US Strategic Disadvantages
by Stan Moore
Although U.S. military experts and generals will tell you that the coalition to effect
regime change in Iraq is perhaps the most powerful in the history of warfare, there are
some strategic disadvantages that must be overcome if the U.S. is to succeed. And as
the war progresses, it appears that the Iraqis are aware of them -- not a comforting
thought if you are counting on a quick, painless American victory.
Some of these differences are based on culture and religion, and perhaps sincerity of
belief in those religions. While most Americans are Christian and would claim to trust in
God and look forward to their "heavenly reward", the fact is that most Americans have
a morbid fear, a dread of death. And that includes U.S. soldiers as well as the U.S.
public.
Because of this fear of death, the public wants minimal casualties and may very well
come to reject a previously acceptable war because the American causality rates are
just too costly for the American psyche. This fear of death has a trickle-down effect in
several ways. The military is forced to control the flow of information by the media.
Gruesome photos, especially of American causalities are not acceptable, because of
being devastating to stateside morale. So censorship by the military on the press
creates distrust by the public of truthfulness of military casualty reports. The old saying
goes "when the bullets fly, truth is the first casualty" and the spread of distrust over
military reporting can be a precursor to loss of support for the very goals of the war, no
matter how "noble" or acceptabl e in the beginning.
Perhaps even more importantly, the combat strategies must be adjusted to minimize
risk of casualties to U.S. troops. This can mean shifting of tactics from more effective
artillery and ground sweeps to firing of long-range cruise missiles and air attacks. On a
skilled, determined, and creative military, these long-range attacks may be less
effective, as in cases where camouflage or deception prevents effective targeting of
the "precision" weapons. This leaves more Iraqi firepower available for time of
application when the Iraqi military leadership chooses, with potential consequence of
increased American casualties. Not having the same morbid fear of death as Christian
Americans, Iraqis may also be willing to expose themselves to greater individual danger
in order to inflict maximum casualties on American troops.
American strategy in the current war certainly focuses on a quick, painless victory, but
that strategy may be backfiring already. In an attempt to race to Baghdad, the U.S.
forces have actually bypassed Iraqi troops and formations and even cities with Iraqi
forces, allowing Iraqi saboteurs and resistance to operate behind the front lines. This in
and of itself can be detrimental to the desire to limit casualties, as hidden Iraqi troops
bearing rocket-propelled grenades or other weapons can launch quick, but deadly
small-scale attacks that cause unwanted casualties. A rocket striking a troop transport
vehicle can kill several soldiers at once. The Iraqi soldier, if detected, will likely be killed,
but the casualties caused by his action will be have much greater impact than his own
death, because the Americans are far more sensitive to individual casualties than the
Iraqis.
The American public is also sensitive to civilian casualties, though not at the same
scale of concern as regarding American combat casualties. Nonetheless, this public
concern affects American strategic selection of military targets and tactics, and limits
somewhat the overwhelming advantage in firepower otherwise enjoyed by American
forces.
It may seem strange, even bizarre, that a powerful and aggressive army of conquest
could be limited by fear of death. But such is the case within the American military as
well as the American public, and this factors into American strategic and tactical
strategy.
Another interesting factor relates to American attitude towards Iraq, its citizens, its
military, and Iraqi perceived attitudes towards their national leadership. Apparently, the
American military and the American government are or were convinced that the Iraqi
public so hated the dominant Baath Party and regime of Saddam Hussein that they
were just waiting for American "liberators" to arrive so they (the Iraqis) could overthrow
the regime themselves or aid the Americans in doing so. The Americans seem to
believe that most, if not all, Iraqi soldiers would simply lay down their arms and
surrender when faced with the "righteous" Americans and all their righteous firepower.
And, it was apparently assumed, the Iraqis would likely take action into their own hands
by eliminating Hussein personally as well as his party and military leaders once the Iraqi
public understood that the regime was doomed and had no chance or survival. It was
even thought that the Iraqi military itself would likely stage a coup and remove Saddam
and save the American military from the risk and dangers of that sort of engagement.
To date, it appears that the Iraqi citizens and military are not willing to exchange even a
repressive native regime for a foreign one. So far, it appears that many Iraqis are
actually willing to fight for their love of country, and not just love of its dominant regime.
So far, it appears that resistance to the American invasion is much stronger than
predicted, and in fact, it appears that many American soldiers are genuinely surprised
to be receiving incoming fire against their invasion! But those fires continue to be
directed at the Americans, sometimes with devastating results.
While none of these strategic disadvantages in and of themselves are necessarily fatal
to the success of the American efforts at Iraqi occupation and regime change, they
certainly make the effort more difficult than many anticipated. Expectations were high
for a quick, easy, and relatively painless war, but with the change in expectation could
be change in morale and change in public opinion back home.
The Iraqis seem to be aware of these things. Instead of allowing the American generals
to prosecute the war solely on their own terms, the Iraqis appear to be exhibiting some
cleverness and some learning from previous experiences during the Gulf War. Lying low
and not issuing frontal challenge to every American soldier or formation seems to be
allowing Iraqis to inflict casualties and undermine American morale.
Will it make the final difference in the outcome of this war? To date, the American
leadership continues to express full confidence that the outcome is pre-determined and
the American forces are unstoppable. If firepower and abundance of military hardware
were the sole determining factor in ultimate success, the story would not even be worth
covering by the press. It would be a one-sided easy victory for the U.S.
As in sports, the outcome of a battle or a war cannot be determined on paper. "That is
why they play the games" is the old saying on why sports are determined on the field or
court instead of in the press. And this war, if completed to military conclusion, will have
to be fought on the ground and in the air until the outcome is determined. And we will
watch and wait and see.
The writer is a member of several falconry and ornithological clubs and
organizations. He contributed above article to Media Monitors Network (MMN)
from California, USA. |
