Are Neocons cooking their own goose?
By Roger Patching
While many debate the wisdom of current efforts by neoconservatives in the Republican Party to create their vision of Pax Americana, I wonder if the historical outcome hasn't already been determined.
That is, while Republicans on all sides worry about "containing" what was once considered a war behind closed doors between unilateralist hawks (the neocons) and multilateralist moderates in the party over a policy based upon U.S. hegemony -- world dominance -- I wonder if it isn't an already irreversibly failed policy simply because the American people were never seriously included by anyone, even the media, in the discussion.
I wonder if the worldview of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, Vice President Richard Cheney, Richard Perle, columnists William Kristol, Lawrence Kaplan, Robert Kagan and other members and leaders of the Defense Policy Board, American Enterprise Institute and The Project for a New American Century is already dead because not only did they not make a case for hegemony to the public, they never seriously attempted to even define the term or explain the concept.
And, now, it is too late. Because the public has little understanding of the depth and breadth of their vision of global politics and is already growing weary of American involvement in Iraq, the neocons' grander plan seems destined to never come to fruition. By choosing to not present it directly to the public at large and thereby commence an examination and debate, they have unwittingly undermined it as a viable theory and now we are witnessing the manifestations of its slow and costly death.
Their political penchant for cloaking their vision in immediate emotional (and presumably less complex) terms of righteously fighting terrorism and thwarting evil, instead of explaining their plan, has not served them well. People are confused, and the opportunity to teach hegemonic theory as a basis for American foreign policy has passed.
Bush and the neocons are now viewed as not having a plan. Indeed, even as fragments of their worldview enter the public's consciousness, that they earlier chose to not share it with the public now taints it with suspicion and duplicity.
Why has all this happened? Historians will have to sort it out. Certainly they will address whether the neocons were naïve and/or arrogant in believing that it was unnecessary to explain themselves to either the masses or dissidents in their own party. And, of course, it will be difficult to ignore the floundering of the Democrats. In addition, historians will surely need to examine the nature and quality of presidential leadership of both the GOP and public opinion.
Bolstered by control of both houses of Congress, the moment was ripe for a clear public declaration of how an expensive and prolonged occupation of Iraq was but the first step in promoting world peace through global hegemony. Instead, the administration chose to create in the public mind the more appealing expectation that there would be no major American occupation, simply an invasion to liberate Iraqis. That the Bush people must now suffer the fallout from a bewildered and disillusioned public that still doesn't understand the endgame is due to how they chose to handle this issue.
Why did these policy makers both in and out of government who refer to themselves affectionately as the "cabal" choose to neither explain nor build a case for the man on the street? After all, they have devoted years to formulating their program. The White House's "National Security Strategy of the U.S." released in September of 2002 is not greatly different from the plan Wolfowitz drafted in 1992 when he was undersecretary of defense for policy.
Ironically, Kristol and Kagan wrote in a 1996 Foreign Affairs piece that one of the major conditions for the success of the neocons' plan for "Benevolent Global Hegemony" was that the public have a clear understanding of it in order to gain popular support.
In this article, where they cast aside both the Wilsonian multilateralism of the Clinton administration and the neoisolationism of Buchananites while finding tepid the "realism" of Henry Kissinger and his disciples, they aggressively advanced their case for American unilateral global dominance and control. And, key to that, they cited "citizen involvement," along with an "increased defense budget" and "moral clarity."
"Weak political leadership and a poor job of educating the citizenry to the responsibilities of global hegemony have created an increasingly distinct and alienated military culture.
"It is foolish to imagine that the U.S. can lead the world effectively while the overwhelming majority of the population neither understands nor is involved with its international mission."
They then proceed to attempt to dismantle arguments that Americans might not support such an ambitious policy.
While they're right that they needed to mount a public relations campaign, it never occurred, and the public is consequently wondering what is going on. What's the plan for the future? The Third Army and their families wonder why they are still in Iraq, along with 150,000 other troops, with more preparing to rotate in. It is no longer unpatriotic to oppose what is going on.
The deficit is skyrocketing and the supposed surplus (as if anyone actually has a surplus when they are deeply in debt) has vanished. Taxes that could be devoted to other things are needed now to service interest on the debt. Almost every state is in a budgetary crisis. Unemployment is at an all-time high. We have myriad problems at home and people are unclear about what we are doing abroad. Issues of both trust and credibility have loomed ever larger of late. And the rhetoric of the neocons isn't playing well anymore.
So what is this hegemony theory all about and why is the public's general lack of awareness of it important? While my colleagues may dutifully criticize me for oversimplification, it isn't all that complicated. All governments conduct all policies based upon theories of what is happening, what ought to happen and why. Therein lies the endless debate that characterizes all democracies.
The impetus for and nature of current American operations in Iraq and elsewhere are consistent with the theory of hegemony that drives the neocons in charge. While they were not able to sell it to Bush senior or Clinton, they were successful with Bush junior.
Hegemony theory focuses on the rise and decline of global and regional superpowers, or "hegemons." From the Greek "hegemonia" (the predominance of one state over another), it examines the causes and effects, pros and cons, of the dominance of one state over a region or the world. The theory partly attempts to explain global stability and instability during the last few centuries and assumes that stable world order requires a dominant single leader to maintain order.
The dominance of a single great power is necessary to keep peace, punish wrongdoers and prevent competition and conflict among rivals from spinning out of control, causing problems for commercial transactions and jeopardizing international military security. The dominance of Portugal followed by the Netherlands in the 16th and 17th century and then joined by the British later during the 18th and 19th centuries are often cited as examples.
