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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (15415)3/24/2003 6:48:34 PM
From: Clappy  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 89467
 
I expect war to erupt on five fronts at least

Which are they?

Iraq, Turkey,

Iran? Syria? Saudi Arabia?



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (15415)3/24/2003 8:58:34 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
THE BOMBING OF BAGHDAD

The view from the banks of the Tigris.

By JON LEE ANDERSON
The New Yorker
Posted 2003-03-24

newyorker.com

The morning the first cruise missiles hit Baghdad, on March 20th, I was in a suite at the Al Rashid hotel, in a room facing south, which provided good reception for satellite phones and a panoramic view of some primary targets: the telecommunications tower; several grand domed palaces; and the headquarters of the Mukhabarat, the secret police. I was awake around five-thirty and heard a big, muted whoomping noise. Then my bed moved, as if there had been an earthquake rather far away. I thought I heard a high-flying jet go past, followed by anti-aircraft fire and air-raid sirens. There was more firing and, as a light-blue dawn broke, silence, except for the sound of a rooster crowing, birds singing, and a muezzin calling out “allahu akbar” over and over. Not long afterward, Paul McGeough, the correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald, who was staying in the next room, received a phone message from his office saying that we had to move out of the Al Rashid because it was “a high-value target.”

There had been rumors all week that the Al Rashid would be hit, perhaps because, it was said, there was a secret Presidential bunker under it, or because a tunnel linked it to Saddam Hussein’s main palace complex across the street, or simply because it was in the way of missiles headed for the palaces or key office buildings nearby. Journalists had been hedging their bets about where to stay once the bombing started, booking rooms in several hotels and moving back and forth. The night before the missile attack, McGeough and I shared a dirty little room with two single beds in the Palestine Hotel, a run-down place that was built in the nineteen-eighties, during the Iran-Iraq war, on the other side of the Tigris River. The Palestine was popular because it overlooks the palace complex but isn’t uncomfortably close to it. We were able to get a room when a Canadian news organization ordered its reporter to get out of the country and he gave us his keys, but we were so miserable there that we moved back to the Al Rashid, where the gardeners were still watering the lawn and clipping the shrubs, and where enough of our colleagues were staying that we felt the safety of good company, if not numbers.

I had hoped to stay in my favorite hotel in Baghdad, the Al Safeer, a small, family-run place on Abu Nawas street, on the same side of the river as the Palestine. I stashed food and water and other emergency supplies—candles, matches, batteries—there and visited several times in the days leading up to the war. The Al Safeer is near some open-air fish restaurants, which, in normal times, are brightly lit and jovial, with Middle Eastern music blaring from speakers on the walls. Many of the houses in the neighborhood are dilapidated mansions, with wrought-iron balconies and arched windows and doors. Farther down Abu Nawas from the Al Safeer there are several art galleries, a theatre, and a café where men sit outside and play dominoes. Narrow lanes run from Abu Nawas to Sadoun Street, a boulevard lined with watch shops and kebab restaurants and movie houses. The week before President Bush announced that President Hussein had forty-eight hours to get out of town, the movies running on Sadoun Street included “American Pie,” a teen-sex film, and “Inner Sanctum,” a thriller that, judging from the garish illustrations on the billboard advertising it, must be pretty gruesome.

My driver, Sabah, would often take me for a haircut and a shave on one of the back streets near the Al Safeer, at a small barbershop owned by a man named Karim, who has been cutting Sabah’s hair for thirty years. Karim served us sweet black tea, in little glass cups and saucers, from the chaikhana, the teahouse, just across the street. Sometimes, late in the evening, we would smoke apple-flavored tobacco in a nargileh—a water pipe—at another teahouse nearby, which is owned by an Egyptian who came to Iraq years ago, when it was a wealthy country and immigrant workers flooded in from all over the Middle East. Many immigrants from those days, including quite a few Sudanese, still live in the neighborhood. The streets are dirty now, with uncollected garbage and rubble lying about, but it is my favorite part of Baghdad.

