Renewed Ties Between China, North Korea May Be Key To Nuclear Solution
Apr 09, 2003
stratfor.biz
Summary
During his 50-day absence from the public eye, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il paid a secret visit to China to shore up relations with the new government and compare notes on the progress of the U.S.-led war in Iraq. During the visit, new Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to continue mediating between Pyongyang and Washington and to "not stand idle" should tensions rise between the two. With Pyongyang mending ties with Beijing, China now might be better able to arrange for an amicable solution to the North Korean nuclear standoff -- and reap the benefits.
Analysis
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il paid a brief visit to Beijing shortly after the start of the war in Iraq, Russian intelligence sources confirmed to Stratfor. Kim's visit came amid a conspicuous 50-day absence from the public spotlight -- with the most noticeable absence his failure to appear at the sixth session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly on March 26, the first SPA session he has missed since they began in 1998.
Kim's secret visit to Beijing accomplished three things. First, he healed the rift with China that had broken open with the Oct. 4 detention of Yang Bin, a Chinese citizen chosen by North Korea to head the proposed Sinuiju Special Administrative region. Second, he opened a new stage of relations with China's new leadership. Finally, he discussed observations and lessons from the war in Iraq with Chinese leaders.
For its part, Beijing agreed to continue acting as mediator between Pyongyang and Washington. With its revived leverage in North Korea, China now can act on this pledge -- and Beijing will ensure that whatever solution to the North Korean nuclear standoff it facilitates will bring significant benefits to China itself.
Russian foreign and military intelligence sources say Kim spent two or three days in Beijing shortly after the war in Iraq began on March 19. Kim's visit was partially confirmed by Russian foreign affairs sources and Chinese diplomatic sources, who could not "confirm or deny" the visit but noted that China was, is and will be doing much more on the North Korean-U.S. confrontation than is currently understood or than "somebody can presume."
Considering that Kim missed the SPA session, he likely was in Beijing or returning from China that day, since his absence was quite conspicuous at Mansudae Assembly Hall. The timing and secrecy surrounding the visit illuminate both the seriousness and uncertainty surrounding Kim's decision to visit China.
Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing were on the decline in the latter half of 2002, and they took a significant turn for the worse in September when officials in Pyongyang chose Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin to head the Sinuiju SAR. Beijing had opposed the establishment of the SAR on its border, and was particularly incensed when North Korea chose a Chinese citizen to spearhead the economic experiment. Less than two weeks after the announcement, China arrested Yang on charges of tax evasion and illegal assembly.
The diplomatic downturn quickly proved damaging for China: North Korea allegedly admitted having an active uranium enrichment nuclear program to James Kelly, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, on the same day that China arrested Yang. The U.S. State Department withheld North Korea's alleged admission until nearly two weeks later, on the eve of Kelly's visit to Beijing, where he was to finalize preparations for President Jiang Zemin's long-anticipated visit to U.S. President George W. Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas.
Washington timed the release to pressure China both to deal with the North Korea problem and to acquiesce on a U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq. Beijing did accede -- wishing to avoid undermining Jiang's symbolic trip to Texas -- and went so far as to help bring undecided council members on board to back U.N. Resolution 1441. But despite its claims of leverage over North Korea, the dismal state of relations left China with little ability to control or even strongly influence North Korea's actions.
Rather, Beijing tried at least to keep Pyongyang from stepping too far out of line, but couldn't do much more than talk big and offer its services as a mediator. North Korea took a backseat to China's other, more pressing concerns -- not the least of which was the final stage of the leadership transition, during which Jiang stepped down.
In the meantime, Washington pressed for a new U.N. resolution on Iraq -- much to the chagrin of Beijing, which opposed the war not because it strongly supported Iraq but because it feared damage to the United Nations, the one remaining entity that had a chance of balancing the increasingly monopolar policies of the United States. While China struggled to balance its internal leadership transition and its external concerns with U.S. war plans and the future of the United Nations, the nuclear standoff between Washington and Pyongyang intensified, and Beijing found itself back in the middle.
In an attempt to regain some control over Pyongyang, China stemmed the flow of oil to North Korea for brief periods of time as a reminder of North Korea's dependence on its massive neighbor. But while this arm-twisting failed to convince the North Koreans to return to Beijing's good graces, the reality of the war in Iraq and Washington's apparent intransigence on the North Korean nuclear issue finally brought Kim back to Beijing -- but only after the new leadership was in place.
Kim's secret visit likely was arranged by Cho Myong Rok, first vice chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commission, who coincidentally arrived in Beijing on March 18 to receive medical treatment for kidney problems. Cho is still in Beijing, and South Korean intelligence has suggested his visit is not just a doctor call but also an opportunity for talks with Chinese military officials over the nuclear issue. Cho was instrumental in the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000, shortly after Cho had traveled to Washington to meet with then-U.S. President Bill Clinton.
Cho and Kim achieved three goals while in Beijing. First, by coming to China, Kim effectively kowtowed to the Chinese leadership, atoning for his perceived arrogance in pressing ahead with Sinuiju without Chinese support or approval. This act of coming to Beijing -- rather than having Chinese leaders come to him -- demonstrated Kim's willingness to return to a more junior role in the relationship with China, at least in the near term.
Second, Kim waited until the new Chinese leadership was in place before coming to Beijing, both to save some face by not having to apologize to Jiang or others responsible for embarrassing him by arresting Yang, and to establish a new chapter in Chinese-North Korean relations built on new personal relationships. This will help redefine Beijing-Pyongyang relations under new terms, with North Korea's longstanding regime hoping to take a more active role in bilateral relations with China's new leaders.
The final aspect of the visit was to discuss the developments in Iraq, and especially to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. war-fighting strategy. Russian intelligence sources say Kim and officials in Beijing agreed that the lesson to draw from the war is that the U.S. war machine is not invulnerable, and would have serious difficulties against a well-prepared, well-entrenched, well-armed and strong-willed North Korean military.
But Kim does not want to face the United States alone, and he sought assurances of support from China. He got reassurances, but not necessarily the ones he sought. Chinese leaders assured Kim that they would support his regime for the foreseeable future, but primarily in the form of Chinese intermediary efforts to avert a military conflict with the United States. However, Beijing did pledge that it would "not stand idle" if the United States appeared to move close to attacking North Korea.
For Pyongyang, Kim's visit offered comfort both from the assessment of the U.S. military abilities and from the assurances that China once again would back North Korea. Kim returned to Pyongyang more confident in his position and better prepared to face the United States with rhetoric and the belief that North Korea's need for U.S. assurances of nonaggression are not out of his reach.
But it is China that gained the most from the visit. China's new president now has built the foundation for a personal relationship with Kim, freeing Hu from some of his reliance on Jiang -- at least as far as North Korean policy is concerned. But North Korean policy might well set the tone for China's relations with the United States, South Korea, Russia and Japan.
If China proves itself to be the facilitator of a peaceful settlement to the North Korean nuclear standoff, it will gain gratitude and future credits from South Korea's new leadership. It also will gain a new bartering chip in dealing with the United States, which would have to go through China first for any security problems in Northeast Asia. And internationally, China would prove its importance on the political and security fronts, bolstering its drive toward becoming a true regional -- if not global -- power.
And while a resolution to North Korea's nuclear standoff remains complicated, China's renewed and restructured ties with the "hermit kingdom" bring a solution much closer. |