Modern usage of the word is generally traced to an Italian, Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), who discussed hegemony in terms of how a new elite class emerges and becomes ideologically and therefore politically dominant because the masses accept, if not adopt, its moral and intellectual leadership. The elite shapes public opinion to serve its interests, which are often contrary to that of the masses.
The hegemonic class leads its nation-state to acquire unrivaled power to reshape the existing system by making and enforcing rules which they believe will preserve both world order and its own dominant position.
Hegemonic control, of course, imposes great stress and expense on the population of the hegemon because it must bear the costs of global political and economic order while protecting itself and its empire. In time, so argue critics, this becomes increasingly burdensome, actually making the hegemon vulnerable. New rivals arise leading to the demise of one hegemon and the dominance of another, often through war or internal collapse. Hence, national and international understanding and support of the beliefs of the hegemon's elite class are essential to the longevity of hegemonic power.
In opposition to this theory of unilateral control are those who argue that, in the modern world, multilateral problem solving is, by its very nature, more democratic in practice and therefore is more likely to build democratic institutions and cooperation in all forms of international relations. Putting Democrats completely aside, the division on this issue, both within and among departments and agencies of the Bush administration and the Republican Party, has silenced the clear articulation of the theory to the American public.
Americans want to do the right thing and have their government do the right thing, but are becoming increasingly confused. They don't know that Iraq was targeted for our hegemonic expansion, along with other regions, well before Sept. 11, 2001. They don't know that Iraqi oil reserves were central to U.S. energy planning by this administration prior to the attack by mostly Saudis on the Twin Towers. They don't know that we invaded Iraq without an exit strategy because hegemons don't leave and that Iraqi sovereignty is not part of the agenda. They are not aware that there is a global theory at work and Iraq is just part of it.
While Kristol and Kaplan in their book, "The War Over Iraq" (sponsored by The Project for a New American Century), explain that "the mission is more than Iraq" and elaborate how Iraq is just the beginning of the execution of the new role of the U.S. in the 21st century, the Bush administration has not connected the dots for Americans about this grander vision. The public has not been told that this hegemonic plan targets other significant nation-states all over the world for unilateral American domination.
Foreign ruling elites, however, have read and studied the policy pieces written by the neocons in support of American hegemony. That is partly why we had and continue to have difficulty obtaining allies. There is no place in hegemonic theory for multilateral cooperation, only imposed cooperation. Americans wonder why they have to foot the roughly $4 billion to $5 billion a month bill for Iraq alone. They don't understand that much of the world does not want American hegemonic plans to succeed.
It is philosophically difficult for neocons to dilute America's status as a hegemon by seeking assistance from other nations, and yet they are fully aware that many in and out of the administration want just that. This partly explains the administration's less than fervent effort to secure foreign assistance in the ongoing occupation of Iraq and the reluctance of those coaxed nations to participate without the involvement of a countervailing force such as the United Nations.
While Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is on the multilateral side of the issue, can be considered earnest in his desire, along with many others, to share the burden and the control that accompanies the occupation of Iraq, the posture of the administration so far has been hegemonic. This awkward division fuels skeptics and undermines the credibility of both positions at home and abroad.
Worse, in terms of credibility, is the advice provided by Michael Ledeen, a former U.S. national security official and key neocon strategist. Author of a 1999 book entitled "Machiavelli on Modern Leadership," and a more recent publication, "The War Against the Terror Masters," he is quite comfortable advising that "lying is central to the survival of nations and to the success of great enterprises, because if our enemies can count on the reliability of everything you say, your vulnerability is enormously increased."
Such "strategic deception" is presumably morally justifiable as long as the survivability of the state is at stake. So, given this operational premise, how can one discern, here or abroad, the difference between governmental information and disinformation, truth and lies? While we shall clearly be deeply involved in Iraq for years to come, maybe the end of the necons' global vision is already a done deal. Given the litany of current problems at home and worries of an Iraqi quagmire reminiscent of Vietnam, this is not a good time to explain the true nature, plans and cost of world hegemony. The public has not been prepared for it and now wouldn't accept it.
We are probably witnessing the beginning of the end of this experiment, and it will pass into history, as have many other grand schemes, with most Americans not having ever known anything about it at all.
That is, of course, unless the Democrats somehow become united in their effort to recapture the White House and seize the opportunity to confront the administration and demand an explanation of the nature and basis of its muddled policy. The documents and articles are available. Many Republicans despise hegemonic theory. And, easy links to the status of the economy and uncertainty regarding the future can be drawn.
Contrary to common rhetoric, it is not always necessary to have an alternative plan. While perhaps not fashionable, history is replete with successful negative campaigns against individuals, parties and issues at all levels of government.
GOP leaders were so confident in 1920 that they could get anyone elected because of the lack of clarity from a badly divided Democratic Party, led by a crusading president incapacitated by a stroke, that they deliberately ran a dull-witted unknown, Warren Harding, to an easy victory. Their slogan: "Let us be done with the wiggle and the wobble." They promised only a return to "normalcy." FDR promised a "New Deal" and offered almost no specifics, but that was enough.
If Bush wishes to stay in office, he may need to officially abandon, much to the chagrin of "the cabal," the unilateralism and expense that accompany global hegemony, or Americans may decide in 2004 that they want a different future. |
