To: NickSE who wrote (105673 ) 7/17/2003 1:43:23 AM From: frankw1900 Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 Thanks for posting this. I think it interesting no one has commented on Gerecht's article. He is an extremely experienced reporter and it's full of fascinating observation: As I walked the streets of Baghdad at night, which in most districts of the city isn't a particularly dangerous thing to do, as I visited mosques and clerics in the Sunni and Shiite lands to the north and south, I picked up a fairly acute case of cognitive dissonance. Reading too much of the Western press before and especially during a visit to Iraq is mentally unbalancing. Though the problems in Iraq are enormous and the isolation of many U.S. officials in the Jumhuriyah Palace headquarters in Baghdad is surreal, neither the country nor its American administrators appeared to be sliding downhill into chaos. In most of Iraq--in the key areas of the country, in the Shiite south, the Kurdish north, and in Baghdad--just the opposite is happening. Productive energy and commerce are slowly returning to the streets, which is impressive given how long it is taking to rebuild a functioning nationwide telephone system ...Most critically, in the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, Arabic-speaking American officials from Baghdad and Hilla are slowly but surely improving their access and communication with Iraq's great clerical families, who compose the Howza, the seamless but hardly unified body of senior religious jurists resident in Najaf, Iraq's preeminent Shiite town. This improved communication does not necessarily make the dialogue happier--the differences in style and objective between American officialdom and the various Shiite religious players are sometimes substantial--but it does ensure that grievances, preferences, and orders are understood more clearly. And it means that personal politics--the long, shoes-off, derrière-to-the-carpet conversations that give depth and honesty to professional relations--become stronger. After spending several days talking and dining with numerous clerics aligned with Najaf's two most influential grand ayatollahs, Ali al-Hoseini as-Sistani and Muhammad Said at-Tabatabai al-Hakim, I couldn't see at all a desire on their part for a divorce. Yes, some complained of American heavy-handedness and ignorance in the national and, more acutely, local administrations. Some but by no means all were worried about "street morality" in Najaf and Karbala, fearing that the American presence might provoke a little too much independence and sartorial free expression among Iraqi women. And some were worried that the Americans might develop a "British mentality," publicly embracing the idea of Iraqi democracy but privately working to undermine the right of the Shiite majority to gain the upper hand politically. But I didn't meet a single cleric in this crowd who really wanted the Americans to leave right away. ...The Shiites have no military power beyond the Badr Brigade of Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, the famous Iranian-aided wayward member of the al-Hakim family of Najaf. The four grand ayatollahs of Najaf have so far shown no intention of elevating the political capital of Muhammad Bakr or the potential power of the military wing of his Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Indeed, contemplating the future without the Americans is probably very unpleasant for the Howza. There are still numerous scenarios worse than a "lengthy" U.S. occupation. ... This self-correcting disposition appears to be present, if not always dominant, among Americans in Iraq. Among the few highly talented Arabic-speaking civilian administrators who are quite literally responsible for the United States' future in the Middle East, it appears to be the working creed. Very interesting recommendation:The American administration in Iraq has already searched and depleted the benches of the Near East Bureau at the State Department in Washington. It would be a very good idea if the department and the CIA now stripped U.S. embassies and consulates of their fluent Arabic speakers for assignment to Iraq. As important as these individuals may be to the various missions in Yemen, Egypt, or Algeria, their presence in Iraq would be vastly more important to America's future in the region. The State Department ought to embrace this responsibility and start playing for keeps. Gerecht wrote a very good article for the Atlantic, Aug 2001theatlantic.com The Counterterrorist Myth <http://www.theatlantic.com/images/1pt.gif> A former CIA operative explains why the terrorist Usama bin Ladin has little to fear from American intelligence Final prophetic paragraphs: If we are going to defeat Usama bin Ladin, we need to openly side with Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who still has a decent chance of fracturing the tribal coalition behind Taliban power. That, more effectively than any clandestine counterterrorist program in the Middle East, might eventually force al-Qa'ida's leader to flee Afghanistan, where U.S. and allied intelligence and military forces cannot reach him. Until then, I don't think Usama bin Ladin and his allies will be losing much sleep around the campfire. Right after publication Mas'ud was assassinated and the WTC was destroyed. The US allied itself with Massoud's successors and ran al Qaeda out of Afghanistan.