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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Crimson Ghost who wrote (19027)	5/11/2003 11:18:55 AM
From: T L Comiskey	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

'end very badly'............ Furthur proof that the (Well) paid inmates are .. running The Asylum Loose Nukes of the West By Alan J. Kuperman Wednesday, May 7, 2003; Page A31 Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and especially since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has been trying to control "loose nukes" -- the former Eastern Bloc's nuclear materials -- to prevent their being stolen or sold to make an atomic bomb. This effort is vital, but its narrow regional focus has obscured an equally pressing danger: the loose nukes of the West. In fact, while Russia has been gradually tightening controls on bomb-grade materials, the United States and Europe have been slackening theirs, and a bill moving rapidly through Congress would roll back protections still further. Unless remedial action is taken, Osama bin Laden may soon have better luck shopping for nuclear bomb material in Western markets than in the former Soviet Union. A particular vulnerability is posed by civilian commerce in highly enriched uranium. This fissile explosive, which powered the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, is still used at many research and commercial facilities in North America and Europe that lack adequate security forces. If terrorists got hold of a sufficient amount, they could quickly fabricate an atomic bomb using the simplest design. According to the late Manhattan Project physicist Luis Alvarez, "terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half." Just 100 pounds is enough for a Hiroshima-era bomb, while even less is needed for a moderately sophisticated design such as Pakistan's. Dangerous civilian commerce in bomb-grade uranium persists for two reasons. First, unlike modern nuclear reactors, a few old research facilities in Europe and America still use bomb-grade fuel. Second, pharmaceutical companies in Canada and Europe have rejected safer production methods and still use bomb-grade uranium to produce medical isotopes for hospitals. Oddly enough, the West confronted this nuclear threat more seriously before the advent of al Qaeda than it does today. In 1978 it started developing technologies to fuel reactors and produce isotopes using much safer, low-enriched uranium, which is unsuitable for weapons. In 1992 a bill by then-Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), now a senator, was enacted that banned all further exports of bomb-grade uranium, except on an interim basis to facilities in the process of converting to low-enriched uranium. But a decade later, despite the rise of catastrophic terrorism, pharmaceutical companies and reactor operators are trying to undermine this landmark anti-terrorism law. One culprit is a large new German research reactor that is the West's first in a quarter-century built to use bomb-grade uranium fuel. Located on a vulnerable university campus near Munich, the reactor is slated to require 1.2 tons of such fuel -- sufficient for at least a dozen nuclear weapons. President Bill Clinton refused to provide the fuel, but the Germans then struck a deal with Russia. President Bush, rather than discouraging such Russian trafficking, has legitimized it by seeking identical material from Moscow to fuel U.S. nuclear research reactors. The Germans could convert to safer fuel before starting up their reactor but have refused. The biggest offender in the pharmaceutical industry is the Canadian isotope producer Nordion, which reneged on an explicit pledge to design its new facilities to eliminate any need for bomb-grade uranium. The Canadians have constructed an isotope plant that will require more highly enriched uranium than any other. Though the lightly guarded Ontario facility is yet to begin commercial operation, it already has stockpiled 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium -- enough for at least two nuclear weapons. Still worse, the foreign pharmaceutical companies are lobbying to repeal the Schumer provision that requires them to gradually convert to low-enriched uranium as a condition for receiving bomb-grade uranium in the meantime. The repeal amendment, sponsored by Rep. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), already has been approved by the House in its new energy bill. In the Senate, it is being pushed toward quick enactment by Kit Bond, a Republican from Missouri, where the overseas isotope producer Mallinckrodt has its corporate home. The shame is that the foreign pharmaceutical companies could have ceased their reliance on bomb-grade uranium years ago, if they had put as much effort into converting their production processes as they have into lobbying. There is no technical barrier to conversion. The United States has significant leverage on foreign producers, because we are the main source of bomb-grade uranium and the primary consumer of medical isotopes. Several years ago the State Department worked with these companies and the Nuclear Control Institute to draft a pledge under which all producers would agree to convert. Unfortunately, a mid-level official in the Bush administration's Department of Energy spiked the initiative in 2001. In Iraq the United States has budgeted $60 billion and sacrificed more than 100 American lives in a war premised mainly on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The very least that the pharmaceutical companies and our ally Germany can contribute is to stop undermining U.S. anti-terrorism law. And as the energy bill heads to the Senate floor, Congress must halt the special-interest effort to overturn this vital law. The writer is an assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy, and senior policy analyst for the Nuclear Control Institute. © 2003 The Washington Post Company