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Politics : Foreign Policy Discussion Thread -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: ChinuSFO who wrote (5683)	7/20/2003 11:01:01 AM
From: Hawkmoon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 15991

To me Saddam is not such a significant factor in the "war on terrorism" as he is made out to be. We have Yasser Arafat, And who was one of Arafat's largest financial supporters, sending money to martyrs, as well as training Palestinian terrorists at Salman Pak?? I'm sorry that you don't believe Saddam fostered terrorism throughout the region. I guess you'll just have to go on thinking that he's just someone who was "misunderstood" and If Saddam was a threat they why was he on the US payroll when Reagan and the senior Bush were Presidents. That's just horsecrap! Every global leader who conducts trade with the US, or receive any foreign or military aid is on the US "payroll", using your definition.. My god.. if he was on the "payroll", why didn't we just let him keep Kuwait back in 1991? Even the CIA has no "credible proof" that Saddam had ties to Al-Qaeida. And you have no proof that he did not. Given the secrecy and terror under which Saddam's government controlled his people, we effectively have little to no confirmable intelligence about Iraq. What about going after the big ones. Osama, Abu Sayyaf etc. And also Yasser Arafat. Abu Sayyaf is located in the Phillipines, continuing on the muslim rebellion that has existed there for decades. We have provided support, advice, and training to their people there. Arafat? We're undercutting him right now.. financially through taking out Saddam's government, as well as politically by excluding him from the peace talks. Osama? If he has fled to Kashmir, as many predict, we can (at this point) only choose to support the Pakistani government of Musharraf in its attempts to deal with him. But Pakistan is effectively a divided country, a few small steps from civil war between secularists and militants. Is the pursuit of Osama worth risking igniting that? Not at this point. Besides, Saudi Arabia is the heart of Muslim militancy and this Wahhabist flavor of Islam that has created and spread this militancy. Iraq is much closer to that eventual target. Hawk Hawk

To: ChinuSFO who wrote (5683)	7/21/2003 6:37:32 AM
From: DavesM	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 15991

ChinuSFO, re:"What about going after the big ones. Osama, Abu Sayyaf etc" Abu Sayyaf leaders have previously stated that they received monetary support from Saddam's Iraq. Further, Abu Sayyaf leaders have publicly admitted that Iraq offered them a "bounty" for each American they kill. Abu Sayyaf was founded by men recruited by OBL's Brother in-law (while living in Iraq). These facts are clear. The U.S. was and is a target of terrorism from Al Qaeda, for the most part, because U.S. troops were stationed - long term, in Saudi Arabia. As long as Saddam was in power in Iraq, the United States would have a large military presence in Saudi Arabia - containment.

To: ChinuSFO who wrote (5683)	7/22/2003 8:54:24 AM
From: Chas.	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 15991

this is part of a larger overall view of the current situation in Iraq, it is not my writing but I agree with the premise. B. Why Iraq? 1. Iraq is centrally located with borders on Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It has major ports through which supplies and troops can move. If we occupied Iraq, it would be ideal as a potential base of military operations against any of those other nations, and they all know it. This would make diplomatic threats against them far more effective. 2. Among the major nations of the region, Iraq had been relatively mercantile, relatively secular, and had originally had a relatively well-educated and cosmopolitan population. Reform was more likely to be successful there. 3. A casus belli existed that could be leveraged to justify conquest in certain fora. 4. The existing sanctions process against Iraq (including patrols over the "no fly" zones) was a failure and was unsustainable. One way or another the status quo had to be ended. Lifting the sanctions and ceasing to enforce the "no fly" zones without removing Saddam from power was too risky. 5. Saddam represented a substantial long-term threat. He had demonstrated utter ruthlessness and viciousness in two external wars and uncountable internal repressions. He showed no sign of abandoning his ambition to develop nuclear weapons irrespective of how long it might take or how much it might cost. 6. Saddam had been providing immense support for terrorist groups, both monetarily and in other ways. There were known training bases in Iraq and he had been providing money and arms. (It is not clear that much or any of that support went to al Qaeda; most of it went to various Palestinian groups.) 7. Saddam had developed and used chemical weapons against Iranian troops and on Iraqi civilians. Left to himself there was a non-trivial chance of his giving such weapons to terrorists. After the war in 1991 and 12 years of Anglo-American enforcement of sanctions, Saddam had a grudge against the US, and the chance of him surreptitiously aiding terrorist attacks against us was too great to ignore. It's a matter of record that he attempted to have the senior President Bush assassinated. 8. Revolution in Iraq was impossible; reform there could only be imposed from outside by military force. 9. There had been substantial support by American voters since 1991 for military operations to remove Saddam from power. There was far less support for invasion of Iran and no support at all for conquest of any other nation in the region. 10. Iraq's oil wealth could be used to offset much of the cost of rebuilding after the war, as well as making the nation economically viable and prosperous and helping to finance diversification of its economy. 11. Saddam had become a symbol for the "Arab Street". He was thought of as a strong Arab leader who was standing up to the West, and was viewed as a hero. Though he'd had his ass kicked in 1991, he survived it and this actually enhanced his reputation. He hadn't won against us, but at least he'd tried, which was better than anyone else seemed to be doing. The "Arab Street" were proud of him for making the attempt. (It ceased to matter that the war in 1991 started because Saddam had invaded fellow Arab nation Kuwait, nor that several divisions of Arab troops had been part of the coalition that defeated him. 1991 had symbolically become Saddam fighting against the US.) 12. The leaders of Kuwait feared Saddam and owed us a big favor from 1991, so Kuwait could be used as a base from which to launch an invasion of Iraq. 13. Iraq's military had the reputation of being the largest, best armed and most dangerous of any in the region; if it was decisively crushed it would be psychologically devastating. 14. We owed the southern Shiites a moral debt for not supporting their attempted revolution in 1991, and for our failure to make any attempt to prevent the retaliatory slaughter inflicted on them by Saddam afterwards. (I consider this the most important and most shameful lapse by the US since the end of the Cold War.) 15. The Kurds had prospered under the umbrella of the northern "no fly" zone, but if we'd given up and stopped enforcing that zone without eliminating Saddam, and if the sanctions had been lifted, the Kurds would then have been crushed by a reinvigorated Saddam. It would have been another betrayal similar to 1991 for the Shiites.