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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Harvey Allen who wrote (113654)9/1/2003 9:09:15 PM
From: Harvey Allen  Respond to of 281500
 
What they’re watching at the Pentagon

Looking back on America’s military defeat in Vietnam, the late CIA director William Colby concluded that the United States had fought the wrong kind of war.
Rather than using special forces and intelligence operations to combat a shadowy enemy, Colby argued, the US decided to wage “an American-style military war” with more than 500,000 troops whose job, as the conflict dragged on, increasingly became one of protecting themselves rather than securing the Vietnamese.
“American troops only rarely could find the enemy; since it proved almost impossible to fix him, fighting him generally consisted of fighting off attacks, not finishing him according to the best military tradition,” Colby wrote in his book, Lost Victory, published in 1989, seven years before his death. A far better strategy, he argued, would have concentrated on providing security to Vietnamese villages through aggressive “pacification” operations such as the controversial Phoenix program that Colby ran from 1968-1971.
Colby’s critique is worth reviewing now, at a time when many analysts are urging President George W. Bush to send more troops to Iraq. The latest call comes from Senator John McCain. “We need a lot more military, and I’m convinced we need to spend a lot more money,” the Arizona Republican said after visiting Iraq.
Sending more troops always sounds like the right answer when the going gets tough on the battlefield. But as Vietnam showed, deploying a bigger, heavier force isn’t necessarily a wise choice. The large US garrison, with all its logistical needs, may simply reinforce the impression that it’s America’s war – making the enemy more aggressive, our local allies more passive and US troops more vulnerable.
One former senior Pentagon official from the Vietnam era offers a pithy, five-word response to the argument that sending more troops will solve America’s problems in Iraq: “Cam Ranh Bay Umpires Association.” The US troop presence in Vietnam grew so large, he recalls, that there was a demand for sports at the huge US base at Cam Ranh Bay; with so many players, they needed umpires, and with so many umpires, they needed an umpires association. But none of that translated into victory.
So far, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has resisted calls for sending more troops to Iraq. Instead, with typical Rumsfeldian enthusiasm for “transforming” the Pentagon establishment, he is reportedly seeking new ways to boost military power without hiring more soldiers. Rumsfeld’s theme is that “overwhelming force” isn’t necessary if the United States uses new technology to achieve “overmatching power,” according to a recent article in the New York Times.
But for all his skepticism about conventional answers, Rumsfeld may be guilty of his own version of “overmilitarization” in Iraq. He failed to anticipate the postwar challenges – especially the need to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and police. He focused instead on the American military occupation, which increasingly became a target for a small but ruthless resistance.
Robert Andrews, a Green Beret in Vietnam who served as head of special operations in Rumsfeld’s Pentagon until last year, argues that the Afghanistan war demonstrated that light, fast-moving special forces working with local allies can be far more effective against a terrorist enemy than conventional troops.
“We may be able to provide better security to Iraqis with a mobile strike force of several brigades of conventional forces based in garrisons away from the population centers,” Andrews says. “These brigades would work with Special Forces teams and their Iraqi allies in the cities.” Andrews argues that if Iraq is becoming a war of counterinsurgency, the United States must make sensible decisions about strategy and troop levels. Bad news certainly shouldn’t stampede America into pulling out. But it shouldn’t mean an automatic decision to send more troops to implement a flawed strategy.
Pentagon sources report one hopeful sign that the military is thinking creatively and unconventionally about Iraq. On Aug. 27, the Pentagon’s special operations chiefs scheduled a showing in the US Army auditorium of The Battle of Algiers, a classic film that examines how the French, despite their overwhelming military superiority, were defeated by Algerian resistance fighters.
A Pentagon flier announcing the film puts it in eerie perspective: “How to win a battle against terrorism and lose the war of ideas … Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range. Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire Arab population builds to a mad fervor. Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To understand why, come to a rare showing of this film.”
The Iraq debate should be about strategy, not a numbers game. America’s job is to give Iraqis the tools to create a modern, secure country – and then get out. The right force is the one that will accomplish this mission.

David Ignatius is a Paris-based syndicated columnist

dailystar.com.lb



To: Harvey Allen who wrote (113654)9/1/2003 10:09:24 PM
From: Harvey Allen  Respond to of 281500
 
Iraq enters a tense new phase

US administrator to meet with military chiefs to reassess strategy this week.

By Scott Peterson | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

NAJAF AND BAGHDAD, IRAQ – The three-day funeral for one of Iraq's most venerated Shiite Muslim clerics comes to a climax today in the holy city of Najaf. But even before the sea of tearful mourners ebbs, Iraqi leaders and US administrators face a critical juncture in their nation-building strategy.
For Iraqis, more than the UN headquarters bombing the previous week, the powerful blast that killed Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim and some 80others last Friday shattered any sense of progress toward stability.

It deepened cleavages between factions of the Muslim Shiite majority as well as the Sunni minority, confirmed a pattern of car bombings, and underscored the challenges still preventing the US from instilling peace.

"Somebody seems to be pushing all the right buttons to wreck the American political strategy," says Tim Ripley at the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Britain's Lancaster University. "This doesn't seem like postwar chaos; it's someone reading the agenda [who] wants to derail it."

The chief US administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer, is to meet with US military chiefs in Baghdad this week to reassess American security plans. Options under consideration range from more US troops, a UN deal for more international soldiers, or the creation of Iraqi paramilitary forces. But analysts say it's not clear that either the American and Iraqi publics will wait for these options to come to fruition.

In Najaf, because of the bombing, US Marines are delaying the handover of control of this area of southern Iraq to a Polish-led international force that was supposed to take place tomorrow.

