After Iraq: Fear the fear that may rule US foreign policy
By K. KESAVAPANY (Director of the Institute of South-East Asian Studies)
THE United States-led war on Iraq is nearing a conclusion, and the US is in a triumphalist mood.
On the other hand, in much of the Arab world, there is deep resentment: Arabs see yet another Arab defeat, and the occupation of a major Arab state by the US for the first time in its history.
For much of the rest of the world, the emotions evoked by the swift US occupation of Baghdad are relief and nervousness. The relief comes from the war seemingly turning out to be shorter than anticipated. The nervousness stems from uncertainty as to what to expect from the US now that it seems to have achieved its objectives in Iraq. The world awaits uneasily for the next pronouncements out of Washington.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US demonstrated its ability to project its vast military power even more vividly than in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. Some commentators feel that the apparent ease with which the US stamped its dominance on Iraq may encourage the Bush administration to deal in the same way with other countries whom it considers as either terrorist states or harbourers of terrorists.
Iran, Libya, North Korea and Syria worry that they may soon be in Washington's sights, and indeed they have good reason to worry. Fear of adversaries, perceived or real, may be the driving force in the US campaign against what it considers rogue states. And the relatively quick victory over Iraq could well give further impetus to that US campaign to bring about regime change as a means of forestalling global terrorism.
The months ahead will be rife with uncertainty for the global community and the multilateral institutions which have underpinned a stable international state system for the past five decades.
Having failed to win United Nations approval for its invasion of Iraq, there is a widespread belief among many UN members that the Bush administration is unlikely to turn to the UN as a mechanism to regulate international security. When it comes to what it considers its own vital interests, the US is likely to chart its own course irrespective of the opinions of others, especially those - such as France, Germany and Russia - which were at the forefront of efforts to frustrate Washington at the Security Council over the Iraq issue.
There is the belief that US unilateralism could well diminish the standing and role of the UN, with Washington turning to the UN only when it comes to providing humanitarian aid. But for the key issues of war and peace, the Americans might decide to chart their own course, consigning the UN to irrelevance. This downgrading of the UN's role in the management of the international order is an unwelcome development, particularly to small countries like Singapore.
The major impact of the Iraq war, however, has been on the Arab and wider Muslim world. It almost goes without saying that in the eyes of most Arabs and Muslims, the image of the US is now at its lowest point.
If substantial US forces remain in Iraq for any length of time, the bitter resentment against the US could manifest itself in increasing incidents of terrorism against it and its interests globally. Indeed, one should not discount the possibility that within Iraq itself, the US might face a low-level insurgency mounted by diehard Saddam loyalists, and assisted by foreign jihadists, whose aim would be to inflict casualties on an occupying army.
The Muslim world will also be watching closely to see whether Washington follows through on its pledge to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians by putting pressure on its Israeli ally to accept a roadmap for a comprehensive peace settlement.
Without that major US pressure on Israel, Muslims will only perceive an America that practises double standards. They will construe the US as being uninterested in pursuing fairness and justice, but rather in stamping what they view as a Western and Zionist dominance of the Middle East.
Another casualty of the Iraq war has clearly been transatlantic relations. Strains to US relations with some European continental allies as a result of the Iraq situation involve fundamental questions of global outlook. And those countries which had obstructed the US in the Security Council are unlikely to be forgiven so easily. Certainly, the neo-conservatives in the Bush administration would probably wish to exact a price on those who had opposed US military action in Iraq.
A re-ordering of transatlantic relationships, and in particular the future of Nato, might thus be a significant consequence of the fallout of the Iraq war. The division of the spoils of war, especially the control over Iraqi oil, would be another.
The dispute which countries such as France, Belgium, Germany and Russia have had with the US has in fact been longstanding, going beyond the issue of Iraq. At its heart is the desire of these countries to contest the notion that in the post-Cold War era, the central organising principle on which international security turns is US power.
The French tendency to want to remain an ally of the US, but not to blindly follow the US lead on questions of international security, has caused frictions between Paris and Washington. Those frictions were generally papered over during the Cold War, but are more visible and acute now with the Cold War over.
Germany, with its pacifist traditions which grew out of the destruction wrought by World War II, has tended to view multilateral institutions and processes, rather than US power, as constituting the keystone underpinning international security.
This German outlook has been reinforced by the government of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder burnishing its socialist credentials. Surprisingly, non-alliance partners of the US, like Russia and China, have been more adept in maintaining a more nuanced position and thus have managed to deflect much of Washington's ire.
Closer home, the outcome of the Iraq war will be felt in the ongoing dispute between North Korea and the international community. Even now, President Kim Jong Il might be calculating whether he should continue with his defiant stance or seek accommodation. As in the case of Mr Saddam Hussein, the former seems more likely. The North Korean armed forces are vastly superior to those of Iraq. In geographical proximity and in weapon systems, North Korea has the ability to devastate a large part of Seoul, including US forces located along the 38th parallel. Some 37,000 US troops in South Korea, together with many other thousands of dependents, sit under the shadow of a nuclear-armed North Korea. That is an uncomfortable reality for the Americans.
US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has already signalled that some US troops will be pulled back from the 38th parallel, beyond the range of North Korean artillery. In the longer term, the prospect of US troop withdrawals from the Korean peninsula is an increasing possibility. The North Koreans will also be comforted by the rising degree of anti-Americanism in South Korea. These factors are beginning to corrode the US-South Korea alliance.
The outcome of the Iraq war has addressed some short-term concerns of the US and its allies. But with Sept 11 as a reminder, and the spectre of terrorism hovering in the background, a US which is increasingly imperious and unilateralist may well be the norm for a long time to come.
That, in short, means that fear would be the dominating element in US foreign policy, with unforeseeable consequences for the rest of the world.
The writer, a former Singapore High Commissioner to Kuala Lumpur, is director of the Institute of South-east Asian Studies. This is an excerpt from his speech at the Fulbright Association annual dinner last Friday.
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