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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tekboy who wrote (104101)7/5/2003 8:44:09 AM
From: epicure  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Many people think we ARE bogged down in Afghanistan:

Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor reports:

February 14, 2003

THE WAR in Afghanistan, once a success story for US-led coalition forces, appears to be becoming increasingly untenable.

Hardly a day goes by without some skirmishes with the Taliban, their Al-Qaeda supporters and their Hezb-e-Islami allies.

There has been a steady increase in the level of violence involving Afghan, as well as Pakistani, extremists.

On 27 January, US and Afghan forces encountered one of the biggest concentrations of enemy forces since Operation Anaconda in eastern Afghanistan.

Eighteen of around 80 militants were killed by air power.

...........

You do realize how long we've been in Afghanistan, right? And it isn't looking like a brilliant success (unless you are able to define brilliant success in a rather interesting way). Our "success" with the Taliban appears to be anything but. Things may change, of course, but right now

hrw.org

Human Rights Watch, which has monitored conditions in Afghanistan throughout the military conflict, said the warlords are stepping into a power vacuum created when the U.S.-led military coalition failed to support the extension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) outside of Kabul. The mounting repression and lawlessness facing Afghan civilians are dashing hopes that the June 10-16 meeting of the loya jirga will have credibility in selecting the next government



To: tekboy who wrote (104101)7/12/2003 11:38:51 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Former Intelligence Officials, Arms Control Experts Say Bush Administration Misrepresented and Hyped Iraqi Threat

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JULY 11, 2003
11:46 AM
CONTACT: Arms Control Association
Daryl Kimball, 202-463-8270 ext. 107
Wade Boese, 202-463-8270 ext. 104

WASHINGTON - July 11 - Intelligence and arms control experts charged Wednesday that the Bush administration exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and derided the UN arms inspections process in order to justify toppling the Iraqi dictator. Appearing at a press conference sponsored by the non-profit, non-partisan Arms Control Association, the speakers said the Bush administration made its case for going to war by misrepresenting intelligence findings, as well as citing discredited information, about the status of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and ties to terrorists.
The experts did not dispute that Iraq at one time possessed chemical and biological weapons, pursued nuclear weapons, violated its disarmament commitments, and did not fully cooperate with arms inspectors. Instead, they took issue with the Bush administration's dire description of Iraq as an immediate threat to U.S. and world security that required U.S. military action.

Greg Thielmann, who served as director of the office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research until September 2002, said, "I believe the Bush administration did not provide an accurate picture to the American people of the military threat posed by Iraq. Some of the fault lies with the performance of the intelligence community, but most of it lies with the way senior officials misused the information they were provided."

Thielmann highlighted the administration's characterization of the Iraqi nuclear threat as being the most misleading. "Going down the list of administration deficiencies, or distortions, one has to talk about, first and foremost, the nuclear threat being hyped," he said. In particular, Thielmann said he believed "something was seriously amiss" about President George W. Bush's reference in his State of the Union speech to a report that Iraq was trying to procure uranium from Africa. Thielmann's office had concluded previously that this was "bad information." This assessment was delivered to Secretary of State Colin Powell in March 2002.

But the Bush administration's distorted portrait of the Iraqi threat was not confined to just one wrong allegation. The panelists also discussed other overblown claims by the Bush administration, including its contention that aluminum tubes bought by Iraq were for a nuclear weapons program even though the International Atomic Energy Agency and some analysts in the U.S. government disputed that conclusion.

Thielmann argued that it appeared that senior administration officials had already made up their minds about the U.S. course of action on Iraq and then selectively used intelligence to support preconceived conclusions. "This administration has had a faith-based intelligence attitude. It's top-down use of intelligence; 'we know the answers, give us the intelligence to support those answers.'"

Gregory Treverton, a former vice chair of the National Intelligence Council, explained that intelligence is not straightforward so "you do get a lot of probablys/may-haves that are susceptible to very different interpretations." In the case of Iraq, he said the question is not the intelligence but "whether the administration improperly characterized that intelligence in making a public case for war in Iraq."

Testifying before the Senate Armed Service Committee July 9, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the United States did not go to war with Iraq because of new intelligence but because "we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light, through the prism of our experience of 9/11."

Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described Rumsfeld's admission as "shocking." Cirincione noted that the Bush administration "repeatedly gave the impression, and in fact said, that they had new evidence."

Cirincione further stated that administration descriptions of U.S. intelligence findings often were at odds with the actual intelligence reports. He said, "The public statements went far beyond the now-unclassified and publicly available intelligence assessments. All the 'could-be' and 'may-have' and 'possibly' were dropped from the public statements, and they became 'is, 'has' and 'definitely.'"

