SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: lurqer who wrote (22536)7/17/2003 12:55:04 PM
From: Neocon  Respond to of 89467
 
Islam and Muslims
Shia Islam, Shiite Muslims and Twelver Muslims


The term Shia is a shortened form of Shiat Ali, which means "the party of Ali" - and at the time of Ali's death in 661, that is probably all it was: a party or tendency of people who supported Ali's claims to the caliphate. Why did they advocate this? Ali was Muhammad's first cousin, in some ways Muhammad's adoptive brother, the husband of his favorite daughter (Fatima), and the father of his favorite grandsons. Moreover, Ali was regarded as more authentically representative of what Muhammad stood for and fought for, especially in contrast to the wealthy and worldly Umayyads.

Ali was not, however, universally accepted by Muhammad's family and supporters. In particular, he was opposed by Aisha, Muhammad's wife and the daughter of Abu Bakr. Ali had become caliph after Uthman had been murdered during prayers, and Aisha accused Ali of being lax in bringing Uthman's killers to justice. Ali's forces defeated Aisha's at the Battle of the Camel in 656, after which she apologized and was allowed to return to her home in Medina, where she withdrew from public life.

After Ali died, his role was believed to have passed to his two sons, Hasan and Husain, who were also Muhammad's grandsons. Despite this, they did not take over the caliphate, and instead that position went to Mu'awiya, who founded the Umayyad dynasty. After this time, the descendants of Ali became a principle focus of dissent and opposition to the Umayyads.

Many came to believe that the Umayyads and following Islamic rulers were corrupt and had fallen away from the path set by Muhammad. Those who believed that justice and good government would only replace tyranny and corruption when the rightful heirs of Muhammad took control came to be known as the Shiites. For them, this heir would be the Mahdi, a leader guided pesonally and directly by god. The Mahdi is Islam's only messianic figure.

The only successful revolt against the Umayyads which the Shiites managed to organize was led by Muhammad's uncle, Abbas, who founded the Abbasid caliphate. He and his successors, however, ended up repudiating the fundamental Shi'ite ideals and asserted themselves as the new establishment. With this, the Shia remained a sect within the larger Muslim world, distinct from Muslim orthodoxy and mainstream culture.

Shia Muslims continue to hold the same fundamental beliefs of other Muslims, with the principle addition being that they also believe in an imamate, which is the distinctive institution of Shia Islam. The doctrine of the imamate was not fully developed until the tenth century, and other dogmas developed still later.

Sunni Muslims view the caliph as a temporal leader only and consider an imam to be a prayer leader, but for the Shia the historic caliphs were merely de facto rulers, while the rightful and true leadership continued to be passed along through a sort of apostolic succession of Muhammad's descendants, the Imams (when capitalized, Imam refers to the Shia descendant of the House of Ali).

The imamate began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni Muslims as the fourth of the "rightly guided caliphs" to succeed the Prophet. But the Shia also revere Ali as the First Imam, and his descendants, beginning with his sons Hasan and Husain, continue the line of the Imams until the twelfth. The Twelfth Imam is alleged to have been just five years old when he assumed the position of Imam in 874 when is father died. But, because his followers feared assassination, he was seen only by his closest deputies.

Sunnis, therefore, will often claim that he never existed or that he merely died when he was a child. But the Shia believe that he never died at all and instead simply disappeared in 939. This is called the Great Occultation, and it will continue until Allah commands him to manifest again on earth as the Mahdi. During this occultation, the Shia believe that he is still spiritually present, even if physically hidden - although some believe that he appears during various invocations and prayers.

At times in history, the Imam may have had actual, temporal power, but usually this was not the case, and the Imam remained in the role of a political outsider. Nevertheless, he always retained spiritiual and religious authority. He may not be equal to Muhammad because revelation from Allah has ceased, but interpretation is not simply a matter of learning - it also requires divine guidance. Thus, the Shia believe in at least a separation between temporaral and spiritual authority which is unlike the Sunni, yet similar to what we find in Christianity.