The Al Fanar, another small hotel on Abu Nawas Street, right next to the Palestine and a half mile or so from the Al Safeer, was filled by a cosmopolitan group of people who had come to Baghdad to show their solidarity with the Iraqis and to protest the war. One of them, an Irish-American in his early fifties named Patrick Dillon, insisted that I accept his copy of Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness” as a gift. Dillon is a distinctive figure. He is very pale and he always wears black clothing. His head is shaved, and there is a tattoo of the crosshairs of a rifle on the back of his skull. He told me that he came to Baghdad to make a movie inspired by “Le Petit Soldat,” Jean Luc Godard’s second film, which was made in 1960, during the last years of the Algerian war for independence from France. The narrator of Godard’s film is a deserter from the French army who works for a right-wing terrorist organization (more or less the O.A.S.), and who has come to Geneva to assassinate an important commentator for the Arab side of things. The movie is full of moral and narrative ambiguities, and has some nasty scenes of torture. Dillon said that he had served as a soldier in Vietnam and had been obsessed with war and killing ever since. He said that he had also spent time in Northern Ireland, Somalia, and Kosovo, sometimes as a filmmaker and sometimes as a relief worker. “I love death,” he said to me, enthusiastically. “I know it’s wrong, but I do. Don’t you? Isn’t that why you’re here?”

Before Dillon left me his copy of “Heart of Darkness,” he read aloud the passage from which the title is derived: “The reaches opened before us and closed behind, as if the forest had stepped leisurely across the water to bar the way for our return. We penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness. It was very quiet there.” His voice was reverent, and he repeated the passage, then turned to me: “Doesn’t that just fucking say it all? The heart of darkness. That’s where we are, right here, right now, in fucking Baghdad.” Later, I found a note that he had left in the book for me. “I’ve been shooting my eyeballs out, the underworld of sewage streets and feral packs of night children who remind me of me,” he wrote, “and always on the verge of tears because of what Curtis ‘Bombs Away’ LeMay invented in Japan, evolved in the valleys of N. Korea and perfected in Vietnam, the firebomb, which is about to erase whatever is left of Iraqi life as it was known and lived and celebrated for what, four or five thousand years? But what’s one or two or a hundred cultures or ethnicities tossed into the dustbin of history, among friends, right? . . . I’ve moved my bed away from the balcony sliding doors and taped the great panes of glass in cross-shaped patterns but I’ll be damned if I can find any earplugs. What kind of a dump is this, hey?” I liked Dillon, but I worried about him. I saw him quite often as I drove around the streets near the Al Fanar. He would be striding purposefully along the sidewalk, and he was always alone.

The prelude to the war in Iraq attracted many eccentrics to Baghdad, among them a Russian photojournalist who wore a green paratrooper’s outfit and a tall, blond human shield named Gordon Sloan, who was famous for having participated in the Australian version of “Big Brother.” He had been filmed naked in the shower, and was subsequently known as Donkey Boy. Another human shield, Godfrey Meynell, a retired British civil servant, wept often and recited Kipling and Gerard Manley Hopkins. Korean feminists and Green Party activists mingled with more well-known visitors. Ramsey Clark, Dan Rather, Yevgeny Primakov, and Alexandra Vodjanikova, the current Miss Germany, all passed through the lobby of the Al Rashid, where the famous floor mosaic of the first George Bush had been carpeted over (because, it was said, Hans Blix did not want to be photographed stepping on it). Alexandra Vodjanikova hoped to discuss peace with Saddam Hussein, and although she did not get this opportunity, she was invited to dinner by Saddam’s priapic and psychotic elder son, Uday. It is not known how their evening went, because the next morning Miss Germany left the country with nary a word to the press corps.

A few days after Patrick Dillon gave me his copy of “Heart of Darkness,” he said that he was rereading Orwell’s “1984,” another of his favorite books. He was very excited about the imminent war, he said, and had found some wonderful subjects for his film: a group of child violinists who were learning to play Sibelius, and an Iraqi man who had returned from London, where he had been living for thirty years, and taken on the Sisyphean task of restoring a boat owned by his father. The boat had sunk in the Tigris during the bombing of Baghdad by the Americans in 1991. The man had raised it from the depths and was painstakingly working on it. “The trick to the film is to come back after the bombing, and see which of them has survived,” Dillon said. “That’s the story. Will any of us survive? Will you survive? Have you thought about that?” He laughed.

