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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: GST who wrote (110347)	8/7/2003 4:11:10 AM
From: D. Long	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

What right has the UN, being a mere collection of individual states, to decide what is or is not a legitimate intervention? Individual states having no right to intervene at all, except in cases of self-defense as you mentioned. Does a quorom of states with no-right to intervene assume a right-to-intervene by means of agreement? What is the source of a state's power to delegate such a legitimacy it itself doesn't possess? Derek

To: GST who wrote (110347)	8/7/2003 5:02:08 AM
From: bela_ghoulashi	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

You're living in a fantasy world. Exactly no (as in zero) countries actually adhere to any of this. They all act as dictated by their own self-interest, to whatever extent they have the military or economic power to do so.

To: GST who wrote (110347)	8/7/2003 5:55:53 AM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

The Occupation ______________________________ By Max Rodenbeck* The New York Review Of Books Volume 50, Number 13 · August 14, 2003 Feature nybooks.com <<...One much-voiced criticism of the US military is that troop strength has been too low. More pertinent, perhaps, is the question of appropriate equipment and training. In numerous situations, Iraqi civilians have been killed either because American soldiers were unable to communicate such simple instructions as Stop, or because troops answered perceived threats with lethal gunfire rather than crowd control measures. Giant tanks, massive self-propelled artillery, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, with their 25-millimeter chain guns firing up to five hundred rounds a minute, are not much good for peacekeeping. On the other hand, thin-skinned Humvees offer little protection from the self-propelled grenades that are ubiquitous in Iraq. Until the occupation army is more appropriately equipped, casualties on both sides will continue to be higher than necessary. 2. Immediately after the war, Iraqis frequently expressed wonder at their occupiers' counterintuitive behavior. "Its like they don't know how to take over a country," said a bemused lawyer, sitting on the sidelines of one of the sweaty, chaotic early gatherings at Baghdad's Palestine Hotel, where exhilarated Iraqis struggled, unsuccessfully, to make sense of the new order. "What you do is impose an immediate curfew. You protect all public buildings. You shoot looters on sight. You issue edicts to reassure people. You set up credible tribunals to air grievances and punish Saddam's thugs." Following the initial, catastrophic period of looting, the perplexity deepened. The occupation force was clearly big and powerful, but it seemed more intent on protecting itself than on providing general security. Reports from the provinces were replete with tales of undermanned units, with few or no resources at their disposal other than guns, struggling to field a barrage of demands for aid, many of which they could not understand for lack of translators. And this despite the extraordinary American outlay on maintaining its troops: $1 billion a week, or $25,000 a month per soldier, a sum easily equal to the annual income of ten Iraqi families...>> *Max Rodenbeck is based in Cairo and writes on the Middle East for The Economist. (August 2003)