To: LindyBill who wrote (105179 ) 7/14/2003 9:53:25 PM From: Dayuhan Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 July 9 in Iran was a huge disappointment to anybody who would like to see the ayatollahs fall. I include myself in that category, but in my case the disappointment was somewhat mitigated by the fact that I expected to be disappointed. All the evidence I've seen suggests that resistance to the regime is a long way from the kind of critical mass that will be required for an overthrow, and the July 9 actions reflected that: widespread, but involving fairly small numbers. We talked about this some weeks ago: this event had been planned for months, and it needed to show a 6-figure turnout to mean much. Instead, it fizzled. This would have been cause for nausea, if it hadn't inspired hilarity first: The Shah put up a less impressive fight in 1979; in the end he wasn't willing to massacre his own people in order to stay in power. Whereas, the recent ministrations of the ayatollahs' goons is communicating to the country that, this time, they can expect no decency whatever. Thois image of the Shah as a sort of warm and cuddly dictator, driven from power only because he wasn't willing to use force, is totally at odds with reality. SAVAK kidnapped, tortured, and murdered thousands of dissidents. Troops repeatedly fired into rallies; the funeral processions turned into bigger rallies. The ayatollahs are not holding on because they are more brutal, they are holding on because the critical mass of resistance has not been reached. It may not be for some time. One of the things deterring that critical mass is the American presence in Iraq, aided by the American pattern of aggressive rhetoric. I said a long time ago that this would be the case, and was roundly castigated on the thread, but now we have Ken Pollack, in the current FA, saying the same thing: an aggressive military posture on Iran's borders, even threats to use force -- could easily backfire in the maelstrom of Iranian domestic politics in ways that undermine or forestall the prospects for a "velvet revolution" in Tehran. Iran's hard-liners maintain power in part by stoking popular fears that the United States seeks to rule the country and control its policies, and so aggressive containment or active counterproliferation measures could play right into their hands. Another Pollack comment that should be remembered by Warren, and by a few people on this thread as well: In the case of Iraq, preemptive intervention was a thinkable (and ultimately doable) option because the United States could invade and occupy the country without a massive mobilization. But that is simply not true in the case of Iran. Its population is three times the size of Iraq's, its landmass is four times the size, its terrain is difficult and would make operations a logistical nightmare, and its population has generally rallied around the regime in the face of foreign threats. Invading Iran would be such a major undertaking that the option is essentially unthinkable in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.