ARMHY:
(sorry about the formatting)
Price - Local / ADR: 52p / $2.53
12-Month Price Objective: 85p / $3.98
Date Established: 02-Dec-2002 / 02-Dec-2002
Estimates (Dec) 2002A 2003E 2004E
Total Revenue 151.0 130.6 153.0
Price/Sales 3.5 4.1 3.5
EPS - Reported Diluted 3.1 2.1 3.1
P/E 16.8 24.2 16.6
ADR EPS - Reported Diluted $0.15 $0.10 $0.15
Opinion & Financial Data
Investment Opinion – Local: C-1-9
Investment Opinion – ADR: C-1-9
Mkt. Value (£ mn)/ Shares Outstanding (mn): 529 / 1,018.04
Book Value/Share (Dec-02): 16.865
Price/Book Ratio: 3.08
ROE 2003E Average: 11.9%
Net Debt/Net Equity: -75.2%
Est. 5 Year EPS Growth: 15%
2003E P/E Rel. to Home Mkt: 195%
Stock Data
52-Week Range – Local: 267.00p-40.50p
52-Week Range – ADR: $11.8-$2
Symbol / Exchange – Local: ARMHF / London
Symbol / Exchange – ADR: ARMHY / New York
Bloomberg / Reuters: ARM LN / ARM.L
Shares/ADR: 3.00
Exchange Rate: GBP0.64/USD
Free Float: 88%
All figures are in Sterling except where otherwise noted.
Note: Due to currency factors, the investment opinion of the ADR may differ
from the underlying share.
Highlights:
• ARM’s “flat” forecast for Q2 revenue implies
a strong rebound in deal volume after the
March quarter dearth of activity.
• We think this will provide a momentum
stimulus to the share price which we already
believe to be trading at well below fair value.
Our price objective is 85p.
• Cashflow, royalty rate and volumes, and
operating margin all exceeded our
expectation.
• Our above consensus estimates remain
unchanged because the lower license order
bookings in the first quarter feed through to
lower license revenue during the year.
• Our price objective equates to 13% growth
and 25% operating margins during the
growth period of our EVA valuation, followed
by 3% growth and a return fade over 40
years. See inside the report for sensitivity
analysis.
• We believe in particular our margin
assumption is conservative given the company
achieved a clean margin of 22% in Q1.
What Has Changed?
There were three key takeaways for us from ARM’s Q1
results:
1. Very weak license signing in the quarter (after a
strong Q4).
2. Very strong royalty revenues.
3. Better than expected clean operating margin.
ARM’s forecast of flat revenue (GBP31m) in Q2 implies
that the license signing issue is more a lumpy-timing issue
than a secular change, and with little reason to doubt
ARM’s now more conservative management we believe
Q2 will see good order momentum.
A month ago our estimates were at consensus level, but the
latter have now fallen and we leave our EPS estimates
unchanged at 2.2p and 3.1p for 2003 and 2004 (consensus
is 1.9p and 2.9p according to Multex) but are based on
higher royalties and margins, and lower license income.
Processor Core Orders GBP5.5m
ARM does not explicitly release order data, but a few
minutes of modelling work gets us the value of deals
signed each quarter based. In our model deal value ranges
from USD300k for a per-use license to USD10m for an
architecture license so just counting deals signed is of little
value.
The results is even worse orders signed in Q1 than in the
pre-announced Q3 with 6 low-license fee per-use licenses,
an ARM10 derivative, and an extended subscription
license adding GBP5m to backlog. We expect the
subscription license, which will not kick in materially until
2004, made up the bulk of the figure.
We had expected volatility, but the order bookings were
much lower than expected.
Recognised License Revenue
GBP12.1m
Recognised revenues were higher than orders as a result of
non-processor core revenue of GBP1.8m, and the
recognition of backlog booked in previous quarters –
largely the strong Q4 2002, we suspect. Although ARM
stated that its overall (and un-published) backlog remained
roughly flat, processor core backlog fell to 37% of total
from 52%.
