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To: JohnM who wrote (4276)8/4/2003 9:41:49 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793682
 
Chapel Hill is back in the news. This book review becomes all the more interesting within the context of the University.

Clueless and calculating

By J. PEDER ZANE, Staff Writer
J. Peder Zane is the Book Review Editor and books columnist for The News & Observer. His Sunday column has won several awards, including the 1999 Distinguished Writing Award for Commentary from the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Zane is a graduate of Wesleyan University and Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism.

According to officials at UNC-Chapel Hill, they're just a bunch of clueless naifs, mystified by the controversy surrounding the book they've asked incoming freshmen to read, Barbara Ehrenreich's best seller , "Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting by in America."

But to their well financed right-wing critics, they're calculating bomb throwers, bent on indoctrinating unformed minds with their leftist politics.

Clueless or calculating? Two views, worlds apart. Both may be right -- better make that correct (but not politically). The reason helps explain why the brouhaha at Chapel Hill is much larger than one book and one campus. The flap is a flash point in the increasingly noxious and partisan political battle that has been crackling since the Supreme Court made George Bush president in December 2000.

To begin, "Nickel and Dimed" is not simply an account of the struggles of low-wage workers. It is a polemic against American capitalism. Built around three one-month stints Ehrenreich spent working as a maid, waitress and Wal-Mart clerk, "Nickel and Dimed" compellingly illuminates the challenges faced by her fellow employees. It does not even attempt to give an employer's point of view or provide a larger context for understanding the forces driving our economy.

Instead, Ehrenreich uses her reporting, and her sharp wit, as literary devices to liven up a call for a higher minimum wage and more powerful labor unions. "Nickel and Dimed" does not force readers to think, but tells them what to think.

Given the right-wing's anger over last year's summer reading assignment, "Approaching the Qur'an" by Michael Sells, UNC's surprise at the controversy over Ehrenreich's avowedly leftist work seems unfathomable. According to UNC-CH Provost Robert Shelton, "Nobody I talked to thought this would be a controversial book."

I don't doubt that. And therein lies the problem. His comment suggests a staggering lack of intellectual diversity on campus. What critics cast as a "Marxist rant," campus officials see as an honest and important work that tells the truth about an under-addressed social problem. Who's right is a matter of opinion. What seems more certain is that UNC officials -- like their critics at the conservative John Locke Foundation in Raleigh -- are so like-minded that they never came across a single voice expressing a common complaint about the book.

However, the "Nickel and Dimed" debate is far more than a tired rerun of the ongoing drama "Ivory Tower Liberals and the Right-Wing Fanatics Who Despise Them." The two radically divergent views of the book reflect the increasing compartmentalization of American intellectual life. As our politics become more partisan and our news sources more varied and ideological, it is becoming easier to pass one's life without ever hearing many opinions that challenge one's perspective. Broadly speaking, liberals get their version of reality from CNN, NPR, the Nation magazine and progressive books and Web sites, while the right feeds on a steady diet of Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, the Weekly Standard, Ann Coulter and conservative blogs.

Where you tune in increasingly defines who you are. And never the twain shall meet.

Is "Nickel and Dimed" fair and balanced? You decide.

While I accept UNC's claims of cluelessness, I also suspect that, subconsciously at least, their actions were quite calculated. Their choice of Ehrenreich's book has an in-your-face quality that reflects a cancerous dynamic that has metastasized since the presidential election (selection?) of 2000: a process I call "the rightification of the left."

Liberals are mad as hell and they're not going to take it anymore. After years of mostly silent suffering at the mouths of conservative firebrands, the left has decided that turnabout is fair play. While Al Gore has called for a liberal talk-radio alternative as strident as the one the right has ridden so hard for so long, left-leaning writers have been sharpening their knives. The nation's most prestigious newspaper, The New York Times, boasts three liberal columnists -- Bob Herbert, Maureen Dowd and Paul Krugman -- who describe the Bush administration in Michael Savage-esque terms. Ehrenreich and her fellow provocateurs such as Noam Chomsky ("9-11") and Michael Moore ("Stupid White Men") have turned their fury into best sellers.