Shiite confusion

Tens of thousands of Shiite mourners, escorted by armed guards, wailed and beat their chests as they marched south from Baghdad Sunday toward Najaf with Hakim's casket. The mourners gave voice to the crosscurrents of strategic options and emotions. Some called for a stronger US presence to go after loyalists of Saddam Hussein's regime - widely believed responsible for Friday's blast - while others claimed that only Mr. Hussein's iron hand could reestablish order.

Also of concern to many Shiites here is the possible role of Sunni militants from outside Iraq (reported to be arriving in increasing numbers) bent on destabilizing the US occupation. The FBI team investigating the UN blast is looking at possible links between the two bombings.

Special project



Few Iraqis blamed their fellow Shiites of a rival faction led by Moqtada al-Sadr, which has vociferously opposed the US presence in Iraq, saying that no Shiite would ever bomb the Imam Ali Mosque, the holiest Shiite shrine.

Public confusion over the proper response grew yesterday when the Arabic television station Al Jazeera broadcast an audiotape, purporting to be from Hussein, in which the fugitive dictator denied responsibility for the blast.

"They rushed to accuse before investigating," said the voice on the tape. "They did that to divert attention from the real culprits."

While many Shiite leaders called for calm and unity, they also blamed American forces for not doing enough to secure Iraq and its holy sites - or to let Iraqis secure themselves.

"[The bombers] are dividing all the Iraqi people," said Mohamed Kadhim, a driver who favors a tougher US response, as he sank into the flag-waving mourners. "They want us to kill each other - but we know that. We will catch all the bad people. We ask the Americans to let us have our arms and do all that is good."

Hakim's brother Abdulaziz, a member of the US-appointed Iraq Governing Council, said America should "reconsider its policy," after ignoring Shiite warnings about instability inspired by the former regime.

Cooperative cleric

The death of Hakim was a particular loss for the US. Despite 23 years living in exile in Iran, the black-turbaned cleric had reluctantly agreed to cooperate with American plans for governing Iraq - if only to bring a swifter end to the US occupation.

He also was a tenuous but important link between Washington and Tehran, at a difficult juncture in US-Iran relations.

"Let's agree that we'll not stop, that we'll stay united and follow our way," Mr. Abdulaziz told the crowds at the launch of the funeral procession. "We will follow Hakim's ideas: unity in Iraq between Shiite, Sunnis, and Kurds; or a democratic country without dictatorship; and a country not under occupation."

But there was a less magnanimous view on the street, where fist-waving mourners called for revenge. Among the mosaic of black mourning banners was a red one, that read: "We will not stop until we get revenge."

"It's clearly a wake-up call, and the impact [of the blast] will be severe, but it need not be fatal. It has really sent us back to the drawing board," says Phebe Marr, author of the book, "The Modern History of Iraq," and a former US government analyst. "Iraq could become a failed state if there isn't enough security. And nothing attracts terrorists as much as a failed state. We have to keep our eye on the nation-building project."

But that is proving harder to do, as fears re-emerge of sectarian divisions between rival Shiite groups, and the minority Sunnis, from which Iraq's leadership has been drawn for more than 80 years. Though spared the blood bath that some analysts predicted would follow in the wake of the US invasion last spring, Iraqis are now growing fearful.

"Someone is trying to cause Sunni-Shiite trouble. Otherwise, why would you kill a Muslim sheikh? He is not colonizing us," says Maktouf Aurabi, a Sunni cleric south of Baghdad, referring to the Americans.

"We pray to God to keep things quiet between Sunni and Shiite, and pray to God to find the truth, and know the Sunnis did not do it," Mr. Aurabi says. "The Americans are always in control, but Iraq is a very big country. Saddam himself could not control all of it."

Keeping control is what the game will be about. Hakim and his Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) has been locked in a struggle for influence with Mr. Sadr's violent "Sadriyyin" faction.

Some argue that Sadr's followers were responsible for a bomb attack on Hakim's uncle at his home just days before the mosque explosion. His group are also widely believed to have been behind the death of another exiled Shiite leader, who was stabbed to death at the Imam Ali mosque shortly after the US invasion.

A turning point?

All the violence has the Shiites in the south - and Iraqis throughout the country - concerned that US forces may be unable to regain control.

"I'm not ready to say this is a turning point, but the whole process of our [US] presence in Iraq has lost its virginity," says Youssef Ibrahim, a former fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York, and now head of the Strategic Energy Investment Group.

"There was a destructive war against Iraq, and now a war against the Americans, and this is not going to go away," Mr. Ibrahim says. "The only way to stop the cycle is to end the American face of occupation. Every day we stay in Iraq, it more and more takes on the flavor of a quagmire."

But while US strategists may be taking new measure after nearly five months of occupation, for Iraqis affected by the violence, their suffering is only an extension of the war. Peace is a word they have yet to experience.

Jabar Kadhim Faisal al-Amiri was a father of six from the holy city of Karbala who had taken his children to pray at the Najaf shrine on Friday. Outside the morgue at the main hospital in Najaf - where the corpses of victims covered the floors, hallways, and parking lot over the weekend, waiting to be identified - his brother tells the story.

Inside the mosque that day, Mr. Amiri had bought sweets for three of the children, but the three others complained that they had none.

"He went for the sweets. He was gone. And then there was the blast," says brother Mohamed Kadhim. Under a bloodied aquamarine sheet in the parking lot, he found his brother - and drew a quick breath in shock, that cut off a wail.

Amiri was one of those now known as the "Friday Martyrs."

"What are his children going to do with their father gone?" Mr. Kadhim asks quietly.

csmonitor.com