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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (87029)3/27/2003 3:15:44 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Barbara Lerner has a pessimistic view of the ME. Is she right? TWT.

There Will Never be a Palestinian Democracy
Facing reality.

By Barbara Lerner

....... I believe in America's power to make the world a better, safer place by expanding freedom in the Middle East. I'm a strong supporter of President Bush's plan to liberate Iraq, to end the Baathist regime and set it on the road to democracy. I think Iraq is ripe for it. Europe may be blind, but most Iraqis know that Saddam Hussein and his thugs are responsible for their miseries, not America or Israel ? and they are eager to be liberated. If they can work out tribal and religious differences peacefully, sharing power in a workable federation, a relatively short occupation might suffice. I think Iran, struggling hard to dethrone her tyrannical mullahs, is riper still and can succeed, with a little help from us. I think President Bush thinks so too. I think he sees Iran as the eastern end of a great new arc of freedom, stretching across the whole northern half of the region, from Iran through Turkey. I think he intends to create that new reality, a reality Middle Eastern despots in the south will have to compete with, one their subjects will know about and envy. It's a vision that is worthy of this great nation, and achievable at a cost we can afford.

But it's unrealistic, I think, to expect anything like democracy in the southern half of the Middle East any time soon, and a dangerous illusion to expect a Palestinian democracy ever. Look, first, at Egypt, the population giant of the south. Most Egyptians still see Nasser, a megalomaniacal thug, much like Saddam Hussein, as a hero. Most still blame the same scapegoats Nasser blamed for Egypt's poverty, backwardness, and oppression: America and Israel. Egypt's current dictator, Hosni Mubarak, pretends to be our ally, but his government-controlled media is still pumping out the same old lies and excuses, still demonizing us, still pretending that Egypt's half-century of stagnation is our fault, still goading his people to channel their blind rage at us and at Israel. And what is true for Egypt is true for other southern Arab states as well.

We can't occupy them all, of course. Still, the situation isn't hopeless, because most Arab states have one important positive thing in common with Germany and Japan. In each case, when you strip away the misdirected rage, the false claims that external enemies are responsible for their failures, there is still something left, something beyond hatred and lies on which to build a non-predatory national identity. There was a Germany before Nazism ? a country and people with its own unique language and culture, a culture that produced Bach and Goethe, as well as Hitler. There was an Egypt, too, long before Nasser and Mubarak ? an Egypt with great periods in its past, as well as appalling ones, and this is true of most other nations of the Middle East. True, too, of many ancient peoples in the region who have been denied nationhood for centuries ? the Kurds, for example, and the Berbers.

It's not true of "Palestinians." They have no past to hearken back to. No past glories, no nation or people, no unique language or history or culture. And no wonder: Until the 1960s, they didn't exist. They are as much a product of the Sixties as slogans like "Make love, not war" or inventions like the kindly, democratic Uncle "Ho-Ho-Ho Chi Minh." Before the Sixties ? when Arabs from what is now Jordan, Egypt, and Syria moved west of the Jordan River to take advantage of new economic opportunities opened up by the returning Jews ? they took their nationality from their countries of origin, or from whichever Arab country claimed sovereignty over the land at the time. They were mostly Jordanians, but all three Arab states claimed the land, and each ruled it, or parts of it, at different times. Intra-Arab rivalries notwithstanding, all Arab nations ? the whole Arab world, 200 million strong ? agreed from the start that the Jews would never get to keep any part of ancient Israel, that everything from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea was Arab land, and that Arabs would take back every inch of it. This played well to Arab audiences, but it made for ineffective public relations with the outside world. "Help 200 million Arabs drive a handful of Jews into the sea" was not a winning slogan in most parts of the world. And as the Israeli handful defeated the attacking Arab millions in war after war, it became a liability the united Arab rejectionist front could no longer afford.

Unable to win militarily, they resolved to attack diplomatically instead, with a relentless new propaganda war. Job One was to obscure the fact that the same old Arab Goliath was still bent on destroying the Israeli David. To do that, it needed an Arab rejectionist front in miniature ? a few million dedicated Arab warriors to present a saleable image to the world, an ersatz victim image to compete with the all-too-real victim image of the Jews. And so they invented a new Arab people, "the Palestinians," whose entire raison d'etre is hatred of the Jews, based on a false claim that "their" land has been stolen from them by greedy, foreign Jewish oppressors. This new national identity gave the re-named Arabs an instant claim to a separate new state of their own, and it gave every Arab dictator a cruel new cause to champion ? a new and more effective way of redirecting the popular rage at real oppression at home into rage against manufactured oppression abroad. To give that rage a permanent base, all the Arab states together made pariahs of the so-called Palestinians ? popular pariahs, but pariahs nonetheless. The Palestinians were unwelcome in every Arab state but Jordan, where they form the majority ? and even there, the door is shut to further immigration. Consider: A million Jews who had lived in the Middle East since time immemorial were forced out of Arab lands and into Israel, but the Arabs in Israel were locked in, goaded with a constant stream of propaganda, supplied with clandestine weapons, and given large sums of money for murdering Jews.

These Arabs will never be at peace, will never know the blessings of democracy so long as they are encouraged to cling to a false and hateful identity as "Palestinians." They are not a separate people; they are part of the Arab nation and, with few exceptions, they need to be absorbed back into it. Until they are, there will never be peace in Israel or real and lasting progress toward democracy in the southern Arab states. The biggest mistake America can make would be to keep this evil identity alive by giving it a U.S.-sponsored mini-state. The ancient land of Israel has already been divided between Arabs and Jews, into Jordan and Israel. It cannot be divided again to create another viable state.