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, added that the Bush administration often skewed the fact the inspectors could not account for previously reported Iraqi weapons as evidence that Baghdad was hiding them. Kimball noted that Hans Blix, the head of the UN arms inspection team in Iraq, warned many times that "one should not equate not accounted-for with existing."

The Bush administration never had much enthusiasm for the inspection process and publicly doubted it could be effective. Cirincione asserted the administration did not want the inspectors to have success. "In order to build their case for war, the administration had to discredit the inspection process," he said.

Thielmann said that the misuse of U.S. intelligence could have serious consequences. "A little flaw in presentation here and a little flaw there and pretty soon you have fostered a fundamentally flawed view of reality, seriously eroding the credibility of the U.S. government in the process," Thielmann cautioned.

Kimball warned that lingering questions about U.S. credibility could undermine efforts to deal with greater proliferation dangers than Iraq, such as North Korea and Iran. He said, "It is going to become harder and harder for the United States to mobilize international action to deal with other threats...unless there is some clarity about how (the Iraq) episode played out and how it can be fixed in the future."

Kimball and Cirincione both pointed out that the lack of dramatic weapons finds in Iraq so far underscores the value of international arms inspections in stymieing the development of militarily significant stockpiles of weapons or major weapons programs.

"It is now fair to say that the U.N. inspection process was working and-if given the time and resources necessary-could have had a good chance of both preventing any ongoing programs; discovering any activities that were underway; ending a good deal of this low-level activity, such as the hiding of critical blueprints and parts recently unearthed in the backyard of an Iraqi scientist who came forward; and preventing the restart of any of these programs as long as (inspections) had been allowed to continue," Cirincione concluded.

A full transcript of the press conference is available at the Arms Control Association's Web site. In addition, the Association has collected a selection of Bush administration statements on the threat posed by Iraq, which is also available at the Arms Control Association's Web site.

###

commondreams.org



To: tekboy who wrote (104101)7/14/2003 12:56:26 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Betting everything on a hoax about Iraq
________________________________________

Uranium: As the Bush administration distances itself from false claims used to justify the invasion, the fallout remains nebulous.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By William R. Polk
Special To The Baltimore Sun
Originally published July 13, 2003

The Bush administration is caught in a scandal of almost unprecedented dimensions over the justifications that it and Great Britain gave for going to war against Iraq. Call it the "yellow cake scandal." It goes to the core of whether Saddam Hussein was trying to produce nuclear weapons, thus posing a threat to the United States and Great Britain, which would justify war.

It goes to a charge by President Bush that Iraq was trying to build a nuclear arsenal in which Bush used evidence his administration now acknowledges was no good. The President's people are now saying he was given bad information by the Central Intelligence Agency, but it is worth recalling that in the campaign for a war against Iraq, intelligence sources consistently complained the White House was manipulating intelligence to build support for the war.

"Yellow cake" is the nickname of uranium oxide, a component of nuclear weapons. It is produced, among other places, in two mines (Somair and Cominak) in the west African state of Niger. Working those mines is an international consortium composed of French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerien interests. They, in turn, are closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that no dangerous materials are diverted to unauthorized parties.

In late 2001, a rumor circulated that the government of Iraq was trying to buy yellow cake. In the shadowy world of espionage, it is still unclear who started the rumor. What is known is that some individuals or an organization forged documents to cast blame on Iraq.

The documents were appallingly crude. The letterhead on one document was obviously transplanted from some other, presumably genuine, paper; the signature of the president of Niger was copied; and, most telling of all, one signature was supposedly written by a minister who had been out of office for over a decade.

How these documents reached the British and American governments is also obscure. One story has them acquired by Italian agents and passed to the British intelligence agency (MI6), which passed them to the CIA.

When the documents reached the CIA, officials apparently concluded that, despite the papers' obvious faults, the subject they addressed was too important to be neglected. So, in early 2002, the CIA asked a retired American ambassador with 23 years of experience on African affairs (and who had been stationed in Niger in the 1970s) to investigate.

Ambassador Joseph Wilson, now a business consultant, agreed to fly to Niger to attempt to find out what was behind the story. He has described his experiences and conclusions in articles in The New York Times and the Financial Times.

When Wilson arrived in Niamey, the Nigerien capital, he consulted with the current U.S. ambassador, Barbra Owens-Kirkpatrick, and the embassy staff for whom everything relating to uranium was top priority. They told him that the story was well known and that they had already "debunked" it in reports to Washington. Then, as Wilson writes, "I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business." They uniformly and formally "denied the charges." The Embassy concurred.

