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To: Knighty Tin who wrote (244434)6/8/2003 9:28:36 AM
From: Pogeu Mahone  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 436258
 
OPEC says will not shift oil sales from dollar
Reuters, 06.08.03, 8:50 AM ET



DOHA, June 8 (Reuters) - The OPEC oil cartel will not consider switching dollar-denominated oil sales to the euro, despite the fall in the value of the U.S. currency, OPEC's President said on Sunday.

Abdullah al-Attiyah, who is also oil minister for Qatar, said the dollar's decline versus other leading currencies like the euro and the yen had hurt OPEC revenues and helped oil importing nations.

"We are facing a very difficult situation with the dollar," he told reporters in Qatar ahead of next week's Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries meeting in the cartel member country.

"The dollar has lost 20 percent of its value against the euro. The customer is receiving a discount from us."

The euro hit a record high last week at $1.19, rising 11 percent since the start of 2003 and up 45 percent from a low of 82 cents in late 2000.

But Attiyah said there was no prospect of a change.

"We will stick with the dollar. It is very difficult to change," he said. "Assume we changed to the euro and six months later the euro fell, we would have to switch back."

Any decision by OPEC to denominate oil sales in euro, even just to European customers, would severely undermine the dollar's status as the standard currency of international trade.

OPEC meets on Wednesday with oil prices near $31 for U.S. crude, pricing the cartel's own index of crudes near the top end of its $22-$28 target range.

Attiyah said there were no proposals to adjust that target band to compensate for the lower value of its dollar oil sales.

"We have no proposal to change the band, in my opinion $25 on average is good for consumers and producers," he said. "We never seek compensation for the rate of exchange."

With Iraqi exports set to start by mid-month, but only at modest rates, the group is expected to leave production limits unchanged.

Copyright 2003, Reuters News Service



To: Knighty Tin who wrote (244434)6/8/2003 9:36:40 AM
From: Pogeu Mahone  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 436258
 
June 8, 2003
Deficits and Dysfunction
By PETER G. PETERSON


have belonged to the Republican Party all my life. As a Republican, I have served as a cabinet member (once), a presidential commission member (three times), an all-purpose political ombudsman (many times) and a relentless crusader whom some would call a crank (throughout). Among the bedrock principles that the Republican Party has stood for since its origins in the 1850's is the principle of fiscal stewardship -- the idea that government should invest in posterity and safeguard future generations from unsustainable liabilities. It is a priority that has always attracted me to the party. At various times in our history (especially after wars), Republican leaders have honored this principle by advocating and legislating painful budgetary retrenchment, including both spending cuts and tax hikes.

Over the last quarter century, however, the Grand Old Party has abandoned these original convictions. Without ever renouncing stewardship itself -- indeed, while talking incessantly about legacies, endowments, family values and leaving ''no child behind'' -- the G.O.P. leadership has by degrees come to embrace the very different notion that deficit spending is a sort of fiscal wonder drug. Like taking aspirin, you should do it regularly just to stay healthy and do lots of it whenever you're feeling out of sorts.

With the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House, this idea was first introduced as part of an extraordinary ''supply-side revolution'' in fiscal policy, needed (so the thinking ran) as a one-time fix for an economy gripped by stagflation. To those who worried about more debt, they said, Relax, it won't happen -- we'll ''grow out of it.'' Over the course of the 1980's, under the influence of this revolution, what grew most was federal debt, from 26 to 42 percent of G.D.P. During the next decade, Republican leaders became less conditional in their advocacy. Since 2001, the fiscal strategizing of the party has ascended to a new level of fiscal irresponsibility. For the first time ever, a Republican leadership in complete control of our national government is advocating a huge and virtually endless policy of debt creation.

The numbers are simply breathtaking. When President George W. Bush entered office, the 10-year budget balance was officially projected to be a surplus of $5.6 trillion -- a vast boon to future generations that Republican leaders ''firmly promised'' would be committed to their benefit by, for example, prefinancing the future cost of Social Security. Those promises were quickly forgotten. A large tax cut and continued spending growth, combined with a recession, the shock of 9/11 and the bursting of the stock-market bubble, pulled that surplus down to a mere $1 trillion by the end of 2002. Unfazed by this turnaround, the Bush administration proposed a second tax-cut package in 2003 in the face of huge new fiscal demands, including a war in Iraq and an urgent ''homeland security'' agenda. By midyear, prudent forecasters pegged the 10-year fiscal projection at a deficit of well over $4 trillion.

