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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: J_F_Shepard who wrote (412281)6/6/2003 4:55:38 PM
From: Raymond Duray  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 769670
 
ABC News: "Intelligence Historian Says CIA 'Buckled' on Iraq"

abcnews.go.com

<SNIP>

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The CIA bowed to Bush administration pressure to hype the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs ahead of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, a leading national security historian concluded in a detailed study of the spy agency's public pronouncements.

"What is clear from intelligence reporting is that until about 1998 the CIA was fairly comfortable with its assessments on Iraq," John Prados wrote in the current issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

"But from that time on the agency gradually buckled under the weight of pressure to adopt alarmist views," he said. "After mid-2001, the rush to judgment on Iraq became a stampede."



To: J_F_Shepard who wrote (412281)6/6/2003 4:59:24 PM
From: Neocon  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769670
 
This is what the New York Times says:

U.S. Report Raises Doubts About Iraq Weapons
By REUTERS

Filed at 3:25 p.m. ET

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration pushed for war against Iraq last fall because of weapons of mass destruction despite a secret Pentagon report it did not have enough ``reliable information'' Iraq was amassing chemical weapons, a defense official said on Friday.

Hours after portions of the classified September 2002 report by the Defense Intelligence Agency leaked out on Friday, the head of the agency said information from the report was quoted out of context and his agency believed Iraq had a WMD program.

``The sentence that is being carried is a single sentence lifted out of a longer planning document,'' Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the DIA, told reporters after addressing a closed Senate Armed Services committee hearing on the issue.

Earlier, a U.S. defense official confirmed a sentence in the report that said the DIA did not have enough ``reliable information'' that Iraq had chemical weapons.

News of the report added to claims the White House and the Pentagon slanted intelligence on Baghdad's weapons program to justify the war. No such weapons have been found since Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was ousted in April.

``It (the report) talks about the fact that at the time in September 2002 we could not specifically pin down individual facilities operating as part of the weapons of mass destruction programs, specifically the chemical warfare portion,'' said Jacoby.

In no way, said Jacoby, was the document intended to suggest U.S. doubt that such a weapons program existed. ``DIA joined in the intelligence community assessment and that assessment assessed that they had a weapons of mass destruction program in place,'' said Jacoby.


``TRUST THE CLAIMS''

Republican Sen. John Warner urged Americans to trust the administration's claims. ``I make the appeal to the American people to continue to repose trust in this administration as we go forward (in the search).''

Reacting to the report, National Security Council spokesman Mike Anton said any charges the United States slanted intelligence were ``nonsense.''

``This report is consistent with the judgment of the intelligence community, with what the president was saying, with what the U.N. was saying, with what foreign governments believed and assessed about Iraq,'' said Anton.

Around the time of the DIA report, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld went to Congress to press his case that Iraq was stockpiling chemical and biological weapons.

A small team of U.N. nuclear experts returned to Iraq on Friday but they said their role was to check on looting at a research facility that may have caused radioactive contamination and was not to look for any weapons.

Surprise at the lack of chemical weapons has even been expressed by the U.S. military. Last week, U.S. Marine Lt. Gen. James Conway said U.S. intelligence was ``simply wrong'' in leading the military to believe the invading troops were likely to be attacked with chemical weapons.

CIA Director George Tenet has defended his agency's intelligence on chemical and biological weapons, saying the ``integrity of our process was maintained throughout.''

On Friday, a leading national security historian, John Prados, concluded in a study that the CIA bowed to political pressure to hype the threat of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs ahead of the U.S.-led war in Iraq.

nytimes.com



To: J_F_Shepard who wrote (412281)6/6/2003 5:15:00 PM
From: Raymond Duray  Respond to of 769670
 
Bush WMD chase confused with Marx Brothers Movie!

Pre-war information called “faith-based intelligence.”

thebulletin.org

Source: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Calendar of errors

This one’s for the history books, folks. While it’s always possible that some Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or WMD—which posed such an immediate threat to the United States that the Bush administration was compelled to invade that country—may some day be found, so far the weapons have proved elusive. Just for the record, (and in case in a few years no one can believe what happened, or the story becomes confused with the plot of a Marx Brothers movie), here’s a representative sample of reports from the U.S. and British news media since the search for Iraq’s WMD began:

April 7: The Washington Post relays the Pentagon announcement that it has found the “smoking gun”—the 101st Airborne has located a large cache of chemical weapon-laden missiles southwest of Baghdad; buried “bioweapons labs” are also reported found.

April 10: U.S. military commanders announce they have secured the Tuwaitha nuclear facility.

April 11: U.S. military commanders reveal that before April 10, Tuwaitha, a site known to contain various radioactive materials, was left unguarded for days. During that time Iraqi civilians looted the facility, almost certainly carrying away contaminated materials.

April 12: The Guardian reports that the U.S. and British governments have rejected the idea that experienced U.N. weapon inspectors should return to Iraq. Meanwhile, the Associated Press reports that Saddam Hussein’s science adviser, Lt. Gen. Amer al-Saadi has surrendered, but insists Iraq had no WMD.

April 13: The Washington Post reports that the “smoking gun” chemical weapon found on April 7 is some sort of pesticide, probably used to combat mosquitos; as for the April 7 report that chemical weapons missiles had been found, the Pentagon “denies any knowledge of this alleged discovery.”

April 15: CNN reports that buried bioweapons labs turn out to be crates of new, unused laboratory equipment (test tubes and the like).