And this fall, publishers will release dozens of books inveighing against Bush and the right including "The I Hate Republicans Reader" edited by Clint Willis, "They've Stolen Our Country and It's Time to Take It Back" by Jim Hightower and "Lies, And the Lying Liars Who Tell Them ... A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right" by Al Franken.

We may lament the left's efforts to ape the worst habits of the right, but their logic is undeniable -- what's good for the goose is good for the gander. In this context, UNC's selection of "Nickel and Dimed" can be seen as a salvo in the culture wars. Given the current political environment, defined by warring camps who live in their own worlds, it is reasonable to conclude that the school's administrators were both clueless and calculating. A part of them couldn't imagine that anyone would find "Nickel and Dimed" inflammatory; part of them, it seems, wanted to send this message: If you thought last year's book was bad, try this one on for size.
newsobserver.com



To: JohnM who wrote (4276)8/5/2003 12:24:14 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793682
 
"A common complaint from Iraqis is that Al Jazeera is too sympathetic to Mr. Hussein and too eager to inflame Arab conflicts with the United States"

Iraqis Get the News but Often Don't Believe It
By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. - NEW YORK TIMES

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Aug. 4 - The Iraqi economy is flat on its back. But here on Karada Out, the bustling boulevard just across the Tigris River from Saddam Hussein's palaces, business is booming.

Specifically, the information business. In a two-mile stretch of this thoroughfare, 53 shops are selling satellite television receivers. Close to 100 stores have television sets on display on the sidewalks, where multicolored boxes from Korean manufacturers are stacked high.

At one store, Abdullah Salama, a 35-year-old manager, watched on a recent day as eight workers unloaded 3,000 satellite dishes from an orange tractor-trailer. The load should take only a few weeks to sell, Mr. Salama said. "Some people want to see entertainment programming," he said, "but basically they want to see the news."

The boom is taking place despite the on-again-off-again electricity situation in many places. Iraqis say they are mainly watching the Arabic language networks like Al Jazeera, though they have mixed opinions about whether they like what they see.

More than 100 newspapers are being published. By early afternoon it is impossible to find a copy of what by many accounts is the most credible daily paper in Baghdad: Azzaman, circulation 75,000, published by a former Saddam Hussein aide who escaped in 1992. Internet cafes also dot the street. Baghdadis now freely surf the Internet and send e-mail without a government official pacing behind them.

Abbas Darwish, 63, a shop owner who sells newspapers, said, "Iraqis are very thirsty to learn what is happening outside of Iraq."

The nascent Iraqi media offers evidence that a free market can thrive here. Yet it has also left Iraqis in Baghdad and in other cities overwhelmed by the choices and struggling to figure out which news sources are believable.

One outlet that does not appear to have won over most Iraqis is the occupying powers' own Iraqi Media Network, a $5 million-a-month effort.

Many Iraqis complain that the network's televised programming is dull and repetitive. The network, which is managed by a Pentagon contractor, has been criticized by some of its own officials, who contend that its credibility has been hurt by meddling by occupation officials and a bare-bones budget.

Its television director, Ahmad al-Rikaby, said he quit in protest last week over the network's limited resources. "You cannot make television if you do not spend money," he said an interview from London.

Don North, a television producer who has just returned to the United States after serving as an adviser to the network, said he grew frustrated by orders to run programs that in his view were not sound journalism, as well as a slim budget.

"Its role was envisioned to be an information conduit, and not just rubber-stamp flacking for the C.P.A.," Mr. North said, referring to the civilian authority.

In response, a senior Iraqi Media Network official said that the network had been spending lots of money on new equipment to ease a shortage that he said was partly due to difficulties getting the staff to agree on what was needed. The official also acknowledged that new programming was needed, saying the network was working to develop some new shows quickly.

Officials say that some form of propaganda was always part of the plan. "I would not deny that they are in many ways a mouthpiece for what the coalition has done," including the broadcasting of public service announcements, said Charles Heatley, a spokesman for the civilian authority here. He said the reach of the network was demonstrated two weeks ago when Baghdad erupted in celebratory gunfire after the network broadcast reports that Uday and Qusay Hussein had been killed by American forces.

