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Pastimes : NNBM - SI Branch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: lurqer who wrote (28318)	8/27/2003 4:33:03 AM
From: elpolvo	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 104216

perfesser- Are you two trying to tell this slow learner something? not a tall that was an interesting piece. thanks. i can't say anything about your verbal skills because i've never heard them... but your writing skills are excellent. your humility is greatly appreciated because it's genuine -- it projects honesty -- in that there is no ABSOLUTE truth. but there is knowledge and there is wisdom. and you have more than most. i liked the pilot studies. i can really relate to those through experience. the writer was obviously not a commercial pilot and there were some fallacious deductions made. there is only ONE pilot-in-command on any aircraft. that person is responsible for all flight decisions and their consequences. co-pilots and flight engineers are there as assistants, information providers or replacement of the pilot-in-command in the event of incapacitation. information provided as indirect or direct suggestions and concern are all that can be expected of them and anything more would be injurious to the safe conduct of commercial aviation. in the instance of the runway overrun, that could have been a disaster had the pilot decided to go-around too late in the landing process. i'm sure the captain knew even before the wheels touched that he was not going to be able to stop on the runway but at that late time, with full flaps extended, at landing airspeed (which is slower than takeoff airspeed) and a high groundspeed from the tailwind, he was committed to the ground and would likely have stalled the wings on a go-around attempt resulting in a crash that would have killed everyone aboard and who knows how many on the ground. the captain and the co-pilot would be aware of passing that point of no return at approximately the same time (depending on experience) and no suggestions or information from the co-pilot would have helped the situation but it's obvious that it would have been a topic of discussion anyway. i was once in a co-pilot situation identical to this. had i been the pilot-in-command i would have taken the plane down to the runway and overrun it as i felt the point of no return had been passed. the pilot-in-command (more experienced in this particular aircraft) thought otherwise and elected to apply power and go around. i was terrified. the stall warning horn sounded for a full two minutes as we barely maintained flight and altitude. i just KNEW we were dead-meat-flying. finally, through great skill of the pilot-in-command we gained enough speed to climb again without stalling the wings. we did fly well below the envelope of safe flight and all lives on board were at considerable risk. the outcome was successful but it could have been a multiple fatality as opposed to a damaged aircraft. had there been any doubt about who was pilot-in-command and an over assertiveness on my part, the outcome could also have been fatal in a struggle for control of the aircraft. i just sat there discussing our precarious predicament -- i'm sure it wasn't helpful. <vbg> in the other situation (which i remember very well from when it happened) there was something that the co-pilot said that was misinterpreted by the writer. the co-pilot suggested that they check the tops again before takeoff. what he was referring to was the tops of the clouds, not the wings. he wanted to know how far the plane had to climb before it would emerge from the icy conditions and begin to melt the ice off the wings. this indicates to me that the co-pilot did not think that takeoff should be aborted because there was too much wing ice to fly - he was just concerned that more ice would accumulate on the climb-out and wanted to make sure that they didn't have too far to fly through the clouds before breaking out of icing conditions. as it turned out, there was already too much ice for the aircraft to fly and it never gained more than a couple of hundred feet before the wings stalled and it fell into the potomac. this accident changed a lot of pilot decisions from that day forward. how much ice is too much ice for take off? ANY ICE IS TOO MUCH!! anyhoo... i thought the article was interesting and i liked the cultural differences discussed about the japanese in their indirect style... but there's no ABSOLUTE truth here about communication styles... and picking pilot / co-pilot conversations as a topic was a bit out of the norm because that's more like a military environment of superiors and subordinates that has to be imposed for safety and dependable results - it's not appropriate to transfer that to most situations in our lives. but the article brought up interesting things to ponder. in the navajo culture it is not uncommon for people to visit with each other and never speak for hours. it's not uncommon at home with kathleen and mice elf either. enjoying each other's company and communication does not necessarily REQUIRE conversation. the next class you teach should be on body language <g> one caveat from experience though... to maintain a healthy relationship, NEVER let a misunderstanding, disagreement, or ill feelings go untended to. though it may not require a conversation, it ALWAYS requires communication and a fair resolution ASAP. JMHO -el sailor man