So there you have it: in just two years there was a $10 trillion swing in the deficit outlook. Coming into power, the Republican leaders faced a choice between tax cuts and providing genuine financing for the future of Social Security. (What a landmark reform this would have been!) They chose tax cuts. After 9/11, they faced a choice between tax cuts and getting serious about the extensive measures needed to protect this nation against further terrorist attacks. They chose tax cuts. After war broke out in the Mideast, they faced a choice between tax cuts and galvanizing the nation behind a policy of future-oriented burden sharing. Again and again, they chose tax cuts.

The recent $10 trillion deficit swing is the largest in American history other than during years of total war. With total war, of course, you have the excuse that you expect the emergency to be over soon, and thus you'll be able to pay back the new debt during subsequent years of peace and prosperity. Yet few believe that the major drivers of today's deficit projections, not even the war on terror, are similarly short-term. Indeed, the biggest single driver of the projections, the growing cost of senior entitlements, are certain to become much worse just beyond the 10-year horizon when the huge baby-boom generation starts retiring in earnest. By the time the boomer age wave peaks, workers will have to pay the equivalent of 25 to 33 percent of their payroll in Social Security and Medicare before they retire just to keep those programs solvent.

Two facts left unmentioned in the deficit numbers cited above will help put the cost of the boomer retirement into focus. First, the deficit projections would be much larger if we took away the ''trust-fund surplus'' we are supposed to be dedicating to the future of Social Security and Medicare; and second, the size of this trust fund, even if we were really accumulating it -- which we are not -- is dwarfed by the $25 trillion in total unfinanced liabilities still hanging over both programs.

A longer time horizon does not justify near-term deficits. If anything, the longer-term demographics are an argument for sizable near-term surpluses. As Milton Friedman once put it, if you cut taxes without cutting spending, you aren't really reducing the tax burden at all. In fact, you're just pushing it off yourself and onto your kids.

You might suppose that a reasoned debate over this deficit-happy policy would at least be admissible within the ''discussion tent'' of the Republican Party. Apparently, it is not. I've seen Republicans get blackballed for merely observing that national investment is limited by national savings; that large deficits typically reduce national savings; or that higher deficits eventually trigger higher interest rates. I've seen others get pilloried for picking on the wrong constituency -- for suggesting, say, that a tax loophole for a corporation or wealthy retiree is no better, ethically or economically, than a dubious welfare program.

For some ''supply side'' Republicans, the pursuit of lower taxes has evolved into a religion, indeed a tax-cut theology that simply discards any objective evidence that violates the tenets of the faith.

So long as taxes are cut, even dissimulation is allowable. A new Republican fad is to propose that tax cuts be officially ''sunsetted'' in 2 or 5 or 10 years in order to minimize the projected revenue loss -- and then to go out and tell supporters that, of course, the sunset is not to be taken seriously and that rescinding such tax cuts is politically unlikely. Among themselves, in other words, the loudly whispered message is that a setting sun always rises.

What's remarkable is how so many elected Republicans go along with the charade. The same Republican senators who overwhelmingly approved (without a single nay vote) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to crack down on shady corporate accounting of investments worth millions of dollars see little wrong with turning around and making utterly fraudulent pronouncements about tax cuts that will cost billions or, indeed, even trillions of dollars.

For some Republicans, all this tax-cutting talk is a mere tactic. I know several brilliant and partisan Republicans who admit to me, in private, that much of what they say about taxes is of course not really true. But, they say, it's the only way to reduce government spending: chop revenue and trust that the Democrats, like Solomon, will agree to cut spending rather than punish our children by smothering them with debt.

This clever apologia would be more believable if Republicans -- in all matters other than cutting the aggregate tax burden -- were to speak loudly and act decisively in favor of deficit reductions. But it's hard to find the small-government argument persuasive when, on the spending front, the Republican leaders do nothing to reform entitlements, allow debt-service costs to rise along with the debt and urge greater spending on defense -- and when these three functions make up over four-fifths of all federal outlays.

