308). As with the other TEMs, the experts unanimously conclude that Iraq’s declaration on its biological weapons programme is incomplete and inadequate. 15 Apr 1998 The report of the Special Group on the visit to Presidential sites is submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General (S/1998/326). 16 Apr 1998 The Commission’s semi-annual consolidated report is submitted to the Council (S/1998/332). 6 May 1998 The Executive Chairman informs the Council (S/1998/377) that its requirements with respect to access to sites are sufficiently implemented to allow for the termination of the travel ban called for in resolution 1137 (1998). 14 May 1998 Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council welcomes the improved access provided to the Special Commission and the IAEA by Iraq, following the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding of 23 February 1998. The Council expresses the hope that the agreement by the Government of Iraq to provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission and the IAEA would reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate and detailed information in all areas of concern (S/PRST/1998/11). 3-4 Jun 1998 At the Council’s request, experts from the Commission’s New York Headquarters staff provide a technical briefing to Council members in informal session. At the conclusion of the meeting the Executive Chairman circulates to Council members for information an informal paper on disarmament issues which the Commission deems necessary to be completed and verified for the formulation of a report pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). 14 Jun 1998 The Executive Chairman agrees on a schedule for work on certain outstanding disarmament issues with the Deputy Prime Minister covering the following six weeks (S/1998/529). 10-15 Jul 1998 A team of UNSCOM international experts meets with their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad to give Iraq an account of the Commission’s VX. findings. 14 Jul 1998 As a consequence of the high-level talks between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman in June 1998, a team of UNSCOM international biological experts is assembled in Baghdad to review, for the third time, Iraq’s declaration on its biological weapons programme. The experts conclude that the declaration is not verifiable. 3 Aug 1998 During a visit to Baghdad, the Executive Chairman is told by the Deputy Prime Minister that he must certify to the Security Council that the requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991) have been met. The Chairman responds that he is not in a position to do so. The Deputy Prime Minister suspends the talks (S/1998/719). 5 Aug 1998 The Revolutionary Command Council and the Ba’ath Party Command decide to halt cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA pending Security Council agreement to lift the oil embargo, reorganize the Commission and move it to either Geneva or Vienna. In the interim, Iraq would, on its own terms, permit monitoring under resolution 715 (1991). 6 Aug 1998 The Executive Chairman briefs the Security Council on Iraq’s position and the results of his talks in Baghdad (S/1998/719). The Security Council’s President terms Iraq’s actions "totally unacceptable". 12 Aug 1998 The Executive Chairman informs the Security Council (document S/1998/767) that, in addition to halting all disarmament activities, Iraq’s actions with respect to monitoring have impinged on the effectiveness of the monitoring system and the Commission could not continue to provide the Security Council with the same level of assurances of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations not to reestablish its proscribed weapons programmes. 18 Aug 1998 In a letter from the President of the Council (S/1998/769), the Security Council reiterates its support for UNSCOM in the full implementation of its mandate and notes that Iraq is obliged to provide UNSCOM with cooperation necessary for it to undertake activities, including inspections. 19 Aug 1998 The Executive Chairman proposes, in a letter to the Deputy Prime Minister that Iraq and the Special Commission resume the full range of activity. This is rejected by the Deputy Prime Minister in remarks to the press stating that Iraq does not trust the Executive Chairman or the elements dominating UNSCOM and that it does not believe that there is any use in resuming work with them. 3 Sep 1998 The Executive Chairman briefs the Security Council on the status of UNSCOM’s work in Iraq, including three incidents where Iraq has placed further limits on the Commission’s rights and activities with respect to monitoring. 9 Sep 1998 Security Council resolution 1194 (1998) unanimously condemns Iraq’s decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM, terming Iraq’s actions a totally unacceptable contravention of Iraq’s obligations; demands Iraq rescind its decision and decides not to conduct the 60-day sanctions reviews until Iraq does so and the Commission reports to the Council that it is satisfied that it has been able to exercise its full range of activities, including inspections. 24-25 Sep 1998 The Commission holds a second international expert meeting in New York to discuss the results of 1998 analyses conducted on remnants of Iraq’s missile warheads. 6 Oct 1998 The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council (S/1998/920). 13 Oct 1998 The Executive Chairman briefs the Council on the Commission’s semi-annual report. 22-23 Oct The Commission convenes a further international expert meeting to discuss the 1998 analysis of samples taken from remnants of Iraq’s special warheads. The report of the meeting which is submitted to the Council. 31 Oct 1998 Iraq announces that it will cease all forms of interaction with UNSCOM and its Chairman and to halt all UNSCOM’s activities inside Iraq, including monitoring. The Security Council, in a statement to the press, unanimously condemn Iraq’s decision to cease all cooperation with UNSCOM. 4 Nov 1998 The Executive Chairman informs the Council (S/1998/1032) that, as a result of Iraq’s actions, the Commission is not in a position to provide the Council with any level of assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations not to retain and not to reestablish proscribed activities. 5 Nov 1998 Security Council resolution 1205 (1998) unanimously condemns Iraq’s actions and demands that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally its decisions of 31 October and 5 August. 15 Nov 1998 Press Statement by the President of the Security Council in which the Council takes note of Iraq’s statement of 14 November to cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the IAEA. The Council members underline that their confidence in Iraq’s intentions needs to be established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities. The Council members also reaffirm their readiness to proceed with the comprehensive review once the Secretary-General has confirmed, on the basis of reports from the Special Commission and the IAEA that Iraq has returned to full cooperation on the basis of resolution 1194 (1998) and the Council President’s letter of 30 October to the Secretary-General (SC/65/96-IK258). 3 Dec 1998 The Special Commission submits the first of a series of weekly reports on its activities during the period 17 November to 2 December 1998. The report covers inspection activities during that period and also provides an account of correspondence exchanged with Iraq regarding matters such as the provision of documents, clarifications on a number of points previously raised with Iraq and asking that Iraq provide new substantial information on its biological weapons programme. 9 Dec 1998 The Special Commission submits its second weekly report to the Security Council describing monitoring activities and the difficulties encountered in the course of those activities, including blockage at a site. 15 Dec 1998 The Special Commission reports to the Security-General concerning UNSCOM’s activities and the status of Iraq’s cooperation with the Commission in the period since 14 November 1998. The Executive Chairman concludes that Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it had promised on 14 November 1998 (S/1998/1172) 16 Dec 1998 The Special Commission withdraws its staff from Iraq.

