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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 4:42:09 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Re: France and some other European countries, like some posters to this board, refuse to see the on going world wide war between modernist and reactionary forces. It appears they will continue to try not to see it until it appears on the Champs Elysee. And that's a shame because Paris is such a pretty town.

I'm afraid that civil warfare between "modernist and reactionary forces" will sooner break out in the US --and that's another shame because America was such a great beacon of freedom....

mediamonitors.net
Excerpt:

What was missing from the conversation, edited out perhaps, was any effort to identify any corresponding imbalance in Western philosophy and Christian and Jewish theology and practice. In its place was a concerted effort to ignore and obscure even the most obvious of the many failings and flaws that bedevil so-called Western modernity from within.

Referring to September 11th, Moyers asked, "Why didn't this attack come from Christian fundamentalists? Why didn't it come from orthodox Jews?" One of the Jewish conferees had a ready answer. "First of all, Christian fundamentalists, whether you believe them or not, have come to terms with modernity. They are happy to live in the United States, which has embraced modernity. They don't like certain aspects of the culture, but they don't believe that the best thing to do for their version of the kingdom of God is to destroy modernity," replied David Aikman.

What could be further from the truth? Many Christian fundamentalists believe precisely that the best thing to do for their version of the kingdom of God is to destroy modernity. As yet another Texan, the late Grace Halsell, who, like Moyers, worked in the Johnson White House, pointed out in Forcing God's Hand: Why Millions Pray for a Quick Rapture and the Destruction of Planet Earth, more than 30 million Christian Zionists across the United States fervently hope and pray that, in their lifetimes, the modern world will be destroyed in a final battle, Armageddon, the conflict between good and evil at the end of the world. Moreover, many of them work industriously toward that goal, putting their efforts and their money behind Israeli plans for the creation of a greater Israel. In what Dr. Alfred M. Lilienthal called "the strange marriage of convenience between the U.S. Christian Right and Israel," U.S. Christian Zionists are providing political and financial support for the return of American Jews to Israel and the hundreds of still growing Jewish-only settlements established on illegally occupied Palestinian lands. Such illegal settlements are widely acknowledged to be the greatest obstacle to peace in the Holy Land. U.S. Christian Zionists support the illegal settlements in the fervent belief that their actions will hasten Armageddon, the end of the modern world, and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ. On July 9, a group of 400 American and Canadian Jews immigrating to Israel arrived in Tel Aviv on an El Al charter flight from New York. Each of the new Israeli settlers was supported by a grant of $5,000 from American evangelical Christians and each received additional funds through the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews, a group with which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, among other prominent U.S. political figures, is associated.

Why did Moyers let Aikman's glib falsehood pass unchallenged? Could he have failed to take note of Christian Zionism and its proponents' alarming influence in American politics and foreign policy? Hardly, given that North Texas, where Moyers grew up, is the sentimental home of the socially and politically influential Christian doomsday cult. Its founder, an alcoholic Confederate Civil War veteran named Cyrus Schofield who wrote his own thoughts into the margins of what has come to be known as the Schofield Reference Bible, became the pastor of Dallas' First Congregational Church in 1882. His Armageddon theology, also known as Dispensationalism, is now taught in some 200 Bible colleges, seminaries, and institutes across the USA, including the large and influential Dallas Theological Seminary, where Hal Lindsey studied. Lindsey, author of the 1974 best-seller, The Late Great Planet Earth, which sold over 28 million copies and was made into a documentary film narrated by Orson Welles, popularized Armageddon theology and reshaped it in so-called modern Western consciousness into an apocalyptic nuclear third world war scenario that takes place in the Middle East. Today, three-fourths of those who attend the National Religious Broadcasters annual convention believe in Armageddon theology, and "fast-paced end-time thrillers" are big sellers in bookstores across the U.S.

[...]