As war approached, most Iraqis I met seemed to be oddly neutral about the prospect. They were concerned about their families, but were not visibly hostile toward the West, or toward Americans. I had the impression that there was widespread, if privately held, support for regime change. I had a number of unmonitored conversations with Baghdadis, and several spoke to me with a candor that would have been unthinkable just a few weeks earlier. One day, as I was standing near the Tigris River with an Iraqi man, he said, “If God wills, Bush will bomb Saddam into the river. But not the people. Just Saddam. And Tikrit.” Tikrit is Saddam’s home town, and most of his close associates are from there. “If God wills, Tikrit will be flattened,” the man said. He spat, and called Tikritis “camels’ offspring” and a series of other pithy epithets in Arabic.

I was invited to dinner one night at the home of a senior government official, a man I will call Firas. There were a few other guests—educated, well-to-do Iraqi men who were friends of his. I told Firas that I hoped to stay in Baghdad during the war, and he said he thought that the rumors about the Al Rashid being a target were credible. He said he assumed that his ministry would be bombed, but he didn’t say that this was a terrible thing, or that the Americans were embarking on a criminal enterprise by going to war with his government.

Firas grilled Gulf shrimp on a portable charcoal grill in the kitchen, and his guests sat in the living room drinking Lebanese arrack and eating warm pistachios, cashews, and almonds. Whenever Firas joined us, he would pick up the remote control of the TV and flip channels, following the news on CNN, Iraqi state TV, and Al Jazeera. Then he got interested in “My Best Friend’s Wedding,” which was playing on a satellite movie channel. He laughed delightedly at the scene where Cameron Diaz sings badly in a karaoke bar. Throughout the evening, Firas was interruptedby phone calls, including one from his boss, who wanted to talk about the eleventh-hour invitation to Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei to return to Baghdad to discuss Iraq’s offer of “accelerated coöperation” on the issue of disarmament. When he got off the phone, Firas turned to me and shrugged, as if to say he knew that it was already too late to stop the war, but he had his official duties to perform. “What else can we do?” he said.

As we ate the shrimp, Firas began flipping channels again, and found another movie, “Six Days, Seven Nights,” starring Harrison Ford and Anne Heche as two mismatched people who crash-land on a deserted South Sea island. The movie was subtitled in Arabic, and Firas kept the sound turned down, but it was pretty easy to follow. Ford and Heche feuded and fought and then, predictably, fell in love. Firas and his Iraqi guests were transfixed. I said that it seemed a little strange to be sitting here in Baghdad watching a Hollywood film a few days before the American attack, and they nodded vigorously and laughed, then turned back to the television set.

The day after Bush set the deadline for Saddam to leave, I visited the home of Sameer, an Iraqi violinist. Sameer and his wife and children live in a modest but comfortable house in a residential section of Baghdad. Sameer leads a chamber-music group, but he earns his living as a violin teacher at a Baghdad music school for children. He has taught three of his four childen to play instruments, and he wanted to show me what they could do. The children were excited. They squeezed together on the couch in the sitting room, whispering and fidgeting. Large wooden bureaus had been placed in front of the windows, and the furniture was covered with drop cloths. Sameer went first. He stood in front of a music stand and played a sweet, mournful étude. Then Hamid, his ten-year-old son, played his own little violin while his father stood next to him, gently directing him with his hand. One of Sameer’s daughters played a piece for flute, and his eldest child, a twelve-year-old girl, played the piano. Sameer apologized about the piano being out of tune. He said that the violin strings were not in the best shape, either. They were second-rate strings from Turkey and China. “It’s impossible to get professional violin strings in Baghdad,” he said sadly.

