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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: NOW who wrote (17823)	4/22/2003 8:28:27 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

Ah, the New York Times. That bastion of left wing bias & one sided, albeit slanted POV's & their penchant for, shall we say untruths........ Speak for Yourself, Johnny “Nobody got it quite right” is the first sentence in R.W. “Johnny” Apple’s Sunday war wrap-up, and he of all people should know. Here’s Apple from March 30: “With every passing day, it is more evident that the allies made…gross military misjudgments…The very term 'shock and awe' has a swagger to it, no doubt because it was intended to discourage Mr. Hussein and his circle. But it rings hollow now.” Less than a month later, the war is over, and it’s Apple’s piece that rings hollow. Apple’s latest, “A New Way of Warfare Leaves Behind an Abundance of Loose Ends,” tries to split the difference: “The war in Iraq, now in its final military stages after only a month of fighting, was neither as painful as its opponents predicted nor as painless as its proponents suggested.” Awful big of Apple to spread around the blame concerning faulty war predictions, don’t you think? The fact is, Apple and other Times writers were dead wrong, Let not let them forget it. timeswatch.org “Death Squads” In Argentina, But Not Iraq Elisabeth Bumiller wonders if the U.S. is guilty of “propaganda” and “loaded language” when it calls Iraqi’s fedayeen paramilitary groups “death squads.” But the Times isn’t so fussy when it comes to labeling “right-wing” death squads. More... timeswatch.org The Times Man In Baghdad Speaks Out On Saddam’s Reign Times Baghdad reporter John Burns sheds some light on how journalism is made in a dictatorship: “Any Iraqi voicing an opinion other than those approved by the state would be vulnerable to arrest, torture and execution. But these were facts rarely mentioned by many reporters.” Burns did mention such things--and the regime threatened his life. More... timeswatch.org

To: NOW who wrote (17823)	4/22/2003 8:29:33 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

Oh yes,the New York Times. That bastion of left wing bias & one sided, albeit slanted POV's & their penchent for, shall we say untruths........ Scott Ritter, the Times Mr. Credibility People who don’t think Iraq has weapons of mass destruction could use more credible spokesman—and the Times could use Nexis. The Times William Broad reports: “One of the most vocal skeptics is Scott Ritter, a former Marine Corps major who worked as a United Nations inspector in Iraq for seven years. Mr. Ritter became deeply skeptical of American charges that the Baghdad government had weapons of mass destruction. ‘Professionally, I don't see how these weapons could exist. They defy the laws of industry, the laws of science and technology.’” Well, Scott Ritter certainly knows a thing or two about defying laws. Broad also ignores this widely circulated, credibility-crushing quote from Ritter’s March appearance on a South African radio station (as laughably wrong as an Iraqi information minister briefing, though not as entertaining): "The United States is going to leave Iraq with its tail between its legs, defeated...We do not have the military means to take over Baghdad and for this reason I believe the defeat of the United States in this war is inevitable….We will not be able to win this war, which in my opinion is already lost." Given Ritter’s perfectly wrong track record, why should the Times or anyone else respect his opinion on Iraq, or anything? timeswatch.org

To: NOW who wrote (17823)	4/22/2003 8:32:44 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

More from the New York Times & how they use the truth..... Taking Dictation From Dictators After CNN news chief Eason Jordan’s disturbing revelations on the Times op-ed page, assistant editorial page editor Ethan Bronner reveals more details on the difficulties journalists face covering dictatorships—and the compromises they make with truth. “Just getting a visa to places like Iran, Syria, Sudan and Libya is a monumentally frustrating chore. A few countries' applications, for example, demand to know if you have ever visited ‘Occupied Palestine,’ meaning Israel. If you say yes, you may be barred. Since any decent reporter covering the region has been to Israel, this means being forced to lie. A few countries ask your religion. ‘Jewish’ is not the right answer. Often a visa is available only during a staged state celebration, like Saddam Hussein's obscene birthday parties or the anniversary of a revolution.” Kudos to the Times for providing a forum on the scandal of journalists trading truth for access inside oppressive regimes. timeswatch.org

To: NOW who wrote (17823)	4/22/2003 9:11:17 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

This from a writer with a negative bias toward the Shah, Britain, the US, the CIA, etc.......... In 1941, during World War II, a new shah (the Iranian equivalent of a king) came to power. He was only 22. The Shah brought into the parliament a European-educated lawyer named Mohammed Mossadegh....... In 1951, the parliament voted to nationalize the oil, and the popular Mossadegh was named prime minister <NOT ELECTED>..... <font size=5> ....The coup marked the first time the U.S. helped to directly overthrow a democratic-oriented government....<font size=3> ustrek.org