Iraqis are known as voracious readers, but for 35 years they had little access to news ? except for Saddam Hussein's version. As a result, Iraqis tend to be highly skeptical of newspapers and official pronouncements.

"I usually don't buy ? I just like to read the headlines," said Bilal Rashid, 36, as he surveyed a street corner newsstand. Like many Baghdadis, he prefers to spend 20 or 30 minutes scanning the front pages instead of shelling out money to buy a newspaper.

Mr. Rashid noted that many journalists now working for independent papers used to work for those sanctioned by the government. "Some of them are liars," he said. "They used to work for Saddam."

The skepticism extends to the slick Arab satellite television networks, notably Qatar-based Al Jazeera. A common complaint from Iraqis is that Al Jazeera is too sympathetic to Mr. Hussein and too eager to inflame Arab conflicts with the United States.

"They put benzene on the fire," said Abdul Hussain, owner of an electronics store on Karada Out.

The media free-for-all has created some tense moments for the civilian authority, including the publication, and subsequent retraction, of an article in one Baghdad paper alleging that American soldiers had raped two Iraqi women.

Iraqi journalists are also still grappling with an American edict against publishing material that incites violence against the occupying forces, with violators facing imprisonment. One paper has been shut down ? Al Mustaqila, which advocated "Death to all spies and those who cooperate with the U.S."

Hassan Fattah, a Berkeley- and Columbia-educated journalist who is editor of Iraq Today, a weekly English-language paper, expressed concern, though. "You risk self-censorship, which basically defeats the whole purpose of a free press," he said.

Some of the media skepticism is also clearly a product of the many newspapers published by political parties and religious groups with little effort at Western-style detachment. Some include bizarre diatribes. Al Thaqalain, a Shiite publication, recently maintained on its front page that there had been an influx of AIDS-bearing Jewish prostitutes.

Mr. Fattah's newspaper has had a rough-and-tumble entry into the Iraqi media. The day before the first edition was published, the offices were robbed by bandits armed with Kalashnikov rifles. Last week, two days were lost because the power generator conked out.

But the business is growing. The latest edition brought in $9,000 in advertising revenue. It includes articles about drug abuse, an American military raid in a wealthy Baghdad neighborhood and a tale about a bachelor who stole Saddam Hussein's bed and used it to persuade his girlfriend to accept his marriage proposal.

Its reporters have been forced to learn quickly, especially about how to discern credible sources of information.

"You've got to take the word from the mouth of the horse," said Zaid Fahmi, a reporter who studied physics in college but this week had a front-page article about residents in a Baghdad district banding together to protect their local bank branch from looters.

Another skill Mr. Fahmi said he has been refining is how to elicit the right information. "If you ask a small question," he said, "you get a small answer."
nytimes.com



To: JohnM who wrote (4276)8/5/2003 2:39:44 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793682
 
The Real Intelligence Failure
What if it turns out Saddam didn't have weapons of mass destruction?

BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA
Tuesday, August 5, 2003 12:01 a.m. WSJ.com

The media has been focusing obsessively on the relatively minor issue of how an incorrect assertion about Iraq's nuclear ambitions got into the president's State of the Union speech. In doing so, it has missed the much larger issue, which is that of Iraq's missing weapons of mass destruction. The inability to locate these weapons is vastly more consequential to American credibility than the fact that the White House staff failed to vet 16 words in a single speech. The missing weapons reflect a much more fundamental institutional intelligence failure.

The source of this failure does not lie in the political agenda of this administration. The Bush people are right in saying that their estimates of WMD stockpiles were no different from the conclusions of the Clinton administration. And the latter would say, if asked, that their assessment was drawn from Unscom, the U.N. weapons inspectors who operated in Iraq from 1991-98. The intelligence failure is thus ultimately traceable to Unscom, and deeply embedded in an intelligence process that in the 1990s was biased toward overestimation of threats.