At the same time, Christian Zionism's primitive, dark, and violent theological doctrines, as dogmatically held and arguably at least as socially and politically influential as any of the supposedly evil doctrines that some Western critics are wont to see in Islam, are thriving in a Western economic, social, and political environment characterized by decades of unparalleled economic success, technological advancement, social progress, and triumphant political and cultural hegemony. Following the Vietnam War, American fundamentalists, including the Rev. Jerry Falwell, looked for inspiration to Israel's victories over its Arab neighbors. In the decades since America's ignominious defeat in Vietnam, conservative ideologues beguiled by Christian Zionism's violent theology have increasingly found fulfillment and taken a vicarious but nonetheless pathological pleasure in Israel's war against Palestinian civilians and its other Arab neighbors. The new "war on terrorism" provides for more immediate and direct expressions of Christian Zionism's animosity toward any and all who stand between militant Christian fundamentalists and their dreams of and desire for rapture, heavenly release, on a schedule of their own making.
[snip]
______________________________



To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 7:50:18 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Perhaps you do not grasp the significance of unilateralism as a foreign policy framework. France, Russia, Germany and China did not oppose taking action in Iraq. The nature of potential UN actions was up for debate. But the opportunity to resolve the outstanding UN SC Resolution issues in Iraq was never the central problem. Unilateralism as the cornerstone of US policy was and is the central problem that our allies have with us now and had with us then, and this is what killed US progress through the UN -- not France. Using France as a smokescreen only works with people who are looking for a non-American scapegoat and to sidestep the real issue. So long as we have a unilateralist policy framework, we are isolated and on our own. Being on our own does not serve us well and is entirely unnecessary. It is an ideological luxury that gratifies a handful of people who put their ideology ahead of our national security.



To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 8:01:41 AM
From: GST  Respond to of 281500
 
THE REAL WORLD CONSERVATIVE REALISTS BLAST BUSH'S FOREIGN POLICY:[THIRD Edition]
Laura Secor, Globe Staff. Boston Globe. Boston, Mass.: Aug 24, 2003. pg. D.1

Abstract (Article Summary)
Realism is the unsentimental foreign policy tradition that runs from Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes to the first [George W. Bush] administration, whose key security advisors, James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, reacted cautiously to the breakup of the USSR and openly criticized the Iraq war plans last summer. Realists are not necessarily isolationists, but they believe force should be used sparingly. Explains realist John Mearsheimer, author of "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics": "Realists tend to believe it is sometimes necessary to use the sword. But when you do, other states get very nervous and protect themselves, so it has limited utility."

No one would have described candidate George W. Bush as a foreign policy idealist in the year 2000. In fact, Bush campaigned as a realist, skeptical of nation building and disinclined to go to war. At the same time, future national security advisor Condoleezza Rice laid out her classically realist vision of the post-Cold War world in a Foreign Affairs essay. Of Iraq she noted that the Ba'athist regime was "living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic"; even if Iraq were to acquire nuclear weapons, deterrence would suffice.

There were also strategic problems. The neoconservatives assumed that a show of American force would lead hostile, WMD-seeking states to moderate their behavior and "bandwagon" on the side of the greater power. Says Mearsheimer, "Realists believe that adversaries invariably do not bandwagon. They balance against you.", The idea that our strike at Iraq will dispose Syria and Iran to cut terrorist ties is thus deeply misguided, in Mearsheimer's view. "War with Iraq makes the terrorism problem worse, not better. The United States will be perceived as a bully that takes special pleasure in beating up on Arab Islamic states."



To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 8:06:58 AM
From: GST  Respond to of 281500
 
COST OF AMASSING RESENTMENTS IS HIGH:[SUNRISE Edition]
ROBERT LANDAUER - The Oregonian. The Oregonian. Portland, Or.: Aug 24, 2003. pg. B.04
Author: ROBERT LANDAUER - The Oregonian
Copyright Oregonian Publishing Company Aug 24, 2003

Ambushes in Afghanistan, bombings in Baghdad and troubles elsewhere suggest that U.S. foreign policy these days is more successful at raising resentments than at easing tensions.

A set of principles guided U.S. conduct from World War II until the century's turn: balance of power, multilateral cooperation, peaceful resolution of disputes, no first use of nuclear explosives, regard for international agreements, respect for national sovereignty and deference to other peoples' choice of rulers.

The results generally served us well, especially in triumphantly ending a 40-year Cold War without nuclear disaster. By contrast, departure from the code of conduct produced our most conspicuous defeat, in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the Bush administration is reworking the nation's former foreign-policy standards, editor John Feffer contends in "Power Trip: U.S. Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11. The Bush team's goal is "to remake the world in the United States' image." In the process, it is recklessly "targeting adversaries, ignoring allies and acting with all the arrogance of a country that believes itself above criticism -- a country that is, in short, on a power trip."

