The W. Summit
Will Bush be intimidated?
By Saul Singer
Saul Singer is editorial-page editor of the Jerusalem Post. This piece first appeared in the Post and is reprinted with permission.National Review
New York Times columnist Tom Friedman, with his unerring sense for the sweet spot where forming and riding the conventional wisdom meet, wrote last week of Mideast diplomacy that "America must want peace more than the parties themselves." What matters most, in other words, is not where the parties are, but how much Bush pushes.
The notion that peace is directly related to the amount of American elbow grease applied to it is tempting, and not entirely wrong, but mostly misses the point. It is akin to hitting a broken vending machine harder, or speaking louder to someone who speaks a different language. If presidential involvement were the key, then Bill Clinton who did everything but give Yasser Arafat his own key to the White House would have made peace three years ago.
Indeed, this week's planned Bush summits in Jordan and Egypt are reminiscent of Clinton's Sharm summit at the very beginning of the current Palestinian offensive in October 2000, after which the American president proudly announced, "both sides have agreed... to take immediate, concrete measures to end the current confrontation." That was 32 months ago.
This president, of course, will show up with much greater authority than Clinton had at Camp David, and even his father had at the Madrid conference of 1991. At Madrid the idea was to bang together the heads of Arab and Israeli leaders following the collapse of the Arabs' Soviet backers and the ouster of Iraq from Kuwait. This time the U.S. has actually toppled two regimes in as many years, and is specifically targeting the Middle East for a full makeover.
And yet this region, and specifically this conflict, eats presidential authority for breakfast. This is particularly true if any sign is shown that the authority will not be exercised. For example, why should the Arab world be impressed with Bush's determination to force them to make peace with Israel if he continues to tiptoe around radical Arab positions, or shies away from backing fundamental Israeli needs? The fact is that what matters far more than how hard Bush pushes is who he is pushing and how clearly he speaks. The first test will be at this week's back-to-back summits.
At the first summit, if it happens, with Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, both leaders will be expected to issue parallel declarations in fulfillment of Phase I of the "roadmap." Sharon will say that he is committed to creating a Palestinian state and Abbas will say that the Palestinians (again) recognize Israel's right to exist.
Sharon's declaration will be another small step on the path he and Israel have been traveling for the last decade, in which we have become used to the idea that there will be a Palestinian state. In emotional terms, Sharon crossed a significant line when he not only pushed the roadmap through the cabinet, but said that now was the time to "divide the land" and "end the occupation."
Though the Hebrew word that Sharon used for occupation, kibosh, also means "conquest," and does not necessarily carry the full legal and moral weight of the English word, the use of that word is in some ways even more powerful than endorsing the roadmap. The use of this single word signals that Sharon is not dragging his feet, but actively wants Israel out of the territories, much as Ehud Barak wanted out of Lebanon.
If Bush is serious, he will ensure that when Abbas reiterates Israel's right to exist, that he use a similarly powerful single word that Bush himself used for the first time in his recent speech in South Carolina. In that speech, Bush demanded that the Arab world recognize "Israel has a right to exist as a Jewish state at peace with its neighbors."
In 1988, Yasser Arafat ostensibly recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism. In 1993, in the context of the Oslo agreement, he did so again. Now that over 750 Israelis have died at the hands of terrorists in just the current war, and Abbas continues to say "we cannot relinquish the right of return," repeating the same broken promise again is not enough. Abbas must say that the Palestinians will give up their demand of return to Israel. Otherwise, talk of recognizing Israel is meaningless. And the way for Abbas to say this is that the Palestinians recognize Israel's right to live in a Jewish state.
If the end of this war is mainly about creating a Palestinian state, then the Palestinians have shown in the midst of America's war against terrorism that terror has won. If the main result is the Arab world visibly accepting not only Israel's de facto existence, but accepting Israel as a Jewish state, than the West has won and Arab radicalism has lost.
Which side is winning will be measured largely by whether the Arab side is compelled to put its peace cards on the table early, the way Israel has had to do by proving, over and over, that it supports Palestinian statehood.
If Bush shies away from demanding that the Arab world give Israel a similar level of confidence that the end game is not some backdoor means of our destruction, it will show that the U.S. continues to show deference to a key plank of Arab radicalism.
The assumption that if Bush is seen to tilt toward Israel he will jeopardize the process is exactly backwards. The less Bush is seen to be intimidated by Arab radicalism, the more he will be taken seriously by the Arabs themselves, and the greater the opportunities for peace.
nationalreview.com |
