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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (110017)	8/5/2003 1:19:07 AM
From: Nadine Carroll	Respond to of 281500

More of the same, really, By Barry Rubin Here's a question we should be constantly monitoring and rethinking: What has been the regional effect of the US overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein? I would suggest it has been fairly limited. There is no sign of a new era for the region, though in Iraq itself, of course, the changes have been far-reaching. Let's look at the main issues: Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Frankly, it is absurd to see the current cease-fire as a result of the war in Iraq. In fact it stems from the Palestinian leadership's increasing difficulty in ignoring the high cost of its 30-month war on Israel. Israel did not surrender as a result of terrorism, and the international community did not rush in to turn the West Bank and Gaza Strip over to Yasser Arafat. Palestinian casualties were high, the terrorist leadership was being decimated, Arafat himself was besieged in his bunker, and the Palestinian economic and social infrastructure was collapsing. Before the Iraq war Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) had already decided on his course of challenging Arafat and the effort to make him prime minister was already under way. US policy pushing reform among Palestinians was set. The Egyptians, who played an important role in the cease-fire negotiations, would have done so regardless of what happened in Iraq. What is especially worth noting is that since the Iraq war virtually no new supporters among the leadership have joined Abu Mazen. US policy and leverage has not changed, while most of the Europeans are still determined to shore up Arafat's leadership. In short, there is little or no discernible, direct influence from the Iraq war (but see below for an exception). International war on terrorism: Certainly the Iraq war removed a terrorist-sponsoring regime and has seriously disrupted at least a Baghdad-backed Kurdish terrorist Islamist group. No doubt captured documents and personnel are furnishing additional useful information about terrorist groups. The Anglo-American victory has also motivated Syria to keep a slightly lower profile as a terrorist sponsor (though this has arguably made no actual difference) and motivated Saudi Arabia to try a little more to cut off funds to terrorist groups (at least those not mainly involved in trying to kill Israelis). The Saudis also seem to have thought it a minimal show of support for the US to urge Hamas to accept the cease-fire. Perhaps the most important effect of the war on terrorists is to make them focus their efforts on fighting the Americans in post-Saddam Iraq. The pro-Saddam armed opposition will decline, while that of radical Islamist volunteers may be expected to remain constant, or increase. That new war might well reduce terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world since this Iraq front will be given priority by the forces of Osama bin Laden and similar groups. Democracy and reform: Support for moderation and liberal change in the Arab world has not grown visibly in the war's aftermath. Of course, this may be because any such effect will be encouraged by a new Iraqi regime's rise rather than the old one's demise. The old system remains extraordinarily strong. Rulers, opposition leaders, clerics, the media, and other sectors decry the Iraq war, or at least don't seem to draw any lessons from it on the need for reform at home. The Arab masses draw their information from this environment and are more likely to see the war as an evil imperialist intervention than a joyous liberation. Ironically, there is little concern for the well-being of Iraq's population, but the masses are also being told that Iraqis are no better off. It may take some time if it happens at all before the situation improves enough for Iraq to emerge as an example they might want to emulate. Even in Kuwait, liberal reform forces actually lost ground in the recent elections. AGAIN, THERE are other trends, though these are too often magnified from a standpoint of wishful thinking. The Saudis made some very minor gestures toward reform, and further signs are visible in some of the smaller Gulf monarchies. One can cite articles justifying Saddam's overthrow, and fewer articles analyze this event as an opportunity to increase openness, human rights, and democracy. But such views remain quite scattered even if one has low expectations to start with. The country which may have been most affected was Iran, where student demonstrations received tremendous attention. Yet these marches remained small and isolated, with virtually no other elements of the population joining in. Clearly Iranians are pleased with the change in Iraq (which very much also benefits Teheran's national interests, despite the American presence next door) and would like to see their own regime change. Equally apparent, though, is their inability to make either reform or revolution against the hard-line Islamist rulers. Much more can be said along the same lines regarding other issues. How much has US leverage in the region increased? Not remarkably, and certainly not compared to what happened after the previous victory in 1991. With one important ally, Turkey, US relations have worsened and the ability to affect Ankara's policy seems to have declined. This does not mean to suggest that the US situation in the region is no better than before the war; the point is that it is not so much better. Is there a big opportunity as was perceived in 1991 to bring about changes for the better as a result of the victory? Perhaps, but the evidence is not so persuasive right now. jpost.com