The new pattern: dissolution of treaties, disregard of allies' interests, armed attacks without proven threat or provocation, threatened pre-emptive strategic use of nuclear weapons. In short, a muscle-flexing unilateralism.

Feffer and 17 contributors describe the foundations, policy documents and geographical nuances of this policy shift, and they sketch profiles of the ideological actors driving it. Arriving 22 months after 9/11, the book rides that

cm+RDlandau-b:trauma's-RD>shock wave but is not swamped by it. Two years is time enough to ease early-day fears, evaluate initial responses and gain measured perspective of U.S. interests.

But the authors' chief service lies in their insights regarding risks and vulnerabilities that cling to the aggressive new approach like barnacles to whales:

* The tendency to move from problem-solving by cooperation and compromise to problem-solving by proclamation and confrontation marginalizes diplomacy and global institutions. This exasperates countries that must act largely through the United Nations and similar bodies.

* The inclination has grown to exaggerate the capabilities of armed force and to underestimate its limitations.

We regularly see evidence that a mighty army can be a clumsy shield against angry citizens' rocket grenades and truck bombs.

* U.S. refusal to participate in the International Criminal Court or the Kyoto Protocol on global warming casts the nation as rigidly self-serving, unwilling to bind itself, even with exemptions and disclaimers, to globally accepted standards of justice and the common good.

Cumulatively, such blemishes threaten the United States with a backlash of ostracism and isolation -- the unwillingness of others to help this country advance its foreign policy because reciprocity is stringently, arrogantly rationed.

This reminds me of George Reedy, who quit as Lyndon Johnson's press secretary rather than lie to the public for him about the Vietnam War.

Reedy's fine book about that war-era presidency, "The Twilight of the Presidency: An Examination of Power and Isolation in the White House," is particularly germane now. Johnson, reportedly like George W. Bush, didn't welcome disagreement. Reedy believed that this trait isolated him, breaking down constructive channels of communication, fostering a capricious use of force, eroding the ability to foster unity and ultimately degrading authority and power.

The people in charge now ought to read both "Power Trip" and "The Twilight of the Presidency." They could get useful ideas about responding to threats without increasing dangers.

Robert Landauer: 503-221-8157, or robertlandauer@news.oregonian.com



To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 8:11:17 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Wrong Time to 'Stay the Course':[FINAL Edition]
Michael McFaul. The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 24, 2003. pg. B.07
Copyright The Washington Post Company Aug 24, 2003

Last week was a tragic setback for those committed to promoting regime change in the greater Middle East. Terrorists slaughtered dozens of innocents in Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan. In the wake of the carnage, expressing hope for democracy in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan sounds naive. Even the prospect of stable, effective government in these places seems remote.

Reflexively, Bush administration officials and their supporters reacted to these horrors by reaffirming the need to "stay the course." If offered only two choices -- stay the course or turn back -- then Bush and his team are most certainly right. Quitting Iraq, Afghanistan or the road map would produce greater chaos in these places and eventually new security threats to the United States.

But why must this debate be confined to two choices? Now more than ever the search for third ways demands more attention and resources. The current polarized, simplistic debate is getting in the way of creative thinking and effective policymaking. The Bush administration, especially as the presidential election draws nearer, is playing defense precisely when innovation is needed.

The call for "staying the course" is even more indefensible when one tries to find it. What course are we staying on in Iraq or Afghanistan? The president has boldly outlined the objective or endpoint of our policy: democratic regime change in the greater Middle East. But the president has never articulated or written down the strategy for getting there. Without a plan in hand, the Bush administration instead is compelled to move reactively from crisis to crisis, making up "the course" as it goes along.

Compare the debates and tools developed by those working on economic reform to those developed by social scientists and government officials working on political reform. When the moment came for promoting economic transformation in the former Communist world in 1989 and 1991, Western economists developed theories for how change could occur, proposed specific policies for creating capitalism and suggested very concrete tools to be used by outsiders for facilitating market reform. The evidence of sound theory and well-articulated arguments was the emergence of alternative hypotheses that could be tested in the real world. There were well- defined objectives, clearly defined strategies for achieving these goals, and critics of both.