During the family concert, Sameer’s wife, a pretty woman with deep-blue eyes, had stayed in the kitchen, and I went in to say hello. She was sitting at a table making small face masks with a needle and thread. She put cotton balls and charcoal inside a gauze pouch that would cover the mouth and nose, and little loops of cloth to fasten the masks around the ears. I asked her what they were for, and she smiled shyly. “They are masks, for the smoke, for the children,” she said. I asked her if the children knew what was about to happen. She shook her head. “No, they don’t, really. They just know there will be a lot of noise and smoke.” The children had come into the room and were standing around, smiling and staring timidly at me.

Later, in the bunkerlike front room and out of earshot of the children, I asked Sameer what his plans were. He wanted to take his family out before the bombing began, to Jordan, he said. He had the right papers to leave, but he had so far been unable to get enough gas for the journey. He didn’t know yet if he would manage it in time; there were huge lines at all the gas stations in town. But he was going to try. He nodded toward his children. “I don’t want them to go through this,” he said. I asked if he needed any help. He looked embarrassed and shook his head, thanking me for the offer. When I drove away, the whole family was standing outside, and the children were smiling and waving.

Iraqis who had homes in the countryside or relatives in villages outside of Baghdad were fleeing the city. An Iraqi friend of mine who lives in a Shia neighborhood in the western suburbs was staying, but he told me that his three closest neighbors had locked up their houses and gone to Karbala, two hours to the south. They had asked him to look after their houses while they were away. Western journalists also began evacuating, leaving in a succession of convoys of GMC Suburbans headed for the Jordanian border. The normal fare for the ten-hour journey to Amman, two hundred dollars, had leaped to five hundred by noon of the day after Bush’s speech. By that afternoon, it was seven hundred. Most of the reporters had been ordered out of the country by their news organizations, following Colin Powell’s warning that all Westerners in Iraq were at risk. Some people had become nervous after receiving warnings from Iraqi Information Ministry officials that they could not guarantee their safety—a possible allusion to their being taken hostage by Saddam’s intelligence services.

The last diplomats and U.N. inspectors in Baghdad were expected to leave the next morning, and the atmosphere in the hotels and at the Information Ministry became increasingly tense. Journalists had to pay their bills before they left the country. Fees to the government usually amounted to two hundred dollars plus fifty thousand Iraqi dinars—equivalent to another twenty dollars—per day. One American television network left behind three huge flour sacks full of dinars at the cashier’s desk at the Al Rashid, a hotel employee told me in an awed voice. Until recently, the largest Iraqi notes in circulation were two-hundred-and-fifty-dinar notes, worth about ten cents; a few weeks ago, mercifully, ten-thousand-dinar notes began appearing. Paying off the press center was an immensely frustrating process that sometimes took several hours. There was a single cashier there, who was required to note the serial number of each U.S. bill. Once that tedious procedure was over, various officials had to be found to sign off on things.

The Al Rashid began emptying out. The day before, thinking of moving myself, I had revisited the Al Safeer to see how I felt about being there, and realized that it was probably not a good option after all. There were virtually no other journalists staying there, and I could easily be isolated and cut off from information when the war began. It was a moot point anyway, I discovered, as the managers let it be known that they had been told not to rent rooms to journalists. On Tuesday morning, Paul Mcgeough and I moved to the Palestine, and back to the Rashid the next day. By then, Baghdad had become an eerie place. There were few civilians on the streets, and most of the shops were shuttered, their windows taped with large X’s. The traffic on the roads had thinned out considerably, and quite a few vehicles were filled with men in uniform, going here and there in a hurry. Policemen wearing old-fashioned helmets stood at intersections with their weapons, and throughout the city knots of militiamen and soldiers had assembled on street corners. Most of the foxholes and sandbagged dugouts that had begun appearing throughout the capital in the past four or five days, and had sat empty, were now manned by men with guns.

By Wednesday afternoon, there were few foreigners remaining in Iraq. The night before, the price of a car journey to Amman had reached thirteen hundred dollars, and reports had begun to filter back about journalists—mostly Americans and British, but also some Spaniards and at least one Norwegian relief worker—who had run into problems with the authorities while trying to leave the country. Most, it seemed, had been strip-searched, and detained on previously unenforced currency violations. Either they had been brought back to Baghdad or, depending on the rumors one heard, they were being held in detention in the city of Ramadi, west of Baghdad.