The starve-government-at-the-source strategy is not only hypocritical, it is likely to fail -- with great injury to the young -- once the other party decides to raise the ante rather than play the sucker and do the right thing. When the Democratic presidential contender Dick Gephardt proposed in April a vast new national health insurance plan, he justified its cost, which critics put at more than $2 trillion over 10 years, by suggesting that we ''pay'' for it by rescinding most of the administration's tax legislation. Oddly, it never occurred to these Republican strategists that two can play the spend-the-deficit game.

Not surprisingly, many Democrats have thrown a spotlight on the Republicans' irresponsible obsession with tax cutting in order to improve their party's image with voters, even to the extent of billing themselves as born-again champions of fiscal responsibility. Though I welcome any newcomers to the cause of genuine fiscal stewardship,

I doubt that the Democratic Party as a whole is any less dysfunctional than the Republican Party. It's just dysfunctional in a different way.

Yes, the Republican Party line often boils down to cutting taxes and damning the torpedoes. And yes, by whipping up one-sided popular support for lower taxes, the Republicans pre-empt responsible discussion of tax fairness and force many Democrats to echo weakly, ''Me, too.'' But it's equally true that the Democratic Party line often boils down to boosting outlays and damning the torpedoes. Likewise, Democrats regularly short-circuit any prudent examination of the single biggest spending issue, the future of senior entitlements, by castigating all reformers as heartless Scrooges.

I have often and at great length criticized the free-lunch games of many Republican reform plans for Social Security -- like personal accounts that will be ''funded'' by deficit-financed contributions. But at least they pretend to have reform plans. Democrats have nothing. Or as Bob Kerrey puts it quite nicely, most of his fellow Democrats propose the ''do-nothing plan,'' a blank sheet of paper that essentially says it is O.K. to cut benefits by 26 percent across the board when the money runs out. Assuming that Democrats would feel genuine compassion for the lower-income retirees, widows and disabled parents who would be most affected by such a cut, I have suggested to them that maybe we ought to introduce an ''affluence test'' that reduces benefits for fat cats like me.

To my amazement, Democrats angrily respond with irrelevant cliches like ''programs for the poor are poor programs'' or ''Social Security is a social contract that cannot be broken.'' Apparently, it doesn't matter that the program is already unsustainable. They cling to the mast and are ready to go down with the ship. To most Democratic leaders, federal entitlements are their theology.

What exactly gave rise to this bipartisan flight from integrity and responsibility -- and when? My own theory, for what it's worth, is that it got started during the ''Me Decade,'' the 1970's, when a socially fragmenting America began to gravitate around a myriad of interest groups, each more fixated on pursuing and financing, through massive political campaign contributions, its own agenda than on safeguarding the common good of the nation. Political parties, rather than helping to transcend these fissures and bind the country together, instead began to cater to them and ultimately sold themselves out.

I'm not sure what it will take to make our two-party system healthy again. I hope that in the search for a durable majority, Republicans will sooner or later realize that it won't happen without coming to terms with deficits and debts, and Democrats will likewise realize it won't happen for them without coming to terms with entitlements.

Whether any of this happens sooner or later, of course, ultimately depends upon the voters. Perhaps we will soon witness the emergence of a new and very different crop of young voters who are freshly engaged in mainstream politics and will start holding candidates to a more rigorous and objective standard of integrity. That would be good news indeed for the future of our parties.

In any case, I fervently hope that America does not have to drift into real trouble, either at home or abroad, before our leaders get scared straight and stop playing chicken with one another. That's a risky course, full of possible disasters. It's not a solution that a great nation like ours ought to be counting on.

Peter G. Peterson is chairman and co-founder of the Blackstone Group and chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He served as secretary of commerce under President Nixon.

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company | Home | Privacy Policy | Search | Corrections | Help | Back to Top



To: Knighty Tin who wrote (244434)6/8/2003 1:47:51 PM
From: Giordano Bruno  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 436258
 
KT, according to FOX NEWS Bush officials now concur on their contentions.

foxnews.com

Aren't you glad that's all over?



To: Knighty Tin who wrote (244434)6/8/2003 2:37:10 PM
From: Lucretius  Respond to of 436258
 
rofl



To: Knighty Tin who wrote (244434)6/8/2003 11:23:42 PM
From: ild  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 436258
 
Sunday June 8, 2003 : Weekly Market Comment

John P. Hussman, Ph.D.