A parallel body of knowledge regarding regime change or political reform or state building does not exist. Nor is a compelling blueprint for bringing about democratic regime change sitting on the shelf of a policy planning staffer, a Stanford professor or a former government official/think tanker. It is time for us all to confess that our understanding of regime change and the role that outside actors can play in fostering it is frightfully underdeveloped and poorly accumulated. Government officials and outside analysts roll out their favorite analogies -- postwar Germany today, East Timor tomorrow. Practitioners who have worked in countries undergoing regime change have a wealth of on-the-ground experiences. But this mishmash of metaphors and anecdotes has not added up to a model for how to change regimes effectively.

The list of immediate amendments to the course in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is obvious -- more American troops, faster deployments of newly trained Iraqi forces, more money for the reconstruction effort and a new United Nations resolution to help bring in soldiers from other countries. But these reactive corrections do not substitute for fundamental rethinking of our grand strategy.

The Bush administration must become proactive in filling this void of ideas. Most immediately, it must speak honestly about the need to refine the present course and engage those who reject retreat but who also have alternative ideas for improving the present course. Intellectually exhausted and politically challenged, Bush and his closest advisers have circled the wagons to defend the status quo. They cannot remain insulated and in the bunkers for two more years. Democrats in turn must do their part to engage in and not simply politicize this debate. Too many innocent people are dying every day to put the search for new ideas on hold until November 2004.

To help articulate and execute a refined course, President Bush should create a Department of Democratic Regime Change headed by a Cabinet-level official -- the offensive equivalent of the defense- oriented Department of Homeland Security. The State Department's mission is diplomacy between states, not the creation of new states. The Pentagon's mission should remain regime destruction; its formidable capacities for regime construction should be moved into a new agency, which would also appropriate resources from the Agency for International Development (particularly the Office of Transitional Initiatives), the State Department, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and Energy. This new department must include an office for grand strategy on democratic regime change and be endowed with prestige, talented people, and above all else resources. Our capacity to help build new states must be as great as our capacity to destroy them. (It is telling that the top position at AID is called "administrator," hardly the equivalent of a secretary of defense.) Radical? Yes. Unprecedented? No. It is exactly what leaders with vision undertook after World War II as a way for dealing with the new threat of communism. Their creations included the CIA, the National Security Council, Radio Free Europe and a bipartisan commitment to the grand strategy of containment as the guiding doctrine of American foreign policy. By comparison, it is striking how little institutional change has occurred or how little bipartisan agreement has emerged to address our new security needs.

The same can be said of institutional innovation at the international level. In the wake of World War II, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, NATO, the precursor to the European Union and many other new bodies all got their start. Since Sept. 11, 2001, not one new major international organization has been formed. Instead of citing the real flaws in existing international institutions as an excuse for unilateralism, the Bush administration should take the lead in creating new organizations for promoting democratic regime change. For instance, what about creating an Organization for International Trusteeships? Founding countries would offer assistance in governing failed or new states (Palestine, Liberia, maybe even Iraq) in return for leverage over "sovereign" decisions in these places -- a kind of IMF with guns and a focus on state building rather than economic reform. As a representative organ of all states, with a commitment to neutrality and a focus on diplomacy between states, the United Nations cannot effectively undertake such missions.

In the private sector, organizations form and dissolve all the time to respond to changing market conditions. Government institutions must do the same.

Reorganization or shifting resources does not substitute for new ideas but may help to generate them. Maintaining the status quo is no longer an option.

The writer is Hoover fellow and professor of political science at Stanford University and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.



To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 8:16:35 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
GOING IT ALONE ; America's wooden stance: King is only player on board.:[Chicago Final Edition]
Clyde Prestowitz. Chicago Tribune. Chicago, Ill.: Aug 17, 2003. pg. 1

With American casualties in Iraq mounting and weapons of mass destruction remaining elusive, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz told Congress recently that he is suspicious of United Nations offers of help because they might entail some constraints on U.S. actions.

About the same time, South Korean students marking the 50th anniversary of the Korean War armistice called America more dangerous than North Korea; production of opium destined for the U.S. heroin market was reported to be soaring in Afghanistan; looting and slaughter continued under Liberia's thuggish dictator as Washington declined a UN request for humanitarian intervention; and African cotton farmers faced growing penury as President Bush failed to reduce subsidies to U.S. growers as they flooded world markets with excess production.