Because of this, Shia Islam is very much a voice of dissent and opposition, an advocate for the underclasses and downtrodden. This is not unlike Christianity's situation in its early days, except that in the latter case, much of that character was lost over time because Christian spiritual authority became fused with Roman temporal authority.

Also like with Christianity, an important theme in Shia Islam is the ideal of suffering and martyrdom, particularly because Ali's son Husain and his followers were massacred by the armies of Mu'awiya's son, Yazid, at the battle of Karbala (680). Husain is treated very much as a Christ figure in Shia Islam, and every year people celebrate his martyrdom with passion plays and penitential processions (normally on the tenth day of Muharram (Ashura), the anniversary of his death). Ritual mourning (taaziya) is performed by groups of five to twenty men each.

It is an important characteristic of Shia Islam, differentiating it from Sunni Islam, that doctrine can be continually expanded and reinterpreted. Shia practice also differs from Sunni practice concerning divorce and inheritance in that it is more favorable to women. Supposedly the reason for this is the high esteem in which Fatima, the wife of Ali and the daughter of Muhammad, was held.

A third characteristic which is rather distinct is the emphasis on visitation of shrines dedicated to the various Imams. In Iraq, these include the tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son, Imam Husayn, in Karbala. Before the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), tens of thousands of Iranian Shias visited them each year. In Iran, sites include the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qom. Part of the reason for the popularity of these shrines is the expense and difficulty which the poorer Shia had in making the hajj to Mecca in the earliest days of Islam.

Shia Islam has also developed its own sub-sects, including Twelver, or Ithna-Ashari, Shi'ism, the Isma'ilis, the Zaidis and the Fatimids. The first is the main branch of Shia Islam; the others are much smaller. Shiites generally follow the Jafri school of legal thought, whereas Sunni Muslims follow the Hanifa, Shafi, Hanibal and Malik schools of legal thought. One of the practical differences this results in is that Shia recognize the practice of temporary marriages, something more common before Islam but which the Sunni forbid.

Twelver Shiism

This group traces the line of Imams down to the twelfth, which is the standard belief in Shia Islam and encompasses 80% of the population of Iran. It has survived so well probably because it has been the least politically active, and has at times been entirely been non-political.

Such is often the result when a religion focuses primarily on spiritual rather than temporal authority, and this tradition goes back to Ali. He allowed himself to be passed over for the caliphate three times, even though he knew he was the rightful heir. He essentially bided his time, refraining from dividing the ummah of believers. His son Hasan did the same, abdicating the caliphate rather than engage in civil war against Mu'awiya.

Even Husain's rebellion against Yazid is regarded not as a grab for power, but instead as deliberate martyrdom because of the great inequity of forces. In this tradition, all of the succeeding Imams did not actually abandon their claim for political power, but rather chose not to exercise it in an effort to retain some unity in the Muslim community.

In the eighth century, a dispute arose over who should lead the Shia community after the death of the Sixth Imam, Jaafar ibn Muhammad (also known as Jaafar al Sadiq). Those who followed the teaching of Musa al Kazim became the main body of Shiites, while those who followed the teachings of Musa's brother, Isma'il, were called Isma'ilis.



atheism.about.com



To: lurqer who wrote (22536)7/17/2003 1:22:43 PM
From: Neocon  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
The ummah is the community of believers. In certain circumstances, it is taken as an authoritative source of beliefs and practices.

The little jihad is within the heart, as the believer struggles to be righteous.

Al- Azhar is the most prestigious center of Islamic learning.

But these are not the important matters. What is important are things like this:

We have overthrown a general despised, brutal regime.

We are not in support of a corrupt regime, as we were in South Vietnam.

There is no figure like Ho Chi Minh, who had general prestige for leading the resistance to the Japanese.

We are in control of the country, and armed opposition is light.

There is no country like North Vietnam sponsoring resisting forces, and no chance of anything like the Tet Offensive, where North Vietnamese regulars attacked the South.