I begin with a presumption that the coming weeks and months will not reveal a cache of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials buried somewhere deep in the desert. The reason is simple: After three months in which the U.S. has had every conceivable opportunity to threaten, bribe, and cajole Iraqi scientists involved in the WMD program to reveal their whereabouts, not a single one has done so. On the contrary, they have all stuck to the official line from before the war, that these weapons once existed but were disposed of sometime after the first U.N. inspectors arrived back in 1991. We have to confront the possibility that they are telling the truth.

Why then did Unscom and the U.S. intelligence community believe so firmly that the weapons programs continued big time long after 1991? It was because there was plenty of evidence indicating that the Iraqis were lying, in the form of documents, communications intercepts, defector reports, and other types of suspicious behavior. But this evidence may have been the product of a deeper deceit, and its importance overestimated by everybody.

We know for sure that the Iraqis had very ambitious chemical, biological, and nuclear programs in the '80s. They used chemical weapons against the Kurds and Iranians, and evidently had more potent stocks of VX and sarin ready for use. The U.S. was surprised with the extent of these programs, including their progress on nuclear weapons, when they were revealed by Unscom after the first Gulf War. Unscom, backed by the implicit threat of U.S. power, was able to destroy many of these weapons and evidently motivated the Iraqis to get rid of others it didn't find. After that point, with Iraq under U.N. sanctions, Saddam Hussein likely ordered that the programs be reconstituted, and some desultory efforts were made along these lines. But the extent of this reconstitution was vastly exaggerated by the Iraqis themselves.

Economists have a simple maxim to explain human behavior: People respond to incentives. And if one looks at the incentives facing both the Iraqi scientists, Unscom, and U.S. intelligence, one sees the likely roots of the problem. Iraq was a totalitarian system in which everyone was forced to cater to Saddam's whims. We know that his son Uday, as head of the Iraqi Olympic committee, tortured losing athletes. We also know that during this war, Saddam was being fed false information about the success of his forces by commanders fearful of telling the truth. Iraqi scientists had every incentive to exaggerate the extent of their activities in internal communications with the regime. This appears to have been the case with the hapless Iraqi charged with developing the toxin ricin. He told his U.S. interrogators that he was never able to produce quantities of sufficient purity and toxicity for weapons use, but nonetheless reported to Baghdad that he was managing a large, successful program. It is also possible that Saddam understood that his own people were lying or exaggerating Iraq's capabilities, but wanted word to quietly slip out as a deterrent to the U.S.--even as Iraq officially denied their existence.

Unscom and U.S. intelligence faced skewed incentives of their own when interpreting these communications. Both investment bankers and intelligence analysts earn a living by making predictions about the future. The bankers face relatively balanced incentives: If they are overly optimistic, they may lose a lot of money. But if they are overly pessimistic, they will also lose by failing to get in on the next big thing. The intelligence community, by contrast, faces incentives strongly biased toward pessimism in periods following a failure to predict serious threats. The worst thing that can befall someone charged with responsibility for national security is to be the next Husband Kimmel, who was in command of U.S. Pacific Forces on Dec. 7, 1941. Before Pearl Harbor Kimmel had access to some intelligence data, in the form of Japanese "winds" codes, that in retrospect might have provided warning of the attack. He was subsequently cashiered and went down in history as the man who was asleep at the switch at this critical historical juncture. (Kimmel was eventually exonerated by the Navy, more than 50 years after the event.)

Both Unscom and U.S. intelligence were unpleasantly surprised by the extent of the Iraqi WMD programs uncovered in 1991. Thereafter, both had strong incentives not to be made fools of again. Unscom developed estimates of the extent of covert Iraqi research and stockpiles not accounted for, but whose existence could not be verified. The Clinton administration used the Unscom tallies as a baseline, and supplemented them with worst-case estimates based on intelligence it gathered. The Bush administration simply continued this process. Overestimation was passed down the line until it was taken as gospel by everyone (myself included) and used to justify the U.S. decision to go to war.

