Good analysis from Gates.
AT WAR - How Not to Reform Intelligence
Amid some good ideas, an awful one.
BY ROBERT M. GATES
Wednesday, September 3, 2003 12:01 a.m.
With Congress reconvening after summer recess and the presidential campaign heating up, we can expect another round of proposals to reorganize U.S. intelligence agencies as a way to enhance our war on terrorism. The newest round of ideas will draw heavily on the conclusions and recommendations of a report on the actions of the CIA and FBI prior to Sept. 11.
Submitted by the two congressional intelligence oversight committees in late July, the recommendations cover breaking down barriers among agencies, improving the flow of terrorist-related intelligence information between law-enforcement and intelligence organizations, improved coordination and integration of terrorist watch-lists, accountability, and improved Congressional oversight. They deserve serious consideration and, in some cases, prompt action.
There is, however, at least one really bad idea in the report: reviving the old standby suggestion of creating a director of National Intelligence. This would establish a position independent of any particular agency, and with the authority to manage all U.S. foreign-intelligence agencies. On the surface the approach may look logical, but the reality in Washington would be a far different scenario.
Currently, the director of Central Intelligence oversees a dozen or so intelligence agencies. By law, he establishes overall intelligence priorities for those agencies and prepares their budgets as part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. He actually "controls" only the CIA, however; with respect to the others (such as the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office), he cannot appoint their leadership, control their day-to-day operations and activities, direct changes in internal organization or structure, or influence the career services of the employees.
While the director is held accountable for the performance of these agencies and for their expenditures, he has no authority actually to manage those agencies. It is this that the Congress wishes to change. The Scowcroft Commission, addressing intelligence structure last year, came to essentially the same conclusion.
The rub is the reality of Washington bureaucratic and political life. The only way a director of National Intelligence--or whatever the intelligence czar might be called--can exercise real authority over all U.S. foreign intelligence agencies and make the changes the Congress and others urge is if he really controls their money and appoints their leadership. Historically, 85% of National Foreign Intelligence Program dollars have been spent by the Department of Defense, which runs all of the really big intelligence organizations except the CIA. It's hard to imagine there's any chance a secretary of defense--particularly this one--would willingly give up control of a number of large organizations or their multibillion-dollar budgets. Without that control, the position would be little more than expensive window dressing.
A second problem with the recent proposals for an intelligence czar is that, in nearly all recommendations, the czar would no longer serve as director of the CIA. In other words, the new position would have no bureaucratic base in Washington--no troops. This, too, in the real world, is a fatal weakness.
There are, however, ways to strengthen the director of Central Intelligence within the current structure that would make a real difference in his ability to manage and bring together the intelligence agencies--to forge the kind of integrated approach all agree is desirable. Congress should give the director permanent and unrestricted authority to move money and positions among U.S. foreign-intelligence agencies. The budget process would afford ample opportunity for the Congress to ensure accountability. Improved performance would be the test within the executive branch.
For organizations other than the CIA principally funded through the NFIP--NSA and so forth--the appropriate cabinet secretary should nominate the directors of those organizations to the director of Central Intelligence, who would make the actual appointment. Their leaders would be his appointees, and understand to whom they report on foreign intelligence matters. These and other measures could significantly strengthen the position that currently exists.
At this point in our history and the war on terrorism, it would be a mistake to gamble on a new structure for managing foreign intelligence, especially when that approach is fatally flawed--as demonstrated vividly over a number of years by the limited power and effectiveness of the "drug czar" at the White House. Much of the congressional report is on the mark, as are many of its recommendations. Creating an intelligence czar is not.
A final suggestion for reform: Eliminate committee term-limits for members of Congress who sit on the intelligence oversight committees. Intelligence is a complicated and difficult business. By the time a senator or representative gains a good understanding of that business and can ask informed and insightful questions, he must rotate off the committee. This is an area where the member--not staff--needs the expertise.
A great deal has changed in the intelligence community and in relationships among agencies since Sept. 11--including between the CIA and the FBI. Major structural change already has taken place, most notably the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. While, as the congressional report makes clear, further changes in U.S. foreign intelligence are undoubtedly needed, they are needed in the way day-to-day coordination, cooperation and integrated activities are carried out. The way we do foreign intelligence should not be fodder for political campaigns.
Mr. Gates, a career intelligence officer, served as deputy director of Central Intelligence under President Reagan and as director under President George H.W. Bush. He is now president of Texas A&M University.
opinionjournal.com |
