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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (100110)	6/4/2003 1:39:26 AM
From: LindyBill	Respond to of 281500

China: Fed Up With North Korea? By David M. Lampton - Washington Post The writer is director of China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and at the Nixon Center. Wednesday, June 4, 2003; Page A27 President Bush's just-concluded meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Evian, France, came at a critical juncture in the U.S. effort to build a multilateral coalition to deal with North Korea's drive for nuclear weapons. Hu's cautious yet constructive stance in Evian shows that Beijing is angry at North Korea for precipitating a crisis and fearful of what war or breakdown in that country could mean for China. What a difference a few months make. Last November, after personally hearing what several of China's most senior leaders had to say about the North Korean nuclear program and U.S. policy, I felt that Beijing was unduly complacent. Today, China is nearly apoplectic about Kim Jong Il's behavior. Chinese leaders already have increased cooperation with Washington and are debating the merits of still more extensive cooperation. Six months ago, China's most senior leaders seemed concerned but not alarmed by North Korea's stated nuclear intentions. The formulation they employed was that they "preferred" not to see a nuclear North Korea -- a far cry from the American bottom line that such capabilities were absolutely unacceptable. The general Chinese line was that Kim probably was bluffing, that U.S. intelligence might not be accurate and that China had an overriding interest in peace and stability along its borders. Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans streaming into northern China, fleeing war or societal collapse induced by U.S. pressure, was what Beijing feared. (One can speculate, too, that Beijing was preoccupied with its leadership transition.) But in March China sent its most senior diplomat, Qian Qichen, to Pyongyang to deliver the message that North Korea was to knock off its gratuitous provocations and start talking to Washington. Reinforcing the point, Beijing interrupted the flow of oil to dependent, hungry and cold North Korea. Shortly thereafter the North Koreans agreed to meet in Beijing with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. Since that disquieting April meeting, a stream of knowledgeable Chinese has been coming to Washington to let it be known that Beijing is thinking outside the previous box. Among the more tantalizing though not yet mainstream suggestions is that "regime change" in Pyongyang might be the least of a multitude of evils. What accounts for Beijing's hardening attitude? Quite simply, North Korea has jeopardized fundamental Chinese interests. And this comes on top of a list of grievances extending back a half-century -- all of which makes for a situation in which Beijing has had it with Kim. The extent of the threat to Chinese interests became evident in the April meeting in Beijing among China, the United States and North Korea. There, North Korea asserted that it had nuclear weapons and said it might conduct a "physical demonstration" or export them. The threat of export was off the charts for both the Americans and Chinese. This jolted and embarrassed Beijing. As one Chinese visitor put it to me recently, "North Korea really is a rogue nation! . . . They might sell [nuclear material] even to the Hui," a minority people often accused of "separatism" in western China. "They are a destabilizing force in all Northeast Asia." For the first time the Chinese apparently see that they could be the victims of proliferation. Further, nuclear proliferation around China's borders likely wouldn't stop with Pyongyang. It would spread to South Korea, then possibly Japan, and perhaps Taiwan. China would face nuclear regimes at all points of the compass. Moreover, China's trade and economic interests with South Korea far exceed those with North Korea. While North Korea sucks up about one-third of China's foreign aid budget, Seoul is a major direct investor in China. Finally, a principal Chinese objective is to avoid destabilizing friction with the United States; Beijing understands that Washington is deadly serious about the North Korean nuclear problem. Chinese anger at Pyongyang is exacerbated by a long, unhappy history. It starts with the North Korean effort to obscure China's role in saving the regime in the Korean War, proceeds to North Korea's execution of cadres thought to have links with China and moves on to its lies to Beijing about its nuclear ties to Moscow in the 1970s and its 1998 missile test over Japan, which sparked Tokyo's cooperation with Washington on missile defense. The sad tale concludes with anger that Pyongyang proceeded to establish a special economic zone near China's border despite Beijing's explicit opposition. China's North Korea policy is under strenuous debate and remains unsettled. Nonetheless, the range of things Beijing is considering is striking, including ratcheting up economic pressure on the North. Beyond the aforementioned discussion of "regime change," some Chinese also are rethinking how many refugees they might be able to accommodate. Even some in the military, an organization in which affinity for Pyongyang seems to run deepest, are wondering how far to go in supporting North Korea. Though no responsible Chinese wants a war in North Korea, China might end up sitting on the sidelines if conflict breaks out, much as it did during the U.S. invasion of Iraq -- as long as Chinese security interests in the post-conflict situation are respected. What does Washington need to do to see Chinese policy move in a more supportive direction? First, U.S. policy must have Japanese and South Korean support. It needs to hold out the possibility of cooperation with Pyongyang if the North moves in a positive direction, as well as the certainty of negative outcomes should the North continue on its present course. Beijing will not get out ahead of South Korea and Japan. Second, through talks with North Korea, Washington must establish for all to see whether Kim Jong Il will trade his nuclear programs for the regime's future security and a more normal relationship with the international community. washingtonpost.com