The media's focus on whether President Bush or his advisors were lying is thus totally misplaced. Most in the administration honestly believed there were significant stocks of weapons and active programs that would be found, even if they let slip a false assertion about yellowcake in Niger. Why else would Centcom have been so concerned to protect U.S. forces against possible chemical/biological attack?

The scenario I have presented is obviously speculative. But it is more plausible than any of the alternative explanations. Assuming weapons are not ultimately found, the Iraqis must have disposed of them at some point. Some have suggested they were destroyed or secreted to other countries just before the war. But if so, why did Saddam not reveal this, and save himself from an invasion? And why have U.S. forces, with complete access to the country, not been able to find evidence of their recent disposal?

It is much more likely that the weapons were disposed of long ago, and that all of Iraq's subsequent suspicious behavior was the product of half-hearted efforts at reconstitution that were ultimately fruitless but taken with utter seriousness by others. The failure is not one of dishonest politicians and officials, but of a broader institutional process involving multiple intelligence agencies and the U.N.

The systemic bias toward pessimism following an intelligence failure continues to influence our policy. As in the case of Pearl Harbor, someone was asleep at the switch on Sept. 11, and fingers have been pointing ever since (most recently, in the form of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report). Given the magnitude of the stakes (i.e., terrorists armed with nuclear weapons) it is understandable that people want to plan against the worst case. But worst-case planning bears certain costs as well, in terms of America's relations with the rest of the world and the way it treats its own citizens.

What we need now is not more politicized debate over specific items in presidential speeches, but a careful review of what Unscom and the intelligence community thought they knew about Iraqi programs going all the way back to the end of the 1991 war. This is being undertaken currently by David Kay, the former U.N. weapons inspector, in a closely held process. What he finds needs to come out in the open soon. What is at stake is not the credibility of one administration, but of a system designed to protect the world against weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Fukuyama, a professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins, is the author of "Our Posthuman Future" (Picador, 2003).
opinionjournal.com



To: JohnM who wrote (4276)8/5/2003 5:59:49 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793682
 
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To: JohnM who wrote (4276)8/5/2003 10:26:38 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793682
 
Here is a good BG piece on Moss. He just got promoted at the "Times"

Adam Moss, 46, has been named New York Times assistant managing editor for features, a new position overseeing the Culture and Style sections, the Times Magazine, the Book Review, Travel, Circuits, Real Estate, Escapes and special sections. "Adam is that extreme rarity -- an editor who generates thrilling feature journalism while upholding the rigorous standards of a top-quality news organization," says executive editor Bill Keller. The Times says a new Magazine editor is expected to be named shortly.

This Media Life
Paper Boy
Wunderkind Adam Moss was the handsome young glossy god, the guy who was supposed to change the magazine world -- and then he sought protective custody at the Times.

By Michael Wolff - (Written before the Raines debacle.)

When the country is in recession, the magazine business goes into something like depression -- particularly for magazines that do not have an exclusive niche, or an especially must-have commercial reason for existing.

But then there is The New York Times Magazine.

It appears able to exist outside of magazine reality. As the magazine business morphed during the last generation into product categories and eliminated most general-interest titles, the Times Magazine continued to conduct itself as though all readers had the time and inclination for extended bloviation interspersed with good writing (in a different age, I had a friend who described his overeducated and underemployed mother's main occupation as spending the week reading the Times Magazine).

And yet it's a strategy, or conceit, that has paid off: The Times Magazine is certainly one of the most widely read and profitable general-interest magazines in the country. It continues to have many readers who, like my friend's mother, see it as a form of religion (and the crossword puzzle as Communion). Certainly among its most like-minded competitors -- Harper's, The Atlantic Monthly, and The New Yorker -- it's the only one that is self-sustaining (of course, coming within the Times gives it untold advantages -- including freedom from circulation and postage costs).

At the same time, it's the magazine that magazine people love to hate. Despite its profits, it's always been regarded as the fabulous invalid of the magazine business -- bountiful but always unsatisfying.