The Market Climate for stocks remains characterized by unfavorable valuations but favorable trend uniformity, holding us to a constructive position. Last weeks' market action was particularly good in terms of uniformity - the NYSE recorded 1097 new highs and just 2 new lows. The only other instance in which the NYSE has recorded over 1000 new highs was the week of October 15, 1982. While I certainly don't view the market as similar to 1982 in any respect, it's clear historically that a large number of new highs is not a negative unless it is also accompanied by a large number of new lows - the bearish feature in that case being widespread internal divergence - we don't see that here.

Still, stocks remain overvalued, and neither strong market action nor the likelihood of good second-half economic growth will change that condition. Assuming that current, rich valuations will be sustained into the indefinite future (S&P 500 price/peak earnings currently 18.4, dividend yield 1.67%), stocks are priced to deliver long-term total returns of less than 8% annually. If the assumption of sustained overvaluation is removed and valuations move toward historical norms even a decade or two from now, the S&P 500 will deliver total returns in the neighborhood of 2-5% annually overall. Clearly, our willingness to take market risk here is based strictly on evidence of robust speculative merit, not long-term investment merit.

This does not mean that current market conditions are fragile or unreliable. To the contrary, historical market returns in the current Market Climate have been quite good on average, with somewhat below-average levels of volatility, regardless of valuation levels. We always allow for the possibility that the Market Climate will shift, which is why we never make forecasts even a few weeks into the future, but for now, we have no evidence by which to hold a substantially defensive investment position.

Last week, the Dow Industrials finally generated a Dow Theory confirmation by advancing past their November peak. While we don't actually use Dow Theory, we do respect it enough to keep an eye on divergences and confirmations under the theory. Against that favorable news, stocks are clearly overbought, and the percentage of bearish investment advisors has dropped to just 20% - lower than can be explained simply by appealing to the recent market advance. We wouldn't speculate on the possibility of a market pullback here, but we certainly wouldn't rule one out. In the current Market Climate, such pullbacks have historically represented reasonably good buying opportunities. Overall, we're constructively positioned, and inclined to use short-term weakness as an opportunity to purchase desirable investments.

There are two basic factors behind the market's strength here. First and foremost, investors have taken on a measurably greater willingness to accept market risk. Despite the fact that stocks are priced to deliver relatively low long-term returns, investors are willing to drive those prospective returns even lower, which results in higher prices over the near term. Remember, the higher the price investors pay for a given stream of future cash flows, the lower the long-term rate of return they accept on that investment (and vice versa). The second, much less important factor behind this rally is that investors are looking ahead to a certain amount of economic improvement in the second half; reasonably so from our perspective.

I say that this is a less important factor simply because stocks are a claim on a very long-term stream of future cash flows. Fluctuations in one or two years of those cash flows have very little impact on the discounted present value of the entire stream. Economic weakness doesn't hurt stock prices by reducing their long-term value, but by raising investor's short-term aversion to risk.

So the central fact of the recent rally is very simple: investors have become somewhat more willing to accept risk. We measure this willingness largely through market action in prices, yields and trading volume. When we begin to see divergences or breakdowns in market internals, it will be a signal that investors have become more more sensitive to risk, and we will quickly become more defensive. But for now, the willingness of investors to accept risk seems to be fairly robust.

Of course, you can always flip on the TV to hear analysts offering other reasons for this rally. You can usually identify which subject they flunked by the argument they make.

The econ flunkies argue that stocks are advancing because investors are "selling money market funds and buying stocks." The quickest way to cut through this argument is to ask "to whom?" and "from whom?" As I've noted before, if Mickey sells his money market fund to buy stocks, the money market fund has to sell commercial paper to Nicky, whose cash then goes to Mickey, who uses it to buy stocks from Ricky. In the end, the cash that Nicky used to hold is now held by Ricky, the commercial paper that Mickey used to hold (via the money market fund) is now held by Nicky, and the stock shares that Ricky used to hold are now held by Mickey.

