We didn't know that Al Queda had connections in Morocco?
maintour.com
07-OCT-2002 / BCOFMO01.HTM
A Moroccan court will soon try 10 suspected members of Al Qaeda for allegedly plotting to attack NATO targets, including U.S. and British warships in the Mediterranean, their lawyer said on Saturday.
The three Saudi nationals and seven Moroccans were arrested in May and June and accused of "criminal conspiracy, willful homicide, attempted sabotage of buildings with explosives and the use of false documents."
The 10 suspects are being held at Oukacha prison in Morocco's economic capital of Casablanca, Abdallah Lamari said.
Government officials have said the suspects were planning to carry out "terrorist attacks" in Morocco and in the Gibraltar Strait.
Under Moroccan law, some of the suspects could face the death penalty if found guilty.
and from 2001
mwarrior.com
Jane's Intelligence Review - August 1, 2001 .
SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT; Vol. 13; No. 8, LENGTH: 3472 words .
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HEADLINE: Blowback .
BYLINE: Phil Hirschkorn, Rohan Gunaratna, Ed Blanche, and Stefan Leader .
HIGHLIGHT: During the 1980s, resistance fighters in Afghanistan developed a
worldwide recruitment and support network with the aid of the USA, Saudi
Arabia and other states. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, this network,
which equipped, trained and funded thousands of Muslim fighters, came under
the control of Osama bin Laden. In light of evidence from the recently
completed US embassy bombing trials, Phil Hirschkorn, Rohan Gunaratna, Ed
Blanche, and Stefan Leader examine the genesis, operational methods and
organizational structure of the Bin Laden network - Al-Qaeda.
BODY: Al-Qaeda ('The Base') is a conglomerate of groups spread throughout
the world operating as a network. It has a global reach, with a presence in
Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria,
Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia,
Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan,
Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and in the
West Bank and Gaza.
Since its creation in 1988, Osama bin Laden has controlled Al-Qaeda. As
such, he is both the backbone and the principal driving force behind the
network. The origins Osama bin Laden, alias Osama Mohammad al Wahad, alias
Abu Abdallah, alias Al Qaqa, born in 1957, is the son of Mohammad bin Awdah
bin Laden of Southern Yemen. When he moved to Saudi Arabia, Osama's father
became a construction magnate and renovated the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina, making the Bin Ladens a highly respected family both within the
Saudi royal household and with the public. At Jeddah University, Osama bin
Laden's worldview was shaped by Dr Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian of
Jordanian origin. An influential figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, Azzam is
regarded as the historical leader of Hamas. After graduation, Bin Laden
became deeply religious. His exact date of arrival in Pakistan or
Afghanistan remains disputed but some Western intelligence agencies place it
in the early 1980s. Azzam and Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdelaziz, chief
of security of Saudi Arabia, were his early mentors, and later Dr Ayman
Zawahiri, became his religious mentor.
In 1982-1984 Azzam founded Maktab al Khidmat lil-mujahidin al-Arab (MaK),
known commonly as the Afghan bureau. As MaK's principal financier, Bin Laden
was considered the deputy to Azzam, the leader of MaK. Other leaders
included Abdul Muizz, Abu Ayman, Abu Sayyaf, Samir Abdul Motaleb and
Mohammad Yusuff Abass. At the height of the foreign Arab and Muslim influx
into Pakistan-Afghanistan from 1984- 1986, Bin Laden spent time traveling
widely and raising funds in the Arab world. He recruited several thousand
Arab and Muslim youths to fight the Soviet Union, and MaK channeled several
billion dollars' worth of Western governmental, financial and material
resources for the Afghan jihad. MaK worked closely with Pakistan, especially
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the Saudi government and Egyptian
governments, and the vast Muslim Brotherhood network.
