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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (22016)7/12/2003 7:32:20 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Weak IT Budgets Change More Than Just Dollars and Cents

InformationWeek
July 11, 2003
informationweek.com

____________________

A Forrester Research report says the economic downturn has changed how IT handles projects, how they're funded, and the oversight IT faces.

By Gregg Keizer, TechWeb News



Weak IT budgets haven't just put a crimp on spending. According to a recent report by Forrester Research, the economic downturn has resulted in significant changes in how IT handles projects, how they're funded, and how much oversight IT labors under.

One result, said Tom Pohlmann, research director for Forrester and the author of "How Companies Govern Their IT Spending," is that just 5% of IT spending is really up for grabs for new technology investments. The rest, he said, is already accounted for. That leaves both new in-house initiatives and the vendors that hope to sell their newest wares scrambling for a very small piece of the pie.

While 21% of IT budgets are slated for new investments, three-fourths of that, or 16%, is already earmarked for existing or planned projects, leaving just 5% available for as-yet-undecided spending.

And even that money doesn't grow on trees. Project sponsors take note: Most companies won't commit to funding a new project beyond 11 months, and the idea of even more granular "chunking," as the technique is called, is on the rise. Six-month-long funding chunks, Pohlmann said, are common.

This drop in discretionary spending is just one of the challenges IT must now deal with. "Today's IT decision makers are feeling the heat on several fronts," said Pohlmann, who also cited other factors, including tighter fiscal controls and business unit oversight.

Tight budgets--and the desire by management to squeeze the most out of every dollar--have put IT under closer spending supervision, said Pohlmann. In part, that's due to an increase in the collaboration between IT and enterprise business units: More than 60% of business units fund at least some IT investments, and more than half of the IT shops surveyed said their company's business units set the direction-- and thus the spending--of IT.

"This involvement has led to an environment where any new investment, regardless of the dollar amount, requires executive approval in 30% of the companies," said Pohlmann. The go-go days of the 1990s, when IT spent whatever it felt it needed, are over.

One tack that companies are increasingly taking in an attempt to get a better handle on IT spending is the project management officer (PMO), who oversees technology initiatives and reports back to management about progress. More IT shops than ever work with a PMO; in the last year, the prevalence of IT departments with one almost doubled. A majority of shops now have such a watchdog.

But while IT managers generally believe these watchdogs are effective in improving project delivery, they don't think they keep management any more informed on who's working on what than IT does when it's on its own, according to the Forrester survey.

Offshore outsourcing, one of the hottest topics in IT during 2003, is another way that companies feel they can get more for their money--if they try it out, something companies seem reluctant to do.

"Despite the hype, only 29% of North American IT shops, and only 21% of midsize companies, tap into offshore providers," said Pohlmann. And fewer than one in 10 shops not currently using offshore outsourcing said they had definite plans to try one out in the next year.

But while offshore outsourcing use remains in the minority, Pohlmann noted encouraging signs from those who have turned to overseas service providers. In every area that Forrester rated, better than two out of three companies that use offshore outsourcing reported back that they were satisfied.

"More than 70% of offshore outsourcing clients express satisfaction with their current providers," Pohlmann said, "and 68% of current users plan on doing more offshore." That's what's behind the trend that will drive more than 3 million U.S. services industry jobs offshore in the next 15 years, said Pohlmann.

The survey of more than 700 IT executives, the majority of whom work at enterprises with revenues of at least $1 billion, also highlighted the continued downturn in overall technology budgets.

At midyear, said Pohlmann, IT spending is below planned levels. As a result, Forrester has downsized its yearly spending estimates; it now projects that IT spending will grow just 1.3% in 2003, as opposed to earlier growth estimates of almost 2%.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (22016)7/12/2003 7:39:31 PM
From: Mannie  Respond to of 89467
 
The first panacea for a mismanaged nation is inflation of the currency, the second is war. Both bring a temporary prosperity; both bring permanent ruin.

