To: kodiak_bull who wrote (21489 ) 4/10/2003 3:13:32 PM From: Bruce L Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 206098 OT (Military Brilliance) KB: Again, the purpose of my post was not to detract from the real achievements of American military men and women, but to put our strategy and generalship in some proper historical perspective. Simply put, the Iraqi (after all, an Arab) Army never was competitive, and in that context this war can't be compared to the great military campaigns you mentioned in your post to Ed. I still believe the German campaign against Yugoslavia in 1941 is an appropriate comparison. According to John Keegan, "The Second World War,"(1989) the Yugoslavs had an Army "a million strong, organized into 28 infantry and 3 calvary divisions", all but one commanded by a Serb, with 2 battalions of 100 tanks. (pg 154) Then as now, the Serbs were considered scrappy and had a good military reputation. Keegan, certainly today's most prominent military historian, agrees their defensive strategy was disastrous: they rejected British and Greek advice to abandon the Northern half of their country and coordinate their defense in the south, but scattered their divisions along a 1000 mile frontier. 'He who defends everything', in Frederick the Great's chilling military aphorism, 'defends nothing.' Grolier's history, which you quoted, states that the terror bombing of Belgrade on the first day of the war caused "more than 17,000" deaths. Keegan states that this same raid caused 3000 civilian deaths. (pg 155) According to a German general, Von Mellenthin, ("Panzer Battles>"), so quickly did the Yugoslav coup and order for invasion come, that the strategic invasion plans were almost literally written out on a restaurant napkin. The Germans relied on their subordinate commanders carrying out the general plan to seize tactical opportunites as they arose. The Germans having total air supremacy relied on deep and narrow armored penetrations. They ignored their flanks believing that safety lay in continuing to move forward in a wave of panic and confusion of their own making. So total was the "shock and awe" that only one senior Serbian officer, Mihailovic, resisted the disabling spirit of collapse. Keegan puts the German fatalities at 151 in the campaign; I got the figure of 55 from Von Mellenthin. It is interesting that Keegan was interviewed yesterday on NPR regarding the war: he called Saddam's defensive strategy inexplicably stupid, the primary point being that the Iraqis did not blow a single bridge or dam in a situation where the only hope was to slow the Americans down. I noted your comment that "shock and awe" might only have been "a psy op ploy." I disagree. It is only my opinion, but I feel there is a substantial body of opinion in the American military (both active and retired) that believes in a strategy that I call "American Steamroller." This is the strategy that we employed in Vietnam and this was strategy we employed in Gulf I (bombing for 39 days, "degrading" the enemy from a distance before the first engagement, etc.). In my view, steamroller tactics in the long run are more costly in lives (ours and theirs) and material and sometimes they even fail. (E.g., the Russo- Finnish war of 1940.) However you call it - blitzkrieg, shock and awe - the most successful wars have only been won by the employment of surprize and the unexpected. I believe that one American who certainly understands this is Rumsfeld. Certainly the initial move of the 3rd ID through the western desert gave every appearance of pure blitzkrieg: 'forget about the flanks, just keep moving.' Then a re-supply convey coming up from the rear got lost and then destroyed. The critics came in (insufficient force, undefeated enemy in the rear) and I believe Rumsfeld - or whoever - lost their nerve. There is something on this in the Wall Street Journal. Speed, mobility and flexibility, rather than numbers or mass, save lives. Bruce