ARM Expects License Revenue to
Increase in Q2 – Implies Deal
Volumes Picking Up
We believe ARM’s forecast of flat overall revenue
progress in the second quarter is very positive for the
shares. We believe it implies a significant increase in
licensing activity in the second quarter.
Our license model is based on ARM’s published revenue
recognition policy and we think it is difficult for the
company to achieve its stated aim of rising license revenue
without help from deals signed in the quarter.
The combination of solid deal volume and meeting
estimates will we think be a momentum driver of the
shares at the time of the Q2 results.
Where’s the Proof?
We have no direct evidence that orders will pick up, other
than the recent historic precedent of unusually weak
quarters being followed by stronger. We also know that
semiconductor R&D spending – the source of ARM’s
license revenue – is smoothly increasing this year.
However ARM management during the conference call
and afterwards in our questioning of the CEO and CFO
seemed adamant that overall revenues would be flat which
implies increasing license revenue. We see no reason why
they would choose this line of forecasting if there was a
high risk of missing their financial objectives.
After the collapse in the share price last year the company
is much more conservative with its forecasts, and can be
credited with having foreseen the current order weakness
back in October 2002.
Table 1: ARM Backlog Analysis
Backlog Q3 Q4 03 Q1
Subs and Architecture 29% 29% 37%
Cores 52% 52% 37%
Support, Maintenance etc 19% 19% 26%
Within 6m 35% 35% 34%
6-12m 23% 26% 21%
>12m 42% 39% 45%
Source: ARM
ARM Holdings – 15 April 2003
Refer to important disclosures at the end of this report.
3
Further comfort comes from the rate of re-licensing of
ARM’s existing customer base. Chart 2 shows how relicensing
has trended down to the 20% level on a 12m
rolling average basis.
At this run rate ARM’s partners would upgrade to the next
ARM processor only once every five years. We believe the
long term run rate is more like 3 years, which is why we
have deal volumes trending up to the 33% level by the end
of 2004. Cheaper derivative licenses are likely to run a t a
higher rate as ARM produces more and more variant
products.
Royalties Step Up the Pace
Royalty revenue far exceeded our expectation at
GBP10.3m (Mle GBP8.9m). This is not a one-off effect.
More and more ARM based products are being release
driven by the very strong licensing activity from two years
ago (the corollary is that this year’s weak licensing activity
will lead to a flattening in royalty growth in 2005 –
however by then a semiconductor upturn may obscure the
effect).
5 more companies started shipping ARM product for the
first time, and together with the 6 from the previous
quarter are still only a small fraction of total royalties. As
these 11 companies ramp up production they will provide
further royalty growth. 64 of ARM’s 112 licensees are yet
to ship product and generate royalties.
This is the last quarter in which Samsung will skew the
results – we estimate 25m units but just GBP0.2m of the
royalty revenue came from Samsung’s six-monthly report
of low royalty rate smarcards. The company is shifting to
quarterly reporting to ARM in Q2 – which is one reason
why units, and to a lesser extent revenues, will fall.
More important is the seasonal weakness of Q1 which with
ARM’s reporting lag will impact Q2 royalty revenues.
We expect the net effect to be a reduction in royalties in
Q2 to GBP9.3m, which given ARM’s flat revenue
guidance further reinforces the likely increase in license
revenue mentioned above.
Underlying Royalty Rate Grew
A quick reminder on how Samsung skews alternate
quarters for ARM’s royalties. Samsung pays ARM
royalties on a six monthly basis, so every other quarter (Q1
and Q3) there is a lump in ARM’s royalties. The absolute
amount is not that high because the royalties largely relate
to smartcards, which have very low selling prices and
therefore royalties.
However unit volumes are high – we estimate 25m
reported in Q1. This lifts ARM’s units and lowers the
royalty rate.
It is straightforward to strip out the Samsung effect to
glean the underlying royalty rate, and we calculate it
increased from 6.1p to 6.6p assuming the Samsung royalty
rate was 1p. From Q2 Samsung will report quarterly and so
this effect will disappear.