Money never goes into or out of the market - merely through it. Every security issued must be held. Regardless of the trading that takes place, in aggregate, investors hold exactly the same amount of cash, commercial paper, and stock as they held before those trades. It's only the terms of trade that may change. To the extent that Mickey is eager to sell money market instruments and Nicky is not eager to buy them, Mickey has to give Nicky more money market instruments for a given amount of cash - that is, the price of money market instruments will decline, increasing short-term interest rates. To the extent that Mickey is eager to buy stocks and Ricky is not as eager to sell them, Ricky will sell fewer shares of stock for a given amount of cash - that is, the price of stocks will increase. Similar trades, but different price changes, would result if Ricky was the eager trader instead of Mickey (work through this as an exercise - it's worth the trouble). Still, in the end, any change in stock values comes down to changes in the eagerness to hold stocks, not to any aggregate change in the amount of stocks or cash held by investors.

Meanwhile, the math flunkies argue that the rally is due to the recent cut in dividend taxes. Look, the long-term total return on stocks breaks into two elements - income and capital gains. Long-term capital gains are already favorably taxed, so the only incremental change is the reduced tax rate on dividends (relative to what was already priced into stocks before the change), applied to the stream of dividends over the period to which the tax rate change applies.

Given a current dividend yield of 1.67% on the S&P 500 index, the 10-year dividend tax relief passed by Congress raises the long-term after-tax rate of return on stocks by just 4 basis points. In order to fully reflect this dividend tax change, stock prices would have to rise by only 2.5% (dropping the dividend yield by that same 4 basis points). Applying this change to the total market value of U.S. stocks, the entire impact on the capitalization of the U.S. stock market would be roughly $350 billion. This is an interesting figure, because it is none other than the present value of the dividend tax reductions just passed by Congress.

So we have an elegant and intuitive result: the justified increase in stock market value as a result of dividend tax reductions is equal to the present value of the tax reductions themselves. There's no such thing as free money.

If instead, the dividend tax relief is extended for 30 years, the long-term after-tax return on stocks would rise by about 9 basis points, justifying a stock market advance of about 6%. This larger increase in the capitalization of the U.S. stock market would mirror the larger cost, in present value, of extending this tax relief.

Arguably, whatever tax rate on dividends anticipated by the market beyond 30 years from today was probably already priced into stocks before the recent tax cuts anyway. Tax policy is simply too fluid and unstable to price long-term assets on static assumptions beyond that horizon. But only by unexpectedly and permanently reducing taxes on dividends would stock values be significantly affected. In the infinite-horizon case (assuming that no tax reduction was priced into the market prior to the change, and the entire tax reduction was suddenly priced into the market for the infinite future), the present value of the market would need to rise by about 20% in order to maintain a constant after-tax rate of return. Even this assumes that rich current valuations are actually sustainable over the long-term.

In short, recent tax changes may be part of investor's willingness to take greater stock market risk, but they have a negligible effect in raising the fundamental value of stocks. The entire exercise is worth less than 250 points on the Dow. Still, this negligible effect in terms of total market value still has a fairly heavy price tag in terms of tax revenues. There is a right way and a right time to adjust tax policy. This cut just sets the tax system up for a Clintonesque backlash. We certainly wouldn't price it into stocks for more than a decade or two, and doubt that the markets will either.

In bonds, the Market Climate continues to be characterized by extremely unfavorable valuations and favorable trend uniformity. Valuations, however, carry more weight in determining near-term fixed income returns than they do in stocks, so we are fairly defensive here. Alan Greenspan made some interesting comments last week, indicating the likelihood of markedly stronger economic growth in the second half - remarks strangely at odds with recent deflation talk. The whole deflation issue is increasingly looking like a pretense for further lowering of the federal funds rate rather than any deeply held conviction by members of the FOMC.

As I've noted before, a continued reduction in the demand of investors for "safe havens" is likely to result in a fairly abrupt increase in inflation rates. My opinion is that further easing in the federal funds rate is likely to be accompanied by increases in market-determined interest rates, and that the Fed could be forced to quickly follow suit. If this were to occur, we could see a much flatter yield curve a year from now, with much of the shift accomplished by higher short-term rates. I've already noted the difficulties a flattening yield curve could have on the banking and credit system. Suffice it to say that the greatest risk to the financial system here is not deflation, but rather a substantial flattening of the yield curve.

That said, we'll get plenty of evidence to confirm or refute these risks as the coming quarters develop, and beyond taking a relatively short-maturity stance based on the prevailing Market Climate for bonds, there's no need to take any investment positions on this basis just yet. For now, we're aligned with the prevailing Market Climates in stocks and bonds. We'll take our next steps as new information arrives.
hussman.com