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To: BWAC who wrote (48508)6/7/2003 11:08:33 AM
From: Carl Worth  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 53068
 
how about permacynic? lol...the old cliche is, whether the glass is half full or half empty....you obviously see it half empty

i look at the conditions that are present today, and sure it would be nice if every person who wanted to work had a job at every minute, but obviously that will never happen...6% unemployment isn't even historically high, we got to 4% because companies way overhired to meet demand that was temporary, fueled by Y2K, the startup of so many internet companies all at once, the extra demand caused by those companies, etc.

we had an adjustment because those excesses had to be corrected, and we are still adjusting, but we haven't reached huge numbers on unemployment, and yes, things do appear to be stabilizing

so you look at the above and say oh no, what can go wrong now? what if things don't improve? i look at the above and say hey we came through things pretty well, what can go right now? things have a good chance of improving

for years there has been an impending housing bubble, credit crunch, corporate scandal crisis, deflation scenario, gold to 2000 disaster, or whatever the latest doom and gloom theory is, but we seem to continue on in pretty good to very good shape, depending on the year....another cliche you hear is that economists have predicted 20 out of the last 5 recessions....similarly, the cynics have predicted 20 out of the last 5 (or less) crises...i just don't see the value in living your life worried about the next problem

JMHO

carl



To: BWAC who wrote (48508)6/7/2003 11:17:42 AM
From: E.J. Neitz Jr  Respond to of 53068
 
Are You Ready for Deflation? (Interesting Article-You "Perma-Bear!)

As Dow Crosses 9000, Investors Must Decide
Whether to Expect Falling Prices or Inflation
By JEFF D. OPDYKE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

OK, is it deflation or inflation?

Investors are getting mixed signals these days on which path the economy is taking. This week, Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, again highlighted the risk that falling prices could send the U.S. into a dangerous spiral of Japanese-style deflation. The Fed's preoccupation with deflation has investors piling into bonds, which will increase in value if rates keep tumbling. Ten-year Treasury notes closed Wednesday at 3.29%, their lowest yield in 45 years.

At the same time, prices for many key expenditures, including health care and tuition, continue to rise. For many consumers, these incessant price increases make inflation seem more of an immediate threat than falling prices.

For investors, this is far more than an arcane macroeconomic debate. After the three-year bear market, many investors are starting to wade back into the stock market again. The Dow Jones Industrial Average is up 13% in the past two months -- it closed Wednesday above 9000 for the first time since August. Investors deciding where to deploy their funds must make a fundamental calculation on whether the economy is headed toward falling prices or rising prices. Each scenario calls for a very different portfolio.

"This is the most important investment decision" an investor needs to make right now, says Ray Dalio, president at Bridgewater Associates, a Westport, Conn., investment-management firm.

Deflation is usually bad news for stocks. It means companies lose their ability to raise prices, which squeezes corporate profits. So those fearing deflation are loading up on long bonds, which would provide a steady cash flow in a world of falling prices. They are also buying zero-coupon bonds which appreciate in value when interest rates fall.

In contrast, the stock market generally thrives in a period of mild inflation. Such periods, like the 1990s, often have strong economic growth and rising consumer income, both of which are good for corporate profits. Investors betting on inflation are snapping up Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, bonds whose return automatically rises whenever inflation does.

What follows are two competing investment strategies, one structured for deflation, the other for inflation.

Deflation

Falling prices aren't a common occurrence in the U.S. The last recorded bout of deflation was more than 50 years ago and was mild. The most infamous case occurred during the Great Depression.

In periods of deflation, cash is king. That's because the dollars you have today will buy more tomorrow as prices fall. That favors owning U.S. government bonds with the longest maturities, since they pay the highest rates and are locked in for the longest period of time.

In a deflationary world, zero-coupon bonds will be the rock stars. These bonds don't pay interest -- it's built into their price at maturity, similar to a savings bond. Investors would pay about $670 today to buy a zero-coupon bond that gives them $1,000 at maturity in 2013.

One downside: Even though you don't get interest payments from zero-coupon bonds, you're still required to pay income taxes yearly on the internal interest your bond is earning.

To get income during deflationary times, stick to traditional bonds. The 30-year Treasurys generate the biggest income stream and will get the biggest price pop from deflation, since when interest rates go down, bond prices go up.

Foreign bonds should do well, too. The dollar likely would weaken in a deflationary period, so investors could offset that risk by owning investments denominated in a foreign currency. The easiest way to buy foreign bonds is through mutual funds such as BlackRock International Bond or American Century International Bond.

Steer clear of corporate bonds, however, since in deflationary times, consumers put off many discretionary purchases as they wait for even lower prices. That puts pressure on a company's sales and earnings, increasing the likelihood of default.

Real estate would be a terrible investment, since prices would come down. That means forget the second home or vacation property.

If there is a run of mild deflation, then investors may want to own the dividend-paying stocks of companies that can drive sales based on volume and innovation, instead of price increases. That would include drug companies such as Schering-Plough. Utility stocks also should be winners since their services are necessary and they produce generally stable dividends.

In a period of more persistent deflation, however, investors should consider avoiding stocks completely. Even dividend-paying companies will have a hard time keeping their earnings at a level that will allow them to pay those dividends. Companies focused on commodities, such as energy stocks and gold-mining firms, also will get hammered.

Inflation

If inflation remains mild, then a broad swath of stocks are expected to do well. The easiest way to benefit is to own a low-cost index fund mimicking either the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index or the broader Wilshire 5000.