ARM stated that 65-70% of its royalties came from the
wireless sector. We estimate that the pure handset business
is about 60% and this, coupled with our colleagues
estimates of quarterly handset shipments yields an
estimated 6.1p royalty on handset chips – up from 5.4p in
Q4 and 4.9p in Q3. The main driver of this increase is that
2.5G baseband chips have a higher ASP than 2G. The
impact of ARM9 based shipments is still minimal in the
handset segment, but will become material over 2003,
further increasing the royalty rate.
The remaining royalty divided by the non handset and non
Samsung units yields a rate of 7.5p, down from 8.4p in Q4.
This suggests that higher volume but lower ASP products
are more impacting the segment. It may also be due to the
“late payment” from one partner which had omitted to pay
royalties earlier in the year.
Underlying Margin 22%
ARM’s clean operating expenses fell from GBP23.5m to
GBP21.5m in the quarter, having peaked at GBP25.1m in
Q2 2002. The cost cutting came from expected personnel
cuts (ARM’s workforce is down from 794 in September to
716) and better than expected non salary cost control.
ARM Holdings – 15 April 2003
Refer to important disclosures at the end of this report. 4
Operating expenses are fairly lumpy so we are prudently
not taking the Q1 run rate as a guide for the rest of the
year, but increasing by GBP1m to GBP22.5m per quarter
which should cover any unexpected spikes in cost. ARM
will not be increasing its workforce so we think we are
right to keep costs flat. IN 2004 w assume revenue growth
will allow some cost increase and forecast costs rising
back towards the GBP25m level.
We think there is upside to our numbers from cost-control
turning out to be better than expected. Despite what we
think are prudent cost assumptions, we see operating
margins trending back up through 30% (they tracked
above 30% for 11 quarters up to mid 2002) as the 95%
gross margin license and royalty revenue increases.
Longer Term – ARM11
The conclusion of the above is that Q2 will see better order
momentum. However the company has confirmed that its
new architecture, ARM11, is unlikely to see many deals
before the second half.
5 or so ARM11 deals in the second half will be helpful in
two ways. First it will provide proof of the take-up of the
next ARM architecture and will also provide positive
momentum.
It will also provide a smoother revenue stream and better
confidence for 2004 license income. We believe ARM7
and ARM9 license income is recognised pretty quickly –
over 2 quarters. Newer technology, ARM1026 and
ARM11 is recognised over a longer period – we assume
over five quarters. This provides a much smoother revenue
stream similar to 2000 and 2001.
The table below shows how many licenses have been
signed for each ARM architecture. ARM9 has overtaken
ARM7 (surprisingly) and this implies there is a big
potential market for later ARM technologies over the next
few years.
Table 2: ARM Licenses by Core (Summary)
Core No. Licenses
ARM7 87
ARM9 90
ARM10 13
ARM11 7
Source: ARM
Return on Operating Capital
In our September in-depth analysis of semiconductor
returns, ARM ranked second after Linear Technology in
the global semiconductor sector over 1997-2001. Since the
order shortfall in Q3 leading to lower margins, ARM’s
returns have fallen from the 1998-2002 average of 84% to
56% in 2002 and we expect 27% in 2003. In Q1 returns
fell from 26% to 23% sequentially due to the one-off
writedown and to a small (2%) increase in operating
capital. We assume returns climb back to 2002 average
levels in the long term.
For an asset light company such as ARM, return analysis
may seem misguided. However we capitalise R&D over 5
years which substantially increases “assets” and lowers
returns. ARM’s intellectual property, which it creates
through investment in R&D is its major asset so this
approach makes sense to us. Excluding the R&D
capitalisation ROOC in 2002 rises from 56% to 90%.
Valuation and Risks
Our price objective remains unchanged at 85p. Our midcycle
fair value is up slightly due to small changes in our
model from 93p to 94p using the same 15% growth and
25% through-the-cycle operating margin. Sensitivity is
shown below. Our 85p price objective implies 13%
growth. Our EVA analysis gives a lower valuation than
DCF, so we use the former as our basis. We use a discount
rate of 10% and a return fade to cost-of-capital of 40 years
following the end of the growth period (2015 – when we
expect Moore’s Law to begin winding down).