-Ernest Hemingway



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (22016)7/12/2003 11:15:18 PM
From: abuelita  Respond to of 89467
 
jim-

interesting perspective from a canadian
journalist:

Any worries Americans might have about the economy pale next to their concerns about terrorism and homeland security. And on that score, Mr. Bush is still doing a good job in the eyes of most Americans.<I/>

theglobeandmail.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (22016)7/13/2003 3:11:42 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
National House of Waffles
___________________

By MAUREEN DOWD
OP-ED COLUMNIST
THE NEW YORK TIMES
July 13, 2003

WASHINGTON - More and more, with Bush administration pronouncements about the Iraq war, it depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.

W. built his political identity on the idea that he was not Bill Clinton. He didn't parse words or prevaricate. He was the Texas straight shooter.

So why is he now presiding over a completely Clintonian environment, turning the White House into a Waffle House, where truth is camouflaged by word games and responsibility is obscured by shell games?

The president and Condi Rice can shuffle the shells and blame George Tenet, but it smells of mendacity.

Mr. Clinton indulged in casuistry to hide personal weakness. The Bush team indulges in casuistry to perpetuate its image of political steel.

Dissembling over peccadillos is pathetic. Dissembling over pre-emptive strikes is pathological, given over 200 Americans dead and 1,000 wounded in Iraq, and untold numbers of dead Iraqis. Our troops are in "a shooting gallery," as Teddy Kennedy put it, and our spy agencies warn that we are on the cusp of a new round of attacks by Saddam snipers.

Why does it always come to this in Washington? The people who ascend to power on the promise of doing things differently end up making the same unforced errors their predecessors did. Out of office, the Bush crowd mocked the Clinton propensity for stonewalling; in office, they have stonewalled the 9/11 families on the events that preceded the attacks, and the American public on how — and why — they maneuvered the nation into the Iraqi war.

Their defensive crouch and obsession with secrecy are positively Nixonian. (But instead of John Dean and an aggressive media, they have Howard Dean and a cowed media.)

In a hole, the president should have done some plain speaking: "The information I gave you in the State of the Union about Iraq seeking nuclear material from Africa has been revealed to be false. I'm deeply angry and I'm going to get to the bottom of this."

But of course he couldn't say that. He would be like Sheriff Bart in "Blazing Saddles," holding the gun to his own head and saying, "Nobody move or POTUS gets it." The Bush administration has known all along that the evidence of the imminent threat of Saddam's weapons and the Al Qaeda connections were pumped up. They were manning the air hose.

Mr. Tenet, in his continuing effort to ingratiate himself to his bosses, agreed to take the fall, trying to minimize a year's worth of war-causing warping of intelligence as a slip of the keyboard. "These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the president," he said, in 15 words that were clearly written for him on behalf of the president. But it won't fly.

It was Ms. Rice's responsibility to vet the intelligence facts in the president's speech and take note of the red alert the tentative Tenet was raising. Colin Powell did when he set up camp at the C.I.A. for a week before his U.N. speech, double-checking what he considered unsubstantiated charges that the Cheney chief of staff, Scooter Libby, and other hawks wanted to sluice into his talk.

When the president attributed the information about Iraq trying to get Niger yellowcake to British intelligence, it was a Clintonian bit of flim-flam. Americans did not know what top Bush officials knew: that this "evidence" could not be attributed to American intelligence because the C.I.A. had already debunked it.

Ms. Rice did not throw out the line, even though the C.I.A. had warned her office that it was sketchy. Clearly, a higher power wanted it in.

And that had to be Dick Cheney's office. Joseph Wilson, former U.S. ambassador to Gabon, said he was asked to go to Niger to answer some questions from the vice president's office about that episode and reported back that it was highly doubtful.

But doubt is not the currency of the Bush hawks. Asked if he regretted using the Niger claim, Mr. Bush replied: "There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein was a threat to world peace. And there's no doubt in my mind that the United States, along with allies and friends, did the right thing in removing him from power. And there's no doubt in my mind, when it's all said and done, the facts will show the world the truth."

