SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Attack Iraq? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: calgal who wrote (7047)7/14/2003 1:11:15 AM
From: calgal  Respond to of 8683
 
Lack of Intelligence
Making policy is the President's job, not the CIA's.

Monday, July 14, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT

The flap over who baked the yellowcake uranium story is so transparently political that it is tempting to ignore. But now that Democrats and other opponents of deposing Saddam Hussein are demanding a full-scale scapegoat hunt, by all means let's consider the uses and abuses of intelligence.

The charge is that 16 of the words that President Bush uttered during his January State of the Union address may have been false. Here's what he said: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." We say this "may" be false, because in fact the British government continues to stand by this assertion even if the CIA does not. So what Mr. Bush said about what the British believe was true in January and is still true today.

Based on this non-lie, then, we are all supposed to believe that the entire case for going to war was false and that--precisely what? Other than calling for someone's head, and for a Congressional probe that would give free TV time to Democrats running for President, the critics don't seem to be demanding anything specific about policy. Do John Kerry and Joe Lieberman now regret their vote to allow Mr. Bush to go to war in Iraq?

We ask that question because policy decisions are what Presidents are elected to make, and the results of those judgments are what they should be held responsible for. The case for deposing Saddam was based on a dozen years of history, U.N. resolutions and virtual unanimity in the intelligence community that he had weapons of mass destruction and programs to build more. The furor over yellowcake intelligence is a sideshow about process, and even on this point the critics are working under a mistaken assumption about how intelligence ought to work.
Michigan Senator Carl Levin, among others, seems to believe that somewhere "in the bowels of the agency" there are dispassionate analysts who scour the world for evidence and then make Olympian judgments about what is true or false. These judgments in turn are supposed to be binding on policy makers. Two callow writers at The New Republic even quoted with a straight face a CIA analyst who claimed that it was wrong for Vice President Dick Cheney to have visited Langley to inspect the Iraq evidence lest he upset the equilibrium of what is supposed to be an "ivory tower."

Anyone who believes this is naive or mischievous, and dangerously so. Intelligence is supposed to be a tool of policy, not a determiner of it. By its very nature intelligence is fragmentary and ambiguous. Analysts are supposed to look for patterns in the haystacks, form hypotheses about what they mean and then feed their best estimates to policy makers. The job of the users of intelligence is not to accept this as holy writ but to ask questions, challenge hypotheses and prod the spooks to look for other things or in other directions.

The person who has stated this most clearly is none other than Donald Rumsfeld, who included a notable Intelligence Side Letter as part of the report filed by his Commission assessing the ballistic missile threat in 1999. (Mr. Levin could read it in the Green Room awaiting his many TV appearances.)

The Commission's Side Letter found that in U.S. intelligence circles "the ballistic missile and WMD threat are not normally treated as a strategic threat to the U.S., on a par with any other highest priority issues." Specifically, it blamed "senior users of intelligence" for failing "to interact knowledgeably with the producers of intelligence."

Contrary to the Ivory Tower school, the Side Letter added that "unless and until senior users take time to engage analysts, question their assumptions and methods, seek from them what they know, what they don't know and ask them their opinions--and do so without penalizing the analysts when their opinions differ from those of the user--senior users cannot have a substantial impact in improving the intelligence product they receive."

This adult view of intelligence contrasts with the Levin school, which puts an unfair burden on CIA analysts that most of them really don't want. It makes them the ultimate arbiter of facts that determine policy, turning them into "political" actors. In that sense, Joseph Wilson, the CIA consultant who last week wrote about his trip to Niger over yellowcake, is the one who has "politicized" intelligence. He is a well-known opponent of war with Iraq and clearly now wants to discredit the Bush policy after the fact.

Which brings us back to the current half-baked outrage over yellowcake. The Democratic motive has very little to do with intelligence disputes. The campaign is really about assailing Mr. Bush's credibility, which Democrats realize is his greatest asset. That's why they throw the words "lie" and "untruth" around like loose change, as if Mr. Bush had deceived a grand jury.
That's also why Terry McAuliffe's Democratic National Committee jumped on the yellowcake flap last week with an attack ad. The ad declares that "it's time to tell the truth," but the ad's video clip of Mr. Bush's 16-word State of the Union sentence omits the crucial words: "The British government has learned that . . ." The Democrats are themselves lying about Mr. Bush's non-lie.

The yellowcake assault is itself an abuse of intelligence, and if it extends to a full-scale probe it has the potential to damage a vital tool of U.S. security in the war on terror. Especially after 9/11 and in a world of WMD, the U.S. needs intelligence analysts willing to question their own assumptions, as well as policy makers willing to help them do it. We wish the Bush Administration would stop playing who baked the yellowcake and start explaining to Americans that intelligence is too important to be politicized.