April 20: The Washington Post says the Pentagon intends to form a 1,000-man “Iraq Survey Group” to hunt for weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, Britain’s Independent sums up what has been discovered about Iraqi WMD so far: The U.S. intelligence report that the nuclear facilities at Tuwaitha had been rebuilt was a “sham”; a claim that Iraq had bought uranium in Niger was based on falsified documents; and the aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq were not for gas centrifuges to produce weapon-grade uranium. The United States claimed that Iraq was expanding its chemical facilities, but in reality the chemical site at Al Qaqaa was bombed during the first Gulf War, and its chemical weapons were then removed and destroyed by the United Nations. As for the pre-war claim that Iraq was building a dangerous unmanned aerial vehicle for the purpose of spraying bioweapons into the atmosphere, a single dismantled drone found by U.N. inspectors was not reported because it was not a prohibited item. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s claim at the United Nations in February, that Iraq had weaponized ricin, was misleading, to say the least. The truth, surely known to U.S. intelligence, was that Iraq conducted a single test in November 1990, which failed, after which the ricin project was abandoned. Similarly, no evidence to date supports Powell’s other claims— that Iraq engaged in research on smallpox, or that it had any VX, mustard gas, botulin, or anthrax.

April 21: Questions are raised about how seriously the U.S. government believed its own claims about WMD, considering that, as the New York Times reports, weapons search teams do not have adequate transport and are having to rely on borrowed helicopters. On the same day, in the same paper, reporter Judith Miller declares that an unnamed Iraqi scientist has identified an unnamed site where, he says, Iraq destroyed unnamed chemical and biological weapons before the war. Miller calls this the “most important discovery to date in the hunt for illegal weapons.”

April 24: The Washington Post reports that the reason U.S. forces waited three weeks after reaching Tuwaitha before inspecting it was due to an internal U.S. government dispute about who would be in charge. The BBC quotes the editor of Jane’s Intelligence Digest, Alex Standish, who says reports of Iraq’s WMD were “politically driven.”

April 25: President George W. Bush says WMD may not ever be found in Iraq.

April 27: New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman says it doesn’t matter if no WMD are found. On the other hand, Raymond Whitaker, writing in the Independent, says the road to war was paved with lies and that intelligence agencies were at the mercy of political appointees who distorted intelligence reports to fan the flames. The story about the purchase of uranium from Niger, based on “crude forgeries,” had been known to be false for more than a year. As for Scud missiles, not only were none fired, none were found. The Blair government plagiarized outdated graduate student papers and called them a dossier on Iraqi weapons. Other questionable information came from an exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, which was paid to “come up with” claims. It’s odd, Whitaker concludes, that if U.S. and British authorities were so concerned about finding WMD that within a few days they diverted some of the search teams to other tasks. Meanwhile, the Los Angeles Times reports that David Kay, a pre-war supporter of the administration’s position, says of the U.S. WMD search: “My impression is this has been a very low priority so far, and they’ve put very little effort into it.”

April 28: Associated Press reports that some 55-gallon drums previously found in northern Iraq and described by U.S. military personnel as containing “blister agent” contain rocket fuel.

April 29: Surrendered scientist Nassir Hindawi tells CNN he was the only person in Iraq smart enough to make powdered anthrax (about which, he adds, he kept quiet). Hindawi describes Rihab Taha, Iraq’s famous “Dr. Germ,” as a former student of his who lacked practical abilities. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is described by Independent correspondent Ben Russell as “hinting” that WMD may never be found, although Straw continues to insist that Iraq “had them recently.”

May 1: President Bush lands on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln and declares an end to major combat operations in Iraq. On the same day, but reported in the May 17 Washington Post, U.S. special weapons hunters break down the doors of “Special Security Organization Al Hayat.” The padlocked innermost storage room is found to be filled with vacuum cleaners.

May 7: The Associated Press reports that Lt. Gen. William Wallace of the army’s Fifth Corps says there is “plenty of documentary evidence” of WMD coming from “lower-tier Iraqis.” Wallace offers no examples.

May 9: The Associated Press reports that Col. Richard McPhee says his teams have found no chemical or biological weapons so far, and that they might never be found, but he thinks they will find an “infrastructure.” Or, as Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence says, a program for WMD will be found, just no WMD. “How it was configured and how they intended to use it” is the problem, according to Cambone.

May 11: The Los Angeles Times reports that before the war U.N. teams tracked down what U.S. intelligence had told them were “decontamination trucks” only to find they were fire trucks. Other information provided to U.N. inspectors was also less than helpful: “Sometimes it was amazingly specific. You know, ‘Go into the basement, there’s a door marked 4, go in there, then there’s a long corridor, then you’ll find a room filled with equipment.’ Except there never was.”

May 11: The Washington Post reports that the group directing the search for WMD, the 75th Exploitation Task Force, is planning to leave Iraq.

May 13: The Washington Post’s Harold Meyerson calls pre-war information “faith-based intelligence.” But Kenneth Timmerman, writing in Insight magazine, says that only liberals care whether Iraq actually had WMD.

May 13: The New York Times reports that “suspicious trailers,” which could be mobile bioweapons labs have been found—but they contain no biological materials.

May 17: The Washington Post reports that White House communication director Dan Bartlett believes there is proof that Iraq had a WMD program because “the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution that confirmed it.”

May 22: Peter Jennings, introducing a story on ABC-TV’s nightly news, summed up the record. “U.S. intelligence officials say they have concluded that the two tractor-trailers, which they found in northern Iraq during the war, are laboratories for making biological weapons. But they have found absolutely no trace of biological agents in them. Nine weeks after the war began, there is no tangible evidence of any biological or chemical weapons in Iraq at all.”