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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 8:09:06 PM
From: T L Comiskey	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Jacob...Long time no see...was when qcom was 60+ ...that I last had the pleasure of reading your views..... Take Care.... Tim

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 8:49:29 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Iraq admitted to producing biological agents, and after the 1995 defection of a senior Iraqi official, Iraq admitted to the weaponization of thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinim toxin, and aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs and aircraft. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) experts concluded that Iraq's declarations on biological agents vastly understated the extent of its program, and that Iraq actually produced two to four times the amount of most agents, including anthrax and botulinim toxin, than it had declared. UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council in April 1995 that Iraq had concealed its biological weapons program and had failed to account for 3 tons of growth material for biological agents........ Gaps identified by UNSCOM in Iraqi accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains stockpiles of chemical agents, probably VX, sarin, cyclosarin and mustard. Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads. Iraq has not accounted for at least 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred vehicle for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent........ efreedomnews.com

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 8:59:32 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Source: Cabinet Office paper, November/December 1998 What UNSCOM and the IAEA have found Since 1991, in carrying out its mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 687, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) has destroyed, or made harmless, a "supergun"; 48 Scud missiles; 40,000 chemical munitions; 690 tonnes of CW agents; 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; and biological warfare-related factories and equipment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found a nuclear weapons programme far more advanced than suspected, and dismantled it. But Iraq's declarations to the UN on its WMD programmes have been deliberately false. Because of Saddam's deliberate policy of concealment and obstruction, not everything has been found. He has under-reported his materials and weapons at every stage, and used an increasingly sophisticated concealment and deception system. Directed by Saddam himself, it uses his Special Security Organisation (SSO) and Special Republican Guard to block the inspectors' work. WMD materials are stored in hides, including private houses and farms; and if necessary, inspectors are delayed at the entrance of sites while WMD material is blatantly driven out of other exits and offices are "cleaned" of any evidence. The extent of Iraq's lies were revealed most clearly after the defection of Hussein Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law, in 1995. (Subsequently killed when he was lured back to Iraq in 1996.) Iraq then had to admit the existence of its offensive BW programme, including the manufacture of BW bombs and warheads in 1990, and that it had previously concealed the full extent of its nuclear programme. Chemical Weapons Iraq has consistently denied weaponising VX, the most toxic nerve agent. But recent analysis in the US of missile warhead fragments brought out of Iraq by UNSCOM showed clear traces of VX. Further tests were carried out on different warheads in French and Swiss laboratories. All the results were discussed by a multinational group of experts in October 1998. This group accepted as accurate the results of the US tests; noted that the French laboratory had found evidence consistent with the presence of a nerve gas (which may have been VX or another agent) on a warhead fragment; and noted that all three laboratories had found evidence of attempts to decontaminate the warheads. The experts' report concluded that the evidence from the three laboratories conflicted with Iraq's declarations that these warheads had never been filled with any CW agents, including VX. During a routine inspection in July 1998, UNSCOM found a document showing the use of CW munitions during the Iran/Iraq war, revealing major discrepancies in Iraqi declarations. Iraqi "minders" accompanying the inspectors snatched the document back, and Iraq has still not allowed UNSCOM access to it. 31,000 CW munitions and 4,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals that Iraq claims to have destroyed unilaterally still have to be properly accounted for. Biological Weapons The Al Hakam biological weapon (BW) factory, destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996, was designed to make up to 50,000 litres of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other BW agents a year. Yet Iraq claimed it was an animal feed factory. BW remains the area of greatest uncertainty. Until 1995 Saddam denied having an offensive BW programme at all. UNSCOM has described Iraq's most recent, its seventh, "final" declaration as failing to give a remotely credible account of the programme. The quantities of biological growth media that are unaccounted for are enough to produce more than three times the total amount of anthrax Iraq admits to producing. And production of agents like anthrax and the cancer inducing aflatoxin has been clearly understated. Saddam will rebuild his WMD unless he is stopped For Saddam, his WMD are a symbol of his power and prestige in the region, allowing him to threaten his neighbours and his own minorities. Saddam has shown he will never give up his WMD unless forced to - even at the cost of prolonging sanctions indefinitely. Medicine and food are not covered by UN sanctions, yet Saddam diverts huge sums of money which could otherwise help his people into his illicit WMD programmes. Unless he is stopped: Iraq would be capable of regenerating a CW capability within months. Some CW agents and munitions remain hidden. The Iraqi chemical industry could produce mustard gas almost immediately, and limited amounts of nerve agent within months. This, and some weaponisation, could be done covertly. Saddam almost certainly retains some BW production equipment, stocks of agents and weapons. In any case, Iraq has the expertise and equipment to regenerate an offensive BW capability within weeks. Iraq could still be hiding some pre-Gulf conflict Scud missiles, which could be available within days. A single Scud missile armed with a VX warhead would cause thousands of casualties if it hit a crowded city. Work to produce a 650 km-range missile which could hit many targets in the Middle East may already have begun; even if these had to be built from scratch, this could be done within a year (and crude BW or CW warheads made in the same timeframe). In late 1995, Jordan intercepted a shipment of advanced missile guidance components destined for Iraq. If Iraq's nuclear programme had not been halted by the Gulf conflict, Saddam might have had a nuclear weapon by 1993. If Iraq could procure the necessary machinery and materials abroad, it could build a crude air-delivered nuclear device in about five years. Iraq could design a viable nuclear weapon now. On 14 November Iraq wrote to the Secretary General of the Security Council promising once again to cooperate fully with UNSCOM. On 15 December UNSCOM reported to the UN Secretary General that Iraq had not only failed to cooperate fully, but had placed new restrictions on UNSCOMs work. This confirms yet again Saddam Hussein's determination to retain his WMD capability and defy the United Nations. special.fco.gov.uk

