Confidential
Page 01 State 094420
Origin NEA-11
"Iraqi CCM Kizar Hamdoon called on NEA DAS Placke March 29 to present Iraqi views on UNSC consideration of CW use in Iran-Iraq war. He said Iraq would prefer UNSC presidential statement to resolution and listed three elements it should contain. Placke said USG could accept Iraqi elements and presidential statement if that was consensus of UNSC. Placke informed Hamdoon that on March 30 USG would implement licensing requirements of exports to both Iran and Iraq of five chemicals that could be used in CW production."
The "licensing requirements" would finally remove the chemicals from the "no control" category in order to prevent either Iran or Iraq from continuing to acquire them.
The 3 elements:
"1). Mention of former USNC resolutions on the war, including resolution 540.
2). Strong call for progress toward ending war through ceasefire or negotiations.
3). Reference to CW without mentioning any specific country.
On latter point Hamdoon referred to report of UN mission to Iraq as precedent in not mentioning Iraq. Hamdoon said statement should treat CW as 'unqualified issue' and make general point of attempting to stop spread of CW use. Iraq would not be held responsible for continuing the war or be specifically blamed."
"Placke emphasized firm USG opposition to use of CW however, we agreed on desirability of continuing to call world attention to tragedy of the war and would support Dutch draft, including three points made by Iraq. USG would like to see something constructive come out of this USNC effort. If consensus developed in favor of presidential statement we could accept it as well."
"Placke mentioned two instances in which Iraqi shipping agents had sought to purchase such chemicals and we stopped the sale procedurally."
"We would ask GOI's cooperation, Placke continued, in avoiding situations that would lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing situation. We will not license chemicals to either belligerent and believe it is in the best interests of both USG and GOI if Iraq makes no further efforts to purchase these chemicals. We do not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship nor to detract from our common interest to see war brought to an early end."
So the use of CW is not addressed but the US did not want transfer of chemicals used in production of CW from US to Iraq to be "embarrassing".
The US did not want to come down heavily on Iraq at the time because a deal, being brokered by Rumsfeld with US support for the effort, was in progress to arrange the construction of an oil pipeline from Iraq to Lebanon. Bechtel Corp was the lead contractor for this project.
In a comment from the compilers of the documents:
"On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S. objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the Gulf region, and instructing the director of central intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S. determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse." Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy required "unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare (without naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the U.S. should "place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives." The directive does not suggest that "condemning" chemical warfare required any hesitation about or modification of U.S. support for Iraq [Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated November 16, 1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed their use in February 1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and the U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption of ties, met with Secretary of State George Shultz. When their discussion turned to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that his country was satisfied that "the U.S. analysis of the war's threat to regional stability is 'in agreement in principle' with Iraq's," and expressed thanks for U.S. efforts to cut off international arms sales to Iran. He said that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked that superior intelligence must also be an important factor in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree [Document 60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading a skeptical world that a preemptive and premeditated attack on Iraq could and should be supported as a "just war." The documents included in this briefing book reflect the realpolitik that determined this country's policies during the years when Iraq was actually employing chemical weapons. Actual rather than rhetorical opposition to such use was evidently not perceived to serve U.S. interests; instead, the Reagan administration did not deviate from its determination that Iraq was to serve as the instrument to prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical warfare was viewed as a potentially embarrassing public relations problem that complicated efforts to provide assistance. The Iraqi government's repressive internal policies, though well known to the U.S. government at the time, did not figure at all in the presidential directives that established U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to keep the oil flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing book, in its broad outlines, has been available for years. Some of it was recorded in contemporaneous news reports; a few investigative reporters uncovered much more - especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular debt is owed to the late representative Henry Gonzales (1916-2000), Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively investigated U.S. policy toward Iraq during the 1980s and who would not be deterred from making information available to the public [Note 2]. Almost all of the primary documents included in this briefing book were obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995 [Note 3].
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Document 1: United States Embassy in Turkey Cable from Richard W. Boehm to the Department of State. "Back Up of Transshipment Cargos for Iraq," November 21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. embassy in Ankara reports that Turkish ports have a backlog of goods awaiting transshipment to Iraq, and that a substantial amount of Israeli goods transit Turkey for "Islamic belligerents," including Israeli chemical products for Iran. It remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both Iran and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage. It was sustained by an arms bazaar made up of a broad spectrum of foreign governments and corporations: British, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean, Chinese, South African, Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc., who found both combatants eager consumers of weapons, ammunition, and military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin weapons compatible with the military infrastructure created by the U.S. during the shah's reign, could not buy them directly, and had to rely on third-party suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to the Department of State. "Conversation with [Excised]," December 12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers were providing it with weapons with or without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in September 1979 to protest the admission of the exiled shah to the U.S. for medical treatment, and held 52 Americans hostage. In response, the Carter administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. The hostages were not released until January 20, 1981, the inauguration day of newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 3: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All Near Eastern and South Asian Diplomatic Posts. "Military Equipment for Iran and Iraq," February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms export policy for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981: the "U.S. position has been to avoid taking sides in an effort to prevent widening the conflict, bring an end to the fighting and restore stability to the area."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 4: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Prospects for DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4, 1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did not have formal diplomatic relations at this time - they were restored in November 1984 - they were represented in each other's capitol by interests sections) says that the U.S. now has "a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution of 1958" (when Iraqis overthrew the conservative Hashemite monarchy that had been imposed under British colonialism.) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper is to visit Baghdad, "the first visit by a senior department official since Phil Habib stopped by in 1977."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 5: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To Iraqi Foreign Minister," April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important that "our two countries be able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis," paving the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper's meetings in Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 6: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve relations with Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks for more information from Washington "so as to be able to take up with the Iraqis on suitable occasions a wide array of issues of mutual interest."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit of Under Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks Secretary of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary Draper's visit, supports discussion of strengthened trade relations, and welcomes assurances that the U.S. will not sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 8: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Letter to the Secretary from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 20, 1981.
After reading a "friendly and non-contentious letter" from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State Haig, the head of the U.S. interests section agrees with foreign ministry official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a useful two-way correspondence had been established between the U.S. and Iraq.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the Iraqi Interests Section in the United States. "Meeting with Iraqint Chief al-Omar" [For Eagleton from Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures the head of the Iraqi interests section that he was extremely pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects for improved relations and increased trade. He takes the opportunity to make a "strong pitch" for a U.S. company bidding on an Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 10: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to Department of State. "Meeting with Tariq Aziz," May 28, 1981.
Following consultations in Washington, the head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets with Revolutionary Command Council representative Tariq Aziz, the "highest level in the Iraqi government our Baghdad mission has met with since the 1967 break in relations." Eagleton informs Aziz of "the U.S. government's satisfaction with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations." After the meeting, he tells Washington that "we are in a position to communicate directly with the leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly important message to convey."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 11: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad that it "has no specific information" regarding Iran's reported acquisitions of U.S. arms and spare parts, and asks the interests section head to assure Iraqi officials that "the U.S. has not approved nor condoned any military sales to Iraq or Iran."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 12: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable to the Department of State. "Staffdel [Staff Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit to Baghdad," September 27, 1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq's parliament, and has discussions during which "the atmosphere was pleasant and friendly," reflected in expressions of support for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act |
