How timely..............a perspective you won't hear on FOX!!
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The New York Times
April 1, 2003
MILITARY ANALYSIS
The Test for Rumsfeld: Will Strategy Work?
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
KUWAIT, March 31 — From the day that he took office as defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld has sought to change the nature of American defense. The military Mr. Rumsfeld wants to build is more mobile, can deliver precision weapons at vast distances and takes full advantage of sophisticated reconnaissance systems.
But after nearly two weeks of war with Iraq, a chorus of critics have charged that Mr. Rumsfeld's principles have been applied and found wanting in Iraq.
The skeptics, who include some of the leading former Army commanders from the last war with Iraq, say the force the United States has deployed is not large enough to begin a decisive battle in Baghdad while simultaneously guarding ever-lengthening supply lines and establishing control throughout Iraq.
"Their assumptions were wrong," said retired Gen. Barry M. McCaffrey, who led the 24th Mechanized Division into the Euphrates valley to fight the Republican Guard during the 1991 Persian Gulf war. "There is a view that the nature of warfare has fundamentally changed, that numbers don't count, that armor and artillery don't count. They went into battle with a plan that put a huge air and sea force into action with an unbalanced ground combat force."
The conflict with Iraq is not only intended to topple the government of Saddam Hussein. It is also intended to establish a new military lesson. The paradigm being pushed by Mr. Rumsfeld is one that touts the striking force of American air power and the agility of special forces, but tends to question the utility of the Army's heavy armored divisions.
A final assessment of the strategy will have to await the battle for Baghdad. Mr. Rumsfeld also has defenders who say he is determined to stimulate change and challenge long-entrenched patterns of military thinking, even at the risk of offending retired and active duty generals.
What nobody disputes, however, is that the American force that is fighting in Iraq is fundamentally different from the one used during the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
The doctrine the United States applied in 1991 was one of overwhelming force. Then, the Pentagon sent General H. Norman Schwarzkopf forces he did not even request. A premium was placed on holding risks to an absolute minimum.
When the war came, it began with a 39-day bombing campaign. Then a ground force of more than 500,000 swung into action. The idea was to build up combat power, vanquish the enemy and then quickly withdraw, a concept that came to be known as the "Powell" doctrine, after Gen. Colin L. Powell, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and current secretary of state.
This time, however, the force is much smaller, some 180,000, more than half of which is currently operating inside Iraq. This time the land attack preceded the main air attack, a strategy reversal that commanders say was needed to maintain surprise and seize the Rumaila oil fields but which increased the risk to allied ground troops.
When the war began, the American ground force consisted of the 3rd Infantry Division; the 101st Air Assault Division, which was still arriving in Kuwait and doing its combat checks; a brigade of the 82nd Airborne; the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment, and a Marine expeditionary force.
All in all, it was a modest force given the ambitious nature of the American mission: fighting their way to Baghdad, which is defended by some six Republican Guard divisions, toppling the Saddam Hussein regime, taking on paramilitaries and other regime forces in other towns and cities and establishing order.
(A hybrid British division is also fighting in southern Iraq but is not assigned to fight in or near the Iraqi capital)
The force is also being deployed in a very different way. Instead of first deploying a large force and only then beginning the fight, this time the invasion began as forces were still arriving in Kuwait, a concept known as a "rolling start."
The thinking was that if the fighting turned out to be more difficult than anticipated, forces would continue to flow to Kuwait where they could be used to reinforce the attack. But if the Iraqi regime was quickly toppled the reinforcements could be called off. .
General Franks described the plan this way: "Begin to flow this amount of force, and we'll stop it when it's no longer necessary."
The Pentagon has said this approach offers maximum flexibility. But the theme of gradual escalation marked a sharp break with U.S. military doctrine and strategy following the Vietnam War.
This worried the army. The deployment has come in the wake of difficulties between Mr. Rumsfeld and the Army's leaders. Mr. Rumsfeld seems to regard the Army as the least receptive to change, and has a strained relationship with the Army chief of staff, Gen. Erik K. Shinseki. Pentagon officials say that Mr. Rumsfeld was an important influence on the current war plan.
As debate over the plan has intensified, Mr. Rumsfeld has insisted that the plan was devised by General Tommy R. Franks, the chief of the United States Central Command, but has indicated that he supports it. Mr. Rumsfeld's approach, supporters say, has advantages.
First, it is conceived to take full advantage of American air superiority.Second, by avoiding a massive deployment, the Pentagon has shortened considerably the time needed to send a vast force to the Persian Gulf."I think he accepts the idea that precision and information can combine to produce an increasingly effective military force," said Richard N. Perle, a former Pentagon official, referring to Mr. Rumsfeld. "The plan is well conceived and the forces are appropriate for that plan. I don't believe it is too light. The force is vastly more productive and the systems are more productive. Under those circumstances you can lighten up. I am not aware of any engagement in which heavier forces would have been more effective."
Loren Thompson, a defense analyst, agreed: "I think this is the future. I think this is the way warfare is headed. You can't deploy ground forces quickly. So if you want to get in first you have to it largely with air power."
The land war commanders in the field have been careful to stay out of the brewing debate. Asked last month whether he had a sufficient number of troops and weapons, Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, the V Corps commander who is leading the Army forces to Baghdad, said his forces were "adequate."But some former Army commanders are speaking publicly. They never put much stock in "shock and awe," the air strikes the Bush Administration orchestrated to try to stun the Iraqi government. They say the force dispatched to Kuwait needs more artillery for its fight with the Republican Guard. They say that more forces would also make it easier for the force to protect its long supply lines and cope better with the paramilitary units in the south. Maj. Gen. Ronald Griffith, the commander of the 1st Armored Division during the 1991 war, was careful not to criticize the Pentagon. But he said that if were up to him, he would have deployed two or three armored Army divisions and more artillery.
General McCaffrey, who is the most outspoken of the critics, agreed.In addition to fighting the Republican Guard, the Army is venturing into cities in southern Iraq to look for paramilitary units. It is charged with guarding supply lines. It is moving up massive logistics for its eventual strikes against Baghdad. All of these task require many soldiers.The irony, the critics assert, is that Mr. Rumsfeld's force is not nearly as agile as he suggests.The force can be deployed quickly, they say, but is so limited in number that it has to carry out its tasks in phases, dragging out the war. A bigger force, they say, would be able to better able to keep up the pace of the attack and would have a combat reserve.In the final analysis, the war is not just a battle to unseat a dictator. It is a giant experiment to determine what forces might be most useful in the future. |