Both the fighting and relief efforts were assisted by two banks - Dar al Mal
al Islami, founded by Turki's brother Prince Mohammad Faisal in 1981 and
Dalla al Baraka founded by King Fahd's brother- in-law in 1982. The banks
channeled funds to 20 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the most famous
of which was the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). With IIRO
and the Islamic Relief Agency functioned under the umbrella of the World
Islamic League led by Mufti Abdul Aziz bin Baz. In addition to
benefiting from the vast resources and expertise of governments channeled
through domestic and foreign sources, MaK developed an independent global
reach through several mosques and charities throughout the world.
Bin Laden's relationship with Azzam suffered towards the end of the
anti-Soviet Afghan campaign. The dispute was over Azzam's support for
Ahmadshah Massoud, the current leader of the Northern Alliance fighting the
Taliban. Bin Laden preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, former prime minister and
leader of the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), who was both anti-communist and
anti-Western.
When the Soviets withdrew, Bin Laden decided to form a group that could
unite the whole Muslim world into a single entity. Despite their
differences, Azzam and Bin Laden worked together until Azzam was
assassinated in September 1989. Although Soviet troops withdrew that year,
they installed the pro-communist leader Najibullah in Kabul. MaK
strengthened the organization in order to fight the Najibullah regime and to
channel resources to other international campaigns where Muslims were
perceived as victims. In addition to benefiting from MaK's pan-Islamic, as
opposed to pan-Arab, ideology, Al-Qaeda drew from the vast financial
resources and technical expertise mobilized during the decade-long
anti-Soviet campaign.
At the end of the campaign Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where he
helped Saudi Arabia to create the first jihad group in South Yemen under the
leadership of Tariq al Fadli. After Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the
failure of Saudi rulers to honor their pledge to expel foreign troops when
the Iraqi threat diminished led Bin Laden to start a campaign against the
Saudi royal house. He claimed the Saudi rulers were false Muslims and it was
necessary to install a true Islamic state in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime
deported him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994.
Meanwhile, the National Islamic Front, led by Hasan al Turabi, came to power
in Sudan and sent a delegation to Pakistan. Bin Laden had moved his
infrastructure of well-trained and experienced fighters from Pakistan to
Sudan beginning in 1989 and remained there until international pressure
forced him to return to Afghanistan.
The organization Vertically, Al-Qaeda is organized with Bin Laden, the
emir-general, at the top, followed by other Al-Qaeda leaders and leaders of
the constituent groups. Horizontally, it is integrated with 24 constituent
groups. The vertical integration is formal, the horizontal integration,
informal. Immediately below Bin Laden is the Shura majlis, a consultative
council. Four committees - military, religio-legal, finance, and media -
report to the majlis. Handpicked members of these committees - especially
the military committee - conduct special assignments for Bin Laden and his
operational commanders. To preserve operational effectiveness at all levels,
compartmentalization and secrecy are paramount.
While the organization has evolved considerably since the embassy bombings,
the basic structure of the consultative council and the four committees
remains intact. Bin Laden's intention to expand his operations has been
curbed by the post-bombing security environment, and both Bin Laden and
Al-Qaeda have become increasingly clandestine.
Al-Qaeda membership is estimated at between 3,000-5,000 men, most of who
fight alongside the Taliban against the Northern Alliance and are designated
the 055 Brigade. It has camps in Khost, Mahavia, Kabul, Jalalabad, Kunar,
Kandahar, and depots in Tora Bora and Liza. There are no female members. In
terms of recruitment of experienced fighters, Bin Laden has benefited from
his vast Muhajadeen database, created during the anti-Soviet campaign.
Al-Qaeda support and operational cells have been detected and neutralized in
Italy, Germany, UK, Canada, USA, Tanzania, Kenya, Yemen and Albania, but
they have since been replaced. Cells have also been identified in about 50
countries including Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and the Philippines. Al-Qaeda
operational cells comprised of 'commandos' operate under Mohammad Atef,
alias Abu Hafs. They are mostly suicide members. The organization also has a
Security Service led by Mohammad Mousa. The ideology Al-Qaeda owes its
extensive support and operational infrastructure to its broad ideological
disposition. Bin Laden's ideology appeals to both Middle
Eastern and non-Middle Eastern groups that are Islamic in character.