Iraq has a much higher level of literacy, advanced education, and urbanization than Vietnam did.

These are just some examples of relevant points.......



To: lurqer who wrote (22536)7/18/2003 2:03:50 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Empty Promises of Freedom

______________________________

By FAWAZ A. GERGES
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
The New York Times
July 18, 2003

BEIRUT, Lebanon - With President Bush vowing to bring democracy to Iraq and the Middle East, Arab governments have begun professing a new commitment to encouraging democracy. Kings, emirs and dictators alike suddenly appear to have discovered the value of human rights and civil society and are trumpeting initiatives to promote them.

The problem is that there remains a huge gap between the rhetoric used by these governments and the reality of their response to peaceful dissidents and opposition groups. For every democratizing action, there's an authoritarian reaction.

In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has been trying to change his country's autocratic image and embrace democracy. Yet a court recently imprisoned a journalist, Ali Lamrabet, for "insulting" Mohammed in satirical articles.

In Saudi Arabia, the royal family said that it would confront religious hard-liners and open up the political system after terrorist bombings in May that killed 34 people. Yet later that month the Saudi government ordered the dismissal of the editor in chief of the daily newspaper Al Watan, Jamal Khashoggi, after he published articles criticizing the clergy for propagating extremism. His dismissal revealed that the royal family is more interested in appeasing the conservative religious establishment than in real reform.

In Jordan, King Abdullah II, who had dissolved Parliament in 2001, ordered legislative elections. However, a court barred Toujan Faisal, a democracy advocate (and the only woman who had ever won a seat in Jordan's Parliament), from running in the elections last month. It ruled that she was disqualified because she had been convicted last year of "insulting the dignity of the state" by accusing an official of corruption in a letter she posted on the Internet.

In Egypt, a move that on first glance appears promising — the ruling party proposed democratic reforms that include the establishment of a new National Council for Human Rights and the abolition of state security courts and hard-labor sentences — is deceptive. By establishing its own human rights council, the government would in fact find a means of trying to force out the independent organizations that already exist.

The history isn't encouraging. Those groups often complain about the Egyptian authorities' systematic efforts to intimidate them. Some human rights advocates have spent time in Egyptian prisons. It took three years of considerable American and European pressure to free a democracy activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who was arrested in 2000 and sentenced to seven years of hard labor for daring to monitor parliamentary elections.

Egypt would be more convincing in its talk of democracy if it abolished the emergency laws in effect since the 1967 Middle East war. Using these laws, the authorities have effectively impoverished intellectual and political life by arresting dissidents under the pretext that they are endangering public peace.

This is not to say that the gap between talk and action in nations that aren't American allies is any better. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has promised liberalization. But last year, 10 people, including two members of Parliament, got 3- to 10-year sentences for advocating wider political freedoms and criticizing the authorities.

It's been clear to me, as I've been doing field research in Arab countries over the last few years, that people in the Middle East want democracy. Thousands of courageous Muslims have paid dearly for speaking out against state oppression and religious fanaticism and for demanding political enfranchisement. These democrats hold the key to the Arab world's future and deserve America's support.

It's also clear that Arab autocrats — even those who woo the West with democratic language — won't do anything unless they're nudged and pushed. Shamefully, President Bush and his senior aides spent most of their meeting last month with the leaders of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia pressing them to fight terrorism. What they should have been talking about was the importance of promoting democracy and reform. This emphasis sends the wrong message to Arab rulers and citizens by reinforcing the widely held perception that the United States uses democracy as a whip to punish its enemies, like Iraq, while doing business as usual with its autocratic allies.

Moreover, it is shortsighted. If America wants to end terrorism, it needs to understand that ultimately, democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law are the most effective way to undermine extremism. That change will come about only when the United States begins exerting pressure on its allies, not just its foes.

__________________________________________________

Fawaz A. Gerges is professor of Middle East and international affairs at Sarah Lawrence College and author of the forthcoming "Islamists and the West: Ideology vs. Pragmatism."

nytimes.com