I'm happy that Mr. Bush's mental landscape is so cloudless. But it is our doubts he needs to assuage.

nytimes.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (22016)7/13/2003 11:52:14 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (4) | Respond to of 89467
 
*IraqGATE Update*
____________________________________________

The Dubious Suicide of George Tenet
By William Rivers Pitt
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Monday 14 July 2003
truthout.org

Things have reached a pretty pass indeed when you apologize for making a mistake, but nobody believes your apology. So it is today with CIA Director Tenet, and by proxy George W. Bush and his administration.

On Friday evening, CIA Director Tenet publicly jumped on the Niger evidence hand grenade, claiming the use in Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2003 of data from known forgeries to support the Iraq war was completely his fault. He never told Bush's people that the data was corrupted, and it was his fault those "sixteen words" regarding Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Niger for a nuclear program made it into the text of the speech.

Problem solved, right? Condoleezza Rice and Don Rumsfeld had been triangulating on Tenet since Thursday, claiming the CIA had never informed the White House about the dubious nature of the Niger evidence. Tenet, like a good political appointee, fell on his sword and took responsibility for the error. On Saturday, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer told the press corps that Bush had "moved on" from this controversy.

Not so fast, said the New York Times editorial board. The paper of record for the Western world published an editorial on Saturday entitled "The Uranium Fiction." The last time the Times editors used language this strong was when Bush, in a moment of seemingly deranged hubris, tried to nominate master secret-keeper Henry Kissinger to chair the 9/11 investigation:

"It is clear, however, that much more went into this affair than the failure of the C.I.A. to pounce on the offending 16 words in Mr. Bush's speech. A good deal of information already points to a willful effort by the war camp in the administration to pump up an accusation that seemed shaky from the outset and that was pretty well discredited long before Mr. Bush stepped into the well of the House of Representatives last January. Doubts about the accusation were raised in March 2002 by Joseph Wilson, a former American diplomat, after he was dispatched to Niger by the C.I.A. to look into the issue. Mr. Wilson has said he is confident that his concerns were circulated not only within the agency but also at the State Department and the office of Vice President Dick Cheney. Mr. Tenet, in his statement yesterday, confirmed that the Wilson findings had been given wide distribution, although he reported that Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney and other high officials had not been directly informed about them by the C.I.A."

The sun came up over Washington DC on Sunday and shined on copies of the Washington Post which were waiting patiently to be read. The lead headline for the Sunday edition read, "CIA Got Uranium Reference Cut in October." The meat of the article states:

"CIA Director George J. Tenet successfully intervened with White House officials to have a reference to Iraq seeking uranium from Niger removed from a presidential speech last October, three months before a less specific reference to the same intelligence appeared in the State of the Union address, according to senior administration officials.

"Tenet argued personally to White House officials, including deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley, that the allegation should not be used because it came from only a single source, according to one senior official. Another senior official with knowledge of the intelligence said the CIA had doubts about the accuracy of the documents underlying the allegation, which months later turned out to be forged."

What do we have here?

Here is CIA Director Tenet arguing in October of 2002 against the use of the Niger evidence, stating bluntly that it was useless. He made this pitch directly to the White House. These concerns were brushed aside by Bush officials, and the forged evidence was used despite the warnings in the State of the Union address. Now, the administration is trying to claim they were never told the evidence was bad. Yet between Tenet's personal appeals in 2002, and Ambassador Wilson's assurances that everyone who needed to know was in the know regarding Niger, it appears the Bush White House has been caught red-handed in a series of incredible falsehoods.

There are two more layers on this onion to be peeled. The first concerns Secretary of State Powell. One week after the Niger evidence was used by Bush in the State of the Union address, Powell presented to the United Nations the administration's case for war. The Niger evidence was notably absent from Powell's presentation. According to CBS News, Powell said, "I didn't use the uranium at that point because I didn't think that was sufficiently strong as evidence to present before the world."

What a difference a week makes. The White House would have us believe they were blissfully unaware of the forged nature of their war evidence when Bush gave his State of the Union address, and yet somehow the Secretary of State knew well enough to avoid using it just seven days later. The moral of the story appears to be that rotten war evidence is not fit for international consumption, but is perfectly suitable for delivery to the American people.