What's more, it is just not, magazine people feel, a real magazine -- it doesn't have to duke it out on the newsstand or in direct-mail solicitations (indeed, various magazine editors have fought efforts by the Times Magazine to participate in the National Magazine Awards). Even its editor, Adam Moss, a wunderkind of the last great magazine age and once a contender to become the great magazine editor of his generation (that would be, in magazine time, the generation immediately following Tina Brown), got knocked off the shortlist by going, in what seemed like a semi-sabbatical, to the Times Magazine.

But as we settle into the recession (with daily muttering of which magazines are at death's door), it seemed appropriate to revisit the assumptions about Moss and his magazine. While Moss may never be acknowledged as the great editor of the age, he may be the only one who is (relatively) worry-free.

I actually can't decide what I think of the Times Magazine in its present form. It's less bloated than it once was. But it's less authoritative too (it used to be a grand op-ed page -- important people blathering on), and oddly detached.

It has better writers, a less autocratic style, and quirkier interests (among the more famous pieces of the Moss era is Andrew Sullivan's paean to testosterone; my recent favorite is the one about the Sudanese refugee kids immigrating to North Dakota). On the other hand, it has that inexplicable ethics column and that pointless "What They Were Thinking" photo thing (what were they thinking?). It tries to be hip and clever but is instead often pesky and obtuse.

Of course, part of Moss's signature as an editor is his packaging talent. He has a keen, or compulsive, ability to organize, categorize, and illustrate information. This can be stylish. But it can also be cloying, from the magazine's many front-of-the-book rubrics (the whole front of the book is called, in a great landgrab, "The Way We Live Now") to its relentlessly overarching theme issues ("The Year in Ideas," "Love in the 21st Century," "Women & Power").

Still, I'm not sure that what you read or don't read in the magazine, or whether it looks good or not, determines how you feel about it. Rather, its strongest characteristic is probably that it just comes -- and you feel often like it's been hung around your neck. It's required reading. Even if it's a diverting read, even if it's stirring up controversy, it's still a damned responsibility and obligation.

Now, one traditional goal of many people who want to write about The Way We Live Now (an activity more and more like poetry or certain specialized academic disciplines) is to do it without having to work for the New York Times. The Times has always been too institutional, too dominant, too know-it-all, too depressing -- plus you have to give your life to it (you have to grow up in the Times to truly be a part of it).

Moss began his career as a copy boy at the Times in the seventies -- as did I. The Times was then a linoleum-floor, metal-desk, rotary-phone bureaucracy of depressed and unfriendly lifers (many, I recall, with facial tics). Moss got out of there (as did I) in short order.

These were terrible economic years, but in fact, there were plenty of alternatives to the Times. It was (it borders on the bizarre to remember) a time of thriving, independent, Zeitgeisty magazines.

Rolling Stone, where Moss went to work in 1980, had moved, in the late seventies, from San Francisco to New York. Esquire -- where Moss went to work after Rolling Stone -- with several fabled lives behind it, was embarking on a new one. New Times, a biweekly alternative news magazine, where I went to work, was started by former Time Inc.-ers. New York had launched its sister, New West. Mort Zuckerman bought The Atlantic with great fanfare. Harper's was not that far removed from the era of Willie Morris (the great editor of his generation). Even Condé Nast, then just a rag-trade publisher, wanted in on the game, and launched a revival of Vanity Fair (it took a literary approach in its first pre-Tina incarnation). Manhattan, inc. and Spy burned brightly (if briefly), changing journalism and magazines.

In 1988, Leonard Stern, who owned The Village Voice, backed Moss's plan for 7 Days, a weekly arts-and-entertainment publication -- it lasted 102 issues.

It is hard to overstate what kind of magazine-world hero Moss became with 7 Days and its particular pop-culture idiom, and what kind of success failure can be.

Pop-culture magazine formats spread everywhere, especially to television (and, no small point, to the New York Times ). One result was that celebrityism, which was the dessert of pop-culture journalism, became the main course (which suddenly everyone was serving). Costs began to escalate wildly, partly as a result of Tina Brown's spending at Vanity Fair (enabling, not incidentally, Condé Nast to dominate the high-end magazine market). Plus, there were growing problems at the newsstand, skyrocketing subscription-promotion and -fulfillment costs, and a sudden pervasive expansion of competitive media outlets.