Although an Arab, Bin Laden advocates pan- Islam, not pan-Arabism. His
thinking in this direction was greatly influenced both by Azzam, his
Palestinian mentor, and to a lesser extent by Hasan Turabi, the spiritual
leader of Sudan.
To put his ideology into practice, Bin Laden dispatched several hundred
Afghan veterans to join Islamic groups in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,
boosting the domestic and international guerrilla and terrorist agenda of
these groups. Bin Laden's cadres are drawn from a 50,000 strong pool of two
generations of Afghan veterans. The first generation fought in the
multinational Afghan campaign in 1979-89, the second generation in campaigns
in Tajikistan, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kashmir, Mindanao, Chechnya, Lebanon,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Algeria and Egypt. These fighters are devout Muslims
inspired by Islamic scholars and are willing to sacrifice their lives for
Islam.
Bin Laden supports three types of groups. First, groups fighting regimes led
by Muslim rulers, which they believe, are compromising Islamic ideals and
interests (as in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia). Second, groups that are
fighting regimes perceived as oppressing and repressing their Muslim
populace (as in Kosovo, India and Indonesia). Third: groups fighting regimes
to establish their own Islamic state (as in Palestine, Chechnya, Dagestan
and Mindanao). Bin Laden has also directed his efforts and resources to
fight the USA, a country he sees as a direct threat to Islam, closely
followed by Europe, Israel, Russia and India in importance as targets.
Al-Qaeda's broad ideology has enabled it to infiltrate many Islam- driven
groups. After realizing the potential for inflicting damage to Europe and
North America, Al-Qaeda infiltrated the European network of the Armed
Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Arme - GIA) after 1997. Although the GIA is
an Al-Qaeda constituent, the Al- Qaeda fatwa did not claim GIA as one of its
signatories, possibly because it believed that exposing the association
would be counterproductive. Compared to other groups that openly signed the
fatwa, the GIA had a greater reach into the West.
Most of Al-Qaeda's membership is drawn from the two Egyptian groups: Islamic
Group of Egypt (Gamaya al Islamiya) and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al Gamaya Al
Islamiya). Khamareddine Kherbane, an Afghan veteran, was close to both the
GIA and Al-Qaeda leaderships. Two Algerian groups, the GIA of Antar Zouabri
and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la
Predication et le Combat - GSPC) of Hassan Hattab developed ties with
Al-Qaeda early on, but large-scale penetration of Algerian groups came in
1997-8. Bin Laden also cemented ties with Jaish Aden Abin al Islami of
Yemen, and members of several small Islamist parties from Tunisia, Libya,
and Morocco and elsewhere also joined. With the exception of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG), Al-Qaeda
links with Asian Islamist groups, notably those fighting in Kashmir,
developed in the
second half of the 1990s.
Other Al-Qaeda constituent or affiliated organizations include al-Jamaa
essalafya lid Daawawal Qital, en Nahda, Sipah e Sahaba Kashmir,
Hizb-al-Islami in Kashmir, Harakat ul Muhajadeen and Harakat-ul Jihad in
Kashmir, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Occupied Territories and the
Islamic Party of Turkistan.
Due to fears of penetration, especially since the embassy bombings, Al-Qaeda
is likely to become more discreet in its decision making process, with fewer
operatives knowing the next target. Target selection, preparation and
acquisition will remain confined to Bin Laden and a handful of leaders in
the military committee.
SOURCES OF SUPPORT
Bin Laden's state sponsors have included Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan.
Pakistan has not supported Bin Laden's terrorist campaigns but it does
assist several hundred Afghan veterans currently serving directly under
Al-Qaeda, notably Harakat ul Muhajadeen that is engaged in fighting Indian
troops in Kashmir.
