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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: i-node who wrote (174552)8/26/2003 3:10:33 PM
From: tejek  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1579791
 
Published on Monday, August 25, 2003 by the New York Times

A Weapons Cache We'll Never See
by Scott Ritter

DELMAR, N.Y. — Some 1,500 American investigators are scouring the Iraqi countryside for evidence of weapons of mass destruction that has so far eluded them. Known as the Iraq Survey Group and operating under the supervision of a former United Nations weapons inspector, David Kay, they are searching mostly for documents that will help them assemble a clear, if somewhat circumstantial, case that Iraq had or intended to have programs to produce prohibited weapons.

It is a daunting task. And according to many Iraqi scientists and officials I have spoken to, it is not being done very well.

A logical starting place for such a mission is in the Jadariya district of downtown Baghdad, adjacent to the campus of Baghdad University: the complex that housed the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate.
The directorate was the government agency responsible for coordinating all aspects of the United Nations inspection teams' missions. It was also supposed to monitor Iraq's industrial infrastructure and ensure compliance with the Security Council resolutions regarding disarmament, verification and export-import controls.

As such, the directorate was the repository for every Iraqi government record relating to its weapons programs, as well as to the activities at dozens of industrial sites in Iraq that were "dual-use" — used to manufacture permitted items but capable of being modified to manufacture proscribed material.

For 12 years the Iraqis collected and collated this data. If we inspectors had a question about a contract signed between country A and Iraqi factory B, the directorate could produce it at short notice. The 12,500 page "full, final and complete declaration" provided by Iraq to the United Nations in the fall of 2002 was compiled using this archive. And the directorate's holdings went well beyond paperwork: every interview conducted by the United Nations inspectors with Iraqi scientists throughout the 1990's was videotaped and available for review.

Of course, all this material was put together by officials and scientists who were obedient, either out of loyalty or fear, to the former regime, and it was done in a way intended to prove that Iraq was complying with the United Nations resolutions (something that has not been proved false in the five months since the American-led invasion). Still, even if one was to discount the entire archive as simply a collection of Iraqi falsifications, it would still be a sound foundation on which the Iraq Survey Group could have started investigations. After all, some of my most fruitful efforts as a United Nations inspector were initiated using false claims by the Iraqi government as the starting point.

And it seems that after the coalition troops moved into Baghdad, the records were all there for the taking. According to several senior directorate officials I have spoken to since the war — one a brigadier general who had been a high-ranking administrator at the complex — the entire archive had been consolidated into metal containers before the war and stored at the directorate's Jadariyah headquarters for protection.

<font color=red>Yet these eyewitnesses have provided me with a troubling tale. On April 8, they say, the buildings were occupied by soldiers from the Army's Third Infantry Division. For two weeks, the Iraqi scientists and administrators showed up for work but, according to several I have spoken to, no one from the coalition interviewed them or tried to take control of the archive.

Rather, these staff members have told me, after occupying the facility for two weeks, the American soldiers simply withdrew. Soon after, looters entered the facility and ransacked it. Overnight, every computer was stolen, disks and video records were destroyed, and the carefully organized documents were ripped from their binders and either burned or scattered about. According to the former brigadier general, who went back to the building after the mob had gone, some Iraqi scientists did their best to recover and reconstitute what they could, but for the vast majority of the archive the damage was irreversible. <font color=black>


Obviously, I am relying on the word of former directorate officials, but these are people I knew well in my days as an inspector, and none would seem to have anything to gain by lying today. In any case, the looting of the building, if not the previous presence of American troops, has been well documented by Western news reports.

Why was this allowed to happen? I am as puzzled as the Iraqis. Given the high priority the Bush administration placed on discovering evidence of weapons of mass destruction, it seems only logical that seizing the directorate archive would have been a top priority for the coalition forces — at least as important as the Iraqi Oil Ministry or the National Museum. And it seems highly unlikely that coalition leaders didn't know what the archive contained. I was one of many international inspectors who led investigations of the facility — and the data we produced was used by the American government as part of its case that Saddam Hussein was hiding prohibited programs.

Today, with the tremendous controversy over the administration's pre-war assertions, it is impossible to overstate the importance of the archive that produced Iraq's 12,500 pages of claims — none of which have yet been shown to be false — that comprise the most detailed record of Iraq's weapons programs.

Next month the Iraq Survey Group will give a formal briefing to American and British officials on the status of its investigations. President Bush has already hinted that the group will make a case that it has found evidence of prohibited weapons programs and of efforts to hide them from international inspectors. Such a case may have merit, but without being able to compare and contrast it to the Iraqi version of events, I'm not sure how convincing it will be to the American public, or to the rest of the world.

Scott Ritter is a former United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq and author of "Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America."

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company



To: i-node who wrote (174552)8/26/2003 3:12:21 PM
From: muzosi  Respond to of 1579791
 
i am well-informed with conservative lies too. how do you think i know that you're spewing fox propaganda ?



