Battle of Baghdad, must it become a Nightmarish Scenario?
Tom Cooper
orbat.com
While the US Army and USMC troops are still fighting RGFC troops south of the Iraqi capital, the logical questions appear about what comes afterwards. Obviously, the Iraqi regime is not to give up, but instead try its best to get the Allies involved in the street fighting in Baghdad, while simultaneously provoking it to cause greatest possible suffering for the local civilians, so to cause pressure upon the USA from the international public.
Therefore, it is time for taking a look at two aspects of this war that are about to become very prominent in the following days.
The first of these two aspects are the foreign volunteers, supposedly thousands of which are currently underway to Baghdad in order to join the fight against “evil invaders”.
“International Iraqi Brigade”
In the last days, we have heard the claims from the Iraqi regime about 4.000 volunteers from other Arab and Islamic countries arriving in Baghdad to support the struggle against the Allies. We have heard reports from Syria about 15.000 volunteers applying for being sent to Iraq to help Saddam’s regime. The regime in Baghdad is trying hard to convince anybody that listens that there will be no end of suicide attacks the closer the Allies get to Baghdad. The French TV has even shown a report from the “HQs” of the what is now being called “International Iraqi Brigade”: armed volunteers from Syria, Sudan, Tunis, and elsewhere were shown, wearing camouflage uniforms and waiting to confront the Americans and the British, once these come closer.
But, not a single of all our brilliant, “objective”, and “ever-present” high-tech media – especially not that from Arab states – informed us how the Iraqis watch at this development. Could it be that this is so because – except in Kuwait and in the UK – there are no Iraqi reporters working in freedom?
The reports from Baghdad, namely, indicate that the “everyday” Iraqis look at the arrival of these “volunteers” from quite a different position that most of the world-wide media – and the Iraqi regime, of course. Actually, the better informed within the Baghdadis are amazed and saddened at the extent of delusions within the “Arab street”; they and the exiled Iraqis I had the opportunity to contact are also stunned by the view created in the Arab media, that the life in Iraq is “lovely and dandy” under the current Regime, and both cannot believe that there is a complete refusal on the part of Arab media to state that the suffering of the Iraqi population, genocide of minorities, “routine” torture and public executions are done solely by the “brave and heroic” Fedayeen and other elements of the Iraqi internal security systems. Some reports from inside Iraq indicate that the regime was murdering more Iraqi citizens in a month or two than were killed so far – regardless by which side – during the fighting. This, however, is not mentioned anywhere: it needs to be a – of course - “US bomb” that hits some place in western (pro-regime) parts of Baghdad, so the Arab channels can show what the Allies are causing to the Iraqis.
Simultaneously, the Arab media is also consistently refusing to publish the fact that the regular Iraqi Army actually vanquished from the battlefield, that what is left of the local resistance is fighting under the threat of being shot, or that one quarter of the Allied troops are Iraqis: the Peshmergas, which can’t wait to start their advance to towards south.
Quite on the contrary: such subjects like Fedayeen al-Naghal-Saddam (the full name of what is now usually called “Fedayeen Saddam” in the West), the Iranian Mujaheddin-e-Khalq and similar, which came into Iraq to support and fight for the oppressors of the Iraqi people, are presented as “brothers” of the Iraqis. Well, the average Iraqis do not see this quite that way – simply because they really want to get rid of the regime, even if most of them are not showing this, because they are terribly afraid, war-weary, and certainly do not want their regime eventually to be replaced by the “thugs” that gathered from the whole world, and which have nothing better to do than to fight “Jihad” by terrorizing Iraqis in the middle of their own country.
Therefore, it must be expected, that the significance of such elements like foreign volunteers for the fighting in Iraq will not be of any duration or true significance: as first, most are very poorly trained, and as second, they simply cannot expect to be supported by the local population – in many cases not even under a threat of being shot.
Is there really a need for the “Battle for Baghdad”?
Most media reports and observations about the final stage of the Allied operation against Iraq predict a siege of Baghdad and a massive onslaught that will end with house-to-house and street-fighting, where even the vast technological superiority of the Allies will be minimized by the close combat. There are already predictions that the task of capturing and securing Baghdad will prove impossible, and that the international outcry caused by the heavy losses for both sides, tremendous damage to the city, and mass suffering of the population might even cause the Allies to finally stop the war before achieving their target.
But, would exactly such a scenario really be needed, and do the Allies really need to enter the city and capture it in house-to-house fighting down to the lack brick in order to ascertain the victory?
One of the greatest surprises of this war so far is that of the lack of success on the part of the “hearts and minds” campaign. The US military seems to have extensive problems with this, and also with gathering proper intelligence. The “Free Iraqi Forces” are in action now, but why only 40 of them? Why was their training in Hungary discontinued? Are they considered so much useless for this campaign? Finally, how could it be that after such intensive preparations against an enemy that is confronted since years the US and British military still lack better intelligence, and seem not yet to have a clear picture of how can they make the fighting easier for themselves?