? Freelance writer Barbara Lerner conducted a series of interviews with Israeli politicians, journalists, religious figures, and ordinary citizens between January 27 and February 17, 2003.
nationalreview.com



To: JohnM who wrote (87029)3/27/2003 3:27:10 PM
From: E.J. Neitz Jr  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
>>>Could you offer some links which substantiate, to some degree, the observation that the Russian government "supplied Iraq with WMD components<<<<

John, honestly I know of nothing that has been released, at least publically that would substantiate this. Just a strong suspicion at this point, but that suspicion I have read a number of times. If I can find this or come across this in the future I will send it to you.



To: JohnM who wrote (87029)3/27/2003 3:27:49 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 281500
 
Jed Babbin, NRO.

Reliable reports tell us that Griff Jenkins, Ollie North's senior producer, has taken three Iraqi prisoners. Griff, one of the nicest and most competent people I know, apparently pointed his camera at them, and talked them in. Well done, dude.
nationalreview.com



To: JohnM who wrote (87029)3/27/2003 3:30:23 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Can Blair convince Bush to share his belief in the international institutions?

Martin Woollacott
Wednesday March 26, 2003
The Guardian

It may not be too much to say that the shape of the postwar world and not just of postwar Iraq could be decided in that country once the fighting is over.

Iraq could be the site of a partial reconciliation between the United States and its alienated (former) allies, between America and the United Nations, between Americans and Arabs, and, not least, between America's and Britain's rather different purposes in evicting Saddam Hussein by force.

Or it could be the place where the divergence of interest and policy evident in the period before the war is confirmed and deepened.

The most immediate issue is the role of the UN in Iraq, and at Camp David tomorrow the prime minister, Tony Blair, will almost certainly be trying to persuade President Bush to agree to talk positively in public, if probably rather vaguely, about such a role.

Mr Bush is under pressure from people inside and outside the administration who want to keep the UN out.

Yet he may also see that the UN might be the only "exit strategy" for a US military that does not want to stay in Iraq as a peacekeeping force in any strength, even though, paradoxically, it wants bases there, and for an American civilian mission that may not be able to manage Iraq's difficult politics on its own.

Also, after the war, according to Bill Maynes, head of the Eurasia Foundation - a liberal Washington think-tank - "the preference of ordinary Americans for working with allies may reassert itself", and a distaste for going it alone in Iraq may show itself in the polls.

For all these reasons Mr Bush will want to keep his options open, but without committing himself at this stage.

Mr Blair, on the other hand, needs the UN to the fore now to reassure both his critics and supporters in Britain and as a way of mending fences with France and Germany.

At a deeper level the question is whether Mr Blair's belief in the international institutions at whose head the UN stands will be accommodated by the more pragmatic elements in the Bush administration, or whether the ideologues will prevail.

It comes down to the basic question of how Iraq is to be run. A tripartite system for the governance of Iraq has already been created by the Americans. It is unlike any which has been put in place in post-conflict situations in recent years.

In Cambodia, East Timor, Bosnia, and Kosovo peacekeeping - the military component - was in the hands of an internationally endorsed force drawn from many countries.

In Iraq that force will be overwhelmingly American, with some Britons and perhaps some troops from other countries which have supported America over the war. In those other territories, a multinational civil administration was established, while the Americans have created a purely American team, headed by retired army general Jay Garner.

No jobs for Britons are included in it, probably neither offered nor desired.

Finally, in the other territories, the UN agencies and the major non-governmental organisations were the main organisers of aid and reconstruction, while in Iraq commercial firms, so far only American, are bidding for contracts not only for roads, bridges, power plants, water treatment but apparently even for some aspects of political reconstruction, such as the reconstitution of local government.

This combination of military occupation, pro-consular administration, and corporate reconstruction is, however, not supposed to continue unalloyed for more than a couple of months.

That is why attention is focusing on the next stage - the partial handover of power to Iraqis, and at the same time, an attempt to agree on a role for the UN.

The main behind-the-scenes battle in Washington this week has been between those who want to draw most members of an interim Iraq administration from the leaders of the Iraqi National Congress and those who want an assembly of representatives from all the Iraqi regions to choose such an administration.

It is a classic post-liberation conflict between insiders and outsiders and between different groups of both, and it also raises the question of the participation of supposedly "clean" elements of President Saddam's military, police and civil service.

But this phase will also involve, as Thomas Carothers, of the Carnegie Endowment says, an encounter between those who want nothing to do with the security council and those "who can see the UN as a very handy thing enabling us to partially disengage".

Yet, as another Washington expert put it, "it is hard to overestimate the sheer bloody minded nationalism of some of these people".

Nor would the UN be a passive third party to such an argument in Washington.

Jan Kavan, president of the general assembly, says that the security council would have to be convinced that the UN was being given a substantial and honourable role.

The US administration is not divided on the need to have the dominant voice in post-Saddam Iraq. But it is divided on the means of doing so, and trapped in many unresolved contradictions.

The armed forces want as little peacekeeping as they can get away with, yet the Pentagon wants to re-base its Middle Eastern forces from Saudi Arabia to Iraq.

The administration does not want to pay huge sums, on top of the astonishing $75bn requested for the war this week, to run Iraq, yet knows that taking the money out of Iraq's oil revenues would be politically counterproductive.

The anti-UN crowd want the world body kept out of Iraq except for humanitarian work on the fringes.

Yet the US state department knows that the UN would bring some legitimacy, Mr Bush knows that the road to other people's money lies through the UN, and that his faithful ally Mr Blair needs the UN to be in Iraq as a partner and not as a servant.

The issue can be juggled while the war takes centre stage, but it cannot be for long avoided, and it has the potential to break the bond between the two leaders.

guardian.co.uk