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To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (95899)	4/24/2003 2:14:26 AM
From: Jacob Snyder	Respond to of 281500

Resurgence of the Shias Thursday April 24, 2003 Guardian US and British politicians predicted before the war that indigenous Iraqi leaders would emerge to fill the post-Saddam, post-Ba'athist power vacuum. That process is now indeed gathering pace but with results both unanticipated and potentially inimical to coalition plans. All over non-Kurdish Iraq, Shia clerics and their followers are taking de facto charge of towns and neighbourhoods while well-meaning American consuls scratch their heads and debate democracy in Irbil. In Najaf and Kerbala, in Kut and Nassiriya, and in the suburbs of Baghdad and Basra, Shia civil control is becoming the new political reality, distinct from and largely independent of the occupation authority. On one level, this nascent, unfettered Shia bid for local self-determination after years of repression is a positive outcome of the war. But on the national level, it may yet come to present a serious challenge to US-British hopes of inclusive, integrated statehood. The reviving power of the Shia was dramatically symbolised this week by the pilgrimage that drew hundreds of thousands of faithful to the Kerbala shrine of Imam Hussein. Shia leaders, nominally representative of 60% of the Iraqi population, deny that they seek to dominate Sunni and other minorities or create a theocracy on the Qom-Khomeini model. But nor do they speak with one voice. One emerging leader, Sayed Muqtada al-Sadr, son of a grand ayatollah murdered by Saddam, is said to want to use the supreme religious authority of the Hawza al-Ilmiya centre in Najaf to obtain greater political leverage. In this he and many in a younger, more militant generation are at odds with Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, the chief marja (religious authority) of Shia Islam. Al-Sadr's men are blamed for the recent murder of a leading clerical exile, Abdel Majid al-Khoei, favoured by Tony Blair and who like al-Sistani urged cooperation with the US. There are other powerful factions, too, such as Iran-backed Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and the al-Badr brigade. And then there are interlopers such as Mohammed Mohsen al-Zubaidi who has disconcertingly (for the Americans at least) declared himself Baghdad's new political boss. The Shia barely exist as yet as a coherent national political force; and like Iraq as a whole, they may yet fragment irretrievably. But even under the anti-clerical Saddam, religious devotion was already reviving, a trend now visibly accelerating. If broad, unifying points of agreement can be discerned at the present moment, they are that the Shia will not again allow themselves to be subjugated; they will uphold the tenets of their faith (strictly or loosely interpreted, according to their lights); they will oppose perceived collaborators and secularists such as Pentagon favourite Ahmad Chalabi; and most plainly of all, they will not submit for long to American rule. The Shia have not turned hostile yet. But in time, if their aspirations are frustrated and they are denied a leading role in Iraq's future governance, they surely will. That breakdown may in turn suck in Iran and affect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, too. Such destabilising scenarios are hardly new. What is truly novel is the now freely admitted failure of the US to anticipate this Shia resurgence; its feeble efforts to scapegoat Tehran's mullahs; and the embarrassing cluelessness of Jay Garner, the ex-general currently puzzling, glue-pot in hand, over the myriad broken pieces of the Iraqi mosaic. Hamstrung by legal ambiguities and its own ideology, the US risks losing the political initiative. The case for the UN taking charge grows more urgent by the day. guardian.co.uk

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (95899)	4/24/2003 2:33:26 AM
From: Jacob Snyder	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Egyptian intelligence chief helps resolve crisis; Dahlan to handle security Haaretz, 4/24/03 A last minute intervention yesterday by Egypt's intelligence services chief Omar Suleiman ended more than a week of crisis in the Palestinian leadership struggle when Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat approved a government put together by prime minister designate Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). Israeli officials refused on-the-record comment about the deal, lest Abu Mazen be regarded as an American-Israeli puppet. The deal hammered out by Suleiman allows Abu Mazen to put Mohammed Dahlan in his government as a minister of state responsible for some of the security forces in the territories. Off the record, Israeli defense sources welcomed the Abu Mazen government, saying it was a step in the right direction, particularly since it includes Dahlan, a sworn opponent of the Hamas military wing. Hamas railed against the deal, saying "now is not the time for appointing governments; now is the time for resistance." Earlier this month Abu Mazen met Hamas officials in Gaza and said he planned to disarm the military wings of the movement. He was told that first he should dismantle the Fatah's Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The new government is to be presented to the Palestinian Legislative Council "in the near future," said Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala), the PLC Speaker. The PA constitution, which the PLC approved earlier this year, stipulates that a new government must be presented within a week of its approval. At face value it looks like Abu Mazen won the struggle with Arafat, because he was able to appoint Dahlan and Gen. Nasser Yusuf to his government, but there are unresolved critical issues regarding Arafat's authority and Abu Mazen's ability to operate independently. Abu Mazen not talking Up to last night Abu Mazen was not yet speaking to the media about his government or his plans. Dahlan is to be in charge of the Preventive Security forces in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as the police, but Arafat will retain command of the General Intelligence service and the National Security forces. Abu Mazen will hold the Interior portfolio, the ministerial authority over the security services, with Nasser Yusuf in charge of its civilian functions. Hani al-Hassan, an Arafat associate and loyalist who has been interior minister, will remain in Arafat's service as his national security advisor. Nabil Amr, whom Arafat opposed for the cabinet, will be minister of information, while Saeb Erekat and Yasser Abed Rabo, will apparently be ministers without portfolio involved in negotiating with Israel. The Egyptian intervention came on the last day of the five week period Abu Mazen had been given to form a government. Arafat was under enormous pressure from the Europeans and Egyptians, acting as proxies for the Americans. They have insisted on the need for a prime minister to neutralize Arafat's comprehensive command of the PA leadership - a key Israeli demand for resuming talks with the Palestinians. A week ago, he presented his planned cabinet appointments to Arafat and the Fatah central committee, sparking a furious controversy and angry dispute. Arafat hurled invective at his Number 2, and Abu Mazen stormed out of a meeting when he faced opposition from Fatah members. Arafat's approval of the government means it is likely the PLC will approve the cabinet - but there might yet be further tussles over some of the appointments when the matter reaches the Palestinian parliament. The weeks it took Abu Mazen to form a coalition took some of the wind out of the sails of support he had in the PLC, especially since he wanted technocrats rather than Fatah politicians at the core of the government. Furthermore, the obvious American interest in seeing Abu Mazen get his government - President Bush has said he is waiting for Abu Mazen's government in order to issue the road map - was not helpful to Abu Mazen, especially during the Iraq war, which was very unpopular with Palestinians. From 12-14 ministers in the new government will be members of the outgoing government, and only 4-6 will be new faces. "The agreement is only the first battle in a long campaign over authority and positions," said one senior PA official. Suleiman has been deeply involved for the past year in trying to win a disarmament agreement from the Palestinian armed factions and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has been pressing for the establishment of an Abu Mazen government. Part of the deal forged yesterday includes an Egyptian guarantee of Arafat's position as president of the PA and his personal safety, plus a European promise to work for a lifting of the Israeli siege on him and his Ramallah offices in the Muqata compound. haaretz.com