Americans have been wondering why the world has not rallied to our side in the last two years, and our leaders have provided convenient answers. "They hate our freedom" or "they envy our success" or "criticism just goes with the territory of being the top dog," we are told.

Glibness, however, requires gullibility.

Take first the very notion of America battling alone in the face of envy and hatred. The outpouring of sympathy and support that occurred around the world on Sept. 12, when even the French newspaper Le Monde proclaimed "We Are All Americans" should have put that notion to rest. If it didn't, certainly the number of world leaders, from India to Canada, backing UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his offer of help in Iraq showed a worldwide willingness to help with reconstruction even though most nations had opposed the war.

The real problem here is not so much foreign hostility as America's insistence on going it alone in its own way. Wolfowitz's testimony is the tip-off. The United States would rather be in absolute control than accept any help that might in any way dilute that authority or that might even slightly complicate U.S. operations.

This was evident in the case of Afghanistan long before the Iraq question arose. Immediately after Sept. 11, America's longtime allies in NATO voluntarily invoked the treaty's "an attack on one is an attack on all" clause and literally begged Washington to include their troops in the invasion of Afghanistan, to no avail. It would be easier and faster simply to move alone, the Pentagon said.

The lack of interest in NATO and UN help is the natural result of the adoption by the United States of the radical new doctrine of preventive and pre-emptive war developed by Wolfowitz and a small group of self-styled neo-conservatives after the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

Although the United States won the Cold War with a strategy of deterrence and by building alliances and multilateral institutions such as NATO, the UN and the World Trade Organization, the new thinking argued for military superiority such that no other power would even consider a challenge and a unilateral approach based on the view that while friends are nice to have they are really not necessary for the United States to achieve its objectives.

`Coalitions of the willing'

Much discussed and partly adopted during the 1990s, this doctrine of pre-emption and "coalitions of the willing" in place of deterrence and alliances became the foundation of U.S. strategy since Sept. ll. In the world of the 21st Century, it was argued, the threats will be so dire and immediate that we must be prepared to strike first, and perhaps alone, to avoid being struck.

Of course, to be credible as something other than an excuse for permanent war, such a strategy must be based on accurate intelligence about the immediacy and seriousness of the threat.

In the run-up to the recent Iraq war, the Bush administration repeatedly emphasized that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had large numbers of weapons of mass destruction that could be unleashed against the United States at any moment. Other countries harbored doubts, but, claiming superior knowledge as well as virtue, the United States overrode allied requests for further investigation and deterrence and set course for war with a "coalition of the willing."

In the aftermath, we have learned not only that our intelligence was faulty but that, while we can win the military battles by ourselves we really need help with what comes afterward. Yet our doctrine and operating style inhibit us from getting that help.

This problem goes beyond Iraq.

Despite our great power, it is clear that beyond the battlefield there is little that we can accomplish by ourselves in an increasingly globalized world. We can't fight the wars on terror and drugs by ourselves nor can we run the world economy or deal with epidemics such as AIDS and SARS or problems like global warming by ourselves. We need help and friends; yet our inconsistent attitudes and policies are a source of constant disappointment to those who would be our friends--not to mention that they often are destructive to our own society.

Take the problem of soaring opium production in Afghanistan. As part of the effort to knock out Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, the United States overthrew Afghanistan's ruling Taliban and promised a new era for women, democracy, economic development, and security.

Washington's Afghan failure

In fact, however, Washington has put little effort into providing either development or security and has undermined any hope of democracy by acquiescing control of large parts of the country by its traditional warlords upon whose help the Pentagon relied to defeat the Taliban. Now the warlords are getting rich by promoting opium production with the tacit connivance of the same U.S. government that says it is fighting a war on drugs. Meanwhile, faith in America and its promises of development and democracy is much diminished throughout the region, and the Taliban appear to be making a comeback.

The situation in Korea is another case in point. For Americans who grew up thinking they had "saved" South Korea from the communists, the newly widespread anti-Americanism of Korean young people has come as a shocking betrayal.

