Cool (I guess)...
_+_+_+_+_ Here is the text from the pdf file (footnotes taken out) -- the entire document is an interesting read!+_+_+_+_+_
The mother of all recent Arizona desert dirt plays is the International Precious Metals Corp. (IPM) project 90 miles west of Phoenix, just off Interstate 10. IPM started
as a small platinum exploration company whose shares were traded on the TSE. The company acquired the Arizona property, called BRX, in 1993 by raising $27 million
through private placement.It also owned 18.2% of Xenolix as of December 1997.
A Canadian newspaper account provides an excellent summary of the company’s next years:
IPM had been listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in early 1994 when it announced sensational gold and platinum grades from its Black Rock property in Arizona.
As in the case of Naxos, TSE officials asked the company to hire an independent firm to audit its results. That firm, Kilborn Engineering, found no significant amounts of precious metals. The Arizona Department of Mines also conducted an investigation: “I have checked hundreds of platinum samples in Arizona and I have never come up
with any positive platinum values,” said department director Mason Coggin.
He added that he couldn’t find gold and only trace amounts of silver. When trading resumed in April 1994, the stock plunged. The following month, the company’s shares were delisted for failing to file financial statements.
Like Naxos, the company found a new listing on the Nasdaq [National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations] in the U.S. and announced more sensational gold and platinum results using a “modified” fire
assay procedure.
The company was also heavily promoted on the Internet, which became a battleground for desert dirt supporters and detractors. (To date, more than 30,000 messages have been posted to the IPM thread on Silicon Valley, a popular
Internet stock-talk forum.)
IPM’s shares peaked at $14 in April 1994 but things then began to unravel. The Northern Miner, a prominent Canadian mining journal, questioned IPM’s BRX project. ADMMR
continued to respond negatively to inquiries. Furious, IPM sued74 the Arizona Department of Mines and Coggin, and
obtained an injunction against them discussing the investment value of the stock.
But if Coggin is contrite, he isn’t showing it.
“We can still tell you that we have not been able to corroborate their values using registered Arizona assayers and fire assay procedures,” he said in a recent interview.
“Their claim is that they have to have special fluxes, and we just don’t have any bat wing or eye of newt to put in there.” IPM’s share price slumped steadily to less than $2 in 1998. It was delisted from Nasdaq on April 16, 1998.75 On June 19 of the same year IPM filed a voluntary petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The proceeding was converted to a Chapter 7 full discharge on October 1, 1999, leaving behind a creditors’ list 158 members long. The list includes employees, attorneys, service providers, the State of Arizona, the United States of America, banks, and others.
The 78 million remaining unissued shares were sold, with the approval of the Bankruptcy Court, on October 12, 2000 for $20,000. The shares were therefore valued at $.0003 each. Prior to falling apart, IPM displayed remarkable power and influence for a mining company that did not profitably produce any precious metals. Its stock marketing
succeeded on a worldwide scale:
Some big fund operators have been eager to play. Capital Research & Management Co., which has $150 billion under management through American Funds, owns almost 12% of International Precious Metals. Midas Fund, the London-based precious metals fund, has picked up 200,000 shares. IPM’s stock is trading on Nasdaq at 8 15/16, more than double its price one year ago, bringing its market capitalization to almost $160 million.
IPM stock was the focus of intense investor interest on both the TSE and Nasdaq. The shares were traded in huge volumes, temporarily averaging about 2 million shares every
trading day until halted by the exchanges.
The highest levels of Arizona state government were accessible to IPM. A 1997 meeting in Governor J. Fife Symington’s offices failed to resolve the differences between ADMMR and IPM:
David Kornhauser, IPM corporate secretary and board member, Eli Constantine, IPM investor relations, Samuel Shaw III, IPM, Amy Porter, IPM's attorney from
Lewis and Roca, Bernard Guarnera, president BD [Behr Dolbear & Company] by speaker phone, Rachal Lewis, BD, Joe Layne of the Governor's Office, Joe Dean and Marcus Osborn of the Arizona Dept. of Commerce, Patricia Boland, Arizona Attorney Generals Office, and Mason Coggin and Nyal Niemuth of ADMMR met at the Arizona Governor’s Office. ADMMR requested information as to BD’s investigation of BRX. BD was not allowed to report on their activities by
IPM personnel. Mr. Kornhauser of IPM reported only that they had found measurable quantities of gold.
The ability to retain a large and prestigious Arizona law firm is impressive in itself and is a measure of IPM’s effective fund-raising abilities. However, the ending to this part of IPM’s tale is the law firm’s bankruptcy court claim for $98,000 in unpaid attorneys’
fees. |