The risk to our recommendation is that ARM fails to
maintain the technology lead which, together with the
network effect of the ARM standard, has led it to become a
market leader.
Table 3: Detail Revenue Breakdown
GBPm 02 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 03 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E 2000 2001 2002 2003E 2004E
Royalties 6.4 6.5 6.2 7.8 10.3 9.3 10.0 10.9 25.6 27.9 26.9 40.4 46.2
Licenses 23.6 25.7 17.9 15.8 12.1 12.4 14.1 14.6 45.4 76.8 83.0 53.3 66.5
Development Systems 7.6 6.1 5.0 4.4 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 13.6 23.3 23.1 22.0 25.0
Total Product Revenues 37.6 38.3 29.1 28.0 27.4 26.6 30.1 31.5 84.6 128.0 133.0 115.7 137.7
Consultancy 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 7.6 8.1 4.5 2.6 4.6
Maintenance & Training 3.1 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 8.5 10.9 13.5 12.3 10.7
Total Service Revenues 4.6 4.9 4.2 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 16.2 18.2 18.0 14.9 15.3
TOTAL 42.1 43.2 33.3 32.3 31.0 30.3 33.9 35.4 100.8 146.3 151.0 130.6 153.0
% Total
Royalties 15% 15% 19% 24% 33% 31% 30% 31% 25% 19% 18% 31% 30%
Licenses 56% 59% 54% 49% 39% 41% 42% 41% 45% 53% 55% 41% 43%
Development Systems 18% 14% 15% 14% 16% 17% 18% 17% 13% 16% 15% 17% 16%
Total Product Revenues 89% 89% 87% 87% 88% 88% 89% 89% 84% 88% 88% 89% 90%
Consultancy 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 8% 6% 3% 2% 3%
Maintenance & Training 7% 9% 10% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9% 8% 7% 9% 9% 7%
Total Service Revenues 11% 11% 13% 13% 12% 12% 11% 11% 16% 12% 12% 11% 10%
YoY Growth
Royalties -23% 2% -3% 15% 61% 42% 61% 39% 131% 9% -4% 50% 14%
Licenses 70% 39% -18% -30% -49% -52% -21% -7% 36% 69% 8% -36% 25%
Development Systems 25% 0% -6% -24% -34% -18% 20% 36% 145% 71% -1% -5% 14%
Product Revenues 33% 24% -13% -21% -27% -30% 4% 13% 71% 51% 4% -13% 19%
Consultancy -44% -48% -20% -55% -60% -50% -25% -21% 17% 7% -45% -42% 77%
Maintenance & Training 24% 42% 13% 17% -3% -18% -8% -6% 56% 28% 24% -9% -13%
Service Revenues 10% -3% 4% -12% -22% -26% -11% -9% 35% 13% -1% -17% 3%
Total 30% 20% -11% -20% -27% -30% 2% 10% 64% 45% 3% -14% 17%
Source: Merrill Lynch estimates
ARM Holdings – 15 April 2003
Refer to important disclosures at the end of this report. 6
Table 4: Income Statement
Dec Year End GBPm 02 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 03 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E 2000 2001 2002 2003E 2004E
Units 110 95 123 127 178 149 161 175 367 420 455 662 693
Average Royalty 5.8 6.8 5.0 6.1 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.2 7.0 6.6 5.9 6.1 6.7
Revenues 42.2 43.2 33.3 32.3 31.0 30.3 33.9 35.4 100.8 146.3 151.0 130.6 153.0