Bin Laden's funding sources vary. His personal inherited fortune is in the
region of US$280 to $300 million according to the estimates of Western
intelligence agencies. Wealthy Arab well-wishers in the Middle East,
especially in the Gulf states, continue to support Bin Laden and sympathetic
organizations. Bin Laden is also known to siphon funds from overt Muslim
charities. A wide variety of banks in the Gulf are used, with Bin Laden
front organizations transacting businesses. The transfers of funds occur via
international banks in the Gulf where his brother-in-law Mohammad Jamal
Khalifa is based. He is responsible for managing a part of the financial
network and manages significant investments, notably in Mauritius,
Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. His businesses range from trade in
diamonds to fish. Despite some sources saying he has been disowned, Bin
Laden has received significant funds from wealthy donors including his
family.
The distribution of funds was managed by an exiled Saudi businessman in
Ethiopia, Sheik Mohammad Hussein Al-Almadi, and the Afghan-based Abu
Zubayda, who is thought to be a Palestinian originally named Zein Abedein
Mohammad Hassan. Funds are transferred through a number of banks in the
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
During the 1990s, contributions from Bin Laden's accounts have funded a
number of operations, including providing hotel accommodation, safe houses
and cars to mount reconnaissance on physical and human targets. His funds
have also purchased or manufactured key components for explosive devices. US
authorities were able to trace $5,000 transferred by Bin Laden to the
operational group in Yemen that attacked the USS Cole. He had specifically
allocated funds to video the attack, a task that could not be accomplished.
However, overall evidence suggests the extent of Al-Qaeda funding is
limited, a result perhaps of successful US attempts to block finance to and
from Al-Qaeda or of limits on communication placed on it by the Taliban.
Much Al-Qaeda support is difficult to quantify as it is in the interests of
Bin Laden to keep his involvement covert. It is also difficult to assess the
validity of US government agency and mass media claims about him, as there
are some indications that they exaggerate his influence.
In any case, the embassy bombers received little funding. Ahmad Ressam and
his associates, arrested in the USA and Canada in 1999, were involved in
either credit card fraud or petty theft; and terrorists associated with Bin
Laden arrested in Jordan appear to have financed themselves by bank
robberies, burglaries and forged checks, and were planning ransom
kidnappings to raise funds.
MODUS OPERANDI
Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman, direct a number of support and strike
operations using their own support activists and attack teams. Al-Qaeda's
elite consists of experienced Egyptian, Algerian and Yemeni cadres.
Al-Qaeda has a high capacity for infiltrating any Muslim community
irrespective of size and geographic location. Individually, Al-Qaeda members
have joined Muslim communities from New Zealand to India, and the
organization has infiltrated both authoritarian and democratic states. In
the authoritarian states of the Middle East, especially in the oil-rich
Gulf, Al-Qaeda enjoys the support of Islamic philanthropists and
foundations. In emergent democracies, it infiltrates by providing goods and
services to Muslims in need. In democracies, it operates by forging links
with influential Muslim communities with the aim of soliciting and
channeling their support to Muslim communities in need elsewhere.
As the lead-up to the 1998 bombings demonstrated, several Al-Qaeda
infiltrators were sleepers for several years. In some cases, members who
have left have been re-approached by Al-Qaeda leaders for assistance, and
have returned to the fold. The Western intelligence community believes there
are sleepers in Europe and North America waiting to be activated. State
response to
the fight against Al-Qaeda poses several challenges. Bin Laden has built an
organization difficult to disrupt, degrade and destroy. The intelligence
community is unfamiliar with the network's fluid and dynamic structure and
the past offers little guidance. The time- tested strategy to destroy a
politically motivated armed group is to target the core and penultimate
leadership, but in Bin Laden's case, this is a difficult proposition. In
Sudan, several rings of Sudanese as well as Al-Qaeda bodyguards protected
him and in Afghanistan, the Taliban provides security as well as Al-Qaeda
bodyguards.