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 9:03:34 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

"The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 litres of botulinum toxin - enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hadn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them." United States President George Bush State of the Union address 28 January 2003

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 9:04:08 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

"Baghdad did not provide persuasive evidence to support its claims that it unilaterally destroyed its BW agents and munitions. Experts from UNSCOM assessed that Baghdad's declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and estimated that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agent that it acknowledged producing, including Bacillus anthracis-the causative agent of anthrax-and botulinum toxin." Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs CIA Assessment October 2002

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 9:08:05 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

From PBS Frontline (fairly liberal media outlet) Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program Between 1991 and 1998 the IAEA conducted more than 1500 inspections. IAEA released a report in 1997, with updates in 1998 and 1999, which it believes offers a technically coherent picture of Iraq's nuclear program. In summary, the IAEA report says that following the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq launched a "crash program" to develop a nuclear weapon quickly by extracting weapons grade material from safe-guarded research reactor fuel. This project, if it had continued uninterrupted by the war, might have succeeded in producing a deliverable weapon by the end of 1992.[1] The IAEA inspections revealed seven nuclear-related sites in Iraq. [2] The IAEA reports that all sensitive nuclear materials were removed, and that facilities and equipment were dismantled or destroyed. Activities uncovered and destroyed included: an industrial scale complex for Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS), a process for producing enriched uranium. The complex was designed for the installation of 90 separators; before the Gulf War, eight were functional. If all separators had been installed, the plant could have produced 15 kg of highly enriched uranium per year, possibly enough for one nuclear weapon. a large scale manufacturing and testing facility--the Al Furat Project--designed for the production of centrifuges, used in another method of uranium enrichment. facilities and equipment for the production of weapons components. computer simulations of nuclear weapons detonations storage of large quantities of HMX high explosive used in nuclear weapons. According to former U.N. inspector David Kay, Iraq spent over $10 billion during the 1980s in an attempt to enrich uranium and build a nuclear weapon. However, the Agency concludes that as of December, 1998, "There were no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons," or "that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance." However, the IAEA did find that "Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of [highly enriched uranium] ... and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon." Despite the fact that the facilities and nuclear material had been destroyed or removed, as early as 1996 the IAEA concluded that "the know-how and expertise acquired by Iraqi scientists and engineers could provide an adequate base for reconstituting a nuclear-weapons-oriented program." Nuclear physicist and Iraqi defector Khidhir Hamza agrees. He told FRONTLINE that Iraq did not relinquish certain critical components of the nuclear program to the inspectors, and that it retains the expertise necessary to build a nuclear weapon. He believes that Iraq may have one completed within the next couple of years. Note: IAEA was allowed back into Iraq in January 2000 and again in January 2001. But its inspectors were blocked from full access inspections.

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 9:09:25 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 89467