The prospect of being stuck in an Iraqi jail during an American bombing campaign seemed to rule out the option of leaving, and by late afternoon on Wednesday the lobby of the Al Rashid, which had had a funereal appearance just twenty-four hours before, when all the journalists headed over to the unpleasant Palestine, was once again thrumming with activity. At around 5 p.m., the men who run the Internet Center on the ground floor informed their customers that they would be closing earlier than usual, in two hours’ time. As customers finished at the computers, the men turned them off, unplugged them, and began packing them away into cardboard boxes. Out in the lobby, I noticed that all the floor-to-ceiling windows that look onto the garden had been taped, and in the outer foyer, opposite the kilim shop, the windows were not only taped but covered with beautifully woven rugs. It felt as though you were walking through a luxurious Bedouin tent.

I went for a drive at dusk, through almost empty streets. Here and there, families were loading refrigerators, butane cannisters, and other belongings onto small flatbed trucks. While we were stopped at a traffic light, a man in the car next to us, a rustic-looking character in a red-and-white checked kaffiyeh head scarf, pointed a Kalashnikov out the window and began loading the clip. I heard a metallic-sounding click, and the man put the gun away as the light changed. People were stopping their cars to buy items from men and women who stood beside stands with little mounds of stacked-up wares—kerosene lamps, cans of infant formula, instant coffee, luncheon meat, jugs of soybean oil with the logo of the World Food Programme. Two young men at one of the stands looked at me in surprise and pointed at the sky. One of them asked in broken English if I was staying in Iraq for the war. I shrugged and nodded, and he smiled and said that he hoped I didn’t get killed. We shook hands. I told him that I hoped he didn’t get killed, either.

After the “decapitation” strike against Saddam early on Thursday morning, Paul McGeough and I moved back to the Palestine for good. The lobby was swarming with secret police, journalists, and some pretty eccentric-looking human shields, including one with long dreadlocks and pierced ears who wore black Kurdish pantaloons with a saggy rear end. In a new traffic island behind the hotel, next to a big statue of Saddam, one of the Korean feminist groups had hung a banner protesting sexual abuse.

The second strike came on Thursday evening, and when I looked out my window I noticed that several Iraqis were sitting on lawn chairs on the sidewalk in front of the entrance to a small hotel nearby, as if nothing much were happening and they were just enjoying the fresh evening air. There were three big hits quite close to us, but across the river, and we watched the fires from our balcony. We could see a few cars driving around, even over the bridges. Dogs barked, and the river looked as calm as olive oil, with just a shimmer of motion on the surface.

The next morning, I visited the home of a highly placed Iraqi professional, a man I will call Mr. Hassan, who began reminiscing about the sixties, when many Iraqis of his generation went to England and the United States to study. He had been a student at a provincial English university. It was one of the best times of his life, he said. Something had happened then, a simple thing, that was one of his most enduring memories, and he had been thinking of it that morning. He had travelled to London one day, to the Iraqi Embassy in Queen’s Gate, to get a paper signed. “There was a porter who worked there, a man who had been at the Embassy forever,” Mr. Hassan said. “He was a big, tall fellow, and English, but he had lived in Iraq and had been with the Embassy so long that he seemed completely Iraqi. I told him who I wanted to see and he told me to sit down and wait. After a long time, more than an hour and a half, I asked him why it was taking so long. He said that the person I was waiting for had gone out and that I should come back the next day. This made me very angry, of course. I had waited two hours, I said. The porter looked at his watch and told me I was lying. I had waited only an hour and a half.

“There was no point in arguing with the man,” Mr. Hassan said. “But I was so furious that I told him I wouldn’t leave. The porter stared at me for a moment and took a painting of the then President of Iraq, Abdul Salam Arif, down from the wall and brought it over to me. The frame was very loosely attached. He shoved the painting under my nose. ‘Look,’ he said, and he lifted the portrait up. Underneath was the picture of the President’s predecessor, Abdul Karim Qasim. And there were other layers of portraits. I think the last one he showed me was of King Faisal.” Mr. Hassan is something of a philosopher. “I think the porter was trying to tell me that Iraq’s leaders came and went and it didn’t matter to him, because he was always there. And as for me, I was of no consequence at all.” Mr. Hassan smiled and arched his eyebrows.