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 7:53:57 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Respond to of 25898

1999-2002(NOV) * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org 1999 January 1999 The Council discusses informal proposals submitted by France Russia and Canada including on ways to re-establish dialogue and cooperation between Iraq and the United Nations. 25 Jan 1999 The Executive Chairman submits a report (S/1999/94) to the President of the Security Council on disarmament and monitoring. 30 Jan 1999 Through a note (S/1999/100), the President of the Security Council announces that the Security Council has decided that it would be useful to establish three panels to, inter alia, provide the Council with recommendations on how to re- establish an effective disarmament/ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq. 27 Mar 1999 The Chairman of the Panels forwards the reports of the Panels to the President of the Security Council (S/1999/356) 9 April 1999 The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council (S/1999/401). 30 June 1999 Mr. Richard Butler completes his two year tenure as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. 8 October 1999 The Commission submits its semi-annual report to the Security Council (S/1999/1037). 17 December 1999 Security Council adopts resolution 1284 replacing UNSCOM by the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). 2000- NOTHING 2001- NOTHING 2002- NOTHING TIL 1441 NOW go to UNMOVIC and download the Cluster Document (PDF file) for 2003--- 175 pages long--- containment? un.org Containment? for whom..... it was containment for the UN and Saddam was laughing all the way.

To: PartyTime who wrote (22419)	3/17/2003 8:02:15 PM
From: Volsi Mimir	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 25898

2003 * containment--Saddam didn't produce anything while the previous inspectors were there, he's not producing anything now, why would he in the future under the above conditions? Pick a year and resolution and/or easy read about all the discoveries, lies and rebuttals Iraq incurred:from UN: un.org and notice NO 1441 listed-- that's under un.org How can you say Saddam didn't produce anything while previous inspectors were there, when just a quick read shows the deceptions and previous WMD. 2003 FROM THE PDF FILE--- "CLUSTER document": [snip pg2-173] UNMOVIC evaluated and assessed this material as it has became available and, as a first step, produced an internal working document covering about 100 unresolved disarmament issues, fully referenced to the database, including entries which need to be confidential. The principal part of the present document represents the second step in the assessment and analysis of the material studied. The unresolved issues discussed in detail in the first working document were grouped into 29 “clusters” and presented by discipline: missiles, munitions, chemical and biological. Each cluster has four sections. The first two sections provide the background, including Iraqi statements and earlier UNSCOM findings. The third section provides UNMOVIC’s assessment. It identifies the questions that are deemed outstanding and unresolved. This may be because of the lack of convincing evidence or, in a few cases, because of evidence that conflicts with Iraq’s account. The fourth section contains suggestions what Iraq could do to resolve the issues. This is in line with the precept that Iraq shall declare proscribed activities and items and supply evidence that can be verified by UNMOVIC. It is also in line with operative paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 (1999), which states as regards the “key remaining disarmament tasks” that “what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise.” While a precise description of the disarmament issue to be resolved is generally not too difficult, an exhaustive definition of the ways in which it may be solved is often hard. It is believed that the requirement of definition of the tasks laid on Iraq was included Page 3 of 173 UNMOVIC Working document 6 March 2003 to protect Iraq against any “moving of the goalposts” in the sense of additional requirements for evidence being raised when Iraq had fulfilled those first indicated. The fourth sections seek to be as specific as it is possible to be in the description of what Iraq can do.