In the last few days we were able to follow the developments around the Basrah. We have seen how the British have first very carefully approached the city, then surrounded some parts of it, and then started some local probing operations – time and again disturbed by Iraqi counterattacks and thousands of civilians fleeing the place. Slowly, almost painfully slowly, it dawned on the local commanders what and how to do it: the Ba’ath Party HQs in Basrah were blasted by guided bombs dropped by USAF F-15Es, and then a true man-hunt for Ba’ath Party Militia commanders, officers of different Iraqi secret services (foremost the GIS and MSS) and the remaining few Fedayeen started. Suddenly, the operation “James” showed success, and the British now have a good part of western Basrah under their control. Then, the USMC’s Tarawa Battle Group at an-Nassiriyah attacks the local Ba’ath Party HQs, and – “all of a sudden” - the situation there quietened quite a lot as well.
Was this by accident, and can these lessons be used in Baghdad too?
This was by far not by accident: elsewhere, this author already pointed at the fact, that this war should not be fought against the Iraqi military, but against the elements of the Iraqi internal security network. This highly sophisticated and finely tuned system was developed on the basis of experiences from something like 50 coups and coup attempts in Iraq since 1958. Understandably, such a rich experience in putting down internal unrests of all sorts, suppressing political and military opposition, enabled the survival of the regime under all circumstances: today there is no other way of removing the regime in Baghdad without completely disabling and neutralizing the Iraqi internal security system, and fighting this war by conventional means is only likely to prolong the fighting and cause more damage to civilians and local infrastructure.
The basis of this block-built system is the permanent total control of all elements of the Iraqi society and military directly from the top, combined with simultaneous mutual control of all parts of the system by its own elements.
Instead of disabling this system, however, the Allies have so far put the heavyweight of their campaign on the ground forces, and supported their advance only by a strategic air campaign, which was more of psychological than material significance. Yes, Saddam’s palaces, ministry buildings, military bases etc. were bombed, but these were long since standing empty while the bombing campaign hitting underground shelters was started only few days back, and is continued relatively sporadically. On the other side, the reports from Baghdad indicate that such objects like local Ba’ath Party HQs police stations and similar were so far not attacked. In total, the Iraqi internal security net was not damaged seriously enough – that is, except in the Basrah area.
Few days back, I have already mentioned the Thawra District of Baghdad: this is the eastern side of the Iraqi capital, populated largely by the people terrorized by the Iraqi regime for the last 30 years. Except few shots of the hotels where some international press is stationed – such like the Hotel Palestine Meridian - all of the videos and pictures we are getting from Baghdad so far are from other parts of the city: especially the downtown, the west and the south. But, we saw so far hardly anything at all from the Thawra district.
Like elsewhere in Iraq, the Thawra is also under tight control by the elements of the Iraqi internal security system: in order to keep it under control the regime has not only a net of Ba’ath Party Militia stations in this district, but also local police stations, in most of which at least one floor is occupied by the GIS (General Security Service). These support some four SRGC, RGFC and Army brigades deployed there. Furthermore, the “International Iraqi Brigade” (consisting of the volunteers from different Arab and Islamic countries), and the fighters of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (armed Iranian opposition, supported by Baghdad) are stationed there. The situation in Thawra is meanwhile very tense: for example, the large portrait of Saddam posted in the central reservation must be guarded by two police patrols every night, or it will certainly be destroyed by the locals.
How can this Situation be used against the Iraqi regime?
Logically, the “easiest” way is first to ascertain good intel about all the Police, Ba’ath Party and other HQs in Thawra. The Allied Special Forces, for example – for which it is reported are already active around and inside Baghdad – should start establishing better contacts with the locals. Thawra Baghdadis are not working in important places, that is sure, so they might look, as not worth the effort, but securing half the Baghdad in a single action would certainly be worth trying. When enough intel could be gathered, then all the local HQs – regardless how small – should be bombed - if possible simultaneously – into oblivion. Not a single place should be left intact. Simultaneously also all the symbols of the Iraqi regime inside Thawra would have to be targeted, like that portrait in the central reservation: the meaning of such actions would be foremost of symbolic importance, and the targeting of such objects might appear as not worth the effort to Allied commanders, but such operation would enable the locals to see the might of the regime disappearing. Besides, no police and no Ba’ath Part HQs would mean no permanent presence of the internal security system.
After that, the Allies would have to as swiftly as possible start offering direct support for the Thawra Baghdadis: many of these are armed – foremost with the ever-present AK-47s – but they lack means of communication, larger stocks of ammunition, heavy weaponry, and night-vision equipment. Therefore, deploying SPECFOR troops to assist and support them, and to call-in air and artillery support would equalize these problems. Even more so, such an assistance would provide command and guidance for the local population, and ease their fight, while in turn the Allies would yield huge profits from cooperating with the Thawras on the ground as these would help them evading unnecessary suffering of the civilians. Most important of all, Thawras consider the bombardments from the air to be as terrifying but also a sign of cowardice: the appearance of US troops between them would show them that the Allied troops are as courageous and as ready to die as they are: there is simply no other way to move the locals into an uprising.