Returning to Washington in early March 2002, Wilson reported to the CIA and to the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department of State that, although he had not been shown the documents themselves, he was sure that "there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale [outside controlled channels] to have transpired." Too many people would have had to give approval and even more would have known about the diversion of uranium. Moreover, since it would have violated UN sanctions, a diversion would have attracted a great deal of notice. In short, he concluded, the transaction did not take place.

In his Op-Ed article in The New York Times last Sunday, Wilson revealed "there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a CIA report summing up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally)."

The CIA has confirmed that its account of the matter was distributed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Pentagon, the Justice Department and the FBI and the office of Vice President Cheney.

His task, Ambassador Wilson concluded, had been accomplished: "the Niger matter was settled and [so I] went back to my life."

Despite this negative report, however, senior officials of the Bush administration continued to stress the nuclear threat from Iraq. In a speech in Nashville on August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney warned of a Saddam "armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror" who could "directly threaten America's friends throughout the region and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail."

The next month, in September 2002, Wilson was surprised to learn that the British government had published a "dossier" or white paper on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that included the yellow cake story. Assuming this meant that the CIA had not shared with MI6 the results of his investigation, Wilson called his contact at the CIA to suggest that he warn his British counterparts the materials were a hoax.

Wilson assumed that there was another source for the speech President Bush made on October 7, 2002, in Cincinnati in which he warned that "The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gasses and atomic weapons." But then, on January 28, 2003, he was astonished to hear Bush in the State of the Union address pin his warnings on Saddam Hussein's possession of atomic weapons to the yellow cake story. Bush declared that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

To make its case at the United Nations, the American government turned over the yellow cake documents to the Security Council. When they were examined by the IAEA, its director, Mohamed El-Baradei, informed the Security Council they were fake.

How could the U.S. government not have known? Condoleezza Rice, director of the staff of the National Security Council, replied on Meet the Press. "Maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the [Central Intelligence] Agency, but no one in our circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a forgery."

At least as early as February 2003, all the decision makers in the Bush administration as well as the general public knew that at least this part of the rationale for the invasion of Iraq was based on forged documents, but this did nothing to deter the U.S. military onslaught.

Almost more astonishing, as late as June 25, 2003, Britain was still insisting in Parliament that it stood by reports that Iraq had been trying to buy yellow cake. Finally, on July 7, the White House acknowledged that the story was a hoax.

Should that put an end to the story? No.

As some critics of the Bush administration have pointed out, when President Bill Clinton lied about an illicit sex affair, he was subjected to a major investigation by half a hundred lawyers and was nearly impeached. President Nixon was forced to resign over the Watergate break-in and President Reagan was been closely questioned over the Iran-Contra scandal.

Important as these scandals were, their significance pales in comparison to launching a war in which hundreds of Americans have died in Iraq and thousands of Iraqis have been killed while their country has been left in a shambles. The United States initially spent nearly $100 billion on the war and is committed to far larger outlays to repair what it destroyed.

It is unlikely that many in America will accept as the last word the president's explanation Friday: "I gave a speech to the nation that was cleared by the intelligence services. And it was a speech that detailed to the American people the dangers posed by the Saddam Hussein regime. And my government took the appropriate response to those dangers. And as a result, the world is going to be more secure and more peaceful."

History will judge the truth of that assertion, sooner, perhaps, than the Bush administration would wish.

____________________________________

William R. Polk was a Member of the Policy Planning Council in the administrations of President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. He has written widely on American policy and international affairs. He is now a director of the W.P. Carey Foundation.

Copyright © 2003, The Baltimore Sun

sunspot.net



To: tekboy who wrote (104101)7/20/2003 11:23:37 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Fear-Mongering and Bad Thinking Are Real Threats to Our Security

by Charles Knight

Published on Sunday, July 20, 2003 by CommonDreams.org

Even a casual reading of current news reports and speeches about the threat from North Korea reveals a gathering bipartisan war party. The centrist and liberal leaders urge more adroit diplomatic efforts from the Bush administration, but the ten thousand pound bipartisan guerrilla in the room insists that if the North Koreans don't back down from their nuclear ambitions the U.S. will forcibly disarm them -- that is, start a second Korean war.

Graham Allison, director of Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration, is one prominent centrist leading the charge for confrontation with the North Koreans. In a 14 July 2003 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal Europe, Allison states his case that nuclear terrorists are coming and that America must be prepared to take preventive action. Given the seriousness of the issue it is remarkable how flimsy his evidence and his reasoning are. It is worth closely reviewing this text, because it is likely we will hear versions of its lines again and again in the coming months.

Early in his op-ed Allison quotes Czech President Vaclav Klaus -- "a fundamental question: Was 9/11 an isolated act, or typical of phenomena the world will face in the first half of the 21st century?"