The second layer to be peeled deals with the administration's newest excuse for using the forged Niger evidence to justify a war. They are claiming now that they used it because the British government told them it was solid. Yet there was the story published by the Washington Post on July 11 with the headline, "CIA Asked Britain to Drop Iraq Claim." The article states:

"The CIA tried unsuccessfully in early September 2002 to persuade the British government to drop from an official intelligence paper a reference to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium in Africa that President Bush included in his State of the Union address four months later, senior Bush administration officials said yesterday. 'We consulted about the paper and recommended against using that material,' a senior administration official familiar with the intelligence program said."

We are supposed to believe that the Bush administration was completely unaware that their Niger evidence was fake. We are supposed to believe George Tenet dropped the ball. Yet the CIA actively intervened with the British government in September of 2002, telling them the evidence was worthless. The CIA Director personally got the evidence stricken from a Bush speech in October of 2002. Intelligence insiders like Joseph Wilson and Greg Thielmann have stated repeatedly that everyone who needed to know the evidence was bad had been fully and completely informed almost a year before the data was used in the State of the Union address.

In an interesting twist, the profoundly questionable nature of Tenet's confession has reached all the way around the planet to Australia. I spoke on Sunday to Andrew Wilkie, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Office of National Assessments, the senior Australian intelligence agency which provides intelligence assessments to the Australian prime minister. Mr. Wilkie notes the following:

"In the last week in Australia, the Defense Intelligence Organization has admitted they had the information on the Niger forgeries and says they didn't tell the Defense Minister. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs has admitted they had the information on the Niger forgeries and didn't tell the Foreign Minister. The place I used to work, the Office of National Assessments, has admitted publicly that they knew the Niger evidence was fake and didn't tell the Prime Minister about it.

"You've got three intelligence organizations in Australia, the intelligence organizations in the US, and every one is saying they knew this was bad information, but not one political leader reckons they were told. All three organizations have said they didn't give this information to their political leaders. It is unbelievable to the point of fantasy."

I also spoke on Sunday with Ray McGovern, a 27-year veteran of the CIA who was interviewed by truthout on these matters on June 26 2003. Mr. McGovern is not buying what the White House is trying to sell.

"Tenet's confession is designed to take the heat off," says McGovern, "to assign some responsibility somewhere. It's not going to work. There's too much deception here. For example, Condoleezza Rice insisted that she only learned on June 8 about Former Ambassador Wilson's mission to Niger back in February 2002. That means that neither she nor her staff reads the New York Times, because Nick Kristof on May 6 had a very detailed explication of Wilson's mission to Niger. In my view, it is inconceivable that her remark this week - that she didn't know about Joe Wilson's mission to Niger until she was asked on a talk show on June 8 - that is stretching the truth beyond the breaking point."

Andrew Wilkie crystallized the issue at hand by stating, "Remember that the sourcing of uranium from Niger was the only remaining pillar of the argument that Iraq was trying to reconstitute its nuclear program. By this stage, the aluminum tubes story about Iraq's nuclear program had been laughed out of the room. That had been laughable since 2001, leaving the sourcing of uranium as the last key piece of evidence about Iraq reconstituting a nuclear program. It's not just sixteen words.

"It is just downright mischievous to hear Condoleezza Rice on CNN this morning saying it was just sixteen words. It was worth a hell of a lot more than sixteen words. I can remember that October speech by Bush where he talked about "mushroom clouds" from Iraq. The nuclear story was always played up as the most emotive and persuasive theme. It wasn't just sixteen words."

A page on the White House's own website describes the Bush administration's central argument for war in Iraq. The Niger evidence is featured prominently, along with claims that Iraq was in possession of 26,000 liters of anthrax, 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agents, almost 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents, and several mobile biological weapons labs. The Niger evidence has been destroyed, and the 'mobile weapons labs' have been shown to be weather balloon launching platforms. The vast quantities of anthrax, botulinum toxin, sarin, mustard gas and VX, along with the munitions to deliver them, have completely failed to show up.