That night, the “shock and awe” bombardment began. The first bombs hit precisely at nine o’clock, and we had a front-row view of the conflagration. There were huge blasts, simultaneous concussions with aftershocks that knocked us back. I forgot to put my earplugs in. The Republican Palace and a huge, ugly, pyramid-shaped building some ten stories high were hit several times and burned robustly. Fireballs were followed by white flashes that lit up the sky. Debris flew through the air from a couple of the blasts as buildings took direct hits. What must have been a cruise missile smashed into the roof of the Council of Ministers, and a huge orange plume of flame rose up. A big white dog loped down the center of Abu Nawas Street, followed, some minutes later, by a man on a bicycle, pedalling along in no apparent hurry. I heard a donkey bray. The night sky, which was a deep blue, was filled with columns of black and gray smoke. The Al Rashid was still standing.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (15415)3/24/2003 9:04:56 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
WHO LIED TO WHOM?

Why did the Administration endorse a forgery about Iraq’s nuclear program?

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Columnist
The New Yorker
Issue of 2003-03-31
Posted 2003-03-24

Last September 24th, as Congress prepared to vote on the resolution authorizing President George W. Bush to wage war in Iraq, a group of senior intelligence officials, including George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq’s weapons capability. It was an important presentation for the Bush Administration. Some Democrats were publicly questioning the President’s claim that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction which posed an immediate threat to the United States. Just the day before, former Vice-President Al Gore had sharply criticized the Administration’s advocacy of preëmptive war, calling it a doctrine that would replace “a world in which states consider themselves subject to law” with “the notion that there is no law but the discretion of the President of the United States.” A few Democrats were also considering putting an alternative resolution before Congress.

According to two of those present at the briefing, which was highly classified and took place in the committee’s secure hearing room, Tenet declared, as he had done before, that a shipment of high-strength aluminum tubes that was intercepted on its way to Iraq had been meant for the construction of centrifuges that could be used to produce enriched uranium. The suitability of the tubes for that purpose had been disputed, but this time the argument that Iraq had a nuclear program under way was buttressed by a new and striking fact: the C.I.A. had recently received intelligence showing that, between 1999 and 2001, Iraq had attempted to buy five hundred tons of uranium oxide from Niger, one of the world’s largest producers. The uranium, known as “yellow cake,” can be used to make fuel for nuclear reactors; if processed differently, it can also be enriched to make weapons. Five tons can produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb. (When the C.I.A. spokesman William Harlow was asked for comment, he denied that Tenet had briefed the senators on Niger.)

On the same day, in London, Tony Blair’s government made public a dossier containing much of the information that the Senate committee was being given in secret—that Iraq had sought to buy “significant quantities of uranium” from an unnamed African country, “despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it.” The allegation attracted immediate attention; a headline in the London Guardian declared, “african gangs offer route to uranium.”

Two days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell, appearing before a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also cited Iraq’s attempt to obtain uranium from Niger as evidence of its persistent nuclear ambitions. The testimony from Tenet and Powell helped to mollify the Democrats, and two weeks later the resolution passed overwhelmingly, giving the President a congressional mandate for a military assault on Iraq.

On December 19th, Washington, for the first time, publicly identified Niger as the alleged seller of the nuclear materials, in a State Department position paper that rhetorically asked, “Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?” (The charge was denied by both Iraq and Niger.) A former high-level intelligence official told me that the information on Niger was judged serious enough to include in the President’s Daily Brief, known as the P.D.B., one of the most sensitive intelligence documents in the American system. Its information is supposed to be carefully analyzed, or “scrubbed.” Distribution of the two- or three-page early-morning report, which is prepared by the C.I.A., is limited to the President and a few other senior officials. The P.D.B. is not made available, for example, to any members of the Senate or House Intelligence Committees. “I don’t think anybody here sees that thing,” a State Department analyst told me. “You only know what’s in the P.D.B. because it echoes—people talk about it.”

