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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: JohnM who wrote (103288)	6/28/2003 2:11:55 PM
From: KLP	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

I just looked at her website, and it didn't have anything about it....But I wonder if there is a transcript someplace? Whatever, I'm sure we will see his thoughts in another piece he writes soon... He seemed to be more concerned with the "establishing peace" end of the war...and while he didn't say anything negative about the first man, is quite complimentary about the 2nd...

To: JohnM who wrote (103288)	6/28/2003 2:14:41 PM
From: Rascal	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Pollack's contribution in the current FA is very weak. It's like duh. I have lost all respect for him. Waiting to see him contract with Faux News soon. In his article he said there are 3 choices for us now. None are any good and they are very "Recent History 101". If these 3 choices were what were possible than it is pitiful that President Bush truncated the inspections in favor of occupation and invasion. President Bush's idea of weapons inspections have cost us billions in treasure, hundreds of American lives, tens of thousands of Iraqi lives and 150,000 troops. Cost benefit wise the UN and Bliz offered a very attractive choice. Written reports and things buried under a Rosebush do not constitute a imminent threat. In fact, as this Editorial explains, it is proof of how the sanctions and containment worked.... The Nuclear Finds in Iraq American officials were quite right to stress that the discovery of nuclear-related components and plans buried in an Iraqi scientist's garden in Baghdad is not a "smoking gun" that proves that Iraq had a nuclear weapon or an active program to develop one. Indeed, it looks more like the opposite, namely evidence that Iraq had abandoned for more than a decade its efforts to build a nuclear weapon but was hoping to start the program again later. The Central Intelligence Agency confirmed this week that a scientist, Mahdi Obeidi, who headed Iraq's uranium enrichment program in the 1980's and early 1990's, had turned over some components of a gas centrifuge, a machine used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, as well as blueprints for building and operating such a device. He had been ordered by Saddam Hussein's son Qusay to bury the material in his rose garden in 1991. The discovery reveals that the Hussein regime was willing to hide materials that it was supposed to disclose. The vast bulk of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure was destroyed by allied bombs during the 1991 gulf war or dismantled by international inspectors in the years immediately after, but nuclear expertise and plans are easier to hide than big machines. Still, these newly discovered components and blueprints are a long way from an actual weapon. They are essentially templates that could be used to build the hundreds or thousands of centrifuges needed to produce bomb-grade uranium. It is comforting that even in recent years, when inspectors had been banned from Iraq and Western intelligence feared the worst, Mr. Obeidi was never told to dig up his buried treasures. Iraq's nuclear program was apparently in deep hibernation. The new discovery, then, falls far short of validating the Bush administration's pre-invasion claims that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. The incident sends a mixed message about the challenges facing international inspections. On one hand, it is clear that inspectors would have very little chance of finding material buried in someone's backyard without a tip. On the other hand, if key scientists cooperate, they can point the way to clandestine activities. If Mr. Obeidi's example now encourages other Iraqi scientists to come forward, the world may get a better fix on whether Iraq's weapons program constituted a serious danger. nytimes.com Rascal@ firetheliar.com