What the U.S. public doesn't understand is that while America may have prevented a communist takeover of South Korea, Washington installed not a democracy but a sometimes brutal dictatorship that was backed by a series of U.S. administrations before the Koreans achieved democracy in the 1990s through their own efforts. Indeed, in some cases, U.S. commanders released Korean troops from their command to participate in quelling pro-democracy student uprisings.

More recently, U.S. hard-line policies toward the North are seen not only as having stimulated the North's development of nuclear weapons but also as having been adopted without consultation with the South and in opposition to the South's "sunshine policy" of trying to soften up the northern regime through trade, investment, family visits and tourism. In short, young South Koreans believe America's interest has never been in Korea itself, but only in how Korea fit into America's geopolitical interests.

The case of Liberia again points up the inconsistencies in U.S. policies that give rise to foreign cynicism and alienation from America. Long ruled by a dictator who regularly did business with Al Qaeda and Hezbollah militants and who set up roadblocks made of human intestines from disemboweled victims left by the roadside, it has become the object of a UN effort to stop the slaughter of a raging civil war. In the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the United States has been justifying its invasion of Iraq on the basis of having gotten rid of a brutal, inhumane dictator.

Yet, in Liberia, a country founded by freed American slaves and whose capital Monrovia is named after James Monroe, the United States has stoutly deflected the pleas from the UN to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Cynics ask why the United States will intervene on humanitarian grounds in one place and not the other. They answer with one word: oil.

But perhaps the most troubling example of American inconsistency is international trade. During his recent trip to Africa, Bush talked about helping fight AIDS and promoting investment and economic development.

Common error in Africa

But like all of his Republican and Democratic predecessors, he failed even to suggest the one thing that would make all the difference. Despite all of America's rhetoric about the glories of free trade and all its pressure on countries like China and Japan to open up their markets, American leaders never suggest cutting subsidies for U.S. farmers. Consider that, in West Africa, farmers using oxen and hand ploughs can produce a pound of cotton for 23 cents while in the Mississippi Delta it costs growers using air conditioned tractors and satellite-guided fertilizer systems 80 cents a pound. Logically, the U.S. farmers ought to be switching to soybeans or something else they can grow more competitively. Instead, they are expanding their planting and taking sales away from the African growers in export markets. How can they do this? Via subsidies to the tune of $5 billion. Not surprisingly, Muslim West Africa does not see America as a friend and force for good and is increasingly listening to the mullahs who call America the "Great Satan."

Thus does America checkmate itself by eschewing offers of help and insisting on total control while alienating those who would be friends by talking the talk but not walking the walk. It should be clear by now that the doctrine of pre-emptive war and coalitions of the willing can no longer be maintained. The failure to find those weapons of mass destruction in Iraq means that future U.S. warnings of imminent threats will be met with disbelief by the rest of the world and the American public.

Moreover, it is clear that the United States is already stretched to the limit by the effort in Iraq and could not contemplate any significant additional interventions without real help from the international community. But others will not proffer this help without getting some say in the policy-making process.

Thus, the way forward is to return to the multilateralism that won the Cold War and to work on correcting our inconsistencies rather than telling ourselves it doesn't matter what the rest of the world thinks of us. In fact, it makes all the difference because in the shrunken world of the 21st Century we won't be able to achieve our objectives without friends.

Clyde Prestowitz is president of the Economic Strategy Institute and author of "Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions"



To: frankw1900 who wrote (112827)8/26/2003 8:33:35 AM
From: GST  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Why the Security Council Failed
Michael J. Glennon. Foreign Affairs. New York: May/Jun 2003. Vol. 82, Iss. 3; pg. 16
ISSN/ISBN: 00157120


Abstract (Article Summary)
With the dramatic rupture of the UN Security Council, it became clear that the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law had failed. The problem was not the second Persian Gulf War, but rather an earlier shift in world power toward a configuration that was simply incompatible with the way the UN was meant to function. It was the rise in American unipolarity - not the Iraq crisis - that, along with cultural clashes and different attitudes toward the use of force, gradually eroded the council's credibility. American hegemony will not last forever. Prudence, therefore, counsels creating realistically structured institutions capable of protecting or advancing US national interests - even when military power is unavailable or unsuitable. Yet legalists must be hard-headed about the possibility of devising a new institutional framework anytime soon to replace the battered structure of the Security Council. The forces that led to the council's undoing will not disappear.