To: Lane3 who wrote (70872 ) 7/23/2003 2:20:31 PM From: TimF Respond to of 82486 I agree that some things are just plain wrong. I think murder is just plain wrong. And having sex with a child. And torture. What's your determinate for saying that? Some would say that sex outside of marriage and stealing are absolutely wrong, as well as murder, etc. Is that just their opinion? Are the just-plain-wrongs just my opinion? Or your opinion? Or society's opinion? What is the determinant for what is what I'm calling just plain wrong or you're calling absolutely wrong? Is is some societal threshold? Or many individual opinions of what the societal threshold is? Or is there some standard external to society, which is what Jewel was arguing? Stepping back a minute I see you have been looking at the determinate of what is wrong and I have been looking in a rather abstract way at what being wrong means. I would say that something that is "just plain wrong", is truly in the most total sense of the phrase "just plain wrong". In a sense there is no determinant. What I would look for, and what we could share the search for is knowledge about what is just plain wrong, or if you prefer we can search for a decision about what we will consider to be just plain wrong and perhaps why we will consider it wrong. I would say there is in an abstract right and wrong are external to society but that societies and individuals determine what they will consider right and wrong by use or reason and/or by the traditions of society. In a practical rather then abstract sense all we can go by is our (or our society's) understandings of right and wrong. I think that's what this discussion is about, not whether the morality of some stuff is beyond debate. I don't see how, if morality is to be considered purely a social or individual construct that the morality of anything could ever be considered beyond debate. If morality is a social construct I don't think you are saying X, Y or Z are wrong, but rather "our society says X, Y and Z are wrong". In terms of practical results there is probably little difference between person A who believes that morality was only a matter of individual or societal opinion, or is a social construct, but believes in their own (or their society's) opinion (or construct) enough to do something about it; and person B who thinks that an objective or external morality exists, and has specific opinions about what that objective and external morality is, but recognizes that he is not infallible and doesn't have perfect knowledge of this objective morality. Both of those people are in many ways closer to each other then they are to person C who claims that morality is entirely a matter of opinion and that any opinion is as good as any other, or person D who thinks there is an objective morality and thinks that he, or his church, or organization, or political party, has perfect knowledge about this objective morality and can and should proceed to enforce every detail of it on everyone by force without delay. Tim