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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (19792)	6/2/2003 1:05:55 PM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Integrity, Intelligence And Iraq ________________________________________ By Jeffrey H. Smith The Washington Post Sunday, June 1, 2003 George Tenet probably has the toughest job in America. The intelligence community and the CIA in particular are being sharply questioned about the gap between what was predicted in Iraq and what has been found. Critics of the war are screaming that the CIA did not anticipate the chaos, looting and political instability in Iraq. A group of retired intelligence analysts have written the president charging that systemic "warping" of intelligence "misled" Congress into voting for the war. On Friday, both Tenet and Secretary of State Colin Powell responded by making unusual public statements in defense of the intelligence community and their own actions. Although the intelligence community got much right that enabled an extraordinary military victory, it appears to have gotten much wrong about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and his link with al Qaeda. Time will tell whether the CIA was right about these matters. But in the meantime a more serious charge has emerged, namely that the CIA's analysis leading up to the war was altered under pressure by the administration to overstate the threat Hussein presented. As a result, the credibility of the intelligence community -- and the United States -- is at risk. Therefore hard questions must be asked. At least three investigations are asking those questions, including the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, an internal review ordered by Tenet and a further internal review requested by congressional oversight committees. Among the questions that should be asked: • What did we know before the war and how does it compare with what we found? • What was the president told? • Were there doubts in the intelligence community about some of the analysis, and were those doubts passed up the line? • Was there pressure on career professionals to alter their analysis, and if so, from whom? • If changes were made under political pressure, what can be done to avoid that in the future? As these investigations begin, two principles must be kept in mind. First, as the late William Colby, a former director of central intelligence, was fond of saying, intelligence analysis is like the proverb about the blind man grasping the tail of an elephant and trying to explain what he is holding. We must all understand the inherent limits of intelligence analysis -- and the concomitant risks in basing action on intelligence. Second, the most important aspect of intelligence analysis is integrity. Many factors contribute to that integrity, including the intellectual skills and character of the individuals preparing the reports, the support given to the analysts by CIA leadership and the independence of the agency. Tenet and his senior leadership have greatly emphasized the first two factors. Any recommendations emerging from these investigations must preserve or strengthen them. But attention should also be paid to the third: the independence of the CIA. The CIA was established after World War II because President Truman and Congress recognized that it was imperative to have an agency to collect and analyze intelligence for the president that would be independent of the departments of State and Defense. This independence was and is essential to ensuring that analysis is not tailored to suit the views of any government policymaker. The president's new policy of preemption places an even greater premium on the need for integrity in intelligence analysis. Iraq, the first real test of this policy, painfully proves the point. Serious questions are being asked about whether intelligence was misused, manipulated or ignored by the administration to argue in favor of an invasion. Foreign governments are questioning our word, making it much harder for the president to gather support for his policies in Korea, Iran and other hot spots. Members of Congress have said privately that when they hear reports of other threats facing the United States, they question whether they are accurate or have been influenced by senior administration officials who favor a particular policy. Concern about the integrity of U.S. intelligence analysis cannot stand. The director of central intelligence must be able to speak truth to power. In many ways, Tenet's most important responsibility is to say, "Mr. President, your policy is failing." Those of us who know Tenet are convinced he has the steel to do precisely that. The CIA has established the position of ombudsman for politicization of intelligence. If any intelligence analyst believes his or her analysis has been altered because of policy or political considerations, that analyst can report to the ombudsman, who would then take appropriate measures. The investigations currently underway should examine whether that system is adequate. Congress can help. It has the obligation to conduct vigorous oversight of intelligence agencies. But it must make clear that what it values most is integrity in the collection and analysis of intelligence. Organizational changes might also help. The 9/11 commission is considering changes in the organization of the intelligence community. The congressional oversight committees have been quietly considering some changes. Brent Scowcroft recently completed a study that remains classified but reportedly calls for the director of central intelligence to have greater authority over those agencies in the intelligence community that are part of the Defense Department. At the same time, the Defense Department has created an intelligence unit in the office of the secretary of defense that is said to be a rival to Tenet as a source for analysis that reflects the views of Rumsfeld and that often finds its way to the Oval Office. Congress should examine these organizational issues and be ready to act when the 9/11 commission makes its report. Regardless of organizational or personnel changes, political leaders must recognize that however badly they want intelligence that supports their policy prospective, they cannot "cook the books." Most important, the president must recognize that he needs someone who can speak the truth to him. _______________________________________ The writer is a former general counsel of the CIA. © 2003 The Washington Post Company washingtonpost.com