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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (98627)5/20/2003 12:47:21 PM
From: JohnM  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Nadine, you are pushing things together that need to be kept separate.

The first is the charge that because some of the Arab leadership tried to work affinities with the Nazis, that therefore one can say Arab "ideology" whatever that is, is so similar to the Nazis that it can be called such. I don't know the Lewis' texts which are the basis for Beeman's claims. And see no need to find them. I'm not trying to settle claims here; just trying to note the Lewis' views are controversial within the field and should not be used as a standard to judge others, much less to judge the patriotism of others which is what I see in Daniel Pipes' work.

Moreover, while I'm not terribly knowledgable in this field, I do know an overgeneralization when I see one and am cynical enough to speculate as to the reasons for it.

Second, this post of yours reminds me of the talk of an Arab mentality, culture, mindset, whatever, advanced here without any attempt to make careful arguments pulling all the evidence together to substantiate it. I'm not convinced that the term "culture" helps much in social explanations for two reasons: (1) the difference between texts which are often offered as evidence and practices is not only rarely explored but often used indisriminately to substantiate wildly differing views; and (2) the causal power of "culture" is certainly not only not a settled matter within the social sciences but, in my view, the arguments about the relative causal power of culture and structure often are irrelevant to specific issues.

Third, on the anti-semitism of the Arabs. I increasingly believe all sorts of things are being thrown into this category without much discussion as to whether they belong. Clearly criticism of the actions, statements, whatever of the Sharon government is not, on its face, anti-semitic. Clearly, also, criticism of the Israeli state for not moving out of the West Bank after 67 is not, on its face, anti-semitic.

Finally, on this same point, a sentence which reads the "Arab world" and then attaches something a Saudi paper printed as evidence for the "Arab world" is far too much over generalization for me.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (98627)5/20/2003 1:04:16 PM
From: KyrosL  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Nadine, my understanding is that before the establishment of Israel there was little, if any, persecution of Jews in Arab countries, certainly compared to what the Jews endured at the hands of Christian Europeans. And even after the establishment of Israel, Jews were allowed to emigrate to Israel from most Arab countries. So, while many Arabs expressed support and even admiration for the Nazis, their treatment of Jews was relatively benign. Am I wrong in believing that? Is there some evidence of pogroms of Jews in Arab countries I am missing?

Kyros



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (98627)5/20/2003 2:23:37 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 281500
 

Weapons and Terror - Did the Iraq war really boost al-Qaida?

By Christopher Hitchens - SLATE
Posted Tuesday, May 20, 2003, at 10:06 AM PT

It's fascinating to be this far into the post-Saddam period and still to be arguing about weapons, about terror, and about Saddam. According to one school, the total effect of the whole thing has been to expose WMD claims as a sham, ratchet up the terror network, and give Saddam a chance at a populist comeback.

I don't think that this can be quite right. I still want to reserve my position on whether anything will be found, but I did write before the war, and do state again (in my upcoming Slate/Penguin-Plume book ) that obviously there couldn't have been very many weapons in Saddam's hands, nor can the coalition have believed there to be. You can't station tens of thousands of men and women in uniform on the immediate borders of Iraq for several months if you think that a mad dictator might be able to annihilate them with a pre-emptive strike.

The Iraqis also tended to admit things in reverse. In other words, it was only at the height of the Blix moment in 2003 that they conceded how near they had been to a nuclear weapon in 1990, when almost nobody believed they had such a capacity. And we know how many chemical and biological weapons they possessed at one time because they reluctantly handed over long lists stating what they were.

Thus if nothing has been found so far, and if literally nothing (except the mobile units predicted and described by one defector) is found from now on, it will mean that the operation was a success. The stuff must have been destroyed, or neutralized, or work on it must have been abandoned during the long grace period that was provided by the U.N. debates. One senior U.N. inspector adds a caveat to that, which is worth stressing. The intention of the regime to acquire weapons at some point, or to reacquire them, should not be doubted. There are many blueprints and many brains and many computer discs full of know-how. These would be nearly if not actually impossible to discover, and they will now not be reassembled by a Baathist government. Thus if you take my line of the "long short war," and a timeline of 1990 to 2003, Saddam Hussein went from being a threshold nuclear potentate with the capacity to invade Kuwait to an ex-potentate unable even to deploy his Republican Guard. This was the outcome of a series of measures, from sanctions to bombing, designed to create the conditions for regime change or to make regime change (desirable for numberless other reasons) possible. The anti-war movement opposed even the sanctions at first and the military part of the operation at all times. But Iraq is now disarmed, and who will argue that it was not the believable threat of intervention that brought this about?

Perhaps half-aware that this is true, anti-war Democrats and some others are now saying that the world has nonetheless been made more dangerous because of the threat of additional terrorism. Some stuff may have gone missing, and the fanatics may have been encouraged. Well, they can't have this both ways, either. If there was stuff to go missing, then it was there all along, wasn't it? And it wasn't being kept for recreational use. The incompetence of the U.S. protective and investigative teams, in this and in some other areas (like the elementary delivery of supplies and repairs) doesn't alter that fact. As to the terrorists who (remember?) had "no connection" to Saddam Hussein, they seem moved nonetheless to take revenge for his fall. Can that possibly mean they feel they have lost a friend?

Let us skip over this obvious point and inquire about what they managed. In Saudi Arabia, which is a fertile place for anti-Western feeling of all sorts, they managed to kill a number of Saudi officials and bystanders while inflicting fairly superficial damage on Western interests. Widespread and quite sincere denunciation of this has been evident across Saudi society. While in Morocco, where the evidence for an al-Qaida connection is not so plain, whatever organization did set off the suicide attacks in Casablanca has isolated itself politically. Please try to remember that al-Qaida and its surrogates are engaged in a war with Muslims as well: They boast of attacking the West in order to impress or intimidate those Muslims who are wavering. But they are steadily creating antibodies to themselves in the countries where they operate. The jihadists who murdered tourists in Egypt were widely execrated and not just because they threatened to ruin the tourist industry. The Bali bombers in Indonesia caused something of the same effect. The recent suicide atrocities in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv were clearly directed, by their timing, against elements in the Palestinian Authority who want to make a deal.

This is where all our political and cultural intelligence will be required. In a civil war within the Islamic world, secularists and liberals have the chance to make many allies against theocracy and its gruesome tactics. It is not just Christian Nigerians who oppose the imposition of sharia law in that country and the stoning of Amina Lawal. As the jihadists begin to explode themselves and their devices on Arab streets, they will not fulfill the usual prediction of bringing ever more recruits to Bin Laden. Quite the contrary. Instead, and as in Afghanistan and Iran, there will be more people willing to oppose theocratic absolutism. Of course this political project can be called a "war" because it does also necessitate the use of remorseless force. But when the murderers strike next on American or European soil, it won't prove that it was wrong to fight them, and it certainly won't demonstrate that we brought it on ourselves by making them cross (i.e., by fighting back). It will remind us that it is indeed a war. So, it's depressing to see that, just as many Arabs and Muslims are turning against Bin Ladenism, some Western liberals are calling for a capitulation in the mind and hinting that this war is either avoidable or, even worse, not worth fighting, lest it offend the enemy.

Article URL: slate.msn.com