If inflation kicks into high gear, however, avoid stocks completely and buy hard assets, such as real estate, gold, even collectibles like art and Persian rugs.

The safest play is Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, so-called TIPS. Their returns adjust over time to provide a return over inflation.

TIPS "are the perfect riskless asset," says Douglas Fore, associate director of the TIAA-CREF Institute, the research and education arm of the big provider of retirement-planning services.

Other bonds will do poorly, however. When interest rates rise, bond prices tumble. That's because today's bonds carry low yields, and when rates rise, they will be worth less to investors.

Commodities of all sorts tend to perform strongly during inflationary periods. However, they aren't the easiest assets to own, since they're usually structured as futures contracts that expire in time.

Real estate is often a strong performer during inflationary periods, since the price of land usually escalates. This means owning a home or investing in a second home or vacation property might make sense. You can play real estate more indirectly by owning a real-estate investment trust or a mutual fund such as Alpine Realty Income & Growth Y.

Write to Jeff D. Opdyke at jeff.opdyke@wsj.com1

URL for this article:
online.wsj.com


Hyperlinks in this Article:
(1) mailto:jeff.opdyke@wsj.com

Updated June 5, 2003



To: BWAC who wrote (48508)6/9/2003 11:51:54 AM
From: E.J. Neitz Jr  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 53068
 
Deflation holds unknown perils for the Fed
By Alan Ruskin
Published: June 8 2003 19:03 | Last Updated: June 8 2003 19:03

The Financial Times

It is tough to teach an old dog new tricks. As Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the US Federal Reserve said last month: "We went through most of the post-world war II period with the expectation that fiat [paper] currencies were essentially inflation ridden . . . Japan demonstrated to us otherwise." With 50 years of experience weighing down on inflation, the Fed must now urgently adapt to the risks of deflation.

Far from being complacent, leading Fed officials have framed the debate about how to ward off deflation. They recognise that the credibility of their strategy is crucial to shaping price expectations. Should the fed funds rate approach zero, the Fed would need other tools. So ever since it began talking about pre-empting deflation, the Fed has boasted of its ability to manipulate the yield curve at the long end.

This is remarkable, since for many years we heard about the Fed's ability to control short-term interest rates, but not long-term rates. Officials are now singing from a different hymn sheet. Recently, the Fed has pointed to its success in capping long-term yields at 2.5 per cent in the 1940s as one indication of its potential mastery over the full spectrum of Treasury yields. The Fed can no doubt influence long-term yields significantly.

But before they lurch into any such policy, policymakers need to ask themselves five important questions: can the Fed really control treasury yields? How does any control extend to longer-term private sector yields? Can it calibrate the size of the monetary stimulus and its impact on the real economy? What are the likely distortions to the allocation of capital? And what is the Fed's exit strategy?

The Fed may well be able to exercise control over long-term rates, essentially by agreeing to buy treasury bonds for ever. But where its control is weakest is where it most needs to manipulate yields, in the medium term of a few years.

When the market does not want to purchase treasuries, Mr Greenspan could commit the Fed effectively to capping yields by acting as buyer of last resort. But for this to be effective for more than a short period, the market has to be convinced the Fed stands to see the capping process through the maturity of the long-term bonds it wishes to target. Barring such a commitment, the Fed will inevitably become a victim of its own success. This is because the more credible this unorthodox reflationary policy, the more it tends to place upward pressure on long-term yields. It would then be a case of policy-makers succeeding in the technicalities only to fail in the broader objective.

Even if the Fed can control treasury yields, it is questionable whether this influence extends to long-term private sector yields, which determine the price of most borrowing and lending decisions. Initially, lower treasury yields could be expected to drive down non-treasury bond yields. But if attempts at reflation are successful, expectations of higher inflation will cancel out this substitution effect.

Government bonds are also bound to lose their benchmark status, further complicating the Fed's task. In the 1940s both AAA and BAA corporate spreads narrowed sharply relative to treasuries, but these were war years, with undeveloped capital markets. This leads to many issues on appropriately calibrating policy, including: how can the Fed know what treasury yields are appropriate to engender correct private sector yields? How does the Fed encourage appropriate real yields when steady nominal yields are targeted? What is the impact on money supply and other key measures of liquidity? Amid all these questions, the signal effect of long-term rates for policymakers and the markets is bound to be lost.

As an alternative to a long-term commitment to cap yields, the Fed could periodically buy treasuries. The aim would be to put downward pressure on long-dated yields, as the Bank of Japan has periodically done over recent years, although the Fed would probably intervene on a much larger scale.

The more ad-hoc such intervention, the less influence it would have on yields. But this might be a good thing. For the more interest rates are fixed, the greater the distortions to capital allocation. Fixed interest rates bring the same problems of excessive borrowing and lending as occur under pegged or fixed exchange rate regimes. Risk is underwritten by a central bank that is eventually forced to change the rules. The effect on those borrowers who are inappropriately hedged is then wrenching. Pumping up private sector borrowing, notably in the inflated residential housing market, could lead to an even deeper downswing, should yields rise.

Paradoxically, the more successful the Fed is in pushing interest rates down in the short term, the more destabilising will be the effects when it finally ends its strategy of intervention. For a central banker with as much respect for market forces as Mr Greenspan, the mere thought of tampering with the treasury market in this way must be a sacrilegious act. It is either testimony to how far the challenges facing the US economy have changed, or it is confirmation of a post-bubble monetary policy careering out of control.

The writer is US research director of 4Cast, an economics consultancy