This is certainly a risky strategy (foremost because the Iraqi internal security apparatus in Baghdad is really massive) and some might say, that there are also significant disadvantages in organizing cooperation of regular troops with untrained and ad-hoc organized rebel groups. The fighting in Afghanistan clearly showed that such cooperation is possible, and can lead to a success in combat. But, in worst case, the direct involvement of the Thawras on the Allied side will cause the SRGC and other elements of the Iraqi internal security system to turn their attention to the fighting in that part of the city, and prevent them from participating in the fighting elsewhere in the city. It is also sure, that a vast majority of the Baghdad’s citizens will lock themselves into their homes and not open to anybody until the situation clears. But, as first this will lower the risk of “collateral damage”, and, as second, a participation of at least a small number of Baghdadis in the fighting within the city would ease the general position of the allies considerably and also be of tremendous propagandistic significance. So, if nothing else, such an operation could be staged in order to limit the fighting within Baghdad, and create a safe corridor leading into the downtown – i.e. the place where the actual target must be found. It is simple fact, that the major – and relatively compact - source of rebellion against the Iraqi regime can only be found in the Thawra district, so there is no other logical place to start.
On the contrary, once the fighting for Baghdad starts, one can expect there to be heavy traffic from the Mansour and Arasat Districts towards west – especially along the Saddam International Airport road: consequently, any attack from that side, as predicted by certain Russian and Ukrainian sources – could easily result in a mass carnage on the streets of the Iraqi capital.
On the other side, if the fighting would start in the Thawra district, this route could be held open, so to enable the Baghdadis to flee the city, and thus limit the danger of “collateral damage”. Even more so, the Allies could then establish checkpoints on the highways leading west out of Baghdad, and set up areas near the Saddam International, where everybody could be held until the fighting ends.
The True Danger
There are many observations in the media about the huge dangers of the fighting inside Baghdad. Many commentators explain about the town being in danger of turning into “Saddamgrad” and similar. However, let us be honest and to the point: what is the biggest danger of an eventual “Battle of Baghdad”?
Beyond any doubt, the biggest danger for the Allies involved in a battle for Baghdad is not that of Saddam using chemical or similar weapons inside the city, or the urban warfare, but Saddam escaping undetected – or his body not being recovered.
It will be an imperative for the people in such places like Baghdad, Tikrit, Rahmadi and elsewhere to see and understand that this war is over. Nothing else can illustrate this fact better than showing them – death or alive – Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti in the hands of the Allied troops.
Consequently is the logical question: where to look for him?
Obviously, the spectacular blasting of different palaces and ministry buildings during the “Shock and Awe” air offensive had none – or, at best: limited – effects on the Iraqi regime. We do not know if the Iraqi dictator is still in power, injured, or perhaps even dead, consequently everybody considers him still alive and in power, even if quite a few reports from the top Allied commanders indicate that their intelligence explains them the Iraqis are currently not being lead by the dictator himself.
So, the situation must be clarified – as soon as possible: the Allies will have to find Saddam and either capture or kill him, and then approve this. No peace can be established in Iraq without this task being completed.
Currently, the dictator is being hidden around in the city, but he could even be somewhere outside. Once the fighting starts, however, it is most likely that he will be hidden in the Rhadhwaniyah complex, in western Baghdad, as he will certainly consider this immense areal (approximately 30 times larger than the Buckingham Palace) as the safest for him, and the easiest to defend. Besides, the Rhadhwaniyah “Presidential Complex” is very close to the Saddam International Airport. Additionally, the airport is connected via a tunnel running north-west from the VIP terminal to a heliport in the desert, right at the end of the city, where there always several BK-117, Bo-105, or AS.61 and two Mi-25 helicopters of the 4th Combat-Transport Wing are in waiting (currently hidden between several wrecks, like two VIP-equipped Sea King/Commando helicopters, destroyed already in 1991). [US forces at Baghdad IAP have reported finding a long tunnel – Editor. ] From there, there are several escape-routes, the most important ones leading over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to the north.
The other possibility will be for the Iraqi dictator to mix between the fleeing citizens – foremost women, perhaps even dressed as a woman. Therefore, the Allies will need to establish check-points around the city, “manned” by female troops, which will have the possibility to especially search women escaping out of Baghdad.
Of course, there will be even more escape routes – especially if the Allies do not really encircle the city and put it under a siege – so it might become indeed very easy for Saddam to disappear. But, the search for him should never be stopped, and the media should never get a feeling that the search is being less intense that it most probably will, then otherwise no peace in Iraqi will be possible. |
