DISROBING FANNIE MAE, by Eric J. Fry
from Daily Reckoning:
Last week, a French reader of the Daily Reckoning inquired, "Bonsoir, J'aimerais bien connaître l'opinion de M. Eric Fry en ce qui concerne Freddie Mac et Fannie Mae, les grandes firmes americaines de refinancement hypothecaire. Merci."
Translation: I'd like to know Eric Fry's opinion about Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the large American mortgage companies.
I was flattered that a Daily Reckoning reader - and one who is neither a relative nor a close friend - would solicit my opinion. But I will demur. No opinion will be forthcoming. However, I will happily provide a series of skeptical observations about Fannie, the widely adored mortgage lender. To preview: My observations cause me neither to like nor dislike the company's stock, merely to fear it.
It is not easy to become rabidly negative about a stock selling for nine times earnings. But that does not mean it is difficult to fear it. Fannie Mae is like a great- tasting, non-fat dessert, simply too good to be true. Beginning with its privileged status as a government- sponsored enterprise (GSE) and ending with its impossibly consistent earnings history, there is almost nothing about this financial behemoth that is NOT too good to be true. The company is a financial marvel.
When a mortgage-lending institution grows its earnings year after year at a rate that is several times faster than GDP growth, something is too good to be true...especially when that spectacular growth rate coincides with an equally spectacular increase in debt and balance-sheet leverage. What should we think about a mortgage-finance company that produces consistent, non-volatile earnings growth, alongside an imposing Kilauea of volatile interest-rate derivatives rising up from its balance sheet (or from some location perilously close to its balance sheet)?
And yet, somehow, this behemoth produces perfectly smooth, consistent earnings growth year after year. How does this happen? Is it magic? Or just brilliant management?
Investors must believe it is the latter, or they would not have awarded Fannie Mae a premium valuation relative to other mortgage lenders and financial institutions. Fannie's stock sells for nearly four times book value. Citibank and Bank of America, by comparison, both trade for about two and a half times book value.
"Fannie and Freddie both engage in some form of 'earnings smoothing,'" says Apogee Research's lead analyst, Robert Tracy. Tracy has been digging deep into the financials of Fannie Mae and a couple of other well-known GSEs. "Naturally, senior officers at these companies eagerly justify their unusual accounting practice as something more 'accurate' and 'helpful to investors' than conventional GAAP accounting. But that assertion is highly debatable," says Tracy. "One thing is certain, however - their cosmetically enhanced earnings have been helping to boost their share prices and valuations. And a higher valuation means much larger paydays for the heavily optioned management."
Tracy suspects that the era of earnings 'smoothing' may be drawing to a close. If so, the bull market in 'managed earnings' is also winding down. Which means that the premium valuations achieved by the masters of managed earnings - i.e., entities like Fannie Mae - will fade away.
"By its very nature, the mortgage finance business, which extensively uses derivatives to hedge various forms of interest-rate risk, will experience erratic trends in GAAP earnings," Tracy continues. "To smooth out the reporting of those GAAP trends, both Freddie and Fannie turned to pro forma disclosure, a method whereby Fannie designated its pro forma numbers as 'core business earnings' and Freddie used the term 'operating earnings.' They encouraged the investment community to focus not upon their GAAP earnings, but rather on pro forma disclosures that excluded certain items, most notably the impact of changes in the valuation of derivatives.
"Over at Fannie Mae headquarters, management continues to cling to its preferred version of 'core business earnings.' I guess you can't blame 'em for trying to put the best spin on things - so long as they can get away with it. Fannie's pro forma treatment dishes up a more pleasing and consistent earnings trend than the erratic swings you get with GAAP. Then, too, for the past six quarters, Fannie's reported GAAP earnings totaled $8.5 billion, while pro forma net income totaled $9.7 billion. Who wouldn't want to claim an extra $1.2 billion of earnings? You have to admit that, from Fannie's perspective, pro forma is a win-win situation: not only do the earnings appear more consistent, but, all of a sudden, there's $1.2 billion more of them!"
"So is all the bad news out on the GSEs?" I asked the Apogee analyst. "After all, Freddie Mac's own chairman, Shaun F. O'Malley, declared on June 25: 'The company remains safe and sound.'"
"I don't believe him," Tracy replied. "I don't think he's lying. But he may be mistaken. Investors still do not have access to enough detail about the company's finances to be able to invest confidently in its shares."
In other words, in the case of the GSEs, ignorance is not bliss.
"What, for instance, would have happened had Freddie bet the wrong way on interest-rate movements," Business Week asks provocatively, "or if banks, fearing further problems, refused to buy its debt? Freddie's problems reveal just how little is known about its inner workings - and highlight the risks should the markets lose confidence in its ability to manage its huge derivatives portfolio."
If these companies weren't so big, we might not care how they account for the thousands of derivatives contracts on their books. But Freddie and Fannie are not merely part of the housing market, they are the housing market.
"Fannie and Freddie now carry an astronomical $1.6 trillion in assets on their balance sheets, up from $962 billion in 1999," Business Week notes. What's more, based on the Fed's recent flow-of-funds report, a whopping 77% of total U.S. financial-sector debt outstanding as of the end of this year's first quarter resided with the GSEs, federally regulated mortgage pools and the asset-backed issuers.
"These are the very folks at the direct heart of, and largely responsible for, the bulk of current credit creation in our economic system," observes Contrary Investor. "Many of these financial-sector participants are also significantly leveraged to derivatives as part of the risk-management component of their credit-creation operations. And these folks are operating completely outside of the regulated U.S. banking system."
Not surprisingly, these two lending giants also wield a giant-sized influence over the U.S. economy. Last year, refinancing activity put an extra $100 billion in consumers' pockets, and that pace has accelerated this year, thereby offsetting a severe drought in capital spending. If these two companies can almost single-handedly support the economy, couldn't they single-handedly pull it down?
Is it an exaggeration to infer that a serious problem at either of these two companies would have serious and worrisome implications for their share prices, the housing market, the bond market, the U.S. dollar and the U.S. economy in general? "What a mortal can easily see," says Jim Grant, writing in Grant's Interest Rate Observer, "is that a Freddie accident would be a dollar accident as well as a corporate-finance accident." In other words, containing financial market volatility is a little bit like herding cats. Who can say what sorts of traumas may result from the brave new world of volatility at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Lower share prices would seem to be the best- case scenario.
"I'm hoping for the best," says Tracy, "but I fear the worst. Now that two prominent members of the GSE family have come under the harsh light of disclosure, it's only a matter of time before their share prices reflect the real- world volatility and uncertainty of their earnings results. 'Uncertainty' is just another way of saying, 'falling share price.'"
Regards, Eric Fry, The Daily Reckoning |