URL:http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110003744



To: calgal who wrote (7047)7/14/2003 1:12:31 AM
From: calgal  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 8683
 
'Miranda' Warning for Saddam?
Democrats try to discredit America's victory.

BY ROBERT L. BARTLEY
Monday, July 14, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT

URL:http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/rbartley/?id=110003743

"It's time to tell the truth," the Democratic National Committee urges in an Internet ad, complaining about something President Bush said about uranium. Yes, this is the same DNC headed by Clinton apologist Terry McAuliffe; you'd think the president proclaimed, "I did not have sex with that yellowcake."

But nothing so exciting; the ad is merely carping about the now-famous 16 words in the president's State of the Union address: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa." The White House now says this statement should not have been included; CIA Director George Tenet has said his agency erred in vetting the speech, and Democrats and other malcontents are in full cry about the president lying to build his case for war.

Now, those 16 words were entirely accurate in the sense that the British government had reached and publicized that conclusion. The media flogging the story might be more careful to tell us, too, that the British government maintains the same position today. The prime minister's official spokesman stood by the original report as recently as Friday, after remarking earlier in the week that he was "surprised that journalists had not yet picked up on what we had been saying consistently about this matter."

In testimony to a parliamentary committee on June 27 and consistently since, the British government has maintained that it reached this conclusion from "intelligence reporting from more than one source" and independent of documents that proved to be forged. It also believes it knows more than Ambassador Joseph Wilson, who debunked the allegations after the CIA sent him to Niger to investigate back in February 2002.

British intelligence has not revealed its sources, so unease naturally remains. Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee proclaimed the uranium report "very odd indeed," even while rejecting accusations of political interference and generally concluding that "Ministers did not mislead Parliament." In the end, the uranium issue seems to concern disagreement among intelligence analysts, in this case British ones and CIA ones.

Such controversies are pretty much routine after any war. The congressional hearings over the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack ran 39 volumes, for example, and the Ford administration formally chartered a "Team B" to second-guess estimates of the Soviet military build-up. Generally the losing side within the intelligence community will wrap itself in "professionalism" and charge "political interference." This is under way both in the U.S. and in the U.K., with Greg Thielmann, a retired State Department intelligence officer, joining Mr. Wilson on this side of the Atlantic.
The invocation of "professionalism," though, raises the issue of when was the last time the intelligence professionals got anything right. The professionals failed to foresee September 11, though terrorists had already attacked the same building once. They failed to warn in a persuasive way about Muslim terrorism, though I suspect that here the Clinton administration will have much to answer for. They failed to foresee the collapse of the Communist empire, though Ronald Reagan predicted it at least four times.

Intelligence professionals are entitled to our sympathy, I hasten to add, since their job is to shift for clues in inherently ambiguous signals. We shouldn't expect too much of them, and they shouldn't be surprised if policy makers decide for themselves what the signals mean.

Especially so since it frequently turns out that disagreements are above the professionals' pay grade. Mr. Thielmann, for example, concludes that "Iraq posed no imminent threat to either its neighbors or to the United States." Interesting word, "imminent." It also appears in the DNC ad and increasingly in press commentary.

The word does appear once in the president's State of the Union. To wit, "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent." He rejected this: "Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option." The whole thrust of the policy of pre-emption, after all, is that in a world of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we can no longer wait until a threat is imminent. A madman like Saddam heading a nation-state is itself an intolerable threat.

This conclusion is of course subject to debate, but it is a matter for presidents, not intelligence "professionals." As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has tried to point out above the din, September 11 changed the American view of what threat is tolerable; hence decisions to call Saddam to account at the U.N. and to go to war if necessary. The war resolution passed the Senate by 77-23 and 29-21 among Democrats. The ayes included Senators Kerry, Lieberman, Edwards, Daschle, Dodd and Clinton. For that matter, the policy of regime change was signed into law by President William Jefferson Clinton with the Iraqi Liberation Act back in 1998.

It's a mystery, too, what policy the malcontents would urge instead. The complaint seems to be that President Bush didn't read Saddam his Miranda rights. Does Howard Dean want to apply to international affairs Justice Cardozo's famous observation that since the constable has blundered the criminal should go free? If the president got the uranium report wrong, should we invite Saddam Hussein to come out of hiding and resume his murderous rule? And if not, what's all the fuss about anyway?
Yes, there is some thread of an issue, since by its nature intelligence is never perfect. But more fundamentally, the uranium issue is the latest in a series of desperate efforts by critics to impugn the president's success in Iraq. As the British might say, this is very odd indeed. Usually, intelligence controversies are over who is to blame for failure; this time it seems to be about discrediting victory.

Mr. Bartley is editor emeritus of The Wall Street Journal. His column appears Mondays in the Journal and on OpinionJournal.com.