Q Two on Iraq. First of all, when you mentioned -- when the President mentioned that the concerns about the intelligence came after the speech, did anyone -- was the President aware that the CIA had taken the reference to Niger out of his October speech?
MR. McCLELLAN: Again, I think that these issues have been addressed. Those issues have been raised. The reference in the October speech was specific to amount. You are correct. But it was a different -- it was, as Ari pointed out yesterday, apples and oranges. This has been addressed. The bigger picture goes back to the threat that Saddam Hussein posed and why we took the action that we took.
And as many have pointed out Ari is a liar, was a liar, and completely contradicted and lied about his own statements, from merely a week prior, wherein he said the SOTU line was predicated on the fraudulent Niger claim, on the last day of his job as the chief spokesman for Bush's lies. Yes Saddam was a bad man. Mr. McClellan, "Any more stray canard anyone... anyone... anyone?" Next.
Q You had Niger taken out in October, and you had Niger was piece of what was talked about in January. So was the President unaware of the fact that in October a reference to African uranium -- in this case, specifically Niger -- had been deleted?
MR. McCLELLAN: The President was focused on establishing the case and we went back as a staff working throughout the administration of gathering those facts that made the case. And the case is solid. We can go back through this, but the bottom line is, we have made it very clear this should not have been in the State of the Union. That doesn't mean, with or without the evidence that -- or with or without that statement that the over-arching body of evidence -- I mean, that is still a solid case and a solid reason of why we went to war in Iraq.
Q But was the President aware that this information had been deleted in October?
MR. McCLELLAN: This had nothing to do with -- this did not -- this statement, in and of itself, was not a reason we went to war.
Q Yes, I understand that. But was the President aware that this had been deleted from the October speech, which was an early sign that the intelligence was sketchy?
MR. McCLELLAN: This has all been addressed over the last few days.
Q This question hasn't been addressed --
MR. McCLELLAN: I mean, I think these statements --
Q No, not this question.
MR. McCLELLAN: All these statements have continued to come up.
Take the gum out of your mouth Mr. McClellan and give a straight lie answer. When the reporter questions him mercilously on an indefensible point, McClellan begins to blather, hem and haw, that his predecessor already lied sufficiently about this one, Saddam was a bad man, and really can't we just move along? To paraphrase Dean, Levin, Rockefeller, Hagel, and the rest of the the country... No. We can't move along until heads roll and the administration is held accountable for their lies which continue to cause needless deaths among our soldiers and Iraqi civilians by politicizing our intelligence apparatus. Continuing.
Q All right, secondly on Iraq, I understand that Condoleezza Rice has taken the position that because the speech specifically said British authorities have this information, that that made it technically correct. But the CIA had encouraged British authorities not to include this information in their dossier. So why was it okay to cite a British report that the CIA had tried to change and tried to --
MR. McCLELLAN: Well, first of all, the CIA, going back to October, they did say, take it out. We took it out. If the CIA had said in the State of the Union, which was a different -- let me remind you, I'll remind you, it was a different -- it was based on some different sourcing, and based on the national intelligence estimate, which was coming out during the drafting of the October speech. If the CIA had said, take it out of the State of the Union speech, it would have been taken out, just like it was -- or just like the other statement was in the Cincinnati speech.
Here, McClellan is portraying the administration as a bunch of nattering, spoiled children, who won't take no for an answer, continously asking the parent figures at the CIA, "huh, huh? can we use it now, huh? can we? can we? huh?" With the repeated denials, the administration tries a different tact, "can we use it, huh, huh? if we say the British learned it? huh, can we? they did say it, you know, huh? if they did, why can't we? so, can we?" Tenet, or one of his subordinates, gives in to the relentless nagging and allows them to pass off the hypertechnical untruth that the British have learned about some ambiguous yellowcake claim which our own intelligence services say is dubious.
Also, the idea that the two speeches were based upon different sourcing is a direct contradiction to Condi Rice's statements in a press gaggle just a few days ago. She said the intelligence sources for these speeches, both the Cincinnati speech and the SOTU, were based upon the NIE. Same sources. Anyways, good luck with the nagging children defense |