To: i-node who wrote (174552)8/26/2003 5:17:05 PM
From: tejek  Respond to of 1579791
 
Published on Tuesday, August 26, 2003 by the Washington Post

U.S. Postwar Deaths Match War Fatalities
by Mike Allen

With the death yesterday of another U.S. soldier in Iraq, the number of U.S. troops who have died there since May 1, when President Bush declared an end to major combat operations, rose to 138 -- the same number as perished during the six weeks of fighting that marked the fall of Baghdad and its immediate aftermath, according to Pentagon records.



The figure of 138 includes not only those killed by enemy fire -- called "hostile" deaths by the Pentagon -- but also those who died as a result of vehicle accidents, drowning, medical problems or other factors unrelated to combat. Yesterday's casualty, for instance, involved an unidentified soldier from the Army's 130th Engineer Brigade who suffered a "non-hostile gunshot wound" -- a phrase that can mean suicide or the accidental discharge of a weapon.

Although the 62 deaths from hostilities since May 1 remain well below the 115 that occurred in March and April, the combat death rate has been averaging one soldier about every other day since Bush flew to the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and announced that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended." If that trend continues through the end of the year, those killed in action after May 1 will outnumber those killed in action before then.

Yesterday's threshold event represented a largely symbolic moment in the grinding Iraqi conflict. But by highlighting the steadily mounting U.S. death toll, it underscored the political challenge for the Bush administration in sustaining a reconstruction effort that is clearly costing more U.S. lives than winning the war did.

Instead of facing gradually diminishing resistance, which the administration had expected to find after ousting Saddam Hussein's government, U.S. troops have encountered increasingly organized and violent opposition from Hussein loyalists and foreign Islamic militants who U.S. authorities say are flowing into Iraq. The nature of the combat also has shifted, from largely conventional warfare waged by a uniformed Iraqi force to guerrilla-style attacks and terrorist tactics employed by shadowy resistance groups and teams of hit-and-run fighters.

"The loss of every service member is deeply felt, and their courage and sacrifice will not be forgotten," said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman, asked to comment on the casualty count. "Creating a stable and secure environment for the Iraqi people is important to the national interests of the U.S. and the international community. Our losses only strengthen the resolve of the coalition to accomplish their vital mission."

U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in the Persian Gulf region, has provided little information about the reported deaths. Official announcements have tended to consist of no more than a few sentences citing the general cause of a death and offering a cursory description of the circumstances involved.

But the announcements over time have revealed some telling trends, particularly when compared with casualty patterns before May 1.

During the invasion and immediate aftermath, many of the U.S. combat deaths resulted from military ambushes, artillery fire and helicopter crashes. Since then, most soldiers have died from attacks involving rocket-propelled grenades, small-arms fire and what the military calls "improvised explosive devices," or homemade bombs -- all reflecting the less conventional character of the fighting.

Another significant difference is where U.S. soldiers are dying. During the war, the bulk of the deaths took place south of Baghdad as U.S. troops surged from Kuwait toward the Iraqi capital. In recent months, just over half of U.S. casualties from hostile action have occurred in Baghdad, and an additional quarter have come in the "Sunni triangle" bounded by Baghdad and the towns of Ar Ramadi and Tikrit, where some of the fiercest resistance to the U.S.-led reconstruction effort has been concentrated.

During the war, too, many deaths occurred in clusters and resulted from major individual events -- an ambush in Nasiriyah by Iraqi soldiers who pretended to surrender, for instance, or an attack on Army vehicles that became separated from a supply convoy. But in recent months, death reports have trickled into U.S. military headquarters in ones and twos.

On a few days, as many as three U.S. soldiers have been killed. The worst day for U.S. deaths from hostile fire was July 26, when a grenade thrown from the window of an Iraqi hospital took the lives of three soldiers and a fourth soldier died when his convoy came under rocket-propelled grenade attack.

For the most part, there have been few pauses in the mounting death tally. The longest period in which no combat deaths were reported was the 12-day span that began May 14.

During the first six weeks of fighting, each branch of service lost members, although the Army and Marines lost the most. Since May 1, the Army has suffered nearly all the deaths from hostile action. The Navy and the Air Force each have lost one member as a result of hostile fire. The Marine Corps has not reported any combat deaths, although 17 Marines have died in Iraq since May 1 from non-hostile causes.

A sizable number of the Army's deaths from hostilities have involved reservists called up for wartime duty, including eight members of the National Guard and five members of the Army Reserves.

The majority of soldiers killed since May 1 have been lower-ranking enlisted members. But four officers have died from hostile fire, and so have 24 noncommissioned officers. And although more than half of the dead troops were under 30 years old, 15 were in their thirties, one was 40 and another was 54.

No female soldiers have died from hostile fire since May 1. And no deaths in the past four months have resulted from mistaken fire by U.S. or allied troops.

Of the deaths categorized as non-hostile, at least 22 involved vehicle accidents, a common hazard reflecting the dangers of large-scale military operations. As many as four deaths resulted from the accidental detonation of munitions in areas where soldiers were working.

Unspecified health problems accounted for several deaths. One soldier was described as dying "after collapsing while eating dinner" July 8. In three separate instances -- on Aug. 8, 9 and 12 -- soldiers were found dead when others tried to wake them and discovered they were not breathing.

Staff researchers Robert E. Thomason and Madonna Lebling contributed to this report.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company

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