Many people quail at the idea that the President and his people could have lied so egregiously. What was in it for them? Besides the incredible amounts of money to be made from the war by oil and defense corporations like Halliburton and United Defense, two companies with umbilical ties to the administration, there was an "ancillary benefit to all this," according to Ray McGovern. "Not only did the President get an authorization to make war, but there was an election that next month, the November midterms. The elections turned out surprisingly well for the Bush administration because they were able to use charges of being 'soft on Saddam' against those Democratic candidates who voted against the war."

As Andrew Wilkie says, this issue is not about sixteen words in a speech. It is about lies and American credibility. "All of this breaking news is actually distracting us from the core issue," says Wilkie. "The core issue is the credibility gap. We were sold this war on the promise that Iraq had this massive WMD arsenal. Of course that hasn't been found, and whatever might be found now is not going to satisfy in any way that description of the 'massive' arsenal, the 'imminent threat,' and all those great words used in Britain and Australia and Washington. We've got to be careful that, in debating the details on the issue of Tenet and Niger, we are not distracted from that core issue which is still left to be resolved."

_________________________________

William Rivers Pitt <mailto:william.pitt@mail.truthout.org> is the Managing Editor of truthout.org. He is a New York Times best-selling author of two books - "War On Iraq" available now from Context Books, and "The Greatest Sedition is Silence," now available from Pluto Press at www.SilenceIsSedition.com.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (22016)7/14/2003 12:31:41 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Big Shots Worried
________________________

By Charley Reese
Syndicated Columnist
For Friday, July 11, 2003
reese.king-online.com

Of all the big-shot meetings, the one that really counts, in my opinion, is the annual meeting of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.

Here the heads of the central banks meet, unencumbered by politicians or academics or journalists. These are guys who hold the crown jewels of most industrial countries in their hands. Like all big-shot meetings, it's closed to the public and the press. Nobody knows what they say inside, only what they choose to say when they leave the building.

Well, one of them chose to say: "The issue is really how to produce growth in the economy and cope with the excessive disinflationary patterns which have appeared in many countries. There should be a discussion about strategies on how to prevent deflation and how to cope with it." This statement was published in a story by William Kay that just appeared in the Independent, an excellent British newspaper.

Now, let us, like an old-time preacher, treat this as a Bible verse and see what meaning we can glean from this verse straight from the lips of a central banker.

Notice that he said "the issue" is how to produce growth and cope with excessive disinflationary patterns. He didn't say it's one of several important issues. The implication is that it is the one economic issue that must be confronted, and I certainly agree with him. That's what the politicians and the economists and stocks salesmen are all talking about when they chatter about the economy. It's not growing very fast. And, apparently, they don't know how to make it grow.

Our central bank, the Federal Reserve, has cut the interest banks pay practically to the bone. This, they hope, will encourage businesses to borrow money and expand. President George Bush has succeeded in getting tax cuts for the same reason. He hopes the extra money will stimulate growth in the economy.

But the problem isn't high interest rates or punitive tax rates. The problem is that demand for goods and services is dropping. Who's going to borrow money to expand production when they can't sell the stuff they are making already? And if you're neck-deep in consumer debt, a few hundred extra bucks is likely to pay for past consumption, not for new. Debt is, after all, the money owed for past consumption, for demand already met in the past. Paying debt does nothing to stimulate production. And if you're unemployed, you aren't going to be buying much of anything except the basics.

It seems to me we're sliding into the same pit the Japanese have been in. Our economy is maxed out. There is more money floating around than there are good places to invest it. Practically everybody has all the toys he or she wants or can afford. Lots of people have a bad feeling about the future, so they are hanging onto their money. You might have noticed that the price of gold has gone up. That usually happens when people who know what's really going on get nervous about shaky economies.

Deflation can fuel itself. As demand drops, production is cut; as production is cut, jobs are eliminated; the additional unemployed people lower demand even more, so the cycle can repeat itself. Deflation is what the Great Depression was. All my life, people have said that it could never happen again because "they" have learned how to avoid it.

That's not what that central banker said. He didn't say there was a strategy to prevent deflation. He said, "There should be a discussion about strategies on how to prevent deflation and how to cope with it."

Sounds like "they" don't really know after all how to prevent depressions or cope with them.


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© 2003 by King Features Syndicate, Inc.
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