More from PBS Frontline (fairly liberal media outlet) Iraq's Biological Weapons (BW) Program Between 1991 and 1998, UN inspectors conducted more than 70 inspections into Iraq's biological warfare activities. In its 1999 final report to the U.N. Security Council, UNSCOM noted that Iraq's biological warfare program was "among the most secretive of its programs of weapons of mass destruction." It said that Iraq "took active steps" to conceal the program, including "inadequate disclosures, unilateral destruction, and concealment activities." Therefore, the Commission concluded, "it has not been possible to verify" Iraq's statements about the extent and nature of its biological weapons program. A 58 page annex to the final report describes what the Commission was able to learn about the BW program, despite Iraq's concealment activities, and documents discrepancies between what Iraq claimed to have developed, or destroyed, and the physical evidence. Some of the findings include: Extensive BW program: Iraq had an extensive BW program from 1973 until at least 1991. In mid-1995, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents, but claimed that the entire BW program had been in "obliterated" in 1991 and that all BW weapons had been destroyed and all bulk BW agents had been deactivated. The Commission found, however, that the evidence produced in support of this claim was not credible, and that Iraq "retained suitable growth media, BW facilities, production equipment, teams of expert personnel, and the essential technical knowledge" after 1991. Bulk production: In July, 1995, Iraq acknowledged that between 1988 and 1991, it had produced two BW agents in bulk: botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax). Iraq reported 19,180 liters of botulinum toxin (10-20 fold concentrated) and 8445 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores (10 fold concentrated). UNSCOM found, however, that "bulk warfare agent production appears to be considerably understated," given the resources available to Iraq's BW program, including growth media and fermenter capacity. The Commission said that the production rate of Botulinum toxin could be as much as double the stated amount, and 3 times greater than that stated for Bacillus anthracis spores. Iraq claimed that it unilaterally destroyed more than 7500 liters of the Botulinum toxin and 3412 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores in 1991; UNSCOM noted that there was not evidence to support quantities claimed to be destroyed. The report concludes "the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed... and that a BW capability does not exist in Iraq." Iraq also claims to have produced lesser quantities of clostridium perfringens spores, ricin, and wheat cover smut. BW Warheads: Iraq claimed to have produced 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads and filled them with BW agents. The Commission found that there was no credible evidence to show that only 25 missiles were produced and filled. Iraq declared that the 25 missiles were unilaterally destroyed; the Commission found enough physical evidence to account for the declared quantities of BW warheads, but the location of the remnants were inconsistent with Iraq's story. BW bombs: Iraq declared that 200 R-400 aerial bombs were manufactured for BW purposes, but acknowledged that the numbers of bombs filled with particular agents (100 with botulinum toxin, 50 with bacillus anthracis spores, and 7 with aflatoxin) were "guesses." UNSCOM did find evidence of the destruction of some BW bombs at the site declared by Iraq, but found that the remnants account for less than one third of the bombs Iraq claims to have destroyed. In addition, UNSCOM found evidence of R-400A bombs carrying BW at an airfield where no BW weapons were declared. Aircraft drop tanks: Iraq claimed that it produced 4 aircraft drop tanks to disseminate BW agents, and was developing a pilotless aircraft that could carry the tanks, holding either BW or chemical weapons, and release the toxins at a preset time. UNSCOM found that there was no evidence corroborate that only 4 were produced, and noted that interviews indicated that 12 were planned. Remnants of only three destroyed tanks were recovered. UNSCOM also rejected the evidence offered by Iraq--a letter thanking the project workers--that the pilotless aircraft project was shut down. Aerosol Generators: Iraq developed aerosol generators for the dispersal of BW agents by modifying helicopter-borne commercial chemical insecticide disseminators. Although Iraq claimed the devices were ineffective, UNSCOM received documentation that they were successfully field tested. Interview evidence suggests that there were 12 devices produced; none were destroyed by UNSCOM. Remaining Bacterial Growth Media: UNSCOM determined that there remained substantial bacterial growth media imported into Iraq which remains unaccounted for: 460 kg. of casien; 80 kg. of thioglocollate broth; 520 kg. of yeast extract; and 1100 kg of peptone. The report says that "the amounts that are 'missing' are significant, and would be sufficient to produce quantities of agent comparable to that already declared by Iraq."

To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (19277)	5/19/2003 9:12:53 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Some more from PBS Frontline (fairly liberal media outlet) Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Program UNSCOM was more successful in its pursuit of Iraq's CW program largely because Iraq was more cooperative with its disclosures. The final report notes that a "significant number" of chemical weapons, their components, and related equipment were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision between 1991 and 1997. In addition, the report found: Extensive CW program: Iraq acknowledged that it carried out a large scale CW program between 1982 and 1990. It claims that more than 50% of its chemical weapons stocks were consumed during the 1980s, and that the majority of its production facilities were destroyed by aerial bombing during the Gulf War. Bulk CW agents: Iraq said that it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents during the entire implementation of its CW program, and that 3,315 tons of these agents were weaponized. Agents produced in large quantities included mustard, tabun, and sarin. According to Iraq, 80% of the weaponized CW agents were consumed between 1982 and 1988. In addition, they claim to have unilaterally discarded 130 tons of non-weaponized CW agents during the 1980s. UNSCOM found that these numbers could not be verified. After the Gulf War, Iraq claimed that it had 412.5 tons of CW agents remaining. Four hundred eleven tons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision; 1.5 tons of the CW agent VX remain unaccounted for. Special Munitions: Iraq claimed that between 1982 and 1988, 100,000 munitions filled with CW agents were consumed or disposed of. UNSCOM found that this number could not be verified. After the Gulf war, Iraq declared that there remained over 56,000 special munitions which could carry either CW or BW agents (22,000 filled, 34,000 unfilled). These munitions are all accounted for. They were either destroyed or converted for conventional weapons purposes. Iraq claimed that there were 42,000 special munitions destroyed in the Gulf War. UNSCOM was unable to verify that number, and found that the destruction of 2,000 unfilled munitions remains uncertain, and 550 filled munitions remain unaccounted for. Iraq claimed that it unilaterally destroyed 29,000 special munitions; UNSCOM found that of these, 100 filled munitions remain unaccounted for. pbs.org