Gross Profit 38.2 40.2 29.7 29.7 28.2 27.1 30.5 31.6 89.1 129.0 137.8 117.4 137.5
R&D 11.1 13.0 12.2 11.0 11.9 12.0 12.0 12.0 26.4 36.9 47.3 47.9 49.5
Sales & Marketing 6.3 6.3 6.4 5.7 5.4 6.0 6.0 6.0 17.8 21.5 24.7 23.4 28.0
G&A 5.8 5.9 4.0 6.8 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 12.6 22.5 22.5 17.8 20.0
Amortisation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
One off’s 2.0 1.6 0.0
Operating Income 15.0 15.1 7.0 4.3 5.1 4.6 8.0 9.1 31.0 46.1 41.4 26.8 40.0
Net Financial Income 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.4 5.4
Income Before Tax 15.8 16.1 8.0 5.5 6.0 5.7 9.1 10.3 35.4 50.3 45.4 31.2 45.4
Income Taxes 5.0 4.7 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.7 3.1 6.0 16.3 13.8 9.3 13.6
Net Income 10.7 11.4 5.9 3.591 4.3 4.0 6.3 7.2 29.4 34.0 31.6 21.9 31.8
FD Shares (m) 1,024 1,024 1,020 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,018 1,028 1,025 1,023 1,018 1,018
FD EPS (pence) 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 2.9 3.3 3.1 2.1 3.1
ADR EPS (cents) 4.5 4.9 2.7 1.7 2.0 1.9 3.0 3.4 13.1 14.3 13.7 10.3 15.0
£/$ 1.43 1.46 1.55 1.57 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.53 1.44 1.50 1.60 1.60
KEY METRICS
Revenue YoY 30% 20% -11% -20% -27% -30% 2% 10% 64% 45% 3% -14% 17%
R&D YoY 27% 41% 29% 15% 7% -8% -2% 9% 54% 40% 28% 1% 3%
Pretax YoY 38% 32% -38% -60% -62% -64% 13% 87% 97% 42% -10% -31% 46%
EPS YoY 39% 38% -33% -61% -60% -65% 8% 102% 79% 16% -7% -30% 45%
Revenue QoQ 5% 2% -23% -3% -4% -2% 12% 5%
MARGINS
Product GM 95% 97% 93% 95% 94% 94% 94% 94% 95% 94% 95% 94% 94%
Service GM 55% 66% 59% 70% 66% 55% 55% 50% 56% 50% 63% 56% 50%
Total GM 90% 93% 89% 92% 91% 90% 90% 89% 88% 88% 91% 90% 90%
R&D 26.3% 30.1% 36.6% 34.0% 38.4% 39.6% 35.4% 33.9% 26.2% 25.3% 31.3% 36.7% 32.3%
Sales & Marketing 15.0% 14.5% 19.3% 17.5% 17.3% 19.8% 17.7% 16.9% 17.7% 14.7% 16.4% 17.9% 18.3%
G&A 13.7% 13.6% 12.0% 21.2% 13.7% 14.9% 13.3% 12.7% 12.5% 15.4% 14.9% 13.6% 13.1%
Operating Margin 35.4% 34.9% 21.1% 13.3% 16.4% 15.3% 23.5% 25.8% 30.7% 31.5% 27.4% 20.5% 26.2%
Operating Margin ex One-off's 35% 35% 21% 19% 22% 15% 24% 26% 32% 33% 27% 21% 26%
Tax Rate 32% 29% 26% 35% 29% 30% 30% 30% 17% 32% 30% 30% 30%
Working Capital
A/R DSO 72 85 77 58 61 61 61 61 69 62 50 66 68
Days Inventory Turns 16 35 25 54 41 41 41 41 12 12 42 46 45
A/P DSO 99 175 125 168 112 112 112 112 64 50 131 128 125
Return On Capital
ROOC 69% 60% 36% 26% 23% 22% 28% 30% 100% 77% 56% 27% 28%
Operating Capital 102.8 111.6 116.3 117.0 119.6 125.2 128.2 127.3 63.3 86.5 117.0 127.3 132.1
Sequential Change 19% 9% 4% 1% 2% 5% 2% -1% 62% 37% 35% 9% 4%
Source: Merrill Lynch estimates
ARM Holdings – 15 April 2003
Refer to important disclosures at the end of this report.