If Bin Laden is eliminated, he is likely to be replaced by another Islamist,
although none in the second tier possess his charisma. The penultimate
leadership is operationally significant, and so Al-Qaeda is likely to remain
operational even if Bin Laden is captured or killed. Both his contemporaries
and successors are likely to draw lessons from the unique experience and
expertise of long-range land and sea operations nurtured by Bin Laden.
AL-QAEDA IS RESILIENT FOR FOUR PRINCIPAL REASONS:
- It is the symbol of resistance against Western domination. Although Bin
Laden is a veritable icon of terrorism to the West, in parts of the Islamic
world he is seen as the only leader that can stand up to the big Satan (the
USA) and the little Satan (Israel). To draw maximum support, Al-Qaeda
created the 'World Islamic Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders'. As such,
Al-Qaeda has a ready base of recruits, supporters and sympathizers. To
deepen and widen Al- Qaeda's reach, Bin Laden departs from tradition and
embraces a pan- Islamic view. As a result, Al-Qaeda draws the support of
both Arab and non-Arab Muslims. With time, Al-Qaeda's vast active and
potential support base will grow and mature.
- Al-Qaeda has built strategic depth by maintaining leadership and
operational links with some of the largest and deadliest Middle Eastern and
Asian terrorist groups. As an experienced practitioner, Bin Laden's stature
and personal relationships with the leaders of these groups facilitated
Al-Qaeda links. Bin Laden's generosity with funds and, more importantly,
words of praise, has enabled him to cement strong working relationships at
both leadership and operational levels. Although conceptualized, planned and
even financed by Al-Qaeda, the targeting end of terrorist operations will be
by constituent groups such as GIA, MILF, and ASG. Attributing individual
attacks and finding the perpetrators will be a long process.
- Landlocked Afghanistan provides Al-Qaeda with a political, security and
geographic shield, which, by imposing sanctions, the international community
has only strengthened. Afghanistan's isolation has major implications for
intelligence collection, especially for the generation of high-grade
intelligence, which usually comes through human sources. Without
people-to-people contact it is difficult to influence their thinking.
- Al-Qaeda physically and/or ideologically penetrates international and
domestic Islamic NGOs throughout the world. Thus the Al-Qaeda infrastructure
is inseparably enmeshed with the religious, social and economic fabric of
Muslim communities worldwide. Host countries such as the UK, Canada,
Australia, and even the USA, are hesitant to investigate Islamic charities,
including foreign charities.
Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda is not invulnerable. As was seen in Sudan in 1995,
diplomatic and political pressure and shortage of resources can threaten the
network. Similarly, when Libya pressured Sudan, Bin Laden asked Al-Qaeda's
Libyan members to leave the group. Thanks mainly to US intelligence
agencies, Al-Qaeda has suffered gravely since the embassy bombings but it
still retains a high capacity to replenish its losses and wastage. However,
Al-Qaeda can be destroyed with the allocation and sustained application of
resources, political courage, legal and diplomatic tools. The key to
disrupting, degrading and destroying Al-Qaeda lies in developing a
multi-pronged, multidimensional and multinational strategy that targets the
core and the penultimate leadership and the network's sources of finance and
supplies.
In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda forces fight alongside the Taliban. If the Taliban
defeats the Northern Alliance, Western intelligence and security agencies
fear tens of thousands of foreign and Afghan fighters would then be free to
engage in other theatres and other conflicts in which Al-Qaeda might take an
interest. Russia, India, China, Europe and the USA have regional interests
in Chechnya, Kashmir, Xinjiang, the Balkans and the Middle East, all
conflicts in which Islam is a central factor.
Dr Rohan Gunaratna is Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Terrorism and
Political Violence, University of St Andrews, Scotland. |