Allison provides his answer: "Beneath the headlines, deeper trendlines point to the latter. The relentless diffusion of deadly technologies allows progressively smaller groups to wreak increasingly greater destruction. Globalization has enhanced terrorists' ability to travel, communicate, and transport weapons. America's overwhelming dominance on all conventional battlefields drives rational adversaries to asymmetric responses like WMD terrorism."

Allison's answer is at best remotely related to the realities of 9/11 and is essentially theoretical. The increasingly common use of wide-body commercial aircraft was the only diffusion of technology relevant to the events of 9/11. The terrorists didn't need to transport weapons, they simply took advantage of dangerous vehicles routinely available in the vicinity of their targets. As for communications and coordination, this rather basic commando-type operation could have been equally well carried out long before the age of cell phones and electronic money transfers. And the statement that "America's overwhelming dominance on all conventional battlefields drives rational adversaries to asymmetric responses like WMD terrorism" is neither substantiated nor convincing as it stands.

Next Allison presents a what if: "In 1993, an al Qaeda-linked terrorist, Ramzi Yousef, tried to collapse the World Trade Center by exploding a truck filled with fertilizer-based explosives. Had that same truck carried an elementary nuclear weapon, the blast would have." Yes, we all should be deeply impressed by the threat of a nuclear explosion. But, Ramzi Yousef didn't have a nuclear weapon and Allison can't tell us about any terrorist who has one.

Of course, it is possible that someday a motivated terrorist organization could get a nuclear weapon, since there are thousands in the world, including hundreds small enough to transport in an SUV. However, this threat has been around for longer than commercial jet airliners or SUVs. If my memory serves me right, several of the bad guys in rather old James Bond movies stole nukes and threatened civilization. And critics of nuclear weapons have been complaining from day one of the nuclear-age that nations building and storing thousands of bombs are bound to leak one to irresponsible actors sooner or later.

Allison goes on to say: "The status quo is fatally flawed. The U.N.-chartered, rule-based international security order that was accepted pre-9/11 leaves America or Europe vulnerable to a series of nuclear 9/11s. Such conditions are incompatible with our survival as free nations whose fundamental institutions and values are intact." But our "existential vulnerability" to nuclear weapons existed long before 9/11 and so the allusion to 9/11 in Allison's diatribe against a U.N.-chartered, rule-based international security order is really beside the point.

If Allison wishes to argue in favor of a unilateralist 'might makes right' international security order he is free to do so. On the other hand, it may be the very rule-based type system he disparages that has the best chance of permanently reducing the existential vulnerability humans have to nuclear weaponry. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with its requirement that nuclear powers pursue disarmament contains the germ of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a disarmament program coupled with comprehensive international controls on fissile materials is ultimately the only regime that can reduce the nuclear threat toward zero. Allison's preferred nuclear class war between the nuclear haves and the nuclear not-yets is inherently unstable and prone to the very disaster he hopes to avoid.

Not only does Allison evoke the fear of 9/11 to lead us toward preventive war doctrine, but he vastly exaggerates the significance of a speculative nuclear terror incident. He says, "leav[ing] America or Europe vulnerable to a series of nuclear 9/11s. [is] incompatible with our survival as free nations whose fundamental institutions and values are intact." A nuclear terror incident would be a terrible thing, as we know from observing the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It would not, however, result in the destruction of our free nation and our fundamental institutions and values. It would take a nuclear war with a large nuclear power or the establishment of a dictatorial "war on terror" national security state to do that.

Which brings me back to the current target of the preventive war advocates -- North Korea. Allison points out, correctly I think, that the most likely source of a terrorist nuke would be Russia. Allison points to Pakistan next, and then says, "Next comes North Korea, the world's most promiscuous proliferator." He doesn't mention that history has shown that nation-states are loathe to share nuclear weapons. It is actually a very hard case to make that a reclusive North Korea prone to paranoia is likely to think it is a good idea to sell a nuclear weapon to Jihadists they don't control. But Allison doesn't try to make the case. Instead he employs the cheap rhetorical device used so successfully by the Bush administration in making the case for war on Iraq -- use the name of your target enemy in successive sentences with the name of a currently feared enemy. Thus Allison's next sentence after "North Korea, the world's most promiscuous proliferator" begins, "Were al Qaeda terrorists to acquire a nuclear device."

By now we should expect this sort of threat-mongering from the extreme right-wingers occupying Cheney's and Rumsfeld's offices. It is another indicator of the enormity of the crisis we face as a nation that a Harvard centrist (one well-positioned to advise and serve a future Democratic president) is so eager to join the right-wingers in spreading fear in support of a foolish and dangerous national security strategy.
______________________________

Charles Knight is co-director of the Commonwealth Institute's Project on Defense Alternatives in Cambridge, MA

###

commondreams.org