Table 6: Balance Sheet
Dec Year End GBPm 02 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 03 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E 2000 2001 2002 2003E 2004E
Cash & Equivalents 107.3 115.4 121.7 130.3 135.3 136.8 143.4 154.7 75.3 104.5 130.3 154.7 189.6
A/R 33.3 40.2 28.2 20.5 20.7 20.2 22.6 23.6 18.9 24.8 20.5 23.6 28.4
Inventory 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.7 0.4 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.9
Other Assets 7.9 11.5 15.5 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 5.1 6.6 11.3 11.4 11.4
Current Assets 149.3 168.2 166.4 163.7 168.6 169.9 179.0 191.4 99.7 136.4 163.7 191.4 231.4
Deferred Income Taxes 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.7 0.8 1.7 2.0 2.0
Property & Equipment 22.8 24.1 25.4 25.7 22.8 21.5 20.1 18.7 14.9 22.7 25.7 18.7 12.1
Prepayments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Goodwill 11.7 11.6 11.2 10.4 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3 5.4 12.3 10.4 10.3 10.3
Investments 2.8 2.8 2.8 4.2 2.7 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.6 3.6 4.2 7.5 7.5
Total Assets 187.6 208.1 207.0 205.7 206.4 211.1 218.8 229.8 127.3 175.8 205.7 229.8 263.2
0.0
A/P 4.4 5.6 5.0 4.7 3.4 3.9 4.2 4.6 2.0 2.4 4.7 4.6 5.3
Tax payable 9.6 11.6 9.1 3.8 4.5 1.8 1.7 2.7 1.6 7.1 3.8 2.7 3.5
Personnel Taxes 2.1 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Accrued Liabilities 7.6 9.6 9.4 8.6 7.7 7.9 9.0 9.3 9.1 9.7 8.6 9.3 12.4
Deferred Revenue 13.3 17.4 13.8 14.4 12.1 15.0 15.0 17.0 12.7 19.4 14.4 17.0 14.0
Total Liabilities 36.8 45.3 38.1 32.4 28.7 29.4 30.8 34.5 26.1 39.4 32.4 34.5 36.1
Minority Interest 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.9
Shareholders’ Equity 150.1 162.0 168.1 172.5 176.8 180.8 187.1 194.4 101.0 135.8 172.5 194.4 226.2
Total Liabs and Equity 187.6 208.1 207.0 205.7 206.4 211.1 218.8 229.8 127.3 175.8 205.7 229.8 263.2
Source: Merrill Lynch estimates
Table 5: Cash Flow
Dec Year End GBPm 02 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 03 Q1 Q2E Q3E Q4E 2000 2001 2002 2003E 2004E
Net Income 10.7 11.4 5.9 3.6 4.3 4.0 6.3 7.2 29.4 34.0 31.6 21.9 31.8
Minority Interest 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Depreciation & Intang Amort. 3.5 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 7.3 12.9 15.2 17.4 18.6
Deferred Income Taxes -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.3 0.0
Deferred Revenue -6.2 4.1 -3.6 0.6 -2.3 2.9 0.0 2.0 5.1 6.7 -5.0 2.6 -3.0
Other Non Cash 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
Change in Working Capital -6.4 -6.5 4.6 5.0 -1.4 -1.9 -1.1 0.6 -0.2 -1.0 -3.4 -3.8 -0.5
Operating Cash Flow 1.5 12.5 10.7 12.9 6.1 9.3 9.6 14.3 42.6 52.5 37.6 42.2 46.9
Capital Expenditure -2.9 -4.4 -4.5 -5.0 -1.2 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -18.1 -23.0 -16.8 -10.2 -12.0
Other Investments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.8 0.0 0.0 -2.7 -3.4 0.0 -4.8 0.0
Free Cash Flow -1.4 8.1 6.2 7.9 4.9 1.5 6.6 11.3 21.8 26.1 20.8 27.2 34.9
Equity Issue 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 3.4 0.0 0.0
Other Financing, FX 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.5 1.7 0.1 0.0
Net Cash Flow 2.9 8.0 6.3 8.6 5.0 1.5 6.6 11.3 23.5 29.2 25.8 24.4 34.9
Start Cash 104.5 107.3 115.4 121.7 130.3 135.3 136.8 143.4 75.3 104.5 130.3 154.7
End Cash 107.3 115.4 121.7 130.3 135.3 136.8 143.4 154.7 75.3 104.5 130.3 154.7 189.6
Source: Merrill Lynch estimates |
