Iraq and WMD's from Hans Blix report.
He had them, might have to ask &od what Saddam did with them. But we will find the answer.
probush.com
<<<The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.
Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few [metric] tons and that the
quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never
weaponized. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally
destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq
had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been
declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at
least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponizied. In addition, there are questions to be
answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during
bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.
I would now like to turn to the so-called "Air Force document" that I have discussed with the Council
before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force
Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of
bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq
has now provided this document to UNMOVIC.
The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between
1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus,
there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the
order of about 1,000 [metric] tons. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that
these quantities are now unaccounted for.
The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170
km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the
rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had
such munitions.
The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991
from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They
could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but
rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.
The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is
currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new
efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has
found a further four chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.
I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol,
a mustard gas precursor.
Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December
2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had
repaired chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and had
installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment
and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide whether this
and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.
Biological Weapons
I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it
is an important one.
Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 liters of this biological warfare agent, which it states it
unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and
no convincing evidence for its destruction.
There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some
of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and
be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show
that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.
As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity,
some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission
to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted
the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included.
The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document
were renumbered.
In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq's Foreign Minister stated that "all
imported quantities of growth media were declared". This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of
media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 liters of concentrated anthrax.
Missiles
I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained
SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD
missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defense system during the 1980s. Yet
no technical information has been produced about that program or data on the consumption of the
missiles.
There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by
Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through
inspections and on-site discussions.
Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fueled missile named the Al
Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a
range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum
of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to
the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.
The Al Samoud's diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This
modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing
Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air
missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.
During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programs. We were told that the
final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km.
These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in
excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before
we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both
missiles.
In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a
number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.
They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers
are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than
150 km.
Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking
place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as
December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for
the Al Samoud 2.
Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and,
guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be
determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in
Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.
Mr. President, I have touched upon some of the disarmament issues that remain open and that need to
be answered if dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise. Which are the means at the
disposal of Iraq to answer these questions? I have pointed to some during my presentation of the
issues. Let me be a little more systematic.
Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is
presented to the contrary they should have the benefit of the doubt, be presumed innocent.
UNMOVIC, for its part, is not presuming that there are proscribed items and activities in Iraq, but
nor is it — or I think anyone else after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 — presuming the
opposite, that no such items and activities exist in Iraq. Presumptions do not solve the problem.
Evidence and full transparency may help. Let me be specific.
Find the Items and Activities
Information provided by Member States tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles and
chemical weapons and mobile units for biological weapons production. We shall certainly follow up
any credible leads given to us and report what we might find as well as any denial of access.
So far we have reported on the recent find of a small number of empty 122 mm warheads for
chemical weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of inquiry to look for more. Fine.
Why not extend the search to other items? Declare what may be found and destroy it under our
supervision?
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