President Bush cited the uranium deal, along with the aluminum tubes, in his State of the Union Message, on January 28th, while crediting Britain as the source of the information: “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” He commented, “Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.”

Then the story fell apart. On March 7th, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna, told the U.N. Security Council that the documents involving the Niger-Iraq uranium sale were fakes. “The I.A.E.A. has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents . . . are in fact not authentic,” ElBaradei said.

One senior I.A.E.A. official went further. He told me, “These documents are so bad that I cannot imagine that they came from a serious intelligence agency. It depresses me, given the low quality of the documents, that it was not stopped. At the level it reached, I would have expected more checking.”

The I.A.E.A. had first sought the documents last fall, shortly after the British government released its dossier. After months of pleading by the I.A.E.A., the United States turned them over to Jacques Baute, who is the director of the agency’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office.

It took Baute’s team only a few hours to determine that the documents were fake. The agency had been given about a half-dozen letters and other communications between officials in Niger and Iraq, many of them written on letterheads of the Niger government. The problems were glaring. One letter, dated October 10, 2000, was signed with the name of Allele Habibou, a Niger Minister of Foreign Affairs and Coöperation, who had been out of office since 1989. Another letter, allegedly from Tandja Mamadou, the President of Niger, had a signature that had obviously been faked and a text with inaccuracies so egregious, the senior I.A.E.A. official said, that “they could be spotted by someone using Google on the Internet.”

The large quantity of uranium involved should have been another warning sign. Niger’s “yellow cake” comes from two uranium mines controlled by a French company, with its entire output presold to nuclear power companies in France, Japan, and Spain. “Five hundred tons can’t be siphoned off without anyone noticing,” another I.A.E.A. official told me.

This official told me that the I.A.E.A. has not been able to determine who actually prepared the documents. “It could be someone who intercepted faxes in Israel, or someone at the headquarters of the Niger Foreign Ministry, in Niamey. We just don’t know,” the official said. “Somebody got old letterheads and signatures, and cut and pasted.” Some I.A.E.A. investigators suspected that the inspiration for the documents was a trip that the Iraqi Ambassador to Italy took to several African countries, including Niger, in February, 1999. They also speculated that MI6—the branch of British intelligence responsible for foreign operations—had become involved, perhaps through contacts in Italy, after the Ambassador’s return to Rome.

Baute, according to the I.A.E.A. official, “confronted the United States with the forgery: ‘What do you have to say?’ They had nothing to say.”

ElBaradei’s disclosure has not been disputed by any government or intelligence official in Washington or London. Colin Powell, asked about the forgery during a television interview two days after ElBaradei’s report, dismissed the subject by saying, “If that issue is resolved, that issue is resolved.” A few days later, at a House hearing, he denied that anyone in the United States government had anything to do with the forgery. “It came from other sources,” Powell testified. “It was provided in good faith to the inspectors.”

The forgery became the object of widespread, and bitter, questions in Europe about the credibility of the United States. But it initially provoked only a few news stories in America, and little sustained questioning about how the White House could endorse such an obvious fake. On March 8th, an American official who had reviewed the documents was quoted in the Washington Post as explaining, simply, “We fell for it.”

The Bush Administration’s reliance on the Niger documents may, however, have stemmed from more than bureaucratic carelessness or political overreaching. Forged documents and false accusations have been an element in U.S. and British policy toward Iraq at least since the fall of 1997, after an impasse over U.N. inspections. Then as now, the Security Council was divided, with the French, the Russians, and the Chinese telling the United States and the United Kingdom that they were being too tough on the Iraqis. President Bill Clinton, weakened by the impeachment proceedings, hinted of renewed bombing, but, then as now, the British and the Americans were losing the battle for international public opinion. A former Clinton Administration official told me that London had resorted to, among other things, spreading false information about Iraq. The British propaganda program—part of its Information Operations, or I/Ops—was known to a few senior officials in Washington. “I knew that was going on,” the former Clinton Administration official said of the British efforts. “We were getting ready for action in Iraq, and we wanted the Brits to prepare.”