To: NOW who wrote (17823)	4/22/2003 9:11:50 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh Iran National Front, USA A sub-web dedicated to Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, on the Iran National Front jebhemelli.net From this sited dedicated to Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh A Biography: Dr. Mossadegh. From this biography....... In the 15th Majlis elections, because of the election rigging, Mossadegh did not get the chance to enter the Parliament....... Despite all the interference and frauds of the Shah during the 16th Majlis elections, the fake ballot boxes were announced expired, and the Royal Court minister was assassinated. In the second round of the elections, Mossadegh and a group of his companions were elected. It was this Parliament that approved the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. A while later, the Majlis elected Mossadegh as the new Prime Minister. When Mossadegh became Premier in 1951 <but not democratically elected>, the first thing he did after introducing his cabinet, was the enforcement of the Oil Nationalization Bill. In 1953...... Disputes between the Parliament and the cabinet increased, and following the Majlis member's abstractions Mossadegh declared a national referendum to let the people choose between dissolving of the Parliament, or cabinet's resignation. In this plebiscite,( criticized by many, because of the separation of the Yes and No ballot boxes, and not being held at the same time nationwide), the majority voted against Majlis. In August 1953, therefore, the Parliament was officially dissolved. On August 16, 1953, in an American-British orchestrated conspiracy, the Shah <the current leader of Iran> dismissed Dr. Mossadegh. The chief of the Royal Guards served Mossadegh with the formal dismissal notice. He was also ordered to occupy the house by the Royal troops as he was ordered to. But when soldiers reached the Mossadegh's house, Mossadegh's guards immediately arrested the Royal Guard's chief and his troops. The coup was publicized and the Shah fled to Italy. On 17th and 18th of August, people took to the streets in support of Mossadegh and the statues of the Shah and his father pulled down all over the country. On August 19th, the secret services of the U.S and Britain (CIA - MI6), engineered a more precise and expensive coup and this time succeeded in overthrowing Mossadegh's government. On this tragic day, after bribing some people from different walks of life, those behind the coup managed to pull a large number of hooligans into the streets to rally against the national government of Dr. Mossadegh...... The following day, Dr. Mossadegh and his loyal companions surrendered themselves to the coup Prime Minister, General Zahedi. A few days latter, the Shah returned to Iran from Italy <and resumed power that has been taken by Mossadegh in his August 16 coup>, and began his 25 years of despotic reign. farhangsara.com

To: NOW who wrote (17823)	4/22/2003 9:21:14 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

Mossadegh and oil nationalization From 1949 on, sentiment for nationalization of Iran's oil industry grew. Politically conscious Iranians were aware that the British government derived more revenue from taxing the concessionaire, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC - formerly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company), than the Iranian government derived from royalties. In November 1950, the Majles committee concerned with oil matters, headed by Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, rejected a draft agreement in which the AIOC had offered the government slightly improved terms. These terms did not include the fifty-fifty profit-sharing provision that was part of other new Persian Gulf oil concessions. Subsequent negotiations with the AIOC were unsuccessful, partly because General Ali Razmara, who became prime minister in June 1950, failed to persuade the oil company of the strength of nationalist feeling in the country and in the Majles. When the AIOC finally offered fifty-fifty profit-sharing in February 1951, sentiment for nationalization of the oil industry had become widespread. Razmara advised against nationalization on technical grounds and was assassinated in March 1951. On March 15, the Majlis voted to nationalize the oil industry. In April the Shah yielded to Majles pressure and demonstrations in the streets by naming Mossadeq prime minister. <NOT DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED> Oil production came to a virtual standstill as British technicians left the country, and Britain imposed a worldwide embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil. In September 1951, Britain froze Iran's sterling assets and banned export of goods to Iran. It challenged the legality of the oil nationalization and took its case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The court found in Iran's favor, but the dispute between Iran and the AIOC remained unsettled. Mossadeq had come to office on the strength of support from the National Front and other parties in the Majles and as a result of his great popularity <NOT DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED>. His popularity, growing power, and intransigence on the oil issue were creating friction between the prime minister and the Shah. In the summer of 1952, the Shah refused the prime minister's demand for the power to appoint the minister of war (and, by implication, to control the armed forces). Mossadegh resigned, three days of pro-Mossadegh rioting followed, and the Shah was forced to reappoint Mossadegh to head the government <NOT DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED>. The administration of President Truman initially had been sympathetic to Iran's nationalist aspirations. Under the administration of President Eisenhower, however, the United States came to accept the view of the British government that no reasonable compromise with Mossadegh was possible and that, by working with the Tudeh Party, Mossadegh was making probable a communist-inspired takeover. Mossadegh's intransigence and inclination to accept Tudeh support, the Cold War atmosphere, and the fear of Soviet influence in Iran also shaped United States thinking. In June 1953, the Eisenhower administration approved a British proposal for a joint Anglo-American operation, code-named Operation Ajax, to overthrow Mossadeq. Kermit Roosevelt of the CIA traveled secretly to Iran to coordinate plans with the Shah and the Iranian military, which was led by General Fazlollah Zahedi. In accord with the plan, on August 13 the shah appointed Zahedi prime minister to replace Mossadegh. Mossadegh refused to step down and arrested the Shah's emissary. This triggered the second stage of Operation Ajax, which called for a military coup. The plan initially seemed to have failed, the Shah fled the country, and Zahedi went into hiding. After four days of rioting, however, the tide turned. On August 19, pro-shah army units and street crowds defeated Mossadegh's forces. The Shah returned to the country <AND RESUMED POWER AS LEADER OF IRAN AGAIN>. Mossadegh was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for trying to overthrow the monarchy, but he was subsequently allowed to remain under house arrest in his village outside Tehran until his death in 1967. His minister of foreign affairs, Hoseyn Fatemi, was sentenced to death and executed. Hundreds of National Front leaders, Tudeh Party officers, and political activists were arrested; several Tudeh army officers were also sentenced to death. persepolis.free.fr