Then came the recession of 1990 -- the first official magazine depression -- and the end of most independent and nongenre magazines.

After 7 Days shuttered, Moss tried to launch a magazine about the media while doing consulting on the side. Then, at a dinner party at Frank Rich's house in 1991, he met Joe Lelyveld, who invited him to consult for the Times.

"The Times was undergoing," says Moss, "certain renovations" -- becoming more magazinelike and less newspaperlike, more boomer-friendly and less Establishment-pompous.

Moss became a guru of this change -- an anti-Times sort of figure in the middle of the Times . A magazine person at a newspaper, an openly gay person in a repressed atmosphere, a mild man among bullies and screamers. (His more orthodox detractors at the Times pin on him the creation of the un-Timesian -- and often ludicrous -- "Sunday Styles.")

You can read a certain poignancy into this -- the entrepreneurial, trailblazing editor in a kind of internal exile. At the same time, you can feel his relief at not having to work for an iffy venture, or, even more horrifying, having to go hat-in-hand trying to launch another start-up.

In 1993, he joined the staff, becoming editorial director of the magazine under longtime Timesman Jack Rosenthal.

Like The New Yorker, the Times Magazine had lost much of its advertising base through the eighties and was struggling to attract national brand advertising. (The Times had famously been dependent on bra manufacturers; but then the bra business went offshore -- taking its advertising with it. Similarly, The New Yorker had lost its carriage-trade retail pages.)

While The New Yorker, under Tina Brown, was trying to reinvent itself as a high-profile, in-the-spotlight, on-the-news, edgy weekly (a strategy that probably sealed its fate as a nonviable business proposition), the Times Magazine went mellow. Under Rosenthal and Moss, and then with Moss as editor in 1998, it further unhooked itself from the news cycle; it downplayed the Times' own voice (indeed, while it used to be the platform of star Times writers, under Moss it started almost shunning them); and it began developing -- to advertiser acclaim -- its upbeat, inclusive, occasionally Oprah-ish theme issues, becoming, as Moss describes it, "more emotionally responsive."

In significant ways, Moss, operating under the Times brand and for the Times audience, managed to create his own quirky, personal, many-voiced, successful general-interest magazine.

So what's wrong with this picture?

Over lunch and then, a few days later, in his darkish office (it has a dad's-den-in-the-fifties feel to it), I prod him about what he's going to do next. What would he do if this gig ended (as all gigs do)? What are his other ambitions? (He's only 44.) Can he really see himself trying to make it at the Times until his retirement?

He keeps avoiding the question.

Now, most people, when they have been successful, believe, no matter how implausibly, that they can repeat their success anywhere. But Moss clearly doesn't hold that illusion.

He says the opposite. He says that he can only see doing what he does at the Times.

In fact, not only does he not want to leave the Times but he doesn't want to think about the possibilities if he left. He doesn't, clearly, think there are any other possibilities.

We talk a bit about what magazines we see coming to their inevitable ends, and on what timetable.

"I doubt if I'd do something in magazines," he finally says (obviously annoyed that I keep pressing him -- but I want to know). "I don't see a lot of opportunity to practice our craft." Nor does he seem to have an idea what he would do otherwise.

I can't even bear to bring up the issue of Howell Raines, the Times ' new executive editor and Moss's new boss, who is, the scuttlebutt has it, putting everybody in his sights (John Rockwell, the Sunday "Arts & Leisure" editor, has been the first to go).

There is a sense that some people in the Times would like the magazine back, like it to be more Timesian and "less froufrou," as one Timesman put it to me. And there's politics, that great Timesian bailiwick -- Times people seem to think that Moss is unsophisticated when it comes to politics (the magazine did a hatchet job on Moynihan that caused him to cancel a lunch with Arthur Sulzberger -- not, apparently, a good move).

So the depressing part is not just that Adam Moss has to go into the protective custody of the New York Times to practice "our craft" but that the protection here is pretty iffy, too.

There's nowhere to hide.
newyorkmetro.com