Over the next year, a former American intelligence officer told me, at least one member of the U.N. inspection team who supported the American and British position arranged for dozens of unverified and unverifiable intelligence reports and tips—data known as inactionable intelligence—to be funnelled to MI6 operatives and quietly passed along to newspapers in London and elsewhere. “It was intelligence that was crap, and that we couldn’t move on, but the Brits wanted to plant stories in England and around the world,” the former officer said. There was a series of clandestine meetings with MI6, at which documents were provided, as well as quiet meetings, usually at safe houses in the Washington area. The British propaganda scheme eventually became known to some members of the U.N. inspection team. “I knew a bit,” one official still on duty at U.N. headquarters acknowledged last week, “but I was never officially told about it.”

None of the past and present officials I spoke with were able to categorically state that the fake Niger documents were created or instigated by the same propaganda office in MI6 that had been part of the anti-Iraq propaganda wars in the late nineteen-nineties. (An MI6 intelligence source declined to comment.) Press reports in the United States and elsewhere have suggested other possible sources: the Iraqi exile community, the Italians, the French. What is generally agreed upon, a congressional intelligence-committee staff member told me, is that the Niger documents were initially circulated by the British—President Bush said as much in his State of the Union speech—and that “the Brits placed more stock in them than we did.” It is also clear, as the former high-level intelligence official told me, that “something as bizarre as Niger raises suspicions everywhere.”

What went wrong? Did a poorly conceived propaganda effort by British intelligence, whose practices had been known for years to senior American officials, manage to move, without significant challenge, through the top layers of the American intelligence community and into the most sacrosanct of Presidential briefings? Who permitted it to go into the President’s State of the Union speech? Was the message—the threat posed by Iraq—more important than the integrity of the intelligence-vetting process? Was the Administration lying to itself? Or did it deliberately give Congress and the public what it knew to be bad information?

Asked to respond, Harlow, the C.I.A. spokesman, said that the agency had not obtained the actual documents until early this year, after the President’s State of the Union speech and after the congressional briefings, and therefore had been unable to evaluate them in a timely manner. Harlow refused to respond to questions about the role of Britain’s MI6. Harlow’s statement does not, of course, explain why the agency left the job of exposing the embarrassing forgery to the I.A.E.A. It puts the C.I.A. in an unfortunate position: it is, essentially, copping a plea of incompetence.

The chance for American intelligence to challenge the documents came as the Administration debated whether to pass them on to ElBaradei. The former high-level intelligence official told me that some senior C.I.A. officials were aware that the documents weren’t trustworthy. “It’s not a question as to whether they were marginal. They can’t be ‘sort of’ bad, or ‘sort of’ ambiguous. They knew it was a fraud—it was useless. Everybody bit their tongue and said, ‘Wouldn’t it be great if the Secretary of State said this?’ The Secretary of State never saw the documents.” He added, “He’s absolutely apoplectic about it.” (A State Department spokesman was unable to comment.) A former intelligence officer told me that some questions about the authenticity of the Niger documents were raised inside the government by analysts at the Department of Energy and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. However, these warnings were not heeded.

“Somebody deliberately let something false get in there,” the former high-level intelligence official added. “It could not have gotten into the system without the agency being involved. Therefore it was an internal intention. Someone set someone up.” (The White House declined to comment.)

Washington’s case that the Iraqi regime had failed to meet its obligation to give up weapons of mass destruction was, of course, based on much more than a few documents of questionable provenance from a small African nation. But George W. Bush’s war against Iraq has created enormous anxiety throughout the world—in part because one side is a superpower and the other is not. It can’t help the President’s case, or his international standing, when his advisers brief him with falsehoods, whether by design or by mistake.

On March 14th, Senator Jay Rockefeller, of West Virginia, the senior Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, formally asked Robert Mueller, the F.B.I. director, to investigate the forged documents. Rockefeller had voted for the resolution authorizing force last fall. Now he wrote to Mueller, “There is a possibility that the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq.” He urged the F.B.I. to ascertain the source of the documents, the skill-level of the forgery, the motives of those responsible, and “why the intelligence community did not recognize the documents were fabricated.” A Rockefeller aide told me